carnegie

AppleInsider said:

Apple CEO Tim Cook has sold shares in his company worth about $33 million, and received just under half that after tax.

As detailed in a filing to the Securities and Exchange Commission, Cook sold 196,410 shares, and did so in multiple batches. Based on stated prices received per share, Cook earned between $33.04 million and $33.23 million before taxes.

The sums are a fraction of the estimated $355 million he made selling five million shares in 2021. It's also not as much as the last time he sold shares, when he got around $41.5 million in October 2023.

That 2023 sale came at time when Apple's stock was trading lower than usual, and that's also what is happening now. Apple's stock has dropped sufficiently since its all-time high in December 2023 that firms such as Loop Capital have been advising against buying Apple shares lately.

Few analysts, though, have recommended actively selling them, because there are positive signs of recovery.

However, as first spotted by MacRumors, the SEC filing notes that the sale "was made pursuant to a Rule 10b5-1 trading plan adopted by the reporting person on November 28, 2022."

So Cook has a trading plan. While the details Cook has decided on are not known, this means that his shares will automatically be put up for sale when certain conditions are met.

There are insider trading laws governing how company executives can or can't sell shares in their firms, but Cook still has the option to sell outside of his predetermined plan. This is what he did in 2021, when he received five million shares as the last part of his original 2011 contract for taking on the role of CEO.

Aside from that major sale, and smaller ones that appear to have been triggered automatically by his trading plan, Cook has generally held on to his Apple shares. He did so throughout 2022, for instance, when many other Apple executives cashed some in.



Read on AppleInsider

Mr. Cook only sold around $16-1/2 million worth of shares - about 97.2 million of the 196.4 million which just vested. The rest of the vesting shares were withheld by Apple. In these circumstances Apple doesn’t anctually issue those shares. Rather, it submits their value based on the vesting share price to various tax authorities to meet withholding requirements.

I’d also point out that the main reason Mr. Cook didn’t sell shares in 2022 is that he didn’t have any shares vest in 2022. He generally, though not always, sells new shares when they vest. The general timing of his share sales are fairly predictable.

foregoneconclusion said:

gatorguy said: The book case concerned illegal collusion that resulted in price fixing between Apple and the major publishers. 65% market share is absolutely a relevant statistic when it comes to a company's exposure to antitrust claims. 

No it isn't.

U.S. antitrust law is primarily based on demonstrating harm to consumers. That's why a multi-company conspiracy TO RAISE PRICES ON CONSUMERS is a violation even though it was limited to NYT bestsellers and not the entire ebook market. Like I noted, Amazon had nearly 90% control of the ebook market and was not subject to any antitrust lawsuits regarding ebooks. And still aren't today despite having a commission structure that makes Apple's look positively timid. How do you explain that if you think 65% market share is important in regards to U.S. antitrust law? Amazon would be a slam dunk for lawsuits if that was important. 

Amazon is subject to an antitrust lawsuit relating to its eBook business. There's one going on now in a federal district court in the Southern District of New York - In Re Amazon.com, Inc. eBook Antitrust Litigation. In that case a magistrate judge recommended that Section 2 claims against Amazon shouldn't be dismissed based in part on findings that the plaintiffs adequately pled that Amazon has monopoly power based on its high market share. Amazon's eBook market share is definitely relevant in that antitrust action.

That said, an antitrust allegation wouldn't necessarily be a slam dunk just because a defendant has high enough market share in a relevant market. That's because there's another element to Section 2 violations... anticompetitive behavior.

This case should have been over years ago. Under existing U.S. antitrust law, i.e. the Supreme Court's Illinois Brick (1977) decision, the plaintiffs, i.e. iOS app consumers, didn't rightfully have standing to bring such an antirust suit. But Justice Kavanaugh saw fit to effectively rewrite that corner of U.S. antitrust law when the Supreme Court decided Apple v Pepper (2018). That was a poorly reasoned decision. But he got 5 votes so we're stuck with it.

That said, the plaintiffs still have quite an uphill climb in this case. They're making Sherman Act Section 2 claims which require a showing of monopoly power. In order to show such monopoly power for Apple they need a favorable relevant market definition. Effectively, they need a single-brand relevant aftermarket - e.g., iOS App distribution.

