Trump demanding that Apple must unlock shooter's iPhones because of foreign apps

AppleInsiderAppleInsider
Posted:
in iPhone

Republican Presidential candidate Trump has called for Apple to help the FBI unlock iPhones and "foreign apps" belonging to people accused of plotting to assassinate him.

Sign for the J. Edgar Hoover FBI Building in front of a large, beige, grid-like office building with flags.
FBI headquarters



As predicted by AppleInsider back in July 2024, former President Trump has weighed in on the long-standing disagreement between Apple and the FBI. Repeatedly, the FBI will call for backdoors to be added to iOS to allow law enforcement access, and Apple will point out that this makes a back door for bad actors too.

Now according to Fortune magazine, Republican presidential nominee Trump has said that Apple has to help the FBI. Trump said that the FBI had been unable to unlock "three potentially foreign-based apps" on the iPhone belonging to Thomas Matthew Crooks, who was behind the shooting in Pennsylvania.

The fact that it is specifically three "foreign-based apps" that the FBI can't access, suggests that the agency has otherwise unlocked the iPhone. Conceivably, the apps store data in their own servers instead of iCloud and this is why the FBI can't get further.

Apple has previously handed over information stored in its iCloud servers to authorities. Based on existing statements made by the FBI and the Secret Service, this appears to have already happened.

But, if an app's developer stores the user's data on an external server, Apple physically cannot access it nor does it have the access to go get it.

Trump also said that the reportedly would-be assassin Ryan Wesley Routh had six cellphones. These are presumably but not definitely iPhones, which the FBI had "likewise been unable to penetrate."

"They [the FBI] must get Apple to open the foreign apps," said Trump at a rally in North Carolina, "and they must get Apple to likewise open the six phones from the second lunatic."

The speech also follows the presidential nominee being briefed by US intelligence services over a report that Iran was attempting to have him assassinated. There is no connection that has been made public between Iran and the previous incidents.

"If I were the president,' he continued, "I would inform the threatening country, in this case, Iran, that if you do anything to harm this person, we are going to blow your largest cities and the country itself to smithereens."

Apple's refusal to open up the iPhone to law enforcement was chiefly first highlighted when the firm denied a request over the Pensacola shooters in 2020. Since then, Apple has continually defended what it says is its users' right to privacy, and the FBI has carried on attempting to hack into iPhones anyway.



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Comments

  • Reply 1 of 26
    DAalsethDAalseth Posts: 2,966member
    Trump doesn’t understand what end-to-end-encryption means.
    But then there are a lot of things he doesn’t understand
    jeffharrisiOS_Guy80davxyzzy-xxxmuthuk_vanalingammikethemartianisrandymike1blastdoorAlex_V
  • Reply 2 of 26
    JamesCudeJamesCude Posts: 64member
    Sorry gramps doesn’t work like that.
    iOS_Guy80davxyzzy-xxxdavenmike1blastdoorAlex_VStrangeDays12Strangersmacxpress
  • Reply 3 of 26
    sflagelsflagel Posts: 846member
    In my mind, an analogy is a house versus a safe deposit box or a vault. 

    Parts of the iPhone and its data (iCloud) are like a house, but within that house, there may be a safe within which documents cannot be accessed.  The house can be accessed with the appropriate warrant;  but that does not mean that law-enforcement has access to the safe. 

    Are banks and manufacturers of safes boxes required to provide a master key for the safe deposit box to law-enforcement if asked? If that is the case, then the same should apply to virtual safety deposit boxes. If they are not required to provide master keys, then neither should technology providers. 
    edited September 26
  • Reply 4 of 26
    DaRevDaRev Posts: 29member
    Routh is alive and should be compelled to unlock the apps in question or face additional penalties.  As for TMC's phone and Apps. unless they are written down Trump and the FBI are SOL.
  • Reply 5 of 26
    hammeroftruthhammeroftruth Posts: 1,347member
    Apple's refusal to unlock the phones from the San Bernardino attack in 2015 was the first high-profile case. The FBI paid a large sum to Cellbrite to bypass Apple's security, but it's unclear if they found anything useful. This incident sparked a debate about whether there should be a backdoor into Apple's security, especially in light of concerns about government surveillance.
    12Strangerswilliamlondon
  • Reply 6 of 26
    hogmanhogman Posts: 23member
    Will be voting for Trump this year but absolutely not. Apple shouldn’t do it even if they could!
    williamlondon
  • Reply 7 of 26
    DAalsethDAalseth Posts: 2,966member
    sflagel said:
    In my mind, an analogy is a house versus a safe deposit box or a vault. 

