War College Senior Strategist: "-[I]take a guess[/I]-"
A senior strategist for the War College (my father spent years at the War College) is critical of the handling of the war:
ARTICLE
From the article:
IMO, they may not have actually wanted democracy installed, sure they wanted things to be smoother, but, it isin our interests to have a reason to maintain a sizeable military presence in the ME . . . . at least that is what the famous Pax Americana document talls us is good . . .
Hmmm?!
But this is the kicker:
Which brings up the specific question (and keeps this in posting guidlines) what would need to be recognized as the over-all concern if you could take command?
ARTICLE
From the article:
Quote:
While the United States easily won the initial battles that toppled Saddam Hussein a year ago, the administration "either misunderstood or, worse, wished away" the difficulties of transforming that victory into the larger political goal, Army Lt. Col. Antulio J. Echevarria of the U.S. Army War College writes
While the United States easily won the initial battles that toppled Saddam Hussein a year ago, the administration "either misunderstood or, worse, wished away" the difficulties of transforming that victory into the larger political goal, Army Lt. Col. Antulio J. Echevarria of the U.S. Army War College writes
IMO, they may not have actually wanted democracy installed, sure they wanted things to be smoother, but, it isin our interests to have a reason to maintain a sizeable military presence in the ME . . . . at least that is what the famous Pax Americana document talls us is good . . .
Quote:
Echevarria said the reaction to his paper from within the Army "has been pretty positive."
Echevarria said the reaction to his paper from within the Army "has been pretty positive."
Hmmm?!
Quote:
Historically, the American military has tended to "shy away" from the difficult process of turning military battlefield triumphs into strategic successes, he writes in his paper.
His words reflect the work of the late Army combat officer and strategist Harry Summers Jr., who bitterly observed to a North Vietnamese officer after the Vietnam War that "you never defeated us on the battlefield." That is so, the North Vietnamese replied, "but it is also irrelevant."
As they struggled to understand the lessons of Vietnam, Summers and others came to recognize that the concentration on individual battles neglected the building and defending of a progressive democratic government in South Vietnam.
In both Afghanistan and Iraq, Echevarria writes, the American effort has mistakenly "placed more emphasis on destroying enemy forces than securing population centers and critical infrastructure and maintaining order."
During planning for Iraq, he writes, "senior military officials argued that, while a small coalition force moving rapidly and supported by adequate firepower might well defeat the Iraqi army, a larger force would still be necessary for the ensuing stability operations." Yet Rumsfeld and other senior administration officials "dismissed such arguments as old-think or perceived them as foot-dragging by a military perhaps grown too accustomed to resisting civilian authority."
Historically, the American military has tended to "shy away" from the difficult process of turning military battlefield triumphs into strategic successes, he writes in his paper.
His words reflect the work of the late Army combat officer and strategist Harry Summers Jr., who bitterly observed to a North Vietnamese officer after the Vietnam War that "you never defeated us on the battlefield." That is so, the North Vietnamese replied, "but it is also irrelevant."
As they struggled to understand the lessons of Vietnam, Summers and others came to recognize that the concentration on individual battles neglected the building and defending of a progressive democratic government in South Vietnam.
In both Afghanistan and Iraq, Echevarria writes, the American effort has mistakenly "placed more emphasis on destroying enemy forces than securing population centers and critical infrastructure and maintaining order."
During planning for Iraq, he writes, "senior military officials argued that, while a small coalition force moving rapidly and supported by adequate firepower might well defeat the Iraqi army, a larger force would still be necessary for the ensuing stability operations." Yet Rumsfeld and other senior administration officials "dismissed such arguments as old-think or perceived them as foot-dragging by a military perhaps grown too accustomed to resisting civilian authority."
But this is the kicker:
Quote:
"But once you understand that the political objectives are supreme, you understand that you have to broaden the political coalition internationally, regionally and locally" to support nation-building in Iraq, he said.
"That's hard to do, and even harder if you have to swallow your pride,"
"But once you understand that the political objectives are supreme, you understand that you have to broaden the political coalition internationally, regionally and locally" to support nation-building in Iraq, he said.
"That's hard to do, and even harder if you have to swallow your pride,"
Which brings up the specific question (and keeps this in posting guidlines) what would need to be recognized as the over-all concern if you could take command?
Comments
Bringing peace is much more difficult than winning a war.