If I hadn't signed up to followup, I probably would have echoed @gazoobee's sentiments. Based upon your response, I was preparing to commit to the reseller package but I feel you missed the mark.
I appreciate that you came here to comment. I also appreciate the spirit of what you are aspiring to do with the Canary. I've built a frankenstein-eque capability like this for my home building upon skills I picked up working with embedded sensors in the military. I genuinely want to get behind this product.
But you didn't address the concern that the collected data MUST exist in the cloud. My concern isn't whether it is stored long term, the NSA will handle that. My concern is that it exists anywhere outside of my home. Nothing you say or do will move me past the belief that the data can and will eventually be breached. Too many secure systems have already been. There is no need for the video data to be outbound anywhere other than my mobile device. I would give that up if it meant I got alerts, notifications, and metadata from the sensors rather than there being any remote access to what I do inside my private residence.
If you mentioned support for cutting that comm path to your cloud for video I'd jump in and champion the idea (what little that matters). I'll manage security of the data locally, to include placement such that this ninja burglar threat model I've seen presented could be mitigated.
Care to further address the stance on this? It's either built for folks like me or it isn't. No hard feelings. I just want to know before I spend $5000 and look for 20+ people who might have the same concern.
Thank you for coming on here to respond to posts. What about my statement about how keys are handled? Are those only under the control of the user and not stored in "the cloud" as well (obviously unless I choose to do so)? It's great that the content is encrypted when uploaded to your storage, but if the keys are not totally under my control and are stored on your servers that provides no guarantee, other than one's word (which can always be changed through a TOS update), that what is uploaded can not then be subsequently decrypted (whether by breach, malicious employee or a law enforcement request) because your company also has access to the keys.
In the end anything with a network connection running software/firmware that is not open source could potentially contain backdoors. What is the difference between the NSA asking Indigo to hand over stored data and the keys or if the NSA asks Indigo to build a backdoor into their firmware?
The difference is likely that even the NSA will go after the easy and large-userbase targets first. And that hiding a full backdoor in software might not be as easy a simply siphoning off encryption keys. In particular if you want to sell to banks or defence contractors, they might have a good look at what devices do, monitoring traffic etc. and thus making it harder to put a backdoor in.
And I don't think the NSA is that comprehensive yet that it requires every networkable device to have a backdoor in it, yet.
I use two companies for my home security in a weekend home. [URL=http://simplysafesecurity.com]Simply Safe[/URL] for door and window sensors and the like. The different sensors are a la carte and fairly inexpensive. I chose not to have it monitored. So far I have been happy with it. My only complaint is that it doesn't have any kind of iOS monitoring solution. I'd love to know when the alarm is going off and be able to enable/disable remotely.
The second company I use is [URL=https://www.dropcam.com]Dropcam[/URL]. My weekend place is pretty small so I have only one. It too has a subscription service to keep 7 days of video in the cloud, which I pay $9.99/mo. The iOS integration is great. Alerts for motion and sound sensing. Auto enable/disable when I arrive/leave. Two way audio, 720p video, night vision. (I don't work for the company, I've just been very happy with it.)
Both solutions I use only when I'm not in the house, so I don't have much concern with anyone hacking into my camera and seeing what's going on.
I was all excited -- then I read Gazoobee's comment. I really don't want someone at a commercial company seeing what's going on in my living room. If it went straight to my iDevice I might accept that but even then how is the message protected? I don't think MMS uses any sort of encryption. And worst of all, why shuold I have to buy hardware at all? Doesn't the iPhone and iPod touch have a camera? I should be able to buy a $0.99 piece of software for my iPod touch which could sit in my house and have alerts and/or pictures emailed directly to me. I think I would pay up to $20 to pay for software that ran on my iDevice that protected my home and my privacy, but this solution scares me. I want both security and privacy. And I don't want to buy a piece of hardware if I already own perfectly functional hardware. Do I have to write the software myself? Any software developers out there? Hello?
yes it is workable but do you want your IOS device sitting there recording and set for them to steal thing immediately and in most cases delete the footage
In the end anything with a network connection running software/firmware that is not open source could potentially contain backdoors. What is the difference between the NSA asking Indigo to hand over stored data and the keys or if the NSA asks Indigo to build a backdoor into their firmware?