    Parts of the iPhone and its data (iCloud) are like a house, but within that house, there may be a safe within which documents cannot be accessed.  The house can be accessed with the appropriate warrant;  but that does not mean that law-enforcement has access to the safe. 

    Are banks and manufacturers of safes boxes required to provide a master key for the safe deposit box to law-enforcement if asked? If that is the case, then the same should apply to virtual safety deposit boxes. If they are not required to provide master keys, then neither should technology providers. 
    The difference is that banks have a master key. Apple doesn’t have a master key, there isn’t one. That’s what makes end-to-end-encryption secure. If there was a key, a back door, the bad guys would get in. It wouldn’t be an if it would be when, and the when would be almost immediately. It also wouldn’t be just WhatsApp, it would be your banking apps, your video conferencing apps, the online stores like Amazon etc. All of that would be compromised. Criminals, both private, and state run, would LOVE it if Apple and the others were required to put a back door into their apps. 
    mike1unbeliever2netrox12Strangersmacxpress
  • Reply 8 of 26
    auxioauxio Posts: 2,754member
    The fact that it is specifically three "foreign-based apps" that the FBI can't access, suggests that the agency has otherwise unlocked the iPhone. Conceivably, the apps store data in their own servers instead of iCloud and this is why the FBI can't get further.
    Even if the data was stored in iCloud, if it was end-to-end encrypted and the app used to access it was locked with a strong password, they wouldn't be able to get it.
    edited September 26 12Strangerswilliamlondon
  • Reply 9 of 26
    mikethemartianmikethemartian Posts: 1,469member
    sflagel said:
    In my mind, an analogy is a house versus a safe deposit box or a vault. 

    Parts of the iPhone and its data (iCloud) are like a house, but within that house, there may be a safe within which documents cannot be accessed.  The house can be accessed with the appropriate warrant;  but that does not mean that law-enforcement has access to the safe. 

    Are banks and manufacturers of safes boxes required to provide a master key for the safe deposit box to law-enforcement if asked? If that is the case, then the same should apply to virtual safety deposit boxes. If they are not required to provide master keys, then neither should technology providers. 
    You have to get a court order to drill the lock.
    sflagel12Strangers
  • Reply 10 of 26
    israndyisrandy Posts: 20member
    JamesCude said:
    Sorry gramps doesn’t work like that.
    Finally a real "OK, boomer" moment.
    DAalsethmike112Strangersdewme
  • Reply 11 of 26
    unbeliever2unbeliever2 Posts: 94member
    sflagel said:
    In my mind, an analogy is a house versus a safe deposit box or a vault. 

    Parts of the iPhone and its data (iCloud) are like a house, but within that house, there may be a safe within which documents cannot be accessed.  The house can be accessed with the appropriate warrant;  but that does not mean that law-enforcement has access to the safe.

    Except this safe is inside a different house in another country where law enforcement has no jurisdiction.
    edited September 26 sflagelbeowulfschmidtspheric
  • Reply 12 of 26
    sflagelsflagel Posts: 846member
    Exactly. They need a drill. They don’t get given a master key. Equivalency is given. 
    StrangeDays
  • Reply 13 of 26
    netroxnetrox Posts: 1,479member
    sflagel said:
    In my mind, an analogy is a house versus a safe deposit box or a vault. 

    Parts of the iPhone and its data (iCloud) are like a house, but within that house, there may be a safe within which documents cannot be accessed.  The house can be accessed with the appropriate warrant;  but that does not mean that law-enforcement has access to the safe. 

    Are banks and manufacturers of safes boxes required to provide a master key for the safe deposit box to law-enforcement if asked? If that is the case, then the same should apply to virtual safety deposit boxes. If they are not required to provide master keys, then neither should technology providers. 
    This is not how end to end encryption works.

