According to the gov't, he was the 20th hijacker, and he's being prosecuted as such. Are you going to be a witness for the defense?
</strong>
That he is part of team on UA 93, I don't think so. I think the connections are fairly tenuous until they find out whether he was in a cell and if so, whether that cell was in on the Sept 11 hijackings. We won't know until some documentation is found, like a planning book with his name and the names of the hijackers in it. Right now, they don't have anything except his connection with Atta.
Finding him, them finding Atta was key. Of course, the CIA could have tracked down 5 of the hijackers too...
[quote]The media and the public love a reformer. This may explain the reaction this week to a 13-page letter from FBI agent Coleen Rowley criticizing the investigation of Zacarias Moussaoui.
Rowley has been portrayed by national publications such as Time magazine in almost breathless terms as a cross between Martin Luther and Annie Oakley.
What is astonishing is how little of her memo actually has been read or quoted beyond its most sensational suggestions, such as the notion that Rowley and her colleagues might have been able to prevent one or more of the Sept. 11 attacks.
Rowley's criticism of the FBI largely turns on disagreement over the meaning of probable cause. Rowley insists that there was probable cause to secure a search warrant for Moussaoui's computer and personal effects. FBI headquarters disagreed, and it was right.
On Aug. 15, 2001, Moussaoui was arrested by the Immigration and Nationalization Service on a charge of overstaying his visa. At that time, the Minnesota office only had an "overstay" prisoner and a suspicion from an agent that he might be a terrorist because of his religious beliefs and flight training. If this hunch amounted to probable cause, it is hard to imagine what would not satisfy such a standard...<hr></blockquote>
I find Rowley's memo more persuasive than Turley's article, and Turley looks to be defending the 4th amendment on principle. Admirable, but seems beside the point because Rowley was arguing that the MPLS FBI had probable cause because of the French information (which Turley dismisses), and FBI HQ machinations did not follow through.
Turley says: Rowley rejects the notion that the attacks in any way "improved or changed" the basis for probable cause. In her view, if probable cause existed on Sept. 11, it must have existed before Sept. 11. This is simply wrong as a matter of law. The attacks were obviously material to establishing probable cause against Moussaoui.
Rowley also places importance on a French report that "confirmed (Moussaoui's) radical fundamentalist Islamic" affiliations. This report was extremely vague and discounted by the FBI and other intelligence and foreign agencies.
Rowley says: 2) As the Minneapolis agents' reasonable suspicions quickly ripened into probable cause, which, at the latest, occurred within days of Moussaoui's arrest when the French Intelligence Service confirmed his affiliations with radical fundamentalist Islamic groups and activities connected to Osama Bin Laden, they became desperate to search the computer lap top that had been taken from Moussaoui as well as conduct a more thorough search of his personal effects. The agents in particular believed that Moussaoui signaled he had something to hide in the way he refused to allow them to search his computer.
3) ... While reasonable minds may differ as to whether probable cause existed prior to receipt of the French intelligence information, it was certainly established after that point and became even greater with successive, more detailed information from the French and other intelligence sources. ...
6 ) Eventually on August 28, 2001, after a series of e-mails between Minneapolis and FBIHQ, which suggest that the FBIHQ SSA deliberately further undercut the FISA effort by not adding the further intelligence information which he had promised to add that supported Moussaoui's foreign power connection and making several changes in the wording of the information that had been provided by the Minneapolis Agent, the Minneapolis agents were notified that the NSLU Unit Chief did not think there was sufficient evidence of Moussaoui's connection to a foreign power. ... With the Whitehurst allegations, this process of allowing supervisors to re-write portions of laboratory reports, was found to provide opportunities for over-zealous supervisors to skew the results in favor of the prosecution. In the Moussaoui case, it was the opposite -- the process allowed the Headquarters Supervisor to downplay the significance of the information thus far collected in order to get out of the work of having to see the FISA application through or possibly to avoid taking what he may have perceived as an unnecessary career risk. I understand that the failures of the FBIHQ personnel involved in the Moussaoui matter are also being officially excused because they were too busy with other investigations, the Cole bombing and other important terrorism matters, but the Supervisor's taking of the time to read each word of the information submitted by Minneapolis and then substitute his own choice of wording belies to some extent the notion that he was too busy. As an FBI division legal advisor for 12 years (and an FBI agent for over 21 years), I can state that an affidavit is better and will tend to be more accurate when the affiant has first hand information of all the information he/she must attest to. ...
