Apple will ask Congress for a 'thoughtful and honest consideration of the facts' in testimony on en

Posted:
in General Discussion edited February 2016
Apple's chief attorney, Bruce Sewell, will testify before the U.S. Congress on Tuesday, where he will argue that any decisions on mobile encryption should be decided by representatives of the people, not a warrant request based on a 220-year-old statute.




Sewell's prepared remarks were issued in full to members of the media on Tuesday, first published by Motherboard. In his testimony, Sewell will tell the House Judiciary Committee that secure encryption helps protect U.S. citizens from terrorists and thieves.
"The FBI is asking Apple to weaken the security of our products." - Apple general counsel Bruce Sewell
In his speech, Sewell will suggest that the legislators need to answer tough questions, such as whether the FBI should be allowed to stop Apple, or any company, from providing its users with the most secure encryption possible, and whether the FBI should have the right to compel a company to produce a product it doesn't already make.

"We believe that each of these questions deserves a healthy discussion, and any decision should be made after a thoughtful and honest consideration of the facts," the statement reads.

Sewell's comments will echo those said by Apple Chief Executive Tim Cook, who suggested that the U.S. government form a commission to discuss the implications of unlocking the iPhone used by one of the San Bernardino shooters.

"We feel the best way forward would be for the government to withdraw its demands under the All Writs Act and, as some in Congress have proposed, form a commission or other panel of experts on intelligence, technology and civil liberties to discuss the implications for law enforcement, national security, privacy and personal freedoms," Cook said.

Apple also plans to reiterate the company's belief that the FBI's request to unlock the iPhone 5c involved in the San Bernardino terrorist shooting is not a singular incident. Sewell will remind the committee that there are hundreds of other phones law enforcement officials would like to crack open to aid in their various investigations across the country.

"The FBI is asking Apple to weaken the security of our products," Sewell will state. "Hackers and cyber criminals could use this to wreak havoc on our privacy and personal safety. It would set a dangerous precedent for government intrusion on the privacy and safety of its citizens."




Sewell, an Apple senior vice president and the company's general counsel, is scheduled to take part in a hearing entitled "The Encryption Tightrope: Balancing Americans' Security and Privacy." The discussion will be held on Tuesday at 1 p.m. Eastern, 10 a.m. Pacific, and will be streamed live from the Judiciary Committee's website.

Joining Sewell as part of the second panel in the hearing will be Susan Landau, a professor at Worcester Polytechnic Institute, and Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., district attorney in New York County.

In fact, Sewell's opening statement will specifically refer to Vance, noting that he has said he would like to use a "backdoor" tool, if Apple were to create one, to access over 175 phones in his district alone.

A separate panel at Tuesday's hearing will have just one member: James Comey, director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The discussion on encryption and how it affects law enforcement boiled over two weeks ago, when a U.S. magistrate judge ordered Apple to comply with FBI requests to help extract data from an iPhone owned by one of the shooters involved in the December terrorist attack in San Bernardino, Calif. The device in question is a passcode-protected iPhone 5c that the FBI seeks to unlock.

Sewell's complete prepared statements to Congress are included below:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's my pleasure to appear before you and the Committee today on behalf of Apple. We appreciate your invitation and the opportunity to be part of the discussion on this important issue which centers on the civil liberties at the foundation of our country.

I want to repeat something we have said since the beginning -- that the victims and families of the San Bernardino attacks have our deepest sympathies and we strongly agree that justice should be served. Apple has no sympathy for terrorists.

We have the utmost respect for law enforcement and share their goal of creating a safer world. We have a team of dedicated professionals that are on call 24 hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a year to assist law enforcement. When the FBI came to us in the immediate aftermath of the San Bernardino attacks, we gave all the information we had related to their investigation. And we went beyond that by making Apple engineers available to advise them on a number of additional investigative options.

But we now find ourselves at the center of an extraordinary circumstance. The FBI has asked a Court to order us to give them something we don't have. To create an operating system that does not exist -- because it would be too dangerous. They are asking for a backdoor into the iPhone -- specifically to build a software tool that can break the encryption system which protects personal information on every iPhone.

