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Originally Posted by
lfmorrison 
Please quote the exact terms under which those F/RAND licenses are granted, and provide evidence that those license terms do not include any reciprocal or retaliatory clauses.
Try this:
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An IPR holder that commits to license its patents on F/RAND terms and conditions has irrevocably committed to allow the standard to be implemented under its IPR on a F/RAND basis and thereby waived the right to exclude others from practicing the standard under its IPR. An IPR holder that commits to license its patents on F/RAND terms and conditions cannot use its hold-up power resulting from the incorporation of its technology into the standard to demand royalties that do not comply with F/RAND.
Once an IPR holder has made a F/RAND commitment, all designers have the right to implement the standard in their products and use the inventions from any declared essential IPRs, and there is no need to wait until all the particular F/RAND terms and conditions have been negotiated with the IPR holder or until a definitive license agreement is executed setting out those terms.
If you review the wording of any of the standards bodies in which Samsung participates with their IPR, you will fiind these same standards in place. I invite you to do your own homework and not demand that others perform the due diligence you seem to lack.
The problem for Samsung is that they are attempting to patent ambush Apple in order to get enough dust in the air to force a rescinding of Apple's charges of unfair design infringment against Samsung. This is one of the reasons Apple holds such a large war chest - undoubtably they looked over the telecommunications IPR/licensing situation and acknowledged that there were positions that would allow abuse by standards-based IPR holders in order to create anti-competitive situations where they would try to leverage additional licensing royalites beyond F/RAND.
In the case where a company like Apple that was highly successful in producing competing products, could be sued to leverage additional, heavier, royalties to mitigate that success. It is anti-competitive in that they chose to leverage participation in standards organizations in order to drive use of their licenses and generate royalties, but now do not want to follow the limitations set and demand higher payments or double-up payments by both the company producing the technology under the license, and the company using the licensed technology - "double-dipping" if you will.
The down side to this also contains an upside - as litigation points out some of the holes in standards policy for F/RAND, these cases will cause standards bodies to clarify the terms of standards participation and close the gaps which allow anti-competitive licensing behaviors. Keep in mind also that it is the chipset manufacturers that are responsible to pay royalties for using the standards technology in question, not the device manufacturer using the chipset. Nokia tried to leverage additional licensing fees from Apple in order to slow-down Apple development and to derive additional revenue from their licenses - Apple refused to pay the licensing, showing that the chipset manufacturer had already paid the licenses (and that cost was incorporated into the cost of the chipset as well) and that the terms of use by the standards organization did not include charging licensing to device manufacturers using that chipset. The settlement between Nokia and Apple demonstrated that Nokia knew they could not successfully litigate the additional charges and thus the one-time settlement payment from Apple instead of ongoing license payments in the final settlement.
Samsung is trying the same approach to force Apple to back down on their suits against Samsung, and is trying to spread it wide enough to have a significant financial impact to Apple. Unfortunately Apple has a very large war chest, and if their technology development plans involve further expansion into mobile technologies (and I believe they have demonstrated that conclusively) then they have a vested and determined interest in successfully litigating adherence to F/RAND policies by companies licensing technologies as a part of standards. I mentioned this previously, but it bears repeating: standards policies specify use of the IPR in the manufacturing of technology - like Qualcomm's Snapdragon chipsets for example. That is where the license fees are applied, not in the eventual use of that chipset in other devices. Since the cost of the licensed IPR is already incorporated into the price of the chipset as sold to device makers, standards IPR holders are not allowed under policy to demand further licensing from downstream device makers - which is what Samsung is (like Nokia) trying to do.