watching all these guys scramble to play catch up. People have been kicking around how to do a successful tablet for how many years now? And like .. they are going to cook something competitive up in a few months? Yeah. Right.
The problem with Microsoft is Windows. 30 seconds + loading time on my wife's notebook, one of the most complaint I heard all day. I bet she couldn't wait replacing it with something faster. If Apple & Goolge execute Lion & ChromeOS right I bet there'll be a great mass exodus in computer world starting next year.
But what I really can't understand is Microsoft pushing Windows 7 (again) on a tablet. Is this Ballmer's doing? Is he really that stupid?
Ballmer is trying to convince shareholders that MS is not far behind. He is implying that Win7 was developed with tablets in mind and is a perfect OS for the platform. This of course is somewhat true, as even WinXP ran on "tablets", but these are not the same as the iPad.
I think Balmer is trying to buy time as a CEO, as his days are numbered. With HP moving to Palm OS and Dell to Android, MS is declining into irrelevance and he knows it.
The last time Microsoft attempted to deliver a portable version of its desktop OS was in Windows NT 4, which ran on x86, PowerPC, MIPS and DEC Alpha CPUs and later added support for Intel's Itanium server processor. All non-Intel ports of Windows NT were abandoned in 2000, and today's Windows 7 only supports the PC standard x64 CPUs and Itanium servers, with no binary software compatibility between the two processor architectures nor any packaging system for distributing multiple-binary software.
I don't recall Microsoft ever having been able to port NT to a big-endian architecture like PowerPC (maybe in the lab, halfway, but not commercially). I do remember that the HP PA-RISC architecture, which was originally big-endian got a special bit that switched it to little-endian with the goal that Windows NT could run on it.
For those who do not know, big-endian and little-endian are two fundamentally different memory layouts where the bytes that make up larger values (e.g. the bytes in a a 2-byte 16bit value) are in a different order. Mac OS X and NeXTSTEP before it are fully portable, not just in terms of CPU instructions (which is not so difficult) but also in memory access (which is). Ugly written system software that peeks and pokes around with bits, assuming it is either big or little endian, is not portable across that divide. Windows has been a prime example of that uglyness for a long time (though I do not know if Vista/7 have done away with that) What is ARM? Big- or little-endian?
I bet I know what Ballmer and crew will be showcasing next year at the CES... The Windows7 App Store!
Ballmer, Jobs has given you your marching orders!
No shit. It was leaked that Windows 8 was getting an App Store 6 or 7 months ago!
My guess is that it will be underwhelming though as they already have an App Store. The announcement will essentially amount to "we're adding some extra categories". Not very exciting.
I don't recall Microsoft ever having been able to port NT to a big-endian architecture like PowerPC (maybe in the lab, halfway, but not commercially). I do remember that the HP PA-RISC architecture, which was originally big-endian got a special bit that switched it to little-endian with the goal that Windows NT could run on it.
For those who do not know, big-endian and little-endian are two fundamentally different memory layouts where the bytes that make up larger values (e.g. the bytes in a a 2-byte 16bit value) are in a different order. Mac OS X and NeXTSTEP before it are fully portable, not just in terms of CPU instructions (which is not so difficult) but also in memory access (which is). Ugly written system software that peeks and pokes around with bits, assuming it is either big or little endian, is not portable across that divide. Windows has been a prime example of that uglyness for a long time (though I do not know if Vista/7 have done away with that) What is ARM? Big- or little-endian?
Ballmer is trying to convince shareholders that MS is not far behind. He is implying that Win7 was developed with tablets in mind and is a perfect OS for the platform.
There is also something funny going on with his definitions of what Windows is. A while back someone asked him about their tablet strategy and he said "it will run Windows". Then he held up a WP7 and said something like "this is Windows, it's all Windows" where it's obviously not the same thing, and the distinction is critical.
I've had no idea of what his point was, or if he even had one. Perhaps it was something to do with shareholders.
