All the boneheads claiming Apple created a "backdoor" -- nope. All the tech companies do this (Dropbox, Microsoft, Google), and Apple did 100% server-side CSAM scanning a year ago:
...you dudes are simply panicking and clutching your pearls because you didn't know about it before.
That article is an argument against Apple, not in favor of. Since they are already performing that scan on their servers, what is the point in injecting another mechanism into the device itself? I have no authority on iCloud servers, those are Apple's property, but I have authority on my device and I don't want it to be used to inspect me. This is not different than planting a camera into your house to monitor if you abuse your children or your wife.
Previously, Apple had rejected government's request to develop a custom iOS in order to break into criminals' iPhones. That would work on case-by-case basis, but Apple had still rejected it because it would set a precedent. And now, Apple sets that precedent voluntarily, and not on case-by-case basis but for the whole ecosystem...
Bollocks. So when the Chinese government tells Apple to add a heap of CPP provided hashes, they’re going to refuse? Of course they won’t. If any government said provided data were hashes of CSAM material, who’s Apple to say it’s not?
That's the great thing about the CSAM material; it's just hashes. In some countries it could kiddie porn; in other countries it could be photos taken by the police at protest march. And in those countries, Apple won't be the only ones checking the pictures.
CSAM is not just hashes. Where did you get that idea? The hashes that Apple will compare against come from NCMEC, where the actual images are stored. The hashes are created from the images. Are we supposed to believe that NCMEC will now just accept a hash from any government that feels like sending it over without a corresponding image to go along with it?
Let’s not forget that it US law requires tech companies to report incidences of CSAM. Also, using iCloud Photo Library is opt in, so people who are worried about their photos being matched to a hash don’t need to opt in.
Gruber posits that doing the check client-side, rather than server-side, will allow them to fully encrypt iCloud backups.
So you think China will be happy with Apple using hashes of NCMEC? Where the US government could insert hashes that are of someone they want in China, and then under the guise of CSAM find out all the photos they want of this person?
There is literally no point in encrypting backups if Apple has defied the trust of their customers by inserting this spyware. What's the point in end to end encryption if the spyware is already on the device pre-encryption? How long until it scans all files on your phone before syncing to iCloud? How long before it scans all files all the time?
Nothing is sent to the US government until Apple has reviewed the material and confirmed it is CSAM. If it’s a photo of some Chinese dude it’ll get de-flagged and nothing will happen.
How long before we hear the end of this wailing? Apple are being open and upfront about what they’re doing. If anything changes there’s no reason to think they won’t be open and upfront about that too, at which point you can move to the Ubuntu phone or whatever.
Nothing would be sent to the US government from any other country, because that state wouldn't allow it. Especially somewhere like Russia or China. Instead, the hashes would come from their government, and the photos checked within their borders. The person checking the photos could be anyone the government chooses. Therefore, the hashes could actually be anything the government didn't like.
From your posting history it's quite easy to work out that you're pretty far left; you're quite ok with surveillance, evidently, and can't see how a 180º about-turn on their privacy stance is wrong. Which is likely also why you can't see how this potentially being the the start of widespread government surveillance is a problem. Maybe people will stop complaining about this when you stop "wailing" about the UK leaving the EU. Only there was a vote that you lost for that, this has been imposed.
Apple can resist to government requests but if a government makes that scheme into law Apple cannot resist.
This was true last week too, nothing has changed with regards to Apple's obligation to follow the law in places where they do business.
My guess is that they've been offered a deal: implement the backdoor and the anti-trust/monopoly stuff goes away.
Huh.
You know another big tech, Google, is in the antitrust crosshairs. It also coincides with a decision by Google to no longer give themselves a key to user cloud data so that they can't turn over certain private information even if compelled by court order. They simply can't decrypt it, period. There's been two other recent Google policy changes that will restrict authorities' access to data and communications too, both here and abroad. Is there any connection between privacy and antitrust action? I'm not so sure there isn't.
I actually meant Apple had been offered a deal, but now I'm intrigued.
That is very interesting. There’s a theory floating around that Apple is running the back door in the client so they can implement encrypted backups on iCloud. This seems to blow that idea out of the water.
Dude, you're either entirely ignorant of what this is and how it works, or just trying to be malicious and bash Apple. In either case, this is not what a backdoor is, so your posts consist of just so much mis- or dis-information.