Turley, as he should, argues for the FBI to strictly follow their Constitutional mandate, but in doing so, he dismisses the intel on Moussaoui by agreeing with FBI HQ that the French intelligence information ("activities connected to Osama Bin Laden") was suspect. If this information was correct, then I would presume Turley would think the MPLS FBI had probable cause. "Probable cause" to me hinged entirely on Moussaoui's connection to Osama bin Laden, a person who issued a fatwa for all Muslims to kill any and all Americans and built an organization to do so.
So the argument really lies in the efficacy of the Mousaoui intelligence report. Rowley believed it true. She believed she had probable cause, and that FBI HQ lessoned the danger he could cause by changing the MPLS affidavit and dismissing the French info. Turley thinks it was suspect. (One wonders how Turley would even know the contents of the report.) If it was, yes the MPLS FBI didn't have probable cause, but that seems obvious to me.
So, why is it that FBI HQ and CIA didn't believe the French intelligence on a French national?
I find Rowley's memo more persuasive than Turley's article, and Turley looks to be defending the 4th amendment on principle. Admirable, but seems beside the point because Rowley was arguing that the MPLS FBI had probable cause because of the French information (which Turley dismisses), and FBI HQ machinations did not follow through...
Turley, as he should, argues for the FBI to strictly follow their Constitutional mandate, but in doing so, he dismisses the intel on Moussaoui by agreeing with FBI HQ that the French intelligence information ("activities connected to Osama Bin Laden") was suspect. If this information was correct, then I would presume Turley would think the MPLS FBI had probable cause. "Probable cause" to me hinged entirely on Moussaoui's connection to Osama bin Laden, a person who issued a fatwa for all Muslims to kill any and all Americans and built an organization to do so.
So the argument really lies in the efficacy of the Mousaoui intelligence report. Rowley believed it true. She believed she had probable cause, and that FBI HQ lessoned the danger he could cause by changing the MPLS affidavit and dismissing the French info. Turley thinks it was suspect. (One wonders how Turley would even know the contents of the report.) If it was, yes the MPLS FBI didn't have probable cause, but that seems obvious to me.
So, why is it that FBI HQ and CIA didn't believe the French intelligence on a French national?</strong><hr></blockquote>
I wasn't fully persuaded by what seemed to me to be Turley's too quick dismissal of the French intel report. But we also need to do a reality check here. According to Rowley, that report descibed Moussaoui as having "affiliations with radical fundamentalist Islamic groups and activities connected to Osama Bin Laden." That's a fair description of the prisoners at Gitmo. I seem to recall a great deal of squeamishness regarding the legality of of our treatment of the Gitmo detainees and that was after 9/11. The FBI's handling of Moussaoui before 9/11 was fully consistent with the sensitivities on display during that controversy. This is a point of view that places the dotting and crossing of Constitutional i's and t's ahead of a potential national security threat and it has had a strong currency outside of the FBI. These competing interests aren't easily resolved. It seems to me that this debate should be close to the center of the discussion of this matter.
The FBI's handling of Moussaoui before 9/11 was fully consistent with the sensitivities on display during that controversy. This is a point of view that places the dotting and crossing of Constitutional i's and t's ahead of a potential national security threat and it has had a strong currency outside of the FBI. These competing interests aren't easily resolved. It seems to me that this debate should be close to the center of the discussion of this matter.
</strong>
Yes I agree. It always should be. I don't think the law enforcement agencies need more powers whatsoever, and they didn't need it to stop the Sept. 11 hijackings. As said before, I'm not out to nor do I believe that Americans need to give up their freedoms to be safer from terrorism. Americans do however should expect and require the gov't that is working for and paid by them to work better than as demonstrated.