Personally I think they should do two tablets. A consumer focused ARM/WP7 light weight device and a separate business focused x86/W7 or W7 embedded device (maybe even with an optional keyboard). Both could run the exact same applications off the same application store and could support any future architecturers since the code is all interpreted.
There is no way Microsoft will catch Apple in the consumer space whilst they let demands from business guide their tablet strategy.
You can have hardware equal to, or in addition of, the iPad, but that is not the only thing that makes a great tablet. It will be interesting to see if HP has something in the software and apps departments that will help this sell. Of course, it doesn't help when the iPad 2 is set to debut around the same time that the HP tablet is going on sale.
But what I really can't understand is Microsoft pushing Windows 7 (again) on a tablet. Is this Ballmer's doing? Is he really that stupid?
Yes, Ballmer could be that stupid. He's not alone. Apparently the entire executive team keeps marching to the same drum beat, and what does that say about the board of directors?
This is standard large corporation incompetence. The company I work for is engaged in similar foolishness. They keep following a plan of denying funding to departments across the company. This looks great on paper for the bottom line with all the money they're 'saving'. The problem is, our teams can't develop the infrastructure and the next set of tools to be competitive on future contract bids, so what will happen is we'll lose our sources of income, consequently the cost cutting measures will kill the company.
Microsoft is doing the same old crap and expecting a successful result. One thing I guess they haven't realized is they can't illegally abuse a monopoly position here, so they'll need to pursue a different strategy - one of innovation, which might mean leaving Windows behind. I'm not sure they have the vision to do that. They might have the talent (if those haven't abandoned ship already), but it's hamstrung by management.
I don't recall Microsoft ever having been able to port NT to a big-endian architecture like PowerPC (maybe in the lab, halfway, but not commercially). I do remember that the HP PA-RISC architecture, which was originally big-endian got a special bit that switched it to little-endian with the goal that Windows NT could run on it.
For those who do not know, big-endian and little-endian are two fundamentally different memory layouts where the bytes that make up larger values (e.g. the bytes in a a 2-byte 16bit value) are in a different order. Mac OS X and NeXTSTEP before it are fully portable, not just in terms of CPU instructions (which is not so difficult) but also in memory access (which is). Ugly written system software that peeks and pokes around with bits, assuming it is either big or little endian, is not portable across that divide. Windows has been a prime example of that uglyness for a long time (though I do not know if Vista/7 have done away with that) What is ARM? Big- or little-endian?
They sure did. One of the original intents was for it to be "portable" X86 was not nearly as intrenched as the standard then. It wasn't aimed at Apple machines but IBM units and wasn't around very long. Remember that NT4 was just MS's steal job of OS/2. IBM had an interest in the early development (If I recall correctly. MS was criticized at the time for its practice of having alternate hardware vendors foot the bill for the development costs for the alternate ports) and IBM futzed around with what they would actually do with PPC.
The result of these various requirements was the PowerPC (Performance Computing) specification.
When the first PowerPC products reached the market, they were met with enthusiasm. In addition to Apple, both IBM and the Motorola Computer Group offered systems built around the processors. Microsoft released Windows NT 3.51 for the architecture, which was used in Motorola's PowerPC servers, and Sun Microsystems offered a version of its Solaris OS. IBM ported its AIX Unix and planned a release of OS/2. Throughout the mid-1990s, PowerPC processors achieved benchmark test scores that matched or exceeded those of the fastest x86 CPUs.
Ultimately, demand for the new architecture on the desktop never truly materialized. Windows, OS/2 and Sun customers, faced with the lack of application software for the PowerPC, almost universally ignored the chip. The PowerPC versions of Solaris, OS/2, and Windows were discontinued after only a brief period on the market. Only on the Macintosh, due to Apple's persistence, did the PowerPC gain traction. To Apple, the performance of the PowerPC was a bright spot in the face of increased competition from Windows 95 and Windows NT-based PCs.