I know everyone appears to be content to cling to their ignorance, and perhaps you prefer to do the same. Or, if you''re just being willfully malicious, there are plenty of other Apple bashers to keep you company. But, in the case you aren't content to intentionally spread dis-information, why don't you actually do something to alleviate your ignorance before you say more.
So many people so willing to be ignorant on so many things. The internet has essentially devolved into a cess pool of stupidity and misguided outrage.
It's becoming more and more apparent that Apple has gotten a gag order from big gov, and this is just just another way to justify their actions without saying anything "incriminating".
Apple can resist to government requests but if a government makes that scheme into law Apple cannot resist.
This was true last week too, nothing has changed with regards to Apple's obligation to follow the law in places where they do business.
My guess is that they've been offered a deal: implement the backdoor and the anti-trust/monopoly stuff goes away.
Huh.
You know another big tech, Google, is in the antitrust crosshairs. It also coincides with a decision by Google to no longer give themselves a key to user cloud data so that they can't turn over certain private information even if compelled by court order. They simply can't decrypt it, period. There's been two other recent Google policy changes that will restrict authorities' access to data and communications too, both here and abroad. Is there any connection between privacy and antitrust action? I'm not so sure there isn't.
I actually meant Apple had been offered a deal, but now I'm intrigued.
That is very interesting. There’s a theory floating around that Apple is running the back door in the client so they can implement encrypted backups on iCloud. This seems to blow that idea out of the water.
Gruber states that but he’s cautiously optimistic or more cautious than optimistic on that.
Bollocks. So when the Chinese government tells Apple to add a heap of CPP provided hashes, they’re going to refuse? Of course they won’t. If any government said provided data were hashes of CSAM material, who’s Apple to say it’s not?
That's the great thing about the CSAM material; it's just hashes. In some countries it could kiddie porn; in other countries it could be photos taken by the police at protest march. And in those countries, Apple won't be the only ones checking the pictures.
CSAM is not just hashes. Where did you get that idea? The hashes that Apple will compare against come from NCMEC, where the actual images are stored. The hashes are created from the images. Are we supposed to believe that NCMEC will now just accept a hash from any government that feels like sending it over without a corresponding image to go along with it?
Let’s not forget that it US law requires tech companies to report incidences of CSAM. Also, using iCloud Photo Library is opt in, so people who are worried about their photos being matched to a hash don’t need to opt in.
Gruber posits that doing the check client-side, rather than server-side, will allow them to fully encrypt iCloud backups.
So you think China will be happy with Apple using hashes of NCMEC? Where the US government could insert hashes that are of someone they want in China, and then under the guise of CSAM find out all the photos they want of this person?
There is literally no point in encrypting backups if Apple has defied the trust of their customers by inserting this spyware. What's the point in end to end encryption if the spyware is already on the device pre-encryption? How long until it scans all files on your phone before syncing to iCloud? How long before it scans all files all the time?
Nothing is sent to the US government until Apple has reviewed the material and confirmed it is CSAM. If it’s a photo of some Chinese dude it’ll get de-flagged and nothing will happen.
How long before we hear the end of this wailing? Apple are being open and upfront about what they’re doing. If anything changes there’s no reason to think they won’t be open and upfront about that too, at which point you can move to the Ubuntu phone or whatever.
Nothing would be sent to the US government from any other country, because that state wouldn't allow it. Especially somewhere like Russia or China. Instead, the hashes would come from their government, and the photos checked within their borders. The person checking the photos could be anyone the government chooses. Therefore, the hashes could actually be anything the government didn't like.
From your posting history it's quite easy to work out that you're pretty far left; you're quite ok with surveillance, evidently, and can't see how a 180º about-turn on their privacy stance is wrong. Which is likely also why you can't see how this potentially being the the start of widespread government surveillance is a problem. Maybe people will stop complaining about this when you stop "wailing" about the UK leaving the EU. Only there was a vote that you lost for that, this has been imposed.
Wailing about the UK leaving the EU? Lol at that nonsequitur. Imma just leave that argument and whole second paragraph right where it belongs, in the trash heap.
Regarding the first paragraph: I was talking about the US government because you were talking about the US government, and them inserting hashes of images of Chinese people into the dataset. I can't debate with you if you change the subject in every post.
Apple have stated that they will only work with data provided by "NCMEC and other child safety groups", nothing about government (NCMEC is government funded, but independent). And in the system being introduced Apple check the photos as the second tier review, not the government: "There is no automated reporting to law enforcement, and Apple conducts human review before making a report to NCMEC", so you're plain wrong about that one.
