Originally Posted by SDW2001
I'm sorry, but you simply have no idea
what you're talking about. Our air power is overwhelming. And Serb "armor and troops" did not "survive" anything. The political objective
took that long to accomplish. It was also a much
different tactical situation. We were going for troop positions, not the military-industrial complex.
Laying waste to 80% of Iranian industry in two days sounds plausible, because it doesn't hide or move, and US air power is massive indeed.
But when you say 80% of military capacity, that means Iran in smoking ruins and in total military defeat. Going after the troops on the ground, equipment stockpiles, everything.
No matter what, it is unrealistic.
I have worked in casualty simulation and estimation for large troop concentrations. And before that, been trained for a frontline command job with a strong focus on practical countermeasures to constant enemy air superiority and EW superiority.
Trust me: unless you have a military background, and not just any kind, you do not have a feel for how this really works.
Now, perhaps I went over the top with the 100,000 figure. I'll give you that. That's probably considerably out of line now that I think about it. But the figure about 80% of their military resources is likely not that far off. Consider for a moment that in Operation Iraqi Freedom, we launched 750 cruise missiles in a matter of days. We flew something like 2,000 sorties per day according to the records I can find. We used 1,800 aircraft. We had 3,000 hard targets. And that was the scaled back version. Originally we planned for 6,000 targets.
Consider what that means. The above represented about 50-60% of our capacity to attack, probably less. We used five carrier battle groups and assorted other vessels. One would assume we'd use up to six for Iran and probably have at least 6,000-8.000 targets, as Iran's military is stronger and larger than Iraq's was. One could also assume we'd launch at least 1,000 cruise missiles.
There were in excess of 10,000 strikes
against targets in Yugoslavia, 40,000 total sorties in the region. Yet the Serb troops were not disabled, and bombing infrastructure chosen to put pressure on politicians was the deciding factor.
Only a small amount of US air power is able to enter Iranian air defense with relative safety, so if Iran can conserve its defense and not allow it to be wiped out - the Serb succeeded in this - either US takes casualties or it can only use a part of its power. This puts a multiplier on the life of the targets.
Dispersing everything, digging in everything and everyone, rotating positions, decoys and fakes (a $500 box of electronics can look remarkably like an anti-air radar to a $200,000 radar-seeking missile, etc) - all of these are additional multipliers.
The maintenance, fuel, bombs needed for the air campaign is phenomenal. To a state fighting on its own soil, blood is often cheap and supplies are already buried where they want them.
If Iran doesn't roll over in response to its infrastructure being demolished, there's only bad choices left for the US. Not that I think the choices leading up to that point would have been any good.