Yes I agree. It always should be. I don't think the law enforcement agencies need more powers whatsoever, and they didn't need it to stop the Sept. 11 hijackings. As said before, I'm not out to nor do I believe that Americans need to give up their freedoms to be safer from terrorism. Americans do however should expect and require the gov't that is working for and paid by them to work better than as demonstrated.</strong><hr></blockquote>
The Moussaoui investigation faltered on the issue of probable cause. Going back in time, trying to approach this without all the information we've learned since, it is not at all clear to me that probable cause existed here. This investigation was governed by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978. (<a href="http://www.eff.org/Censorship/Terrorism_militias/fisa_faq.html"; target="_blank">Here's</a> a FISA FAQ.)
from the FAQ:
[quote]3. How does FISA fit with regulation of electronic surveillance?
Given the "tendency of those who execute the criminal laws... to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures," the Supreme Court has viewed commumications interception as an especially grave intrusion on rights of privacy and speech. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 50 (1967) (quotation and citation omitted). "By its very nature eavesdropping involves an intrusion on privacy that is broad in scope," and its "indiscriminate use... in law enforcement raises grave constitutional questions." Id. at 56 (quotation and citation omitted). "Few threats to liberty exist which are greater than those posed by the use of eavesdropping devices." Id. at 63.
Thus, the Court outlined seven constitutional requirements: (1) a showing of probable cause that a particular offense has been or is about to be committed; (2) the applicant must describe with particularity the conversations to be intercepted; (3) the surveillance must be for a specific, limited period of time in order to minimize the invasion of privacy (the N.Y. law authorized two months of surveillance at a time); (4) there must be continuing probable cause showings for the surveillance to continue beyond the original termination date; (5) the surveillance must end once the conversation sought is seized; (6) notice must be given unless there is an adequate showing of exigency; and (7) a return on the warrant is required so that the court may oversee and limit the use of the intercepted conversations.
Indeed, the Court said that if "neither a warrant nor a statute authorizing eavesdropping can be drawn so as to meet the Fourth Amendment's requirements... then the fruits' of eavesdropping devices are barred under the Amendment." Id., at 63.
Where intelligence operations are concerned, however, the bounds of the Fourth Amendment are less clear than they are for ordinary criminal investigations. FISA creates a special court and legal regime for counterintelligence surveillance orders...<hr></blockquote>
The next question in the FAQ deals with the special legal regime for "foreign intelligence" surveillance. (And under which, it would appear, the FBI could have proceeded to search Moussaoui's computer.) This was what seemed to pique Mr. Turley's interest the most.
The Moussaoui investigation faltered on the issue of probable cause. Going back in time, trying to approach this without all the information we've learned since, it is not at all clear to me that probable cause existed here. This investigation was governed by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978. (Here's a FISA FAQ.)</strong>
"Probable cause" is entirely dependent on whether it could be proven that Moussaoui was funded by al Queda and or went through the al Queda terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan. If the French intel said so, I can't see how that wouldn't be probable cause.
Dismissing it as vague and unreliable when it appears to be true seems to be a breakdown in investigative ability somewhere in the intelligence chain.
President Bush wants the INS to stop granting visas to terrorists. The biggest obstacle? His own administration.
By Nicholas Confessore
Exactly six months after Mohammed Atta and Marwan Al-Shehhi had flown planes into the World Trade Center, letters from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) arrived at a Florida flight school informing these two late---very late---students that their visas had been approved. The incident seemed to capture perfectly the unfathomable ineptitude of an agency long unable to control illegal immigration but now supposed to be the front line of the domestic war on terrorism.
Among those most furious was President George W. Bush. "I was stunned and not happy," the president told reporters at a press conference. "I could barely get my coffee down." Within days, Bush's anger cascaded down through the federal bureaucracy. Attorney General John Ashcroft blasted "professional incompetence" for the "disturbing failure." INS commissioner James Ziglar called it an "inexcusable blunder" and promptly reassigned four top INS officials to "begin the process of accountability." And the Department of Justice Inspector General promised to report exactly what had happened. But why wait? Insiders already know what happened, and the president ought to hear the truth right away, though probably not while he's sipping hot coffee.
The good news for Bush---who loves nothing more than to blame Bill Clinton for everything---is that at least half the responsibility for the screw-up lies with the previous administration. In the mid 1990s, the Clinton administration initiated, then let die, a revolutionary computer visa system that could have prevented Atta and Al-Shehhi from getting their student visas, and might even have uncovered their conspiracy before September 11 came to pass. The bad news for Bush (and the rest of us) is that some of the people most responsible for killing the computer system are now running the INS---put there by none other than George W. Bush. And since September 11, these officials have been operating below the media radar to make sure that a broken immigration-security system stays broken.