The difference is likely that even the NSA will go after the easy and large-userbase targets first. And that hiding a full backdoor in software might not be as easy a simply siphoning off encryption keys. In particular if you want to sell to banks or defence contractors, they might have a good look at what devices do, monitoring traffic etc. and thus making it harder to put a backdoor in.
And I don't think the NSA is that comprehensive yet that it requires every networkable device to have a backdoor in it, yet.
The point isn't just the NSA. If they hold the keys all it takes is a malicious employee or a security breach for someone to grab those keys and your encrypted footage is now no longer secure.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Curtis Hannah
some other things don't harm on certain size animals (smaller less problems).
yes it is workable but do you want your IOS device sitting there recording and set for them to steal thing immediately and in most cases delete the footage
False dilemma. Not wanting your footage stored somewhere that you don't control is not the same as wanting no secure backups.
The problem with today's home network services comes from the fact that internet service providers do not hand out DNS names for the external IP addresses associated with our home networks, so we cannot easily remotely connect to services sitting on the internal home networks. Further, without the ability to punch holes in home routers to allow external access to particular services.
The solution seems to be home devices are logged in to vendors' servers and remote users must communicate via the vendor servers. That is a big problem.
It seems evident to me that there are a few critical misunderstandings here. I'm going to separate the matter to make things more explicit. The lack of a response from Adam Sager was sufficient for my concerns. I won't purchase this product. But for clarity's sake:
One issue would be the use of accounts and credentials in connection with the device and a service. This is not really my concern. I am comfortable maintaining an account with Canary as a user of their product and/or services.
Another issue is the transmission of video data from my private residence to Canary's remote servers. This is not necessary for functioning of the device, nor is it preferable. A Canary cam that captures and stores locally is plenty sufficient to address quite a large portion of the problem set defined by Canary.
From the Canary copy:
Quote:
Security means different things to different people. So we didn’t design a rigid one-solution-fits-everyone product. Instead, we fitted our device with the core features you want and put the power in your hands to decide when and how you use Canary.
I expect a solution that is NOT rigid AND puts the power in my hands to decide HOW I use Canary would be one that does not REQUIRE video streams of my home to be uploaded to a remote server. My desire for a smart, innovative home security solution is not an invitation to a company to observe my private behaviors. This is a tremendous aspect to the HOW I use a recording device. As it stands, I have no say over how it is used. I have a say over how I respond to the information it produces. That's not the same. That's a rigid one-solution-fits-everyone product.
While the Canary team cites statistics centered around false positives and break-ins, they are ignoring statistics of startups that unexpectedly shutter 9-18 months after startup. They are ignoring statistics of data integrity issues that could be mitigated by the data remaining local. There's no need to worry about a breach of a large target when none of your data exists there. And there's less reason for an individual to be a target.
Now, for the NSA. It was a joke. But to your question about the difference between a firmware backdoor and keys to stored data I reason it's tremendous. The NSA exploiting a backdoor in firmware requires one to exist. If it is there for the NSA and exploited by another individual, Canary is finished. So they would prefer the keys to stored data model, which is why I don't want them to have any stored data. They don't want the backdoor. I don't want to share video data.
The NSA, as far as sensationalized journalism would lead me to believe, doesn't require a backdoor. They require access to streams of data. If the data is encrypted, they break or decrypt with a private key. If the data is at rest on a personal system closed to the internet, they do not have access. Again, though, I'm not concerned about the NSA, I am concerned about a company that requires access to video of me in my home for any length of time. How much of my capped data plan with my ISP is that going to expend? What impact will that have on my household bandwidth? What serious benefit do I enjoy by sharing my video data with a third party?