As we have told them -- and as we have told the American public -- building that software tool would not affect just one iPhone. It would weaken the security for all of them. In fact, just last week Director Comey agreed that the FBI would likely use this precedent in other cases involving other phones. District Attorney Vance has also said he would absolutely plan to use this on over 175 phones. We can all agree this is not about access to just one iPhone.

The FBI is asking Apple to weaken the security of our products. Hackers and cyber criminals could use this to wreak havoc on our privacy and personal safety. It would set a dangerous precedent for government intrusion on the privacy and safety of its citizens.

Hundreds of millions of law-abiding people trust Apple's products with the most intimate details of their daily lives - photos, private conversations, health data, financial accounts, and information about the user's location as well as the location of their friends and families. Some of you might have an iPhone in your pocket right now, and if you think about it, there's probably more information stored on that iPhone than a thief could steal by breaking into your house. The only way we know to protect that data is through strong encryption.

Every day, over a trillion transactions occur safely over the Internet as a result of encrypted communications. These range from online banking and credit card transactions to the exchange of healthcare records, ideas that will change the world for the better, and communications between loved ones. The US government has spent tens of millions of dollars through the Open Technology Fund and other US government programs to fund strong encryption. The Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technology, convened by President Obama, urged the US government to fully support and not in any way subvert, undermine, weaken, or make vulnerable generally available commercial software.

Encryption is a good thing, a necessary thing. We have been using it in our products for over a decade. As attacks on our customers' data become increasingly sophisticated, the tools we use to defend against them must get stronger too. Weakening encryption will only hurt consumers and other well-meaning users who rely on companies like Apple to protect their personal information.

Today's hearing is titled Balancing Americans' Security and Privacy. We believe we can, and we must, have both. Protecting our data with encryption and other methods preserves our privacy and it keeps people safe.

The American people deserve an honest conversation around the important questions stemming from the FBI's current demand:

Do we want to put a limit on the technology that protects our data, and therefore our privacy and our safety, in the face of increasingly sophisticated cyber attacks? Should the FBI be allowed to stop Apple, or any company, from offering the American people the safest and most secure product it can make?

Should the FBI have the right to compel a company to produce a product it doesn't already make, to the FBI's exact specifications and for the FBI's use?

We believe that each of these questions deserves a healthy discussion, and any decision should be made after a thoughtful and honest consideration of the facts.

Most importantly, the decisions should be made by you and your colleagues as representatives of the people, rather than through a warrant request based on a 220 year- old-statute.

At Apple, we are ready to have this conversation. The feedback and support we're hearing indicate to us that the American people are ready, too.

We feel strongly that our customers, their families, their friends and their neighbors will be better protected from thieves and terrorists if we can offer the very best protections for their data. And at the same time, the freedoms and liberties we all cherish will be more secure.

Thank you for your time. I look forward to answering your questions.
jagnuthlee1169brakken
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Comments

  • Reply 1 of 27
    metrixmetrix Posts: 256member
    I think no one has a problem with the FBI seeking information with a warrant. I think if Apple creates a "key" then it should absolutely be compartmentalized (sp?) so that no single person can create the key but several people are needed to come up with the key. The FBI, CIA, NSA should NEVER have that key if no other reason than with so much power they have there has to be corruption. The same can be said for Apple too, they have a lot of power hopefully too do good. If the FBI really is really only seeking information on terrorist phones then getting the information should be enough but if the real reason is to have access to everyone's iPhone than they will come out with some new reason that "we need the keys!". 

    edited February 2016
  • Reply 2 of 27
    metrix: the FBI is also looking for (i.e. has warrants/orders for) about a dozen other iPhones. None of them, NOT ONE, involves "terrorism".

