Have I understood this correctly:
If that is correct, then part of the problem seems to be that there is no standard definition of a FRAND agreement, so individual courts, anywhere, are free to interpret it how they see fit and according to local precedent, if such exists. I could argue this either way. It is clearly a technical loss for Apple. Maybe Motorola are using it as leverage to get Apple to withdraw their patent challenge, at which point they might accept FRAND rates retrospectively. In this jurisdiction, it looks as if Apple need to decide if they want to gamble on saving paying FRAND rates with a potential for a rather larger bill if they lose.
Apple offered to pay FRAND rates, but reserved the right to challenge (presumably a challenge would be invalidated if they paid without reserving that right?), at which point Motorola declined to accept FRAND rates. Apple used the technology anyway, on the basis that they had offered and would pay whenever the offer was accepted.
Now Motorola wants non-FRAND rates for the period of use to date and the German court has agreed that they can demand more than FRAND because they believe that Apple lost the right to FRAND when they declared their intention to challenge the patents.
It is not just a loss for Apple but for the whole FRAND pooled patents that standards systems are based on.
Hence, expect the EU to step in based on the anti-competitive nature of this behaviour, i.e. preventing competitors from complying with standards.