Bollocks. So when the Chinese government tells Apple to add a heap of CPP provided hashes, they’re going to refuse? Of course they won’t. If any government said provided data were hashes of CSAM material, who’s Apple to say it’s not?
That's the great thing about the CSAM material; it's just hashes. In some countries it could kiddie porn; in other countries it could be photos taken by the police at protest march. And in those countries, Apple won't be the only ones checking the pictures.
CSAM is not just hashes. Where did you get that idea? The hashes that Apple will compare against come from NCMEC, where the actual images are stored. The hashes are created from the images. Are we supposed to believe that NCMEC will now just accept a hash from any government that feels like sending it over without a corresponding image to go along with it?
Let’s not forget that it US law requires tech companies to report incidences of CSAM. Also, using iCloud Photo Library is opt in, so people who are worried about their photos being matched to a hash don’t need to opt in.
Gruber posits that doing the check client-side, rather than server-side, will allow them to fully encrypt iCloud backups.
So you think China will be happy with Apple using hashes of NCMEC? Where the US government could insert hashes that are of someone they want in China, and then under the guise of CSAM find out all the photos they want of this person?
There is literally no point in encrypting backups if Apple has defied the trust of their customers by inserting this spyware. What's the point in end to end encryption if the spyware is already on the device pre-encryption? How long until it scans all files on your phone before syncing to iCloud? How long before it scans all files all the time?
Nothing is sent to the US government until Apple has reviewed the material and confirmed it is CSAM. If it’s a photo of some Chinese dude it’ll get de-flagged and nothing will happen.
How long before we hear the end of this wailing? Apple are being open and upfront about what they’re doing. If anything changes there’s no reason to think they won’t be open and upfront about that too, at which point you can move to the Ubuntu phone or whatever.
Nothing would be sent to the US government from any other country, because that state wouldn't allow it. Especially somewhere like Russia or China. Instead, the hashes would come from their government, and the photos checked within their borders. The person checking the photos could be anyone the government chooses. Therefore, the hashes could actually be anything the government didn't like.
From your posting history it's quite easy to work out that you're pretty far left; you're quite ok with surveillance, evidently, and can't see how a 180º about-turn on their privacy stance is wrong. Which is likely also why you can't see how this potentially being the the start of widespread government surveillance is a problem. Maybe people will stop complaining about this when you stop "wailing" about the UK leaving the EU. Only there was a vote that you lost for that, this has been imposed.
Wailing about the UK leaving the EU? Lol at that nonsequitur. Imma just leave that argument and whole second paragraph right where it belongs, in the trash heap.
Regarding the first paragraph: I was talking about the US government because you were talking about the US government, and them inserting hashes of images of Chinese people into the dataset. I can't debate with you if you change the subject in every post.
Apple have stated that they will only work with data provided by "NCMEC and other child safety groups", nothing about government (NCMEC is government funded, but independent). And in the system being introduced Apple check the photos as the second tier review, not the government: "There is no automated reporting to law enforcement, and Apple conducts human review before making a report to NCMEC", so you're plain wrong about that one.
Bollocks. So when the Chinese government tells Apple to add a heap of CPP provided hashes, they’re going to refuse? Of course they won’t. If any government said provided data were hashes of CSAM material, who’s Apple to say it’s not?
That's the great thing about the CSAM material; it's just hashes. In some countries it could kiddie porn; in other countries it could be photos taken by the police at protest march. And in those countries, Apple won't be the only ones checking the pictures.
CSAM is not just hashes. Where did you get that idea? The hashes that Apple will compare against come from NCMEC, where the actual images are stored. The hashes are created from the images. Are we supposed to believe that NCMEC will now just accept a hash from any government that feels like sending it over without a corresponding image to go along with it?
Let’s not forget that it US law requires tech companies to report incidences of CSAM. Also, using iCloud Photo Library is opt in, so people who are worried about their photos being matched to a hash don’t need to opt in.
Gruber posits that doing the check client-side, rather than server-side, will allow them to fully encrypt iCloud backups.
So you think China will be happy with Apple using hashes of NCMEC? Where the US government could insert hashes that are of someone they want in China, and then under the guise of CSAM find out all the photos they want of this person?
