ppietra
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Apple employees threaten to quit if forced to build GovtOS, report says
Nothing of what I said is related with man-in-the-middle attacks or not trusting Apple and its signature. There are people who have developed ways to jailbreak a device without needing a password and consequently can change the system without an install signature.JeffA2 said:
But this makes absolutely no sense to me. If you don't trust Apple's signing system you have bigger problems than the FBI. Any 3rd party capable of spoofing the signature could mount a man-in-the-middle attack during a software update. Poof...all your data is now in the hands of the Russian mafia. So you pretty much have to trust that Apple has control over its signing keys.ppietra said:You are technically correct about how Apple signature works, but wrong on the big picture because there are vulnerabilities that have been explored that don’t require Apple signature to change the system. Once others understand what Apple did in this tool they will try to replicate it while using those vulnerabilities for their benefit and that will work on many other phones, capable of unlocking those with bad passwords, hence being compared to a skeleton key
As for others understanding the approach -- they already understand it. There's no mystery or difficulty in modifying iOS to do what the DOJ has asked for. The only thing stopping hackers, jailbreakers or governments from doing it now is that they can't get the software to load.
How do you know there is no mystery? One thing is to have an abstract idea about the demands made, another thing is to actually know how to do it and keep the encryption system functional specially with the part where they want a programmable electronic input for the password and remotion of time limits.
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Apple employees threaten to quit if forced to build GovtOS, report says
You are technically correct about how Apple signature works, but wrong on the big picture because there are vulnerabilities that have been explored that don’t require Apple signature to change the system. Once others understand what Apple did in this tool they will try to replicate it while using those vulnerabilities for their benefit and that will work on many other phones, capable of unlocking those with bad passwords, hence being compared to a skeleton keyJeffA2 said:
Why do people keep saying this as if it were true? The 'version of iOS that allows infinite attempts at the password' is to loaded onto the phone in question via DFU mode. An iPhone will not load arbitrary software that way. It must have a valid signature and only Apple can do that. Furthermore, the software can (and by court order must) include the specific UUID of the target phone. Therefore even if this patch got out of Apple's hands, was disassembled and the UUID changed, it would fail to load on any iPhone because it would fail the signature check. To further ensure security the phone is allowed to remain in Apple's possession for the entire time it is running the altered software. As a final condition of the court order, the entire patch must be RAM resident. No flash memory on the phone can be altered. Therefore the patch will be erased from memory as soon as the target phone is unpowered.OttoReverse said:No Jeff that is not the case at all. The FBI are asking Apple to create a version of iOS that allows infinite attempts at the password. If such a version were created and subsequently stolen/leaked it could be used on any other iPhone. Hence the "skeleton key" that opens all the locks analogy.
The other issue Apple has is where does this end? At first the FBI said this is just for this one phone but them Comey (spelling?) admitted they would want to use such a compromised version many many times. So that would compel Apple to constantly maintain a compromised version of iOS in perpetuity.
What we have here is a procedure for producing a key for any specific phone, not a skeleton key. The difference is fundamental.
Your second point that Apple will be asked to do this over and over is probably correct. However, even the FBI admits that the utility of this approach is short-lived. All Apple has to do render it obsolete is require a PIN during DFU. I would expect them to add this to upcoming iOS update very soon. -
Apple employees threaten to quit if forced to build GovtOS, report says
To brute force the password it has to be done on the iPhone and its hardware takes a minimum of 80 mili-seconds between attempts. That means that it could take thousands of years to break a 8 character alphanumeric password.tenly said:
You missed my point. If you read my whole message, you'd see i said it takes 30 min or less to crack a 4 digit passcode, but thousands of years to crack a well-chosen passphrase. 8 characters does not constitute the "well chosen passphrase i was referring to". There are a number of ways to create a well-chosen passphrase and its not as easy as people think - mostly because it has to be easy enough to be memorized and typed occasionally but should be long (>32 characters), not contain any names, dates or words from the dictionary or even any acronyms based upon famous quotes or popular song lyrics - because those things are already built into some of the better brute force attack tools. The best passphrase would be to join together 3 or 4 good passwords - each of which are a meaningless mix of numbers, letters and special characters - but this is hard to remember and hard to type accurately. The context that I mentioned 8 characters in was to suggest that 8 characters might be the longest passcode/passphrase that the FBI would be "okay" with since they could brute force it in a "reasonable" amount of time.JeffA2 said:
Well an 8-digit numeric code would take only a few weeks. Your right for a 8 character mixed-case alphanumeric code though. -
Apple employees threaten to quit if forced to build GovtOS, report says
Apple does not have or had any physical control over that iPhone, no chain of custody seems to have been broken, and if the FBI were only interested in intelligence gathering they could have chosen other options, like going to the NSA. It has become clear that they wish to use this precedent for other cases where Apple would most likely have to testify and provide documentation about this new "tool".JeffA2 said:
Interesting argument. I'm not sure that's actually how things would play out though. The DOJ has already ceded physical control of the iPhone in the San Bernadino case to Apple. Doesn't that create a break in the chain of custody? The DOJ doesn't want to prosecute the Farook;s -- after al they're dead and even the FBI isn't that vindictive. What they want is the information on the phone.radarthekat said:
To support a prosecution the current scheme would be unworkable. So, while Cyrus Vance Jr. has a roomful of phones he wants unlocked, I very much doubt that the kerfuffle over the Farook's is going to help him out. Unless he too just wants data to help point an investigation in the right direction and plans to submit independently gathered evidence in court. Now that could conceivably work.
Even for evidence gathering for a legal proceeding, there are other technical options according to iPhone security specialists.
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Apple employees threaten to quit if forced to build GovtOS, report says
The AWA requires that the order doesn’t create undue burden and as such the judge has to care about these things, even if in the end it is not enough to sway her decision. Losing qualified personnel knowledgable of how the security system works is a burden, I would imagine that only a small group at Apple has this kind of responsibility.Sir_Turkey said:
No judge is going to care much about that pouting stance. The creation of an actual private from the government communication system is never going to fly. Never.ppietra said:This could be used by Apple to show the burden on the company and how it affects freedom of speech.