    Be clear - the FBI is NOT "only seeking information on terrorist phones". Not at all.
    edited February 2016 banchojagnuthlee1169jony0tdknoxbadmonk
  • Reply 3 of 27
    metrixmetrix Posts: 256member
    plovell said:
    metrix: the FBI is also looking for (i.e. has warrants/orders for) about a dozen other iPhones. None of them, NOT ONE, involves "terrorism".

    Be clear - the FBI is NOT "only seeking information on terrorist phones". Not at all.
    Yes of course, I was just addressing the current situation not wanting to be thorough and wordy. 
  • Reply 4 of 27
    mrshowmrshow Posts: 164member
    Apple will ask Congress for a 'thoughtful and honest consideration of the facts'

    So they aren't inviting the Republicans? 

    cincymacchasmpostmantdknoxfracbadmonk
  • Reply 5 of 27
    metrix said:
     I think if Apple creates a "key" then it should absolutely be compartmentalized (sp?) so that no single person can create the key but several people are needed to come up with the key.
    That is still a backdoor and trust me, they will "find" the key and every oppressive government is going to require disclosure of the key. The NSA has even proposed the use of several keys. Every time you add a key, you make the security problem even more complex. Best thing is to keep the 10 password tries and delete all data with time delays between failed attempts and end-to-end encryption with forward secrecy.
    edited February 2016 palominebsimpsenjony0tdknoxbadmonk
  • Reply 6 of 27
    fallenjtfallenjt Posts: 4,054member
    metrix said:
    I think no one has a problem with the FBI seeking information with a warrant. I think if Apple creates a "key" then it should absolutely be compartmentalized (sp?) so that no single person can create the key but several people are needed to come up with the key. The FBI, CIA, NSA should NEVER have that key if no other reason than with so much power they have there has to be corruption. The same can be said for Apple too, they have a lot of power hopefully too do good. If the FBI really is really only seeking information on terrorist phones then getting the information should be enough but if the real reason is to have access to everyone's iPhone than they will come out with some new reason that "we need the keys!". 

    Once you have that "key", every government in the world can request you to give it to them. With court order, Apple must give that "key" away. At least right now they can argue that they can't give what they don't have. Do you understand the impact by creating the back door? 
    banchohlee1169jony0tdknoxkibitzer
  • Reply 7 of 27
    fallenjtfallenjt Posts: 4,054member
    plovell said:
    metrix: the FBI is also looking for (i.e. has warrants/orders for) about a dozen other iPhones. None of them, NOT ONE, involves "terrorism".

    Be clear - the FBI is NOT "only seeking information on terrorist phones". Not at all.
    Maybe there's something in this 5c iPhone: a picture with a middle finger "Fuck Off"
  • Reply 8 of 27
    Be clear - the FBI is NOT "only seeking information on terrorist phones". Not at all.

    Plovell - Totally correct..

    Not only that.. Apple and other companies should NOT be asked to eliminate security measures..

    What SHOULD Be happening is addition of new security measures that allows unique 'front door' access should a warrant be presenting. One example is multi-factor authentication methodology.

    5 factor authentication for example (keep in mind this was just 30 seconds of thinking up one method)
    • 2 private keys: One in the secure enclave other generated during activation of phone stored on Apple servers
    • 3 public keys (one displayed on phone to prove possession, one generated during request (warrant) for Gov't 3rd party, and one kept at Apple.

    Why this way? 
    1. The 1st private key is the core key, and no one can access or change it.
    2. The 2nd private key would only be accessible on Apple premises, presumes Apple would be given a warrant for access and limits availability. 
    3. The 1st Public key; verifies a Gov't's access to device and is provided to Apple (or another OEM) with said Warrant.
    4. The 2nd Public key; displayed only on the device proves they have possession of the device 'in-hand'.
    5. The 3rd Public key; only Apple (or another OEM) would have access to it.
    6. Public and 2nd private keys generated during activation event; and unique to each phone. Secure online activation is required by all iPhones anyway.

    Basically; we need to ADD security, not compromise it.