Establishing such a single-brand market in Apple's case will be difficult in light of what the Ninth Circuit said about such markets in Epic v Apple (2023). At best someone might be able to credibly argue that such a market existed in the early days of iOS. But at this point I think the majority of people buying iPhones and iPads know how the Apple App Store works (and that you generally can't download apps through other app stores) and such general consumer knowledge blows up the first element which an antitrust claimant needs to demonstrate to get to a single-brand relevant market definition.

strongy said:

avon b7 said:

I found a heavily redacted file of the case,(. pdf):

https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Apple-iPhone-motion-for-class-cert.pdf&ved=2ahUKEwi007HX44-EAxVQgP0HHT_kB2A4FBAWegQICBAB&usg=AOvVaw0XWOmus6tWTw53K-NTONpN

And this was part of that:

"First, Prof. McFadden investigated what app store commission rates Apple would have charged in a competitive but-for world (“BFW”). But for Apple’s anticompetitive conduct, there

would have been non-Apple iOS app stores, against which Apple’s App Store would have had to compete to sell apps and IAP to iOS device consumers; as a result, Apple would have charged lower, competitive commission rates. Prof. McFadden has determined that the BFW commission rate would have ranged from 10% to 12%. Prof. McFadden based this range on various benchmark

analyses he performed as well as his analysis of Apple’s App Store profit margin. Byrd Decl., Ex.

K, ¶ 136."

I wonder what he thinks about Apple’s EU proposals?

It is going to be interesting to eventually see what Apple is not revealing here.

Curiously, while searching for that I saw some sites saying his testimony had been rejected. 

That professor must be out of date or crooked even epic says that the 12% is costing them money and they provide less than Apple does 

What Professor McFadden is claiming is, at best, disingenuous.

Sure, if there had been competition in the iOS app distribution market then the rate charged by Apple (and others) just for app distribution (and directly related) services might have been meaningfully lower than it has been. But that really only means that Apple would have broken out the charges - e.g., 10% of certain revenues for reviewing, hosting, and distributing apps and another 20% of those revenues for using Apple's IP.

As it has been Apple hasn't really been charging 30% (or 15%) for distribution related services. It's largely been charging for the use of its IP. When it comes to that Apple IP use there's no such thing as a competitive market; there isn't supposed to be a competitive market. Apple has a legal monopoly on such use. And the irony is, the more such IP use is untied from other services the more Apple is free to charge whatever it wants for such use without the potential for antitrust recourse. The only limit on what Apple can charge for the use of its IP - to the extent the licensing of such use is a stand alone transaction - is what the market will bear. And it's pretty clear at this point that a lot of developers are willing to pay a lot for such use. The use of that IP - and the resulting ability to make functioning iOS apps - is very highly valued.

So, yeah, if alternate app stores had always been allowed, then the commission (on certain revenues) for the use of Apple's App Store would likely have been lower - perhaps 10 or 12%. But there likely would have been a separate commission owed to Apple regardless of whether a developer used Apple's App Store for distribution. The cumulative costs to developers for iOS use and app distribution - and thus the to-consumer prices in general - wouldn't necessarily have been lower.

As has been pointed out many times, the key issue here is the use of Apple's IP. Developers highly value that IP use, and they have no inherent right to it, so it's reasonable that they pay a substantial commission (and/or other fees) for it. If, e.g., the commission was too high then that would be obvious from a broad unwillingness on behalf of developers to pay it.

You can't credibly argue that the use of that IP isn't valuable enough to justify a 15 or 30% commission, but yet at the same time it's so valuable that developers have no choice but to agree to Apple's terms so that they can use it (i.e. so that they can make apps which work on iOS). That is, in effect, what critics of Apple's commissions are arguing. Hidden within the dissonant argument is the assertion that developers have some inherent right to use Apple's IP. Such an assertion runs contrary to the concept of property rights which is one of the cornerstones of societal organization.

I'd note that this is one issue on which Apple initially lost, with the district court determining that Apple wasn't entitled to attorney's fees from Epic. But the Ninth Circuit reversed that finding and remanded to the district court to determine how much Apple was owed. So that's what's left, determining how much Apple gets for attorney's fees.

I could see this issue going either way. Apple could get essentially all that it's asking (or will ask) for. Or, based on the wording of the indemnification clause at issue, I could see Judge Rogers' greatly reducing what Apple gets. I wish the Ninth Circuit had provided a little more clarity on this front as it seems likely to me that this matter will end up back before the Ninth Circuit.