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  • Despite Thunderbolt, iPad to Mac communication is still a mess

    macplusplusmacplusplus
    "We tested the connection issue first using Apple's Thunderbolt 4 cable included with the Studio Displayand a Satechi Thunderbolt 4 cable that was newly purchased. When either cable was used, the iPad Pro would flash in and out of Finder as if the cable was shorted or broken somehow."

    That flashing in and out of Finder occurs with Lightning cables as well, and almost after every iOS/iPadOS update. Apple's suggestion was to reset Location and Privacy first, if no solution then to reset Network settings. This the old "Trust this computer/iPad/iPhone" issue. With Lightning, the use of an original or Apple-certified cable is a must.
    watto_cobrakillroy

  • The best video converter apps for Mac

    macplusplusmacplusplus
    Since you included FFMPEG among "apps", the built-in Apple command-line tool "avconvert" too is worth mentioning. Type "avconvert --help" or better "man avconvert" in Terminal to see its options.
    spock1234rrrob

  • San Francisco doctor charged with possessing child pornography in iCloud

    macplusplusmacplusplus
    Looks like they caught this jerk without installing spyware on his phone.
    That’s old news. All the commercial cloud services have hash checking server-side, including Apple:

    https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2020/01/09/apples-scanning-icloud-photos-for-child-abuse-images/

    …what they’re working on now is making the check happen on your phone prior to upload, so that your iCloud stuff is fully E2E, which it isn’t currently. The butthurts don’t comprehend this.

    This is not the E2E encryption you were waiting for, i.e the one that would fully encrypt "your iCloud stuff". Their technical document mentions some "device-generated keys" but that pertains only to iCloud Photos, since it is tied to CSAM matching.

    Besides, they have never declared openly and clearly that they are bringing E2E encryption to iCloud Photos, correct me if I missed something.
    gatorguybaconstangAlex_Vmuthuk_vanalingam

  • Apple privacy head explains privacy protections of CSAM detection system

    macplusplusmacplusplus
    peteo said:
    Rayz2016 said:
    mike_galloway said:

    It would be helpful (rather than just trashing the offered fix from Apple) to offered an alternative solution - unless we wish to state that there is not a problem to solve.


    Criticism is easy but solutions are difficult - buts lets try.

    I’ll have a think. 
    we already know what the solution is. Only run this in the cloud on iCloud photos. Do not run it on the users device. Of course, I believe they can not do this since iCloud photos are encrypted when in the cloud?
    iCloud Photos are encryped on the cloud with Apple's keys, not devıce (user's) keys.
    baconstangbyronlmuthuk_vanalingamdarkvader

  • Open letter asks Apple not to implement Child Safety measures

    macplusplusmacplusplus
    killroy said:
    killroy said:
    killroy said:
    omasou said:
    Apple should shut down iCloud instead of developing a mass surveillance method for the government.
    It is NOT a mass surveillance method for the government. It is a system for REPORTING CSAM and designed to be an advocate for and to protect children.

    If we see or are aware of CSAM we should report it. Apple can SEE and be AWARE of CSAM w/o violating anyone's privacy and SHOULD report it.
    OK. Why do they monitor my device from within? They can scan their servers for any abusive material. User backups on iCloud are stored unencrypted and law enforcement can always access those backups with a search warrant. They can perform the same CSAM hash checking on their iCloud servers as well.

    The fact that they are bringing the monitoring right into my device shows that they might be following a totally different agenda than preventing child abuse. They may be trying to permanently implement something onto user devices which scope may extend to God knows where...

    Because once it's on Apple servers they can't see it because it's encrypted. You have to see it before it's encrypted or it won't work.
    This is just not true. They store iCloud content on their servers encrypted but with Apple's keys. Your device keys are not used to encrypt content on iCloud (with a few exceptions like passwords etc., certainly not photos). Since they can decrypt your iCloud data and deliver it to law enforcement anytime (with a search warrant), they can do so for their hash business too. Since they already get the permission to scan your content on iCloud by license agreement, what is the point in injecting another but questionable tool into your device, your own property?

    Your phone yes the OS not so much. If you read your phone carriers terms of service you might find that they can upload anything they want to. What Apple is proposing is to  do is add a firewall on the OS to keep the nefarious stuff off their servers.

    Today iCloud Photos. Tomorrow what? iCloud Drive? Including the Desktop and Documents folders of all your Macs? To protect themselves from your nefarious junk?

    You can just op-out. i don't think Google or Facebook and others that have been doing it for yaers give you that.
    Such superficial comparisons with Google or Facebook don't help and are misleading. iCloud Drive is much more than a photo repository, it is a fundamental component of macOS. Google and Facebook don't host your Desktop and Documents folders. Apple's responsibility is deeper than Google's or Facebook's or Dropbox's. Pushing the opt-out option as an argument is just an implicit way to admit how such projects may put the whole ecosystem at stakes.
    darkvadermuthuk_vanalingam