SpamSandwich said: Please. Were the “proper procedure(s)” followed to enact DACA? The prior administration circumvented Congressional authority and the law as it stands it still unconstitutional.
Deferment doesn't require Congressional authority because it's not creating a law. It's postponing legal enforcement of a law. All the people who participate in DACA are not exempt from deportation, but rather have deportation deferred by the executive branch as long as they follow the guidelines set up for DACA. It's similar to a judge giving a suspended sentence or Donald Trump receiving a deferment from the Vietnam War draft.
If you’re “deferring” a law, you’re using legal means to do so. An executive order is a legal (and now SCOTUS-approved) means to circumvent or enforce laws.
I’m disappointed that not one member of the Committee brought up the subject of Section 230 of the Telecommunication Act and if immunity should still apply since, Apple aside, they have evolved from platforms to publishers.
I've seen a lot of misinformation about how §230 works. Some seem to think that if an internet provider censors some material, it loses its immunity (from, e.g., defamation claims) for material posted by others. That's not the case. Even if an internet provider or user - like, e.g., Twitter or Apple Insider - censors material based on viewpoint, it doesn't lose its §230(c)(1) immunity. Indeed, even if it acts in bad faith in censoring material it doesn't lose that immunity.
There are a couple aspects of the protection provided to internet providers and users by §230. It seems that some conflate - intentionally or otherwise - those aspects.
§230(c)(1) says that internet providers and users aren't treated as publishers of information provided by others. Full stop. That treatment - not being treated (for, e.g., defamation law purposes) as the publisher of information provided by others - isn't conditional. It doesn't depend on anything.
$230(c)(2) provides protection, for internet providers and users, for blocking access to certain material - for, e.g., censoring certain material. This is a separate immunity basis than that provided by §230(c)(1). §230(c)(2) says that internet providers and users aren't liable for actions taken in good faith to block material that they consider objectionable. What they consider objectionable provides them with great latitude to decide what material they will block, and still be acting in good faith. But here's the key, this immunity which is conditioned on good faith is against liability they might otherwise have for having blocked certain material. It means that someone can't, in most cases, sue them because they blocked something. This good faith requirement has nothing to do with their having immunity against actions brought based on material they didn't block. Even if they act in bad faith in blocking something, they don't become liable (under, e.g., defamation law) for material posted by others which they don't block. They just, possibly, become liable for having blocked something which they might - in fairly rare circumstances - have had some legal obligation to leave up (e.g., they might have had some contractual obligation).
Apple Insider could, if it wanted, declare that it was going to delete all pro-Trump comments and it could proceed to do just that. It would still have §230(c)(1) immunity for any comments, posted by others, which it left up. It doesn't lose that immunity. It doesn't, e.g., become a publisher for defamation law purposes. The key is that it isn't responsible for information posted by others. It is responsible for information it posts. It could be sued for, e.g., defamation if it posted something defamatory. And if it edited someone's post to make it defamatory, it might also be liable. But it isn't liable for stuff that others post, even if it chooses to delete some stuff that people post.
I’m disappointed that not one member of the Committee brought up the subject of Section 230 of the Telecommunication Act and if immunity should still apply since, Apple aside, they have evolved from platforms to publishers.
By no legal definition has even Twitter or Facebook evolved from a platform to a publisher. That may change with the ongoing reform, but today, all of them are very clearly platforms.
Bill Barr clearly disagrees with you. In an interview two weeks ago he shared the following comments:
I think there are — clearly these, these entities are now engaged in censorship. And they originally held themselves out as open forums where people, where the third parties could come and express their views and they built up a tremendous network of eyeballs.
They had a lot of market power based on that presentation. And now they are acting much more like publishers because they’re censoring particular viewpoints and putting their own content in there to diminish the impact of various people’s views.
Apple itself is guilty of censorship as well, for instance several months ago they banned all apps dealing with covid which didn't originate from a "trusted source". Whether you agree with Apple's decision or not, giving certain people the opportunity to speak while shutting others out is of course the very definition of censorship.
So if you want to censor certain viewpoints, you're going to lose your Section 230 immunity.
Attorney General Barr doesn't seem (in that short passage) to be saying that the law currently works that way. If he was saying that, he was wrong.
An internet provider or user doesn't become a publisher - for, e.g., defamation law purposes - because it censors certain viewpoints. You don't lose §230(c)(1) immunity because you censor certain viewpoints. We could, I suppose, change the law - though I don't think we should in this regard. But as it is, that isn't how the law works.
I’m disappointed that not one member of the Committee brought up the subject of Section 230 of the Telecommunication Act and if immunity should still apply since, Apple aside, they have evolved from platforms to publishers.