    Benefits:
    • Even if all 3 public keys were compromised w/o access to Apple (or other OEM site) they would be useless
    • It requires a paper trail (and thus accountability)
    • Would be UNIQUE to each and every phone. So even if a single phone, some how via Mission Impossible standards, was hacked.. no other phones would be compromised..

    FBI's suggestion, however, is to just compromise all, with hands out. They say otherwise, but why insist on compromising security to begin? Especially when we EASILY have the ability to layer on something like 5 factor authentication to make EVERYONE secure while satisfying law enforcement's ability to execute INDIVIDUAL warrants? 
    edited February 2016
  • Reply 9 of 27
    jkichlinejkichline Posts: 1,369member
    I think I've come up with a solution to this whole ordeal and am planning to write my representatives and senators.

    The fact is that if Apple creates a version of iOS that cracks encryption, that software exists. I don't think its right for the government to force a business to do something without compensation. However, once software is written, it's generally "done".  Apple could destroy the software when finished and have to write it again and again when forced which is dumb.  However, there's an interesting question that arises.

    "How much is it worth to get into that phone?"

    I'm sure there are thousands of phones around the country that law enforcement wants to get into and can't.  However, is it really worth risking the privacy and security of everyone else on earth?  However, there are extenuating circumstances and I'm sure that the FBI has already spent a ton of taxpayer money to get into this and many other phones.

    So imagine this... Apple creates the "cancer" software and keeps it under top secret, military grade security.  When issued with a court order from any jurisdiction, it must be accompanied by a fee.  Think of this as a reverse bail.  For instance, to open a phone the initial amount might be one million dollars.  This would do a couple of things.

    1) It would pay Apple for their time and effort in creating, maintaining and securing an unlock method.
    2) If would place the unlock on a line item on a budget ensuring that only top cases go this route.
    3) It maintains separation between private enterprise and public agency through an open, but regulated market.
    4) It ensures that the public agency is held accountable to the public since the there revenue is derived through tax income.

    This allows the people of each country to live under the law of each country.  For instance, if I commit a crime, I know that my home can be searched with a warrant.  If that happens, I should expect that my phone can be searched too.  However, I have put my trust in the company that creates my phone that my information is safe.  If I commit a small crime, I should not have my privacy invaded.  But if it's a situation of child endangerment or national security, then the stakes are higher and the price must be paid.

    But since it's a market economy, Apple could choose, at it's own discretion to aide the investigation and lower or drop the fee. For instance, if a child was kidnapped and the person who took them left their phone behind, Apple could opt to waive the fee and do it for the public good.  Same with a terrorism case.  That would be made public as well which benefits the manufacturer as well as the public agency as they jointly solved the crime.  If I disagree with this system, I have the right to vote and remove officers from position to ensure that my tax dollars are not being wasted on trivial cases.
    pscooter63
  • Reply 10 of 27
    mrshow said:
    Apple will ask Congress for a 'thoughtful and honest consideration of the facts'

    So they aren't inviting the Republicans? 

    Delusional liberal alert. 
  • Reply 11 of 27
    Apple should absolutely NOT create a back door. Once a "way in" is created, other criminals and low lifes will find it. I feel the risk of being "attacked" by hackers and having my sensitive information stolen is much greater than the risk of being attacked by a terrorist. I think a simple analysis would prove those statistics. How is this any different than if I wrote a coded/encrypted message on a piece of paper? The government could intercept my message, but they would have to decrypt it. No one would consider asking the paper manufacturer or pen manufacturer to help decrypt my message. Furthermore, no one would ask the paper company to develop writing paper that would somehow help the FBI decrypt the message. (Yes, I know auto decrypting paper sounds ridiculous. Just work with me on my analogy.) Bottom line is we have a right to privacy and I'm much, much more worried about the implications of a back door security hole than a terrorist attack.
    hlee1169tdknoxbadmonk
  • Reply 12 of 27
    adrayven said:
    Be clear - the FBI is NOT "only seeking information on terrorist phones". Not at all.

    Plovell - Totally correct..

    Not only that.. Apple and other companies should NOT be asked to eliminate security measures..