IBM diddled around too much and should have ported all its software and and made over its desktop line based on PPC. The CHRP platform wound up being a joke because nobody but Apple made use of it.
If they had promoted their own damn hardware, it might have developed into something beyond an academic exercise going nowhere in the market.
Comments
Yawn.
Ditto
For tablet, Windows 7 is just impossible.
But what I really can't understand is Microsoft pushing Windows 7 (again) on a tablet. Is this Ballmer's doing? Is he really that stupid?
Ballmer is trying to convince shareholders that MS is not far behind. He is implying that Win7 was developed with tablets in mind and is a perfect OS for the platform. This of course is somewhat true, as even WinXP ran on "tablets", but these are not the same as the iPad.
I think Balmer is trying to buy time as a CEO, as his days are numbered. With HP moving to Palm OS and Dell to Android, MS is declining into irrelevance and he knows it.
The last time Microsoft attempted to deliver a portable version of its desktop OS was in Windows NT 4, which ran on x86, PowerPC, MIPS and DEC Alpha CPUs and later added support for Intel's Itanium server processor. All non-Intel ports of Windows NT were abandoned in 2000, and today's Windows 7 only supports the PC standard x64 CPUs and Itanium servers, with no binary software compatibility between the two processor architectures nor any packaging system for distributing multiple-binary software.
I don't recall Microsoft ever having been able to port NT to a big-endian architecture like PowerPC (maybe in the lab, halfway, but not commercially). I do remember that the HP PA-RISC architecture, which was originally big-endian got a special bit that switched it to little-endian with the goal that Windows NT could run on it.
For those who do not know, big-endian and little-endian are two fundamentally different memory layouts where the bytes that make up larger values (e.g. the bytes in a a 2-byte 16bit value) are in a different order. Mac OS X and NeXTSTEP before it are fully portable, not just in terms of CPU instructions (which is not so difficult) but also in memory access (which is). Ugly written system software that peeks and pokes around with bits, assuming it is either big or little endian, is not portable across that divide. Windows has been a prime example of that uglyness for a long time (though I do not know if Vista/7 have done away with that) What is ARM? Big- or little-endian?
I bet I know what Ballmer and crew will be showcasing next year at the CES... The Windows7 App Store!
Ballmer, Jobs has given you your marching orders!
No shit.
My guess is that it will be underwhelming though as they already have an App Store. The announcement will essentially amount to "we're adding some extra categories". Not very exciting.
I don't recall Microsoft ever having been able to port NT to a big-endian architecture like PowerPC (maybe in the lab, halfway, but not commercially). I do remember that the HP PA-RISC architecture, which was originally big-endian got a special bit that switched it to little-endian with the goal that Windows NT could run on it.
For those who do not know, big-endian and little-endian are two fundamentally different memory layouts where the bytes that make up larger values (e.g. the bytes in a a 2-byte 16bit value) are in a different order. Mac OS X and NeXTSTEP before it are fully portable, not just in terms of CPU instructions (which is not so difficult) but also in memory access (which is). Ugly written system software that peeks and pokes around with bits, assuming it is either big or little endian, is not portable across that divide. Windows has been a prime example of that uglyness for a long time (though I do not know if Vista/7 have done away with that) What is ARM? Big- or little-endian?
ARM is bi-endian:
http://www.arium.com/pdf/Endianness.pdf
I guess that means that they eat their hard-boiled eggs from the middle.
Ballmer is trying to convince shareholders that MS is not far behind. He is implying that Win7 was developed with tablets in mind and is a perfect OS for the platform.
There is also something funny going on with his definitions of what Windows is. A while back someone asked him about their tablet strategy and he said "it will run Windows". Then he held up a WP7 and said something like "this is Windows, it's all Windows" where it's obviously not the same thing, and the distinction is critical.
I've had no idea of what his point was, or if he even had one. Perhaps it was something to do with shareholders.