I've seen a lot of misinformation about how §230 works. Some seem to think that if an internet provider censors some material, it loses its immunity (from, e.g., defamation claims) for material posted by others. That's not the case. Even if an internet provider or user - like, e.g., Twitter or Apple Insider - censors material based on viewpoint, it doesn't lose its §230(c)(1) immunity. Indeed, even if it acts in bad faith in censoring material it doesn't lose that immunity.
There are a couple aspects of the protection provided to internet providers and users by §230. It seems that some conflate - intentionally or otherwise - those aspects.
§230(c)(1) says that internet providers and users aren't treated as publishers of information provided by others. Full stop. That treatment - not being treated (for, e.g., defamation law purposes) as the publisher of information provided by others - isn't conditional. It doesn't depend on anything.
$230(c)(2) provides protection, for internet providers and users, for blocking access to certain material - for, e.g., censoring certain material. This is a separate immunity basis than that provided by §230(c)(1). §230(c)(2) says that internet providers and users aren't liable for actions taken in good faith to block material that they consider objectionable. What they consider objectionable provides them with great latitude to decide what material they will block, and still be acting in good faith. But here's the key, this immunity which is conditioned on good faith is against liability they might otherwise have for having blocked certain material. It means that someone can't, in most cases, sue them because they blocked something. This good faith requirement has nothing to do with their having immunity against actions brought based on material they didn't block. Even if they act in bad faith in blocking something, they don't become liable (under, e.g., defamation law) for material posted by others which they don't block. They just, possibly, become liable for having blocked something which they might - in fairly rare circumstances - have had some legal obligation to leave up (e.g., they might have had some contractual obligation).
Apple Insider could, if it wanted, declare that it was going to delete all pro-Trump comments and it could proceed to do just that. It would still have §230(c)(1) immunity for any comments, posted by others, which it left up. It doesn't lose that immunity. It doesn't, e.g., become a publisher for defamation law purposes. The key is that it isn't responsible for information posted by others. It is responsible for information it posts. It could be sued for, e.g., defamation if it posted something defamatory. And if it edited someone's post to make it defamatory, it might also be liable. But it isn't liable for stuff that others post, even if it chooses to delete some stuff that people post.
It feels like a whole Congressional hearing could focus on the publisher vs. platform issue (and another should have focused properly on the anti-trust issue). The publisher question is really interesting and deserves debate far beyond Bill Barr’s transparent agenda. Whatever the legal definitions (they’re important, but they may be antiquated) there’s no question that these platforms are shapeshifting before our eyes. That’s why LinkedIn has an editorial news team curating content and publishing original content. They’re all becoming more proactive, as Axios reports re: Instagram: https://t.co/yPQqp8Y04s. At the very least, aren’t the lines between platform and publisher becoming blurred as these platforms turn into major media companies chasing ad dollars?
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There are a couple aspects of the protection provided to internet providers and users by §230. It seems that some conflate - intentionally or otherwise - those aspects.
§230(c)(1) says that internet providers and users aren't treated as publishers of information provided by others. Full stop. That treatment - not being treated (for, e.g., defamation law purposes) as the publisher of information provided by others - isn't conditional. It doesn't depend on anything.
$230(c)(2) provides protection, for internet providers and users, for blocking access to certain material - for, e.g., censoring certain material. This is a separate immunity basis than that provided by §230(c)(1). §230(c)(2) says that internet providers and users aren't liable for actions taken in good faith to block material that they consider objectionable. What they consider objectionable provides them with great latitude to decide what material they will block, and still be acting in good faith. But here's the key, this immunity which is conditioned on good faith is against liability they might otherwise have for having blocked certain material. It means that someone can't, in most cases, sue them because they blocked something. This good faith requirement has nothing to do with their having immunity against actions brought based on material they didn't block. Even if they act in bad faith in blocking something, they don't become liable (under, e.g., defamation law) for material posted by others which they don't block. They just, possibly, become liable for having blocked something which they might - in fairly rare circumstances - have had some legal obligation to leave up (e.g., they might have had some contractual obligation).
Apple Insider could, if it wanted, declare that it was going to delete all pro-Trump comments and it could proceed to do just that. It would still have §230(c)(1) immunity for any comments, posted by others, which it left up. It doesn't lose that immunity. It doesn't, e.g., become a publisher for defamation law purposes. The key is that it isn't responsible for information posted by others. It is responsible for information it posts. It could be sued for, e.g., defamation if it posted something defamatory. And if it edited someone's post to make it defamatory, it might also be liable. But it isn't liable for stuff that others post, even if it chooses to delete some stuff that people post.
An internet provider or user doesn't become a publisher - for, e.g., defamation law purposes - because it censors certain viewpoints. You don't lose §230(c)(1) immunity because you censor certain viewpoints. We could, I suppose, change the law - though I don't think we should in this regard. But as it is, that isn't how the law works.