Why would members of the Bush administration want to do such a thing, given the president's firm commitment to fight terrorism? Because of the president's other firm commitment to courting Hispanic voters. Key Bush officials know that an effective system of tracking immigrants is the last thing Hispanic and other immigration lobbyists want to see. Indeed, a fundamental tension operates within the Bush administration itself, and the GOP generally, between national-security conservatives, who want a strong INS capable of keeping terrorists out, and libertarian conservatives, who want a weak INS incapable of stopping the free flow of labor. It's no exaggeration to say that the future security of the country may depend upon which side wins. ...
Very interesting confluence of politics, lobbying, privacy, and motives fighting against security needs.
"Probable cause" is entirely dependent on whether it could be proven that Moussaoui was funded by al Queda and or went through the al Queda terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan. If the French intel said so, I can't see how that wouldn't be probable cause.</strong><hr></blockquote>
Where are you getting this? I don?t know what was in that Frech intelligence report. I?m just going by Rowley?s description of it in her memo to Mueller. I didn?t see her mention anything about Moussaoui recieving al Queda funding. I?m not saying it?s not in that report. There?s just a lot of information to track down and I can?t find this. It just seems to me that Rowley would mention it since it would have strengthened her argument regarding the debate over probable cause.
Also, as you said, it boils down to whether it could be proven that Moussaoui was funded by al Queda... Did the French intel report do that?
I'm leaning toward the opinion that there should be a lower standard than "probable cause" in cases like this anyway. Moussaoui wasn't an American citizen or a resident alien.
Where are you getting this? I don?t know what was in that Frech intelligence report. I?m just going by Rowley?s description of it in her memo to Mueller. I didn?t see her mention anything about Moussaoui recieving al Queda funding. I?m not saying it?s not in that report. There?s just a lot of information to track down and I can?t find this. It just seems to me that Rowley would mention it since it would have strengthened her argument regarding the debate over probable cause.</strong>
We, the public at large, don't know what's in the French intel report on Moussaoui. And it's highly likely that Rowley and anyone will not talk about what's in the report since it's classified. I do believe the French report says that Moussaoui went to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and had specific details of which fundamentilist Islamic organizations he had connections with. The money part is also my guess becuase paying for flight training in cash (though I may have this confused with someone else) is rather odd.
<strong>Also, as you said, it boils down to whether it could be proven that Moussaoui was funded by al Queda... Did the French intel report do that?</strong>
I'm not sure this would be the case (even though I said it), legally proven that is. Probable cause is a probability. It seems Turley wants 90% probability while Rowley thinks 51% is good enough for probable cause. The USA was supposed be in heightened alert from terrorist attacks at the time from "militant Islamic terrorists". Under this sort of atmosphere, Moussaoui seems to fit the "probable cause" condition pretty well, but apparently all the lines of communication weren't connected at the time.
What I meant by "proven" is what the French intel actually said. Did it really say that Moussaoui had connections to al Queda? If it did, then yes again, I think it's pretty open and shut.
<strong>I'm leaning toward the opinion that there should be a lower standard than "probable cause" in cases like this anyway. Moussaoui wasn't an American citizen or a resident alien.</strong>
I'm not there yet. I don't see it as that hard for the FBI and CIA to have done a better job of tracing someone's history.
It's the Law, Stupid! An excellent 6/8 National Journal column by <a href="http://nationaljournal.com/taylor.htm"; target="_blank">Stuart Taylor</a> fleshes out the argument that while the FBI may have been incompetent, it really was hamstrung by a) the stringent requirements for obtaining a search warrant under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and b) excessive fear of racial profiling, embedded in law and in the culture. .. Taylor points out that it's a lot easier to change the law and our thinking about profiling than it is to suddenly make the FBI and CIA bureaucracies vastly more efficient. ... P.S.: Taylor thinks Coleen Rowley was wrong -- the FBI hadn't met the standard of "probable cause" under the law. That's because the standard was way too high. As Taylor notes:
"Evidence of terrorist intent alone is not enough; "membership" in some particular international terrorist "group" must be shown."
