Quote:
Originally Posted by
MJ1970 
The Government Can Use GPS to Track Your Moves:
Now I don't doubt this is true, I will say that the the reasoning that says "you do not have any reasonable expectation of privacy in your own driveway" (or any other publicly visible space) and therefore you don't have a reasonable expectation that someone, especially the government isn't going to
trespass onto your private property (driveway) and attach something to to you private property (car) without your knowledge or permission seems a rather large legal leap.
But, alas:
Hurray for Time:
But the
rich will be ok:
There
is hope though:
Of course it will. Let's hope SCOTUS doesn't fuck this one up.
Original Decision
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastor...1/08-30385.pdf
Denial of Rehearing en banc:
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastor...2/08-30385.pdf
Chief Judge KOZINSKI, with whom Judges REINHARDT, WARDLAW, PAEZ and BERZON join, dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc:
Whether some portion of propertythe porch, the stairs, the shed, the yard, the chicken coopis part of the curtilage is sometimes a disputed question. But once it is determined that something is part of the curtilage, its entitled to precisely the same Fourth Amendment protections as the home itself. How do we know? Because the Supreme Court has said so repeatedly.
In Oliver v. United States, the Court said as follows:
[O]nly the curtilage . . . warrants the Fourth Amend- ment protections that attach to the home. At common law, the curtilage is the area to which extends the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a mans home and the privacies of life, and therefore has been considered part of home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes. Thus, courts have extended Fourth Amendment protection to the curtilage. 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)) (emphasis added). Three years later, the Court reiterated the same view in United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987):
[In Oliver] we recognized that the Fourth Amend- ment protects the curtilage of a house and that the extent of the curtilage is determined by factors that bear upon whether an individual reasonably may expect that the area in question should be treated as the home itself.
While it can be unclear whether a particular portion of the homeowners property is part of the curtilage, theres no doubt here because the government concedes that Pineda- Morenos driveway is a part of his curtilage, and the panel expressly assumes that it is. United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1214-15 (9th Cir. 2010). Having made that assumption, Oliver and Dunn require the panel to treat[ ] [it] as the home itself. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 300. Instead, the panel holds that Pineda-Moreno was required to separately establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the curtilage. That according to Oliver and Dunnis like requiring the home- owner to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in his bedroom. We are often reminded that we must follow Supreme Court precedent, see, e.g., Winn v. Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org., 586 F.3d 649, 658-59 (9th Cir. 2009) (OScannlain, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc), but the panel here forgets this advice.
These decisions have curtailed the right of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures not only in our homes and surrounding curtilage, but also in our vehicles, computers, telephones, and bodies all the way down to our bodily fluids and DNA.
Todays decision is but one more step down the gloomy path the current Judiciary has chosen to follow with regard to the liberties protected by the Fourth Amendment. Sadly, I pre- dict that there will be many more such decisions to come.
I dissent.
Don't you know? Chief executives are only responsible when they're Democrat!
