Groupthink
In the 1970s, Irving Janis coined the term "Groupthink" to refer to a certain type of poor decision making that occurs in highly cohesive group. It is a "desperate drive for consensus at any cost that suppresses dissent among the mighty in the corridors of power. Refers to a mode of thinking that persons engage in when concurrence seeking becomes dominant in a cohesive ingroup that it tends to override realistic appraisal of alternative course of action."
Here's one link on it.
He analyzed the faulty decision-making behind Vietnam and the Bay of Pigs during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations in particular. More recently this has been applied to the Space shuttle Challenger disaster, and poor decision-making in organizations like Enron.
Here are the characteristics of Groupthink as Janis described them in the 1970s:
Could this be applied to the current administration's war in Iraq? I hope not. But it's frighteningly easy to see parallels between Janis's work and the current administration's approach in the last 18 months.
The Axis of Evil. Shock and Awe, and they will surrender. Americans better watch what they say and do. "The enemy we're fighting is different from the one we'd war-gamed against," - Lt. Gen. William S. Wallace, U.S. Army senior ground commander in Iraq. Half as many troops as Gulf War I. This prescient article from last year about disagreements between the Pentagon's civilian leadership and career military people.
Here's one link on it.
He analyzed the faulty decision-making behind Vietnam and the Bay of Pigs during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations in particular. More recently this has been applied to the Space shuttle Challenger disaster, and poor decision-making in organizations like Enron.
Here are the characteristics of Groupthink as Janis described them in the 1970s:
Quote:
1. Invulnerability - sharing the illusion of invulnerability, leading them to become overoptimistic and willing to take extraordinary risks
2. Rationalization - collectively construct rationalizations in order to discount warnings and other negative feedback
3. Morality - believe unquestioningly in the inherent morality of their ingroup, may lead group to ignore the ethical or moral consequences of their decisions
4. Sterotypes - victims of groupthink hold stereotyped views of the leaders of enemy groups, they are so evil that genuine attempts at negotiating are unwarranted.
5. Pressure - victims of groupthink apply direct pressure to anyone who momentarily expresses doubts about the groups shared illusions
6. Self censorship - avoid deviating from what appears to be group consensus, keep silent about misgivings
7. Unanimity - share an illusion of unanimity within the group concerning almost all judgments. Reliance on consensual validation within group to replace individual critical thinking
8. Mindguards - appointed mindguards to protect leader and fellow members from adverse information that might break complacency
1. Invulnerability - sharing the illusion of invulnerability, leading them to become overoptimistic and willing to take extraordinary risks
2. Rationalization - collectively construct rationalizations in order to discount warnings and other negative feedback
3. Morality - believe unquestioningly in the inherent morality of their ingroup, may lead group to ignore the ethical or moral consequences of their decisions
4. Sterotypes - victims of groupthink hold stereotyped views of the leaders of enemy groups, they are so evil that genuine attempts at negotiating are unwarranted.
5. Pressure - victims of groupthink apply direct pressure to anyone who momentarily expresses doubts about the groups shared illusions
6. Self censorship - avoid deviating from what appears to be group consensus, keep silent about misgivings
7. Unanimity - share an illusion of unanimity within the group concerning almost all judgments. Reliance on consensual validation within group to replace individual critical thinking
8. Mindguards - appointed mindguards to protect leader and fellow members from adverse information that might break complacency
Could this be applied to the current administration's war in Iraq? I hope not. But it's frighteningly easy to see parallels between Janis's work and the current administration's approach in the last 18 months.
The Axis of Evil. Shock and Awe, and they will surrender. Americans better watch what they say and do. "The enemy we're fighting is different from the one we'd war-gamed against," - Lt. Gen. William S. Wallace, U.S. Army senior ground commander in Iraq. Half as many troops as Gulf War I. This prescient article from last year about disagreements between the Pentagon's civilian leadership and career military people.
Comments
Originally posted by BRussell
Could this be applied to the current administration's war in Iraq? I hope not. But it's frighteningly easy to see parallels between Janis's work and the current administration's approach in the last 18 months.
if you choose to look at it that way, then i guess you could certainly come to that conclusion. but then again, you could also apply that same logic to any large organization or group, such as the UN for instance.