So if it's just one guy who wants to blow up the Superbowl, we leave him alone! ... The problem is less dumb bureaucrats than dumb law...
Taylor points out that it's a lot easier to change the law and our thinking about profiling than it is to suddenly make the FBI and CIA bureaucracies vastly more efficient. ...</strong>
It is easier yes, but doing the hard thing - ie, reforming the 3 letter gov't agencies - benifits us all moreso, while changing the law has the potential to do just as much harm as good. We should do the hard thing because its the right thing to do.
As for profiling, I have no idea what it means, and I would contend that people don't have the same idea of what it is either.
<strong>Taylor thinks Coleen Rowley was wrong -- the FBI hadn't met the standard of "probable cause" under the law. That's because the standard was way too high. As Taylor notes:
"Evidence of terrorist intent alone is not enough; "membership" in some particular international terrorist "group" must be shown."</strong>
This is all assuming that there isn't more information than is publicly known in the French intel. I would presume going through al Queda training camps means membership. If not, then it's a tougher decision.
Also the "membership" qualification isn't the standard, it's:
Section.1801
(a) ''Foreign power'' means -
4. a group engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor;
(b) ''Agent of a foreign power'' means -
(1) any person other than a United States person, who -
(A) acts in the United States as an officer or employee of a foreign power, or as a member of a foreign power as defined in subsection (a)(4) of this section;
(B) acts for or on behalf of a foreign power which engages in clandestine intelligence activities in the United States contrary to the interests of the United States, when the circumstances of such person's presence in the United States indicate that such person may engage in such activities in the United States, or when such person knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of such activities or knowingly conspires with any person to engage in such activities; or ...
The difference between membership and "acting for or on behalf of," I'm not entirely sure, but a person "acting for or on behalf" seems a much looser statement than "membership".
<strong>So if it's just one guy who wants to blow up the Superbowl, we leave him alone! ... The problem is less dumb bureaucrats than dumb law...</strong>
A lone person wanting to commit a terrorist act will be very hard to stop.
" if musical interest is the basis of what age you think people are then I guess I'm 49 as well ".
Oh, I thought I might mention that the point here that Applenut and SpacemanSpiff are missing is that I listened to this stuff 30 years ago when it was new. I've since moved on to other things. Not that I don't go back for nostaligia. But, if I'm reading this correctly I'm glad we have something in common besides owning a Mac.
[quote]As we gather around F.B.I. headquarters sharpening our machetes and watching the buzzards circle overhead, let's be frank: There's a whiff of hypocrisy in the air.
One reason aggressive agents were restrained as they tried to go after Zacarias Moussaoui is that liberals like myself - and the news media caldron in which I toil and trouble - have regularly excoriated law enforcement authorities for taking shortcuts and engaging in racial profiling. As long as we're pointing fingers, we should peer into the mirror.
The timidity of bureau headquarters is indefensible. But it reflected not just myopic careerism but also an environment (that we who care about civil liberties helped create) in which officials were afraid of being assailed as insensitive storm troopers.
So it's time for civil libertarians to examine themselves with the same rigor with which we are prone to examine others. The bottom line is that Mr. Moussaoui was thrown in jail - thank God - not because there was evidence he had committed a crime but because he was a young Arab man who behaved suspiciously and fit our stereotypes about terrorists. One of the most widespread canards since 9/11 is that he wanted to learn to fly a 747 but not how to take off or land. That is completely false; on the contrary, repeated F.B.I. statements show that he specifically asked for instruction on taking off and landing.
Mr. Moussaoui aroused suspicion for much milder behavior: he paid $8,000 in cash for the flight lessons; he expressed "unusual interest" in the notion that a plane's doors could not be opened during flight; he was a wretched pilot and yet wanted to learn how to fly a jumbo jet...<hr></blockquote>
Comments
According to the gov't, he was the 20th hijacker, and he's being prosecuted as such. Are you going to be a witness for the defense?
That he is part of team on UA 93, I don't think so. I think the connections are fairly tenuous until they find out whether he was in a cell and if so, whether that cell was in on the Sept 11 hijackings. We won't know until some documentation is found, like a planning book with his name and the names of the hijackers in it. Right now, they don't have anything except his connection with Atta.
Finding him, them finding Atta was key. Of course, the CIA could have tracked down 5 of the hijackers too...