There is literally no point in encrypting backups if Apple has defied the trust of their customers by inserting this spyware. What's the point in end to end encryption if the spyware is already on the device pre-encryption? How long until it scans all files on your phone before syncing to iCloud? How long before it scans all files all the time?
Nothing is sent to the US government until Apple has reviewed the material and confirmed it is CSAM. If it’s a photo of some Chinese dude it’ll get de-flagged and nothing will happen.
How long before we hear the end of this wailing? Apple are being open and upfront about what they’re doing. If anything changes there’s no reason to think they won’t be open and upfront about that too, at which point you can move to the Ubuntu phone or whatever.
Nothing would be sent to the US government from any other country, because that state wouldn't allow it. Especially somewhere like Russia or China. Instead, the hashes would come from their government, and the photos checked within their borders. The person checking the photos could be anyone the government chooses. Therefore, the hashes could actually be anything the government didn't like.
From your posting history it's quite easy to work out that you're pretty far left; you're quite ok with surveillance, evidently, and can't see how a 180º about-turn on their privacy stance is wrong. Which is likely also why you can't see how this potentially being the the start of widespread government surveillance is a problem. Maybe people will stop complaining about this when you stop "wailing" about the UK leaving the EU. Only there was a vote that you lost for that, this has been imposed.
Wailing about the UK leaving the EU? Lol at that nonsequitur. Imma just leave that argument and whole second paragraph right where it belongs, in the trash heap.
Regarding the first paragraph: I was talking about the US government because you were talking about the US government, and them inserting hashes of images of Chinese people into the dataset. I can't debate with you if you change the subject in every post.
Apple have stated that they will only work with data provided by "NCMEC and other child safety groups", nothing about government (NCMEC is government funded, but independent). And in the system being introduced Apple check the photos as the second tier review, not the government: "There is no automated reporting to law enforcement, and Apple conducts human review before making a report to NCMEC", so you're plain wrong about that one.
I am adamately against spyware, no matter who it comes from. And, opening a backdoor for further abuse is very dangerous. No more “updates” from Apple. I have no more trust in Apple.
Bollocks. So when the Chinese government tells Apple to add a heap of CPP provided hashes, they’re going to refuse? Of course they won’t. If any government said provided data were hashes of CSAM material, who’s Apple to say it’s not?
That's the great thing about the CSAM material; it's just hashes. In some countries it could kiddie porn; in other countries it could be photos taken by the police at protest march. And in those countries, Apple won't be the only ones checking the pictures.
CSAM is not just hashes. Where did you get that idea? The hashes that Apple will compare against come from NCMEC, where the actual images are stored. The hashes are created from the images. Are we supposed to believe that NCMEC will now just accept a hash from any government that feels like sending it over without a corresponding image to go along with it?
Let’s not forget that it US law requires tech companies to report incidences of CSAM. Also, using iCloud Photo Library is opt in, so people who are worried about their photos being matched to a hash don’t need to opt in.
Gruber posits that doing the check client-side, rather than server-side, will allow them to fully encrypt iCloud backups.
So you think China will be happy with Apple using hashes of NCMEC? Where the US government could insert hashes that are of someone they want in China, and then under the guise of CSAM find out all the photos they want of this person?
There is literally no point in encrypting backups if Apple has defied the trust of their customers by inserting this spyware. What's the point in end to end encryption if the spyware is already on the device pre-encryption? How long until it scans all files on your phone before syncing to iCloud? How long before it scans all files all the time?
That isn’t how hashes work. Hashes find the exact same photograph, not a photograph that is similar. So, your imagined scenario where the US government uploads a hash of a photo of someone they are looking for and in return get all photos of that person is not how it works. The uploaded hash would only help to find positive matches of that exact same photo.
Also, as has been mentioned several times already, everyone can opt out.
Translation: Here at Apple, we might have created a back door, but we promise to only ever use it for good. Pinky swear!
Read the user agreement terms for iCloud and other cloud services: they have always had parameters for what is acceptable use of the service and have always reserved the right to screen files as a result. There has never been any "you can do whatever you want in the cloud and we'll never look at any files in the cloud" promise from any of these companies.
The only people that think this is something new are people that never read the user agreements for cloud services.
Exactly. This is not a backdoor. Processing of user photos is not new. Heck, people use internet services every day where their photos are stored "in the clear", processed by AI, etc, and they don't seem to care. But now Apple announces a "well-designed, privacy-in-mind" service to help protect their own cloud services from hosting illegal content and suddeny Apple is the bad guy? It's puzzling.