Originally posted by running with scissors
if you choose to look at it that way, then i guess you could certainly come to that conclusion. but then again, you could also apply that same logic to any large organization or group, such as the UN for instance.
I think by the definition listed above the UN would not satisfy the requirements needed to fall into the catagory of 'Groupthink'
my question is is how one wakes up from the sway of such thought?
is it merely through self-critical analysis of one's excuses . . . I mean, reasonings?
Originally posted by pfflam
I think by the definition listed above the UN would not satisfy the requirements needed to fall into the catagory of 'Groupthink'
my question is is how one wakes up from the sway of such thought?
is it merely through self-critical analysis of one's excuses . . . I mean, reasonings?
Seems we see a little Groupthink here on AI...
just a thought..
Originally posted by FellowshipChurch iBook
Seems we see a little Groupthink here on AI...
just a thought..
Did you even read what the definition is? There's no way that's true.
Anyway, I agree that groupthink is what's going on right now. I'm thinking that the realization that things aren't going as hoped will cause some disagreements within the group and lead to some individuation among the group members. That's the way to have it end.
Especially powerful is a throng of people all fixated on an ideality that has no worldly attributes, and therefore, which can not be subject to any group second thinking . . . like a mass of people swaying in time (rythm; a powerfull hypnotic force) concentrating on, supposedly, the same thing.
Anyway, this allows the individual to confer their 'freedom' and the consequent anxiety and guilt-feelings, -feelings that come from the repression necessary to form individuality- onto the crowd or onto the individual leader of the group
Hence, why people are throwing their whole being into the 'Saddam Fedayeen' and other such groups
a really really good analysis of this kind of Groupthink can be found in Ernest Becker's book: Denial Of Death
where he sees in the clinging to a group the dynamic of expiating the guilt feelings of individuality as well as the anxiety of the fear of DEATH. . . the group takes the burden of being an individual and the eventual bodily death that it implies
Its hard to see it but perhaps if you could see the group under question as being bound not by "conviction" or knowledge but out of fear of being the animals that we are it might make thigs seem a little tragi-comic and not just tragic
so, not powerfull men but scared animals
Originally posted by mrmister
Well, it definitely works for the B'aath party.
And in newsrooms around the planet.
Originally posted by mrmister
Well, it definitely works for the B'aath party.
You're still not getting it. In groupthink, fear does not rule. It's this mentality that they can do anything and nothing can get in their way. I'm willing to lay down money that there are many members of the Baath party that disagree but are scared to speak up. Groupthink is not agreement by coercion, but agreement by mutual selective delusion.
"Pressure to conform is especially powerful in small, close-knit groups" P.616 :Psychology - McGraw-Hill Ryserson Ltd, study from Blake & Mouton, 1979
Thus it isn't fear, or
It's this mentality that they can do anything and nothing can get in their way
Its just the powerful forces of conformity, thats all.
Originally posted by DigitalMonkeyBoy
Groupthink is a real psychological phenomenon.
"Pressure to conform is especially powerful in small, close-knit groups" P.616 :Psychology - McGraw-Hill Ryserson Ltd, study from Blake & Mouton, 1979
Thus it isn't fear, or "quote:
It's this mentality that they can do anything and nothing can get in their way"
Its just the powerful forces of conformity, thats all.
It's not just conformity. It's part of conformity, but it's not the same (kinda like a square is a rectangle, but a rectangle isn't a square). From the original definition:
Invulnerability - sharing the illusion of invulnerability
The source you're quoting looks like an intro psych book. No offense, but they tend to be somewhat dumbed down.
Originally posted by torifile
kinda like a square is a rectangle, but a rectangle isn't a square
Uh, what?
I believe the correct expression is more like "All squares are rectangular, yet not all rectangles are square."
A square fits the definition of a rectangle- so it is a rectangle.
And a rectangle holding more properties than a square cannot be a square.
Perle: Secondly, Saddam is much weaker than we think he is. He's weaker militarily. We know he's got about a third of what he had in 1991. But it's a house of cards. He rules by fear because he knows there is no underlying support. Support for Saddam, including within his military organization, will collapse at the first whiff of gunpowder.
