applebynature

jdw said:

I personally feel folks need to leave Musk alone.  

anonymouse said:

applebynature said:

beowulfschmidt said:

applebynature said:

anonymouse said:

The purpose of the law is ending end-to-end encryption. Child sex abuse is simply being used as the most emotionally compelling rationale for doing so. Apparently this does result in a lot of confusion.

Ironically, victims of child sex abuse are being exploited by lawmakers who want to end privacy.

You are unequivocally and absolutely incorrect. Did you read the damn bill? No you didn't. Because it doesn't ONCE mention encryption. It literally even spells out ways that a company can itself decide how to accomplish the task. For instance it would allow Apple to implement it's CSAM detection service that they've already developed that does not break encryption as satisfying this law, as I stated from the beginning.
You literally have no idea what you're talking about. You're just typing BS from your emotional response to this bill, which again, is NOT aimed at encryption. 
Damn you're so confused, aren't you? Well I guess maybe not so much confused as completely lacking any actual knowledge of this topic whatsoever.

No, anonymouse is exactly correct.  Of course the law isn't explicitly purposed to end encryption, that would expose their agenda.  But whatever the stated purpose, the intended effect is to eliminate end-to-end encryption, or weaken it unto uselessness, so that governments can have access to citizens' private communication, "just in case", and "for their own protection".  CSAM is just the excuse they're using to justify it.

Ah, I see you're employing the Slippery Slope Fallacy here. Moving on.

Slippery Slope's status as a "fallacy" is controversial at best, particularly regarding civil  and political rights. However, arguing that a conclusion is wrong because the argument is based on a fallacy unequivocally commits the argument from fallacy fallacy. Arguing that there are no slippery slopes because not all slopes are slippery seems like a significant lapsus logice.

See how calling out fallacies can be a slippery slope of its own?

But just for you guys who are claiming there is nothing to see here, from the article,

The bill reasons that law enforcement is not capable of identifying child sexual abuse material being shared across online messaging services like iMessage, due to the implementation of end-to-end encryption. Therefore, the law would empower regulator Ofcom to order such platforms to scan the contents of messages. 

However, to accomplish that, there has to be a weakening of end-to-end encryption itself, making it less secure and eliminating the whole point of using the technique for privacy in the first place. 

Apple's plan to detect CSAM was limited to images uploaded to iCloud, and had absolutely nothing to do with images transmitted via iMessage that were not uploaded to iCloud. Anyone arguing that this is not a poorly disguised attack on end-to-end encryption generally is either engaged in wishful thinking or simply hasn't been paying attention to the attacks on end-to-end encryption engaged in by multiple governments, including that of the UK.

And, we see how effective it is to cite child sex abuse as the target of such laws; it's such an emotional subject that some of you have already suspended all rational thinking.

beowulfschmidt said:

applebynature said:

anonymouse said:

The purpose of the law is ending end-to-end encryption. Child sex abuse is simply being used as the most emotionally compelling rationale for doing so. Apparently this does result in a lot of confusion.

Ironically, victims of child sex abuse are being exploited by lawmakers who want to end privacy.

You are unequivocally and absolutely incorrect. Did you read the damn bill? No you didn't. Because it doesn't ONCE mention encryption. It literally even spells out ways that a company can itself decide how to accomplish the task. For instance it would allow Apple to implement it's CSAM detection service that they've already developed that does not break encryption as satisfying this law, as I stated from the beginning.
You literally have no idea what you're talking about. You're just typing BS from your emotional response to this bill, which again, is NOT aimed at encryption. 
Damn you're so confused, aren't you? Well I guess maybe not so much confused as completely lacking any actual knowledge of this topic whatsoever.

No, anonymouse is exactly correct.  Of course the law isn't explicitly purposed to end encryption, that would expose their agenda.  But whatever the stated purpose, the intended effect is to eliminate end-to-end encryption, or weaken it unto uselessness, so that governments can have access to citizens' private communication, "just in case", and "for their own protection".  CSAM is just the excuse they're using to justify it.

anonymouse said:

applebynature said:

anonymouse said:

applebynature said:

I'm a bit confused as to why Apple would be so against this when they already have a ready-to-go service (that they voluntarily developed themselves) that would scan for such images while keeping end-to-end encryption intact.

Because that's completely irrelevant to the issue of legislation outlawing end-to-end encryption. I'm not sure why this would cause confusion.

The legislation described here would not necessitate the outlawing of end-to-end encryption absolutely, only require that CSAM be able to be detected and reported. Apple's implementation would satisfy the law without breaking encryption. The purpose of the proposed law is CSAM, not breaking encryption.
I'm not sure why this would cause confusion.

The purpose of the law is ending end-to-end encryption. Child sex abuse is simply being used as the most emotionally compelling rationale for doing so. Apparently this does result in a lot of confusion.

Ironically, victims of child sex abuse are being exploited by lawmakers who want to end privacy.

anonymouse said:

applebynature said:

I'm a bit confused as to why Apple would be so against this when they already have a ready-to-go service (that they voluntarily developed themselves) that would scan for such images while keeping end-to-end encryption intact.

Because that's completely irrelevant to the issue of legislation outlawing end-to-end encryption. I'm not sure why this would cause confusion.