This is not a backdoor. A "door" allows outside access into the system. That's not what this is. The system "pushes" a notification out of the system to vetted organizations to respond to clear violations, only after a threshold has been exceeded. Nobody is looking at your iCloud Photo library except you.
Of course Apple would never expand the tools. Apple merely provides the backdoor. Governments will be the ones to walk through it.
People keep saying “back door” as if it’s a magic word. Back door to what? No one is getting access to your phone to run arbitrary code. No one is getting access to your phone to do anything. Apple, the maker of your phone and most of the software on it are adding a gateway check to one of their online services. That’s it. Apple are fully in control and have committed to limited use and been almost over zealous in providing information about what is going to happen. There is no skull-duggery, no chicanery, it’s all published on Apples website. The worst thing people have been able to suggest as an immediate consequence is adding some extra photo hashes to the dataset (no info given about how nefarious actors might even do that). So what? Even if they could the review process still goes through Apple so would be marked as a false positive and binned. And the other paranoia is about governments using the law to force Apple to do something else, which has always been the case, governments could do that at any time and nothing has changed.
This is a massive hullabaloo about Apple doing exactly what you’d expect of them - finding a practical, secure way of being a responsible corporation without intruding on the privacy of their customers in any significant and meaningful way except when egregious wrongdoing is taking place.
Not so Crowley, it has created a system where government can demand it also identify any type of person it doesn’t like. Rock spiders today, political dissidents the next.
Tim misses the point. As has already been mentioned. Once you insert the technology, there is nothing stopping it from being abused. I am not talking about the Messages thing. As long as 100% of that is done on-device and DOS not require interaction off device then this is a net win for the platform for those who want to take advantage of it (for the detection and enforcement -- obviously the message itself comes from off device). But the CSAM detection bit is nefarious and should be shown to the bitbucket.
These words should have been in their original public release notes. They need to reiterate them repeatedly. They need to verbally back themselves into a corner. No equivocation or media room double speak.
Not so Crowley, it has created a system where government can demand it also identify any type of person it doesn’t like. Rock spiders today, political dissidents the next.
It absolutely has not. The system they have created has a very limited and specific purpose, matching the hash of photos that are being sent to iCloud against a known list of photo hashes. Apple has stated outright that that is its purpose and Apple has no intention of modifying it or extending it to satisfy any government. And if government were to legally obligate Apple to do something else then that’s no different from if they had done so last week. Governments have no more and no less power over Apple than they have ever have.
Yes Crowley that is right. That’s exactly what it does. Photos of a known list of rock spiders’ imagery today, there is no reason apart from Apple pinky swearing it won’t add photos of a known list of political dissidents the next.
Apparatchik: “Crowley, Why do you have this photo of this criminal dissident our Glorious Leader doesn’t like in your phone? Do you support this person? Why do you undermine the Everlasting Peoples’ Republic? You love the Everlasting Peoples’ Republic you say? Well, you have this person’s photo, so we think you are lying. Just to be sure, it’s off to the gulag for you!”
It is much easier for Apple to say “get stuffed” to government overreach if it doesn’t have the ability to tell government who has the photos in the first place, don’t you think?
The new thing everyone should be afraid of: CSLAMing Like SWATTing, CSLAMing can get you in trouble with the law by taking advantage of Apple's boneheaded plan to scan everyone's photos continuously. All someone needs to do to CSLAM someone is to copy a lot of illegal photos onto your iCloud synced iOS device when you are not looking. "Hey, can I borrow your phone? I need to make a quick call." Perhaps copy a zip file to their shared folder that ends up getting backed up to iCloud. It's quite possible that Apple's ubergenious scanning technology won't be tricked by a simple zip file! I have no idea how it will happen but I guarantee you that there will be more innocent people triggering Apple's image scanning technology than real criminals. The criminals already got the word and deleted their iCloud photos.
Bollocks. So when the Chinese government tells Apple to add a heap of CPP provided hashes, they’re going to refuse? Of course they won’t. If any government said provided data were hashes of CSAM material, who’s Apple to say it’s not?
That's the great thing about the CSAM material; it's just hashes. In some countries it could kiddie porn; in other countries it could be photos taken by the police at protest march. And in those countries, Apple won't be the only ones checking the pictures.