Personally I think they should do two tablets. A consumer focused ARM/WP7 light weight device and a separate business focused x86/W7 or W7 embedded device (maybe even with an optional keyboard). Both could run the exact same applications off the same application store and could support any future architecturers since the code is all interpreted.
There is no way Microsoft will catch Apple in the consumer space whilst they let demands from business guide their tablet strategy.
You can have hardware equal to, or in addition of, the iPad, but that is not the only thing that makes a great tablet. It will be interesting to see if HP has something in the software and apps departments that will help this sell. Of course, it doesn't help when the iPad 2 is set to debut around the same time that the HP tablet is going on sale.
But what I really can't understand is Microsoft pushing Windows 7 (again) on a tablet. Is this Ballmer's doing? Is he really that stupid?
Yes, Ballmer could be that stupid. He's not alone. Apparently the entire executive team keeps marching to the same drum beat, and what does that say about the board of directors?
This is standard large corporation incompetence. The company I work for is engaged in similar foolishness. They keep following a plan of denying funding to departments across the company. This looks great on paper for the bottom line with all the money they're 'saving'. The problem is, our teams can't develop the infrastructure and the next set of tools to be competitive on future contract bids, so what will happen is we'll lose our sources of income, consequently the cost cutting measures will kill the company.
Microsoft is doing the same old crap and expecting a successful result. One thing I guess they haven't realized is they can't illegally abuse a monopoly position here, so they'll need to pursue a different strategy - one of innovation, which might mean leaving Windows behind. I'm not sure they have the vision to do that. They might have the talent (if those haven't abandoned ship already), but it's hamstrung by management.
I don't recall Microsoft ever having been able to port NT to a big-endian architecture like PowerPC (maybe in the lab, halfway, but not commercially). I do remember that the HP PA-RISC architecture, which was originally big-endian got a special bit that switched it to little-endian with the goal that Windows NT could run on it.
For those who do not know, big-endian and little-endian are two fundamentally different memory layouts where the bytes that make up larger values (e.g. the bytes in a a 2-byte 16bit value) are in a different order. Mac OS X and NeXTSTEP before it are fully portable, not just in terms of CPU instructions (which is not so difficult) but also in memory access (which is). Ugly written system software that peeks and pokes around with bits, assuming it is either big or little endian, is not portable across that divide. Windows has been a prime example of that uglyness for a long time (though I do not know if Vista/7 have done away with that) What is ARM? Big- or little-endian?
They sure did. One of the original intents was for it to be "portable" X86 was not nearly as intrenched as the standard then. It wasn't aimed at Apple machines but IBM units and wasn't around very long. Remember that NT4 was just MS's steal job of OS/2. IBM had an interest in the early development (If I recall correctly. MS was criticized at the time for its practice of having alternate hardware vendors foot the bill for the development costs for the alternate ports) and IBM futzed around with what they would actually do with PPC.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PowerPC
The result of these various requirements was the PowerPC (Performance Computing) specification.
When the first PowerPC products reached the market, they were met with enthusiasm. In addition to Apple, both IBM and the Motorola Computer Group offered systems built around the processors. Microsoft released Windows NT 3.51 for the architecture, which was used in Motorola's PowerPC servers, and Sun Microsystems offered a version of its Solaris OS. IBM ported its AIX Unix and planned a release of OS/2. Throughout the mid-1990s, PowerPC processors achieved benchmark test scores that matched or exceeded those of the fastest x86 CPUs.
Ultimately, demand for the new architecture on the desktop never truly materialized. Windows, OS/2 and Sun customers, faced with the lack of application software for the PowerPC, almost universally ignored the chip. The PowerPC versions of Solaris, OS/2, and Windows were discontinued after only a brief period on the market. Only on the Macintosh, due to Apple's persistence, did the PowerPC gain traction. To Apple, the performance of the PowerPC was a bright spot in the face of increased competition from Windows 95 and Windows NT-based PCs.
If they had promoted their own damn hardware, it might have developed into something beyond an academic exercise going nowhere in the market.