    What SHOULD Be happening is addition of new security measures that allows unique 'front door' access should a warrant be presenting. One example is multi-factor authentication methodology.

    5 factor authentication for example (keep in mind this was just 30 seconds of thinking up one method)
    • 2 private keys: One in the secure enclave other generated during activation of phone stored on Apple servers
    • 3 public keys (one displayed on phone to prove possession, one generated during request (warrant) for Gov't 3rd party, and one kept at Apple.

    Why this way? 
    1. The 1st private key is the core key, and no one can access or change it.
    2. The 2nd private key would only be accessible on Apple premises, presumes Apple would be given a warrant for access and limits availability. 
    3. The 1st Public key; verifies a Gov't's access to device and is provided to Apple (or another OEM) with said Warrant.
    4. The 2nd Public key; displayed only on the device proves they have possession of the device 'in-hand'.
    5. The 3rd Public key; only Apple (or another OEM) would have access to it.
    6. Public and 2nd private keys generated during activation event; and unique to each phone. Secure online activation is required by all iPhones anyway.

    Basically; we need to ADD security, not compromise it.

    Benefits:
    • Even if all 3 public keys were compromised w/o access to Apple (or other OEM site) they would be useless
    • It requires a paper trail (and thus accountability)
    • Would be UNIQUE to each and every phone. So even if a single phone, some how via Mission Impossible standards, was hacked.. no other phones would be compromised..

    FBI's suggestion, however, is to just compromise all, with hands out. They say otherwise, but why insist on compromising security to begin? Especially when we EASILY have the ability to layer on something like 5 factor authentication to make EVERYONE secure while satisfying law enforcement's ability to execute INDIVIDUAL warrants? 
    A thoughtful, well-reasoned, and safe option. I think that this would satisfy every position on the issue.
  • Reply 13 of 27
    josujosu Posts: 217member
    metrix said:
    I think no one has a problem with the FBI seeking information with a warrant. I think if Apple creates a "key" then it should absolutely be compartmentalized (sp?) so that no single person can create the key but several people are needed to come up with the key. The FBI, CIA, NSA should NEVER have that key if no other reason than with so much power they have there has to be corruption. The same can be said for Apple too, they have a lot of power hopefully too do good. If the FBI really is really only seeking information on terrorist phones then getting the information should be enough but if the real reason is to have access to everyone's iPhone than they will come out with some new reason that "we need the keys!". 

    It looks that if the FBI intentions are only to get the phone information they will not ask for an special version of iOS, they could discreetly approach Apple and ask them to open the phone that THE FBI BLOCKED. Of course, Apple can do that, yes. My programing skill, ever low level, are totally gone but is as easy as going to the code line that counts the number of mistaken passwords and change the number ten that redirect to the wipe out code and put one billion or one trillion and you got a phone that can be unblocked with a brute force attack. And then What prevents FBI to install it in whatever phone they want?

    Apple can do the trick to change the number, let FBI make the brute force attack in their headquarters and after that get the data inside and reinstall the standard version, yes. But that's not what they want.
    edited February 2016
  • Reply 14 of 27
    josu said:
    metrix said:
    I think no one has a problem with the FBI seeking information with a warrant. I think if Apple creates a "key" then it should absolutely be compartmentalized (sp?) so that no single person can create the key but several people are needed to come up with the key. The FBI, CIA, NSA should NEVER have that key if no other reason than with so much power they have there has to be corruption. The same can be said for Apple too, they have a lot of power hopefully too do good. If the FBI really is really only seeking information on terrorist phones then getting the information should be enough but if the real reason is to have access to everyone's iPhone than they will come out with some new reason that "we need the keys!". 

    It looks that if the FBI intentions are only to get the phone information they will not ask for an special version of iOS, they could discreetly approach Apple and ask them to open the phone that THE FBI BLOCKED. Of course, Apple can do that, yes. My programing skill, ever low level, are totally gone but is as easy as going to the code line that counts the number of mistaken passwords and change the number ten that redirect to the wipe out code and put one billion or one trillion and you got a phone that can be unblocked with a brute force attack. And then What prevents FBI to install it in whatever phone they want?