Canary wants to position as simple and affordable. They look good doing it. But they come from military and banking backgrounds. The more serious the individual about security, the more likely they are to be aware of privacy considerations. Canary's success marketing a remote monitoring device presents an opportunity to a company that provides a comparable product that does not require the upload. The worst of it is Canary hasn't produced a viable unit. There's no certainty it will work as advertised. There's less certainty it will ship on schedule. The price is considerable for something that exists as a render and concept. To miss the mark with privacy isn't promising.
Nice home security product. Very handy to iphone users, hoping similar product will be available soon for android users. We android users have to use traditional home and hotel safes and alarm system.
Comments
If I hadn't signed up to followup, I probably would have echoed @gazoobee's sentiments. Based upon your response, I was preparing to commit to the reseller package but I feel you missed the mark.
I appreciate that you came here to comment. I also appreciate the spirit of what you are aspiring to do with the Canary. I've built a frankenstein-eque capability like this for my home building upon skills I picked up working with embedded sensors in the military. I genuinely want to get behind this product.
But you didn't address the concern that the collected data MUST exist in the cloud. My concern isn't whether it is stored long term, the NSA will handle that. My concern is that it exists anywhere outside of my home. Nothing you say or do will move me past the belief that the data can and will eventually be breached. Too many secure systems have already been. There is no need for the video data to be outbound anywhere other than my mobile device. I would give that up if it meant I got alerts, notifications, and metadata from the sensors rather than there being any remote access to what I do inside my private residence.
If you mentioned support for cutting that comm path to your cloud for video I'd jump in and champion the idea (what little that matters). I'll manage security of the data locally, to include placement such that this ninja burglar threat model I've seen presented could be mitigated.
Care to further address the stance on this? It's either built for folks like me or it isn't. No hard feelings. I just want to know before I spend $5000 and look for 20+ people who might have the same concern.
Quote:
Originally Posted by MikeJones
Thank you for coming on here to respond to posts. What about my statement about how keys are handled? Are those only under the control of the user and not stored in "the cloud" as well (obviously unless I choose to do so)? It's great that the content is encrypted when uploaded to your storage, but if the keys are not totally under my control and are stored on your servers that provides no guarantee, other than one's word (which can always be changed through a TOS update), that what is uploaded can not then be subsequently decrypted (whether by breach, malicious employee or a law enforcement request) because your company also has access to the keys.
In the end anything with a network connection running software/firmware that is not open source could potentially contain backdoors. What is the difference between the NSA asking Indigo to hand over stored data and the keys or if the NSA asks Indigo to build a backdoor into their firmware?
The difference is likely that even the NSA will go after the easy and large-userbase targets first. And that hiding a full backdoor in software might not be as easy a simply siphoning off encryption keys. In particular if you want to sell to banks or defence contractors, they might have a good look at what devices do, monitoring traffic etc. and thus making it harder to put a backdoor in.
And I don't think the NSA is that comprehensive yet that it requires every networkable device to have a backdoor in it, yet.
The second company I use is [URL=https://www.dropcam.com]Dropcam[/URL]. My weekend place is pretty small so I have only one. It too has a subscription service to keep 7 days of video in the cloud, which I pay $9.99/mo. The iOS integration is great. Alerts for motion and sound sensing. Auto enable/disable when I arrive/leave. Two way audio, 720p video, night vision. (I don't work for the company, I've just been very happy with it.)
Both solutions I use only when I'm not in the house, so I don't have much concern with anyone hacking into my camera and seeing what's going on.
yes it is workable but do you want your IOS device sitting there recording and set for them to steal thing immediately and in most cases delete the footage
Quote:
Originally Posted by noirdesir
In the end anything with a network connection running software/firmware that is not open source could potentially contain backdoors. What is the difference between the NSA asking Indigo to hand over stored data and the keys or if the NSA asks Indigo to build a backdoor into their firmware?