<a href="http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/story.hts/editorial/outlook/1434351"; target="_blank">On closer look, Rowley memo ignores Constitution</a>
By JONATHAN TURLEY
[quote]The media and the public love a reformer. This may explain the reaction this week to a 13-page letter from FBI agent Coleen Rowley criticizing the investigation of Zacarias Moussaoui.
Rowley has been portrayed by national publications such as Time magazine in almost breathless terms as a cross between Martin Luther and Annie Oakley.
What is astonishing is how little of her memo actually has been read or quoted beyond its most sensational suggestions, such as the notion that Rowley and her colleagues might have been able to prevent one or more of the Sept. 11 attacks.
Rowley's criticism of the FBI largely turns on disagreement over the meaning of probable cause. Rowley insists that there was probable cause to secure a search warrant for Moussaoui's computer and personal effects. FBI headquarters disagreed, and it was right.
On Aug. 15, 2001, Moussaoui was arrested by the Immigration and Nationalization Service on a charge of overstaying his visa. At that time, the Minnesota office only had an "overstay" prisoner and a suspicion from an agent that he might be a terrorist because of his religious beliefs and flight training. If this hunch amounted to probable cause, it is hard to imagine what would not satisfy such a standard...<hr></blockquote>
<a href="http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/story.hts/editorial/outlook/1434351"; target="_blank">On closer look, Rowley memo ignores Constitution</a>
By JONATHAN TURLEY
</strong>
I find Rowley's memo more persuasive than Turley's article, and Turley looks to be defending the 4th amendment on principle. Admirable, but seems beside the point because Rowley was arguing that the MPLS FBI had probable cause because of the French information (which Turley dismisses), and FBI HQ machinations did not follow through.
Turley says: Rowley rejects the notion that the attacks in any way "improved or changed" the basis for probable cause. In her view, if probable cause existed on Sept. 11, it must have existed before Sept. 11. This is simply wrong as a matter of law. The attacks were obviously material to establishing probable cause against Moussaoui.
Rowley also places importance on a French report that "confirmed (Moussaoui's) radical fundamentalist Islamic" affiliations. This report was extremely vague and discounted by the FBI and other intelligence and foreign agencies.
Rowley says: 2) As the Minneapolis agents' reasonable suspicions quickly ripened into probable cause, which, at the latest, occurred within days of Moussaoui's arrest when the French Intelligence Service confirmed his affiliations with radical fundamentalist Islamic groups and activities connected to Osama Bin Laden, they became desperate to search the computer lap top that had been taken from Moussaoui as well as conduct a more thorough search of his personal effects. The agents in particular believed that Moussaoui signaled he had something to hide in the way he refused to allow them to search his computer.
3) ... While reasonable minds may differ as to whether probable cause existed prior to receipt of the French intelligence information, it was certainly established after that point and became even greater with successive, more detailed information from the French and other intelligence sources. ...
6 ) Eventually on August 28, 2001, after a series of e-mails between Minneapolis and FBIHQ, which suggest that the FBIHQ SSA deliberately further undercut the FISA effort by not adding the further intelligence information which he had promised to add that supported Moussaoui's foreign power connection and making several changes in the wording of the information that had been provided by the Minneapolis Agent, the Minneapolis agents were notified that the NSLU Unit Chief did not think there was sufficient evidence of Moussaoui's connection to a foreign power. ... With the Whitehurst allegations, this process of allowing supervisors to re-write portions of laboratory reports, was found to provide opportunities for over-zealous supervisors to skew the results in favor of the prosecution. In the Moussaoui case, it was the opposite -- the process allowed the Headquarters Supervisor to downplay the significance of the information thus far collected in order to get out of the work of having to see the FISA application through or possibly to avoid taking what he may have perceived as an unnecessary career risk. I understand that the failures of the FBIHQ personnel involved in the Moussaoui matter are also being officially excused because they were too busy with other investigations, the Cole bombing and other important terrorism matters, but the Supervisor's taking of the time to read each word of the information submitted by Minneapolis and then substitute his own choice of wording belies to some extent the notion that he was too busy. As an FBI division legal advisor for 12 years (and an FBI agent for over 21 years), I can state that an affidavit is better and will tend to be more accurate when the affiant has first hand information of all the information he/she must attest to. ...