CSAM is not just hashes. Where did you get that idea? The hashes that Apple will compare against come from NCMEC, where the actual images are stored. The hashes are created from the images. Are we supposed to believe that NCMEC will now just accept a hash from any government that feels like sending it over without a corresponding image to go along with it?
Let’s not forget that it US law requires tech companies to report incidences of CSAM. Also, using iCloud Photo Library is opt in, so people who are worried about their photos being matched to a hash don’t need to opt in.
Gruber posits that doing the check client-side, rather than server-side, will allow them to fully encrypt iCloud backups.
You should read GoogleGuy’s response (and if I’m not mistaken, that’s probably the first time I’ve said that on this forum). Google has been encrypting Android backups for quite some time.
And yes, the database that Apple will be receiving from NCMEC will be just hashes. And we’re not just talking about them, we’re also talking about the equivalents in foreign countries.
Comments
Previously, Apple had rejected government's request to develop a custom iOS in order to break into criminals' iPhones. That would work on case-by-case basis, but Apple had still rejected it because it would set a precedent. And now, Apple sets that precedent voluntarily, and not on case-by-case basis but for the whole ecosystem...
From your posting history it's quite easy to work out that you're pretty far left; you're quite ok with surveillance, evidently, and can't see how a 180º about-turn on their privacy stance is wrong. Which is likely also why you can't see how this potentially being the the start of widespread government surveillance is a problem. Maybe people will stop complaining about this when you stop "wailing" about the UK leaving the EU. Only there was a vote that you lost for that, this has been imposed.
I know everyone appears to be content to cling to their ignorance, and perhaps you prefer to do the same. Or, if you''re just being willfully malicious, there are plenty of other Apple bashers to keep you company. But, in the case you aren't content to intentionally spread dis-information, why don't you actually do something to alleviate your ignorance before you say more.
So many people so willing to be ignorant on so many things. The internet has essentially devolved into a cess pool of stupidity and misguided outrage.
Regarding the first paragraph:
I was talking about the US government because you were talking about the US government, and them inserting hashes of images of Chinese people into the dataset. I can't debate with you if you change the subject in every post.
Apple have stated that they will only work with data provided by "NCMEC and other child safety groups", nothing about government (NCMEC is government funded, but independent). And in the system being introduced Apple check the photos as the second tier review, not the government: "There is no automated reporting to law enforcement, and Apple conducts human review before making a report to NCMEC", so you're plain wrong about that one.
Quotes from: https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/Expanded_Protections_for_Children_Frequently_Asked_Questions.pdf
Also, as has been mentioned several times already, everyone can opt out.
Exactly. This is not a backdoor. Processing of user photos is not new. Heck, people use internet services every day where their photos are stored "in the clear", processed by AI, etc, and they don't seem to care. But now Apple announces a "well-designed, privacy-in-mind" service to help protect their own cloud services from hosting illegal content and suddeny Apple is the bad guy? It's puzzling.
This is not a backdoor. A "door" allows outside access into the system. That's not what this is. The system "pushes" a notification out of the system to vetted organizations to respond to clear violations, only after a threshold has been exceeded. Nobody is looking at your iCloud Photo library except you.
And the other paranoia is about governments using the law to force Apple to do something else, which has always been the case, governments could do that at any time and nothing has changed.
This is a massive hullabaloo about Apple doing exactly what you’d expect of them - finding a practical, secure way of being a responsible corporation without intruding on the privacy of their customers in any significant and meaningful way except when egregious wrongdoing is taking place.
And if government were to legally obligate Apple to do something else then that’s no different from if they had done so last week. Governments have no more and no less power over Apple than they have ever have.
It is much easier for Apple to say “get stuffed” to government overreach if it doesn’t have the ability to tell government who has the photos in the first place, don’t you think?
Like SWATTing, CSLAMing can get you in trouble with the law by taking advantage of Apple's boneheaded plan to scan everyone's photos continuously. All someone needs to do to CSLAM someone is to copy a lot of illegal photos onto your iCloud synced iOS device when you are not looking. "Hey, can I borrow your phone? I need to make a quick call." Perhaps copy a zip file to their shared folder that ends up getting backed up to iCloud. It's quite possible that Apple's ubergenious scanning technology won't be tricked by a simple zip file!
I have no idea how it will happen but I guarantee you that there will be more innocent people triggering Apple's image scanning technology than real criminals. The criminals already got the word and deleted their iCloud photos.