Urei1620

Comey likes to speak from both sides of his mouth and out of ignorance, so everything he has to say is laughable nonsense. This is one mad man fixated on encryption and the companies that make the technology possible. Even Mike Rogers and Hayden recognize that unbreakable encryption is beneficial for America and for the sake of America's technological health, we should encourage tech companies to push ahead, though this makes the NSA's job harder. On the other hand Comey wants it decrypted and handed down to him on a silver platter. So you do not see much support for Jim Comey when it comes to encryption. Even during debates, everyone is against backdoors except Comey. He is a lone wolf and loose cannon. He should resign and let someone else more competent head the Fumble, Blunder, and Ignorance agency.

I agree with this ruling 100%

Congratulations Apple!

studiomusic said:

Looks like that New York judge thinks different: http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/01/technology/apple-wins-ruling-in-new-york-iphone-hacking-order.html?_r=0

woohooo. Awesome!

"Magistrate Judge James Orenstein in New York’s Eastern District said in a ruling on Monday that the United States government couldn’t use a law called the All Writs Act to force Apple to hack into an iPhone that was seized in connection with a drug case. The government overstepped what the All Writs Act was intended for, the judge wrote."

“After reviewing the facts in the record and the parties’ arguments, I conclude that none of those factors justifies imposing on Apple the obligation to assist the government’s investigation against its will,” Judge Orenstein wrote. “I therefore deny the motion.”

Take that Comey and your gang of bullies!

josu said:

metrix said:

I think no one has a problem with the FBI seeking information with a warrant. I think if Apple creates a "key" then it should absolutely be compartmentalized (sp?) so that no single person can create the key but several people are needed to come up with the key. The FBI, CIA, NSA should NEVER have that key if no other reason than with so much power they have there has to be corruption. The same can be said for Apple too, they have a lot of power hopefully too do good. If the FBI really is really only seeking information on terrorist phones then getting the information should be enough but if the real reason is to have access to everyone's iPhone than they will come out with some new reason that "we need the keys!". 

It looks that if the FBI intentions are only to get the phone information they will not ask for an special version of iOS, they could discreetly approach Apple and ask them to open the phone that THE FBI BLOCKED. Of course, Apple can do that, yes. My programing skill, ever low level, are totally gone but is as easy as going to the code line that counts the number of mistaken passwords and change the number ten that redirect to the wipe out code and put one billion or one trillion and you got a phone that can be unblocked with a brute force attack. And then What prevents FBI to install it in whatever phone they want?

Apple can do the trick to change the number, let FBI make the brute force attack in their headquarters and after that get the data inside and reinstall the standard version, yes. But that's not what they want.

Unfortunately, it is more complex than that. The FBI wants to get rid of the 10 count limit, but also wants to get rid of all delays between failed attempts so that they can brute force their way in. It is more than a change to a single line of code.

metrix said:

 I think if Apple creates a "key" then it should absolutely be compartmentalized (sp?) so that no single person can create the key but several people are needed to come up with the key.

That is still a backdoor and trust me, they will "find" the key and every oppressive government is going to require disclosure of the key. The NSA has even proposed the use of several keys. Every time you add a key, you make the security problem even more complex. Best thing is to keep the 10 password tries and delete all data with time delays between failed attempts and end-to-end encryption with forward secrecy.