Turley, as he should, argues for the FBI to strictly follow their Constitutional mandate, but in doing so, he dismisses the intel on Moussaoui by agreeing with FBI HQ that the French intelligence information ("activities connected to Osama Bin Laden") was suspect. If this information was correct, then I would presume Turley would think the MPLS FBI had probable cause. "Probable cause" to me hinged entirely on Moussaoui's connection to Osama bin Laden, a person who issued a fatwa for all Muslims to kill any and all Americans and built an organization to do so.
So the argument really lies in the efficacy of the Mousaoui intelligence report. Rowley believed it true. She believed she had probable cause, and that FBI HQ lessoned the danger he could cause by changing the MPLS affidavit and dismissing the French info. Turley thinks it was suspect. (One wonders how Turley would even know the contents of the report.) If it was, yes the MPLS FBI didn't have probable cause, but that seems obvious to me.
So, why is it that FBI HQ and CIA didn't believe the French intelligence on a French national?
<strong>
I find Rowley's memo more persuasive than Turley's article, and Turley looks to be defending the 4th amendment on principle. Admirable, but seems beside the point because Rowley was arguing that the MPLS FBI had probable cause because of the French information (which Turley dismisses), and FBI HQ machinations did not follow through...
Turley, as he should, argues for the FBI to strictly follow their Constitutional mandate, but in doing so, he dismisses the intel on Moussaoui by agreeing with FBI HQ that the French intelligence information ("activities connected to Osama Bin Laden") was suspect. If this information was correct, then I would presume Turley would think the MPLS FBI had probable cause. "Probable cause" to me hinged entirely on Moussaoui's connection to Osama bin Laden, a person who issued a fatwa for all Muslims to kill any and all Americans and built an organization to do so.
So the argument really lies in the efficacy of the Mousaoui intelligence report. Rowley believed it true. She believed she had probable cause, and that FBI HQ lessoned the danger he could cause by changing the MPLS affidavit and dismissing the French info. Turley thinks it was suspect. (One wonders how Turley would even know the contents of the report.) If it was, yes the MPLS FBI didn't have probable cause, but that seems obvious to me.
So, why is it that FBI HQ and CIA didn't believe the French intelligence on a French national?</strong><hr></blockquote>
I wasn't fully persuaded by what seemed to me to be Turley's too quick dismissal of the French intel report. But we also need to do a reality check here. According to Rowley, that report descibed Moussaoui as having "affiliations with radical fundamentalist Islamic groups and activities connected to Osama Bin Laden." That's a fair description of the prisoners at Gitmo. I seem to recall a great deal of squeamishness regarding the legality of of our treatment of the Gitmo detainees and that was after 9/11. The FBI's handling of Moussaoui before 9/11 was fully consistent with the sensitivities on display during that controversy. This is a point of view that places the dotting and crossing of Constitutional i's and t's ahead of a potential national security threat and it has had a strong currency outside of the FBI. These competing interests aren't easily resolved. It seems to me that this debate should be close to the center of the discussion of this matter.
[ 06-04-2002: Message edited by: spaceman_spiff ]</p>
The FBI's handling of Moussaoui before 9/11 was fully consistent with the sensitivities on display during that controversy. This is a point of view that places the dotting and crossing of Constitutional i's and t's ahead of a potential national security threat and it has had a strong currency outside of the FBI. These competing interests aren't easily resolved. It seems to me that this debate should be close to the center of the discussion of this matter.
</strong>
Yes I agree. It always should be. I don't think the law enforcement agencies need more powers whatsoever, and they didn't need it to stop the Sept. 11 hijackings. As said before, I'm not out to nor do I believe that Americans need to give up their freedoms to be safer from terrorism. Americans do however should expect and require the gov't that is working for and paid by them to work better than as demonstrated.
<strong>
Yes I agree. It always should be. I don't think the law enforcement agencies need more powers whatsoever, and they didn't need it to stop the Sept. 11 hijackings. As said before, I'm not out to nor do I believe that Americans need to give up their freedoms to be safer from terrorism. Americans do however should expect and require the gov't that is working for and paid by them to work better than as demonstrated.</strong><hr></blockquote>
The Moussaoui investigation faltered on the issue of probable cause. Going back in time, trying to approach this without all the information we've learned since, it is not at all clear to me that probable cause existed here. This investigation was governed by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978. (<a href="http://www.eff.org/Censorship/Terrorism_militias/fisa_faq.html"; target="_blank">Here's</a> a FISA FAQ.)
from the FAQ:
[quote]3. How does FISA fit with regulation of electronic surveillance?