The difference is likely that even the NSA will go after the easy and large-userbase targets first. And that hiding a full backdoor in software might not be as easy a simply siphoning off encryption keys. In particular if you want to sell to banks or defence contractors, they might have a good look at what devices do, monitoring traffic etc. and thus making it harder to put a backdoor in.
And I don't think the NSA is that comprehensive yet that it requires every networkable device to have a backdoor in it, yet.
The point isn't just the NSA. If they hold the keys all it takes is a malicious employee or a security breach for someone to grab those keys and your encrypted footage is now no longer secure.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Curtis Hannah
some other things don't harm on certain size animals (smaller less problems).
yes it is workable but do you want your IOS device sitting there recording and set for them to steal thing immediately and in most cases delete the footage
False dilemma. Not wanting your footage stored somewhere that you don't control is not the same as wanting no secure backups.
The solution seems to be home devices are logged in to vendors' servers and remote users must communicate via the vendor servers. That is a big problem.
It seems evident to me that there are a few critical misunderstandings here. I'm going to separate the matter to make things more explicit. The lack of a response from Adam Sager was sufficient for my concerns. I won't purchase this product. But for clarity's sake:
One issue would be the use of accounts and credentials in connection with the device and a service. This is not really my concern. I am comfortable maintaining an account with Canary as a user of their product and/or services.
Another issue is the transmission of video data from my private residence to Canary's remote servers. This is not necessary for functioning of the device, nor is it preferable. A Canary cam that captures and stores locally is plenty sufficient to address quite a large portion of the problem set defined by Canary.
From the Canary copy:
Quote:
Security means different things to different people. So we didn’t design a rigid one-solution-fits-everyone product. Instead, we fitted our device with the core features you want and put the power in your hands to decide when and how you use Canary.
I expect a solution that is NOT rigid AND puts the power in my hands to decide HOW I use Canary would be one that does not REQUIRE video streams of my home to be uploaded to a remote server. My desire for a smart, innovative home security solution is not an invitation to a company to observe my private behaviors. This is a tremendous aspect to the HOW I use a recording device. As it stands, I have no say over how it is used. I have a say over how I respond to the information it produces. That's not the same. That's a rigid one-solution-fits-everyone product.
While the Canary team cites statistics centered around false positives and break-ins, they are ignoring statistics of startups that unexpectedly shutter 9-18 months after startup. They are ignoring statistics of data integrity issues that could be mitigated by the data remaining local. There's no need to worry about a breach of a large target when none of your data exists there. And there's less reason for an individual to be a target.
Now, for the NSA. It was a joke. But to your question about the difference between a firmware backdoor and keys to stored data I reason it's tremendous. The NSA exploiting a backdoor in firmware requires one to exist. If it is there for the NSA and exploited by another individual, Canary is finished. So they would prefer the keys to stored data model, which is why I don't want them to have any stored data. They don't want the backdoor. I don't want to share video data.
The NSA, as far as sensationalized journalism would lead me to believe, doesn't require a backdoor. They require access to streams of data. If the data is encrypted, they break or decrypt with a private key. If the data is at rest on a personal system closed to the internet, they do not have access. Again, though, I'm not concerned about the NSA, I am concerned about a company that requires access to video of me in my home for any length of time. How much of my capped data plan with my ISP is that going to expend? What impact will that have on my household bandwidth? What serious benefit do I enjoy by sharing my video data with a third party?
Canary wants to position as simple and affordable. They look good doing it. But they come from military and banking backgrounds. The more serious the individual about security, the more likely they are to be aware of privacy considerations. Canary's success marketing a remote monitoring device presents an opportunity to a company that provides a comparable product that does not require the upload. The worst of it is Canary hasn't produced a viable unit. There's no certainty it will work as advertised. There's less certainty it will ship on schedule. The price is considerable for something that exists as a render and concept. To miss the mark with privacy isn't promising.
Nice home security product. Very handy to iphone users, hoping similar product will be available soon for android users. We android users have to use traditional home and hotel safes and alarm system.