WPA3 Wi-Fi still saddled with security flaws, researchers claim [u]
WPA3 -- a Wi-Fi security protocol launched by the Wi-Fi Alliance in 2018 -- is, in practice, better than WPA2, but still fraught with security flaws, according to a recent research paper.
"In light of our presented attacks, we believe that WPA3 does not meet the standards of a modern security protocol," wrote authors Mathy Vanhoef and Eyal Ronen, quoted by Ars Technica. The pair argued that many of the same attacks continue to work and will likely remain effective for years, especially with lower-cost Wi-Fi devices.
WPA3 makes use of a technology dubbed "Dragonfly," more formally Simultaneous Authentication of Equals. This improves a previous four-way "handshake" with a Pairwise Master Key as well as "forward secrecy." In combination, the idea was that WPA3 would be more resistant to password guessing attacks.
The Alliance failed to listen to recommendations about moving away from hash-to-group and hash-to-curve password encoding, Vanhoef and Ronen said, and the result is a group of "Dragonblood" proof-of-concept exploits. Those exploits will also work against networks equipped with the Extensible Authentication Protocol, or EAP, so long as they have EAP-pwd enabled. It's said in fact that with EAP-pwd, an attacker could impersonate any user without knowing the person's password.
The simplest WPA3 exploits involve a transition mode that lets WPA3-ready devices work in backwards compatibility with those that aren't. Another set involves side-channel leaks that leak info about the passwords being used.
In a response, the Alliance said that the paper "identified vulnerabilities in a limited number of early implementations of WPA3-Personal," and that WPA3-Personal is not only "in the early stages of deployment," but that "the small number of device manufacturers that are affected have already started deploying patches to resolve the issues."
Neither the researchers nor the Alliance have identified any "Dragonblood" exploits being used by real-world hackers.
Mac, iPhone, and iPad owners can mitigate WPA3 threats by updating compatible Wi-Fi routers to the latest available firmware. They should also use unique, ideally randomly-generated router passwords that are at least 13 characters long -- password management apps may make it easier to meet requirements.
At present, it isn't clear if Apple's line of AirPort routers, now discontinued, will see a firmware update for the exploits. Sources inside Apple not authorized to speak on behalf of the company has told us previously that there is still a corps of software engineers tasked with keeping the AirPort "as safe as possible for as long as possible."
Update: On Thursday afternoon, the Wi-Fi Alliance cited a later tweet by Vanhoef stating that WPA3 is better than WPA2, but the flaws are still serious.
"In light of our presented attacks, we believe that WPA3 does not meet the standards of a modern security protocol," wrote authors Mathy Vanhoef and Eyal Ronen, quoted by Ars Technica. The pair argued that many of the same attacks continue to work and will likely remain effective for years, especially with lower-cost Wi-Fi devices.
WPA3 makes use of a technology dubbed "Dragonfly," more formally Simultaneous Authentication of Equals. This improves a previous four-way "handshake" with a Pairwise Master Key as well as "forward secrecy." In combination, the idea was that WPA3 would be more resistant to password guessing attacks.
The Alliance failed to listen to recommendations about moving away from hash-to-group and hash-to-curve password encoding, Vanhoef and Ronen said, and the result is a group of "Dragonblood" proof-of-concept exploits. Those exploits will also work against networks equipped with the Extensible Authentication Protocol, or EAP, so long as they have EAP-pwd enabled. It's said in fact that with EAP-pwd, an attacker could impersonate any user without knowing the person's password.
The simplest WPA3 exploits involve a transition mode that lets WPA3-ready devices work in backwards compatibility with those that aren't. Another set involves side-channel leaks that leak info about the passwords being used.
In a response, the Alliance said that the paper "identified vulnerabilities in a limited number of early implementations of WPA3-Personal," and that WPA3-Personal is not only "in the early stages of deployment," but that "the small number of device manufacturers that are affected have already started deploying patches to resolve the issues."
Neither the researchers nor the Alliance have identified any "Dragonblood" exploits being used by real-world hackers.
Mac, iPhone, and iPad owners can mitigate WPA3 threats by updating compatible Wi-Fi routers to the latest available firmware. They should also use unique, ideally randomly-generated router passwords that are at least 13 characters long -- password management apps may make it easier to meet requirements.
At present, it isn't clear if Apple's line of AirPort routers, now discontinued, will see a firmware update for the exploits. Sources inside Apple not authorized to speak on behalf of the company has told us previously that there is still a corps of software engineers tasked with keeping the AirPort "as safe as possible for as long as possible."
Update: On Thursday afternoon, the Wi-Fi Alliance cited a later tweet by Vanhoef stating that WPA3 is better than WPA2, but the flaws are still serious.
Comments
... That's sort of a take off on the joke that you don't have to outrun the bear, just your friend.
2) Immediate notification (such as when a sign on is attempted or a new device connected or especially if there is an invalid attempt.)
For myself, I keep MAC authorization enabled so that, if I don't know your MAC address, you aren't getting in.
To WPA2's credit, this protocol has been going strong since its release in the mid-aughts, and without a successor that greatly increases protection it looks like it'll be used for many years to come.
If the attacker is specifically targeting YOU for some reason (see: every celebrity hack ever), then simply trying to be more secure than your neighbor may be a pretty low bar.
PS: If you're on any public network or one you can't completely trust then use a VPN service. You may also want to use a DNS that isn't supplied by your ISP.
The real issue is the tragedy that we have a brand new, should-be-more-secure protocol and they’re already finding holes in it. Seriously?
Note: That's for a manual change which is more effort but still ridilcously easy.
Work smarter, not harder. Security works when you protect yourself through reasonable actions, not when you make life difficult for yourself without affecting a would-be attacker.
Second, we are not talking industrial strength but home security.
Third, "Security through obscurity" is a standard industrial method. Again, not their only method, but part of their security. It's also the reason you don't leave valuables in plain view in your car.
Fourth, Immediate notification has saved me twice when my credit card was hacked. Both times it was for small amounts that I would have passed by a month later while reviewing my credit card statement.
But, chiefly, the part you are missing is: Layers of security are better than any one single of those layers by itself.
Why would anyone put all their security eggs in a single basket? Layers make sense. And, to criticize anyone of those those layers as inadequate in and of itself, makes no sense because NO single layer is adequate in and of itself. So, that leaves layers.
That's fine. you can leave your WiFI wide open since there are no fool proof security systems available. I'll do what I can to keep mine as safe as possible.