...
James P. Rubin: So what would your guesstimate be of the level of effort that would be involved?
Richard Perle: Well, I would be surprised if we need anything like the 200,000 figure that is sometimes discussed in the press. A much smaller force, principally special operations forces, but backed up by some regular units, should be sufficient.
It's interesting to me that it's people like Perle, who have been advocating this war, are the same ones who have said it will be easy and we won't need many troops.
Ken Adleman, in this article, said:
I believe demolishing Hussein's military power and liberating Iraq would be a cakewalk. Let me give simple, responsible reasons: (1) It was a cakewalk last time; (2) they've become much weaker; (3) we've become much stronger; and (4) now we're playing for keeps.
Here's an article describing the debate between Rumsfeld and the career military people over how many troops are needed and whether we should attack Baghdad now even though the rest of the troops are still in Texas and Colorado, and won't be in the Middle East for at least several weeks.
Originally posted by pfflam
I think by the definition listed above the UN would not satisfy the requirements needed to fall into the catagory of 'Groupthink'
my question is is how one wakes up from the sway of such thought?
is it merely through self-critical analysis of one's excuses . . . I mean, reasonings?
your right. i don't know what i was thinking when i wrote that. in need reading of the better skills, thinking i.
Originally posted by BRussell
Here's an article describing the debate between Rumsfeld and the career military people over how many troops are needed and whether we should attack Baghdad now even though the rest of the troops are still in Texas and Colorado, and won't be in the Middle East for at least several weeks.
The 4th Infantry Division was supposed to have come in through Turkey. Instead their equipment is now being shipped through the Red Sea to come in from the south. The personnel may be in Fort Hood but they don't really need to be there ahead of their armour. Whatever debate there's been about the force level needed, it seems to have been resolved long ago that the 4th ID would be part of it. I read a while ago that we didn't neccessarily need everybody in place before we would proceed. (There was also a concern about getting underway before the weather became too severe.) Instead of having all these matters resolved before the start of the war, we would instead have what was described as a "rolling start".
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld repeatedly rejected advice from Pentagon planners that substantially more troops and armor would be needed to fight a war in Iraq, New Yorker Magazine reported.
In an article for its April 7 edition, which goes on sale on Monday, the weekly said Rumsfeld insisted at least six times in the run-up to the conflict that the proposed number of ground troops be sharply reduced and got his way.
"He thought he knew better. He was the decision-maker at every turn," the article quoted an unidentified senior Pentagon planner as saying. "This is the mess Rummy put himself in because he didn't want a heavy footprint on the ground."
It also said Rumsfeld had overruled advice from war commander Gen. Tommy Franks to delay the invasion until troops denied access through Turkey could be brought in by another route and miscalculated the level of Iraqi resistance.
"They've got no resources. He was so focused on proving his point -- that the Iraqis were going to fall apart," the article, by veteran journalist Seymour Hersh, cited an unnamed former high-level intelligence official as saying.
And here's another report from last August in the Army Times about war games in which the General in charge of playing "Iraq" was limited and quit:
The most elaborate war game the U.S. military has ever held was rigged so that it appeared to validate the modern, joint-service war-fighting concepts it was supposed to be testing, according to the retired Marine lieutenant general who commanded the game?s Opposing Force.
That general, Paul Van Riper, said he worries the United States will send troops into combat using doctrine and weapons systems based on false conclusions from the recently concluded Millennium Challenge 02. He was so frustrated with the rigged exercise that he said he quit midway through the game.
He said that rather than test forces against an unpredictable enemy, the exercise ?was almost entirely scripted to ensure a [U.S. military] ?win.? ?
Originally posted by BRussell
That part about when to start the invasion seems a bit odd to me...
This is from a January 13 BBC article:
The expected deployment of a 150,000 personnel in and around the Gulf by the second half of February would be enough to launch what the Pentagon calls a rolling start attack, with more reinforcements arriving rapidly after that.
I'd also point out that one of the key features of the plan that was adopted was to move quickly so as to prevent Saddam from blowing dams and wrecking his oil fields. There's no question that this objective was successful.
it just boggles the mind