    Apple can do the trick to change the number, let FBI make the brute force attack in their headquarters and after that get the data inside and reinstall the standard version, yes. But that's not what they want.
    Unfortunately, it is more complex than that. The FBI wants to get rid of the 10 count limit, but also wants to get rid of all delays between failed attempts so that they can brute force their way in. It is more than a change to a single line of code.
    hlee1169
  • Reply 15 of 27
    josujosu Posts: 217member
    To me this debate is sometimes unfocused, as I see is like if because some bad apples can hide something relevant to a crime in their house law enforcement feels entitled to have a master key that can open any door. With the promise that they will only open that door and never, never, any other... well... OK... maybe in other big crime...but, well, maybe not. Who of you will feel safe with that.

    You know not so long ago here in my country was a dictator, and the laws where what he wants, and one of the most famous fears where that police arrive in your house at night, because it happened, ok it was to depurate bad apples, but you end up gone for not explainable reason. And maybe you where innocent or not. I remember when that happened to my cousin because he was in a demonstration in favor of democracy, he reappeared looking like if he had been in a boxing contest.

    And don't pretend to give me any lessons about terrorism I have know terrorism since the day I was born and know people killed by terrorist, and not by random, killed after a following and targeted, innocent people.
    edited February 2016 tdknoxbadmonk
  • Reply 16 of 27
    5150iii said:
    adrayven said:

    Plovell - Totally correct..

    Not only that.. Apple and other companies should NOT be asked to eliminate security measures..

    What SHOULD Be happening is addition of new security measures that allows unique 'front door' access should a warrant be presenting. One example is multi-factor authentication methodology.

    5 factor authentication for example (keep in mind this was just 30 seconds of thinking up one method)
    • 2 private keys: One in the secure enclave other generated during activation of phone stored on Apple servers
    • 3 public keys (one displayed on phone to prove possession, one generated during request (warrant) for Gov't 3rd party, and one kept at Apple.

    Why this way? 
    1. The 1st private key is the core key, and no one can access or change it.
    2. The 2nd private key would only be accessible on Apple premises, presumes Apple would be given a warrant for access and limits availability. 
    3. The 1st Public key; verifies a Gov't's access to device and is provided to Apple (or another OEM) with said Warrant.
    4. The 2nd Public key; displayed only on the device proves they have possession of the device 'in-hand'.
    5. The 3rd Public key; only Apple (or another OEM) would have access to it.
    6. Public and 2nd private keys generated during activation event; and unique to each phone. Secure online activation is required by all iPhones anyway.

    Basically; we need to ADD security, not compromise it.

    Benefits:
    • Even if all 3 public keys were compromised w/o access to Apple (or other OEM site) they would be useless
    • It requires a paper trail (and thus accountability)
    • Would be UNIQUE to each and every phone. So even if a single phone, some how via Mission Impossible standards, was hacked.. no other phones would be compromised..

    FBI's suggestion, however, is to just compromise all, with hands out. They say otherwise, but why insist on compromising security to begin? Especially when we EASILY have the ability to layer on something like 5 factor authentication to make EVERYONE secure while satisfying law enforcement's ability to execute INDIVIDUAL warrants? 
    A thoughtful, well-reasoned, and safe option. I think that this would satisfy every position on the issue.
    It may be a thoughtful, but it's not well-reasoned at all. Unfortunately, the mathematical reality of encryption, and the social/political/personal reality of humanity makes it impossible for this authentication system to work. Apple could be coerced (as is happening now) to turn over any keys they have, public or private. Any key in anyone's possession is subject to hacking, so the existence of keys by anyone outside the endpoints of any communication are, by definition, vulnerabilities.