    A better analogy would be that a bank safe have TWO locks on the door, one lock requires the bank to have the key and the other lock requires the customer's key. If you unlock one of them, it still won't open. Both locks have to be unlocked in order for the safe door to be opened.

    So, if a customer doesn't have the key, the bank cannot unlock it.  
    DAalsethStrangeDays
  • Reply 14 of 26
    XedXed Posts: 2,814member
    netrox said:
    sflagel said:
    In my mind, an analogy is a house versus a safe deposit box or a vault. 

    Parts of the iPhone and its data (iCloud) are like a house, but within that house, there may be a safe within which documents cannot be accessed.  The house can be accessed with the appropriate warrant;  but that does not mean that law-enforcement has access to the safe. 

    Are banks and manufacturers of safes boxes required to provide a master key for the safe deposit box to law-enforcement if asked? If that is the case, then the same should apply to virtual safety deposit boxes. If they are not required to provide master keys, then neither should technology providers. 
    This is not how end to end encryption works.

    A better analogy would be that a bank safe have TWO locks on the door, one lock requires the bank to have the key and the other lock requires the customer's key. If you unlock one of them, it still won't open. Both locks have to be unlocked in order for the safe door to be opened.

    So, if a customer doesn't have the key, the bank cannot unlock it.  
    To further your Apr analogy, then brute force is required which in this case was either a biometric or using someone like Celebrite.

    For the old man to suggest Apple needs to hand over a key they don’t have is just another in a long line of stupid things he’s said, and one of his least egregious, TBH.
    DAalseth12Strangerswilliamlondon
  • Reply 15 of 26
    danoxdanox Posts: 3,266member
    No fishing trips, get a warrant then you can have a look and this is rich coming from a convicted felon, who fought tooth and nail against all warrants served to him.
    Alex_VDAalseth12Strangerswilliamlondondewmesconosciuto
  • Reply 16 of 26
    Spencer314Spencer314 Posts: 36member
    Apple's refusal to unlock the phones from the San Bernardino attack in 2015 was the first high-profile case. The FBI paid a large sum to Cellbrite to bypass Apple's security, but it's unclear if they found anything useful. This incident sparked a debate about whether there should be a backdoor into Apple's security, especially in light of concerns about government surveillance.
    They didn't find anything of value, which is basically what Apple had expected based on the iCloud data that they did have. 

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apple–FBI_encryption_dispute

    Also, the FBI screwed up the ability to get the phone to do a final iCloud backup, which would have resulted in the most recent content of the phone being available to law enforcement without cracking the phone. 
    mattinozspheric
  • Reply 17 of 26
    StrangeDaysStrangeDays Posts: 13,043member
    Nah we’re good. 
    williamlondonquakerotis
  • Reply 18 of 26
    12Strangers12Strangers Posts: 74member
    First and foremost, F trump. Apple should not cooperate in any way unless directed to by a court of law.
    danoxwilliamlondonsconosciutoquakerotisNotSoMuchilarynx
  • Reply 19 of 26
    macxpressmacxpress Posts: 5,912member
    Why would Apple care to cooperate with a convicted felon? Regardless, like most have said here it doesn't work that way and his dumbass will never understand it. He'll just go on an endless tirade of BS spewing to the max about how bad Tim Apple is and Apple in general. 
    danoxwilliamlondondewmeHedwaresconosciutoquakerotisNotSoMuchilarynx
  • Reply 20 of 26
    XedXed Posts: 2,814member
    macxpress said:
    Why would Apple care to cooperate with a convicted felon? Regardless, like most have said here it doesn't work that way and his dumbass will never understand it. He'll just go on an endless tirade of BS spewing to the max about how bad Tim Apple is and Apple in general. 
    Putting aside Trump being a convicted felon, rapist, philander who used illegal campaign funds to hide paying off a porn star, and a con man who has never been finically successful with any legitimate business, when there's an assassination attempt we should do our due diligence with dealing with that criminal. Even Trump should have that protection afforded to him... even though it would be so much easier to protect him if he were behind bars where he belongs.
    muthuk_vanalingamdewmesconosciutoquakerotissphericdavenNotSoMuchilarynx
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