ORIGIN OF THE RULE
The origin of the public safety exception to Miranda, the case of New York v. Quarles, began in the early morning hours of September 11, 1980. While on routine patrol in Queens, New York, two New York City police officers were approached by a young woman who told them that she had just been raped. She described the assailant as a black male, approximately 6 feet tall, wearing a leather jacket with "Big Ben" printed in yellow letters on the back. The woman told the officers that the man had just entered a nearby supermarket and that he was carrying a gun.
The officers drove to the supermarket, and one entered the store while the other radioed for assistance. A man matching the description was near a checkout counter, but upon seeing the officer, ran to the back of the store. The officer pursued the subject, but lost sight of him for several seconds as the individual turned a corner at the end of an aisle. Upon finding the subject, the officer ordered him to stop and to put his hands over his head. As backup personnel arrived, the officer frisked the man and discovered he was wearing an empty shoulder holster. After handcuffing him, the officer asked where the gun was. The man gestured toward empty milk cartons and said, "The gun is over there." The officer found and removed a loaded handgun from a carton, formally placed the man under arrest, and then read the Miranda rights to him. The man waived his rights and answered questions about the ownership of the gun and where it was purchased.7
The state of New York charged the man, identified as Benjamin Quarles, for criminal possession of a weapon.8 The trial court excluded the statement "The gun is over there," as well as the handgun, on the grounds that the officer did not give Quarles the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona. 9 After an appellate court affirmed the decision, the case was appealed to the New York State Court of Appeals.
The New York Court of Appeals upheld the trial court decision by a 4 to 3 vote.10 According to the New York Court of Appeals, because Quarles responded "to the police interrogation while he was in custody, [and] before he had been given the preinterrogation warnings…," the lower courts properly suppressed the statement and the gun.11 The court refused to recognize an emergency exception to Miranda and noted that even if there were such an exception, there was "no evidence in the record before us that there were exigent circumstances posing a risk to the public safety or that the police interrogation was prompted by such concern."12 In dissent, Judge Watchler believed that there was a public safety exception to Miranda and that the facts presented such a situation. Judge Watchler noted that "Miranda was never intended to enable a criminal defendant to thwart official attempts to protect the general public against an imminent, immediate and grave risk of serious physical harm reasonably perceived."13 He also believed there was "a very real threat of possible physical harm which could result from a weapon being at large."14 The state of New York appealed the case to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court ruled on these facts that a public safety exception to Miranda existed. To understand how the Court reached this conclusion and the implications of this exception on the admissibility of the statement and the handgun, a consideration of a summary of the steps used by the Court is important.
The first step toward this conclusion was a discussion by the Court of the relationship between the Miranda requirements and the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person…shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."15 The Fifth Amendment "does not prohibit all incriminating admissions," only those that are "officially coerced selfaccusations…." 16 In Miranda, the Supreme Court "for the first time extended the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination to individuals subjected to custodial interrogation by the police."17 Thus, Miranda created a presumption that "interrogation in custodial circumstances is inherently coercive" and that statements obtained under those circumstances "are inadmissible unless the subject is specifically informed of his Miranda rights and freely decides to forgo those rights."18 Importantly, the Court noted that Miranda warnings were not required by the Constitution, but were prophylactic measures designed to provide protection for the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination. 19
After providing this explanation of the relationship between the Fifth Amendment and Miranda, the Court explained that Quarles did not claim that his statements were "actually compelled by police conduct which overcame his will to resist."20 Had police officers obtained an involuntary or coerced statement from Quarles in violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, both the statement and the handgun would have been suppressed. 21 And, in this regard, the Court explained that the failure to administer Miranda warnings does not, standing alone, make a confession involuntary in violation of the Constitution. 22
The Supreme Court then proceeded to determine whether the Miranda rule was implicated in this case and agreed with the New York Court of Appeals that it was. The Court agreed with the New York courts that Quarles was in custody. As the Court noted, "Quarles was surrounded by at least four police officers and was handcuffed when the questioning at issue took place."23 Therefore, on the facts of the case, the Court found that the Miranda decision was clearly implicated. The Court then referred to the determination by the New York courts that there was nothing in the record indicating that any of the police officers were concerned with their safety when they questioned Quarles. The Supreme Court noted that the New York Court of Appeals did not address the issue of whether there was an exception to Miranda in cases that involve a danger to the public "because the lower courts in New York made no factual determination that the police had acted with that motive."24
The Supreme Court chose to address whether a public safety exception to Miranda should exist. In this regard, the Court held that: "there is a 'public safety' exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect's answers may be admitted into evidence, and the exception does not depend upon the motivation of the individual officers involved."25 Thus, according to the Court, without regard to the actual motivation of the individual officers, Miranda need not be strictly followed in situations "in which police officers ask questions reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety."26
The Court then applied the facts to the situation confronting them when Quarles was arrested. In the course of arresting Quarles, it became apparent that Quarles had removed the handgun and discarded it within the store. While the location of the handgun remained undetermined, it posed a danger to public safety.27 In this case, the officer needed an answer to the question about the location of the gun to ensure that its concealment in a public location would not endanger the public. The immediate questioning of Quarles was directed specifically at resolving this emergency. Since the questioning of Quarles was prompted by concern for public safety, the officers were not required to provide Miranda warnings to Quarles first. Therefore, the statement made by Quarles about the location of the handgun was admissible.28 In addition, because the Court found there was no violation of Miranda, the handgun also was admissible. The Court declined to address whether the handgun would have been suppressed if the statements were found to be inadmissible.29