    I am frustrated, but not surprised, by the ignorance of the mathematics/logic of security shown by most of us, perhaps even me. And these discussions ignore the existence of public domain, open-source, widely available, widely deployed uncrackable end-to-end encryption. I can encrypt anything I want, right now, right here, in a fashion that no agency on Earth can ever unravel. Yes, that might take me an extra minute, but anyone who wants to keep a secret will spend the extra minute. The technology of uncrackable encryption will not go away, no matter how hard the FBI wishes on a star.
    hlee1169tdknox
  • Reply 17 of 27
    you cannot give a master key to the US government. Too many employees and contractors will have access to this information. History has shown that the US Government is unable to keep your personal information safe.
  • Reply 18 of 27
    josujosu Posts: 217member
    sog35 said:
    josu said:
    It looks that if the FBI intentions are only to get the phone information they will not ask for an special version of iOS, they could discreetly approach Apple and ask them to open the phone that THE FBI BLOCKED. Of course, Apple can do that, yes. My programing skill, ever low level, are totally gone but is as easy as going to the code line that counts the number of mistaken passwords and change the number ten that redirect to the wipe out code and put one billion or one trillion and you got a phone that can be unblocked with a brute force attack. And then What prevents FBI to install it in whatever phone they want?

    Apple can do the trick to change the number, let FBI make the brute force attack in their headquarters and after that get the data inside and reinstall the standard version, yes. But that's not what they want.
    You are wrong. It isn't that easy.
    I have said my coding skills had fade away, my point is that the FBI don't want only to open the phone that they blocked, they want something to open whatever phone that want. Because Apple had admitted they can do what they request.

    Anyway according to John Gruber, is relatively easy to open Farook phone, the problem is that, while being a "ribbon not a chain" what protects the device, what FBI whats is that Apple built a "scissors", not open the ribbon.
  • Reply 19 of 27
    josujosu Posts: 217member

    Urei1620 said:
    josu said:
    It looks that if the FBI intentions are only to get the phone information they will not ask for an special version of iOS, they could discreetly approach Apple and ask them to open the phone that THE FBI BLOCKED. Of course, Apple can do that, yes. My programing skill, ever low level, are totally gone but is as easy as going to the code line that counts the number of mistaken passwords and change the number ten that redirect to the wipe out code and put one billion or one trillion and you got a phone that can be unblocked with a brute force attack. And then What prevents FBI to install it in whatever phone they want?

    Apple can do the trick to change the number, let FBI make the brute force attack in their headquarters and after that get the data inside and reinstall the standard version, yes. But that's not what they want.
    Unfortunately, it is more complex than that. The FBI wants to get rid of the 10 count limit, but also wants to get rid of all delays between failed attempts so that they can brute force their way in. It is more than a change to a single line of code.
    What part of my "My programing skill, ever low level, are totally gone" nobody has understood. I had never say it is easy I have said that if you change the number to a trillion you have much more opportunities before the wipe out. Anyway Farrok phone key is a four digit one, so not much brute force is needed. I only tried to give a simple example of what supposedly the FBI wants.
    edited February 2016
  • Reply 20 of 27
    josujosu Posts: 217member
    sog35 said:
    josu said:

    What part of my "My programing skill, ever low level, are totally gone" nobody has understood. I had never say it is easy I have said that if you change the number to a trillion you have much more opportunities before the wipe out. Anyway Farrok phone key is a four digit one, so not much brute force is needed. I only tried to give a simple example of what supposedly the FBI wants.
    The point is it isn't easy for Apple to turn off the 10 tries limitation on a phone that is locked
    No sog, the point is that Apple can do it, but the FBI wants more than this, demands a custom iOS version that lets, if they want, open whatever phone that want, disguised as a fight to terrorism. They could have asked Apple how to proceed before changing the Apple ID and blocking the back-up process of the phone, that was owned by San Bernardino country, and as the owner was entitled to ask for help then. But they make a mistake and they now want to use Apple to blame of a possible threat for their mistake.

    Is really curious that you get that belligerent with me in what probably is the only issue in which we agree since I have read your posts. (Never giving you a negative, I considered it a lack of respect of other people opinions)
    edited February 2016
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