Given the "tendency of those who execute the criminal laws... to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures," the Supreme Court has viewed commumications interception as an especially grave intrusion on rights of privacy and speech. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 50 (1967) (quotation and citation omitted). "By its very nature eavesdropping involves an intrusion on privacy that is broad in scope," and its "indiscriminate use... in law enforcement raises grave constitutional questions." Id. at 56 (quotation and citation omitted). "Few threats to liberty exist which are greater than those posed by the use of eavesdropping devices." Id. at 63.
Thus, the Court outlined seven constitutional requirements: (1) a showing of probable cause that a particular offense has been or is about to be committed; (2) the applicant must describe with particularity the conversations to be intercepted; (3) the surveillance must be for a specific, limited period of time in order to minimize the invasion of privacy (the N.Y. law authorized two months of surveillance at a time); (4) there must be continuing probable cause showings for the surveillance to continue beyond the original termination date; (5) the surveillance must end once the conversation sought is seized; (6) notice must be given unless there is an adequate showing of exigency; and (7) a return on the warrant is required so that the court may oversee and limit the use of the intercepted conversations.
Indeed, the Court said that if "neither a warrant nor a statute authorizing eavesdropping can be drawn so as to meet the Fourth Amendment's requirements... then the fruits' of eavesdropping devices are barred under the Amendment." Id., at 63.
Where intelligence operations are concerned, however, the bounds of the Fourth Amendment are less clear than they are for ordinary criminal investigations. FISA creates a special court and legal regime for counterintelligence surveillance orders...<hr></blockquote>
The next question in the FAQ deals with the special legal regime for "foreign intelligence" surveillance. (And under which, it would appear, the FBI could have proceeded to search Moussaoui's computer.) This was what seemed to pique Mr. Turley's interest the most.
[ 06-04-2002: Message edited by: spaceman_spiff ]</p>
The Moussaoui investigation faltered on the issue of probable cause. Going back in time, trying to approach this without all the information we've learned since, it is not at all clear to me that probable cause existed here. This investigation was governed by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978. (Here's a FISA FAQ.)</strong>
"Probable cause" is entirely dependent on whether it could be proven that Moussaoui was funded by al Queda and or went through the al Queda terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan. If the French intel said so, I can't see how that wouldn't be probable cause.
Dismissing it as vague and unreliable when it appears to be true seems to be a breakdown in investigative ability somewhere in the intelligence chain.
Here is an interesting article on the INS:
<a href="http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2001/0205.confessore.html"; target="_blank">Borderline Insanity</a>
President Bush wants the INS to stop granting visas to terrorists. The biggest obstacle? His own administration.
By Nicholas Confessore
Exactly six months after Mohammed Atta and Marwan Al-Shehhi had flown planes into the World Trade Center, letters from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) arrived at a Florida flight school informing these two late---very late---students that their visas had been approved. The incident seemed to capture perfectly the unfathomable ineptitude of an agency long unable to control illegal immigration but now supposed to be the front line of the domestic war on terrorism.
Among those most furious was President George W. Bush. "I was stunned and not happy," the president told reporters at a press conference. "I could barely get my coffee down." Within days, Bush's anger cascaded down through the federal bureaucracy. Attorney General John Ashcroft blasted "professional incompetence" for the "disturbing failure." INS commissioner James Ziglar called it an "inexcusable blunder" and promptly reassigned four top INS officials to "begin the process of accountability." And the Department of Justice Inspector General promised to report exactly what had happened. But why wait? Insiders already know what happened, and the president ought to hear the truth right away, though probably not while he's sipping hot coffee.
The good news for Bush---who loves nothing more than to blame Bill Clinton for everything---is that at least half the responsibility for the screw-up lies with the previous administration. In the mid 1990s, the Clinton administration initiated, then let die, a revolutionary computer visa system that could have prevented Atta and Al-Shehhi from getting their student visas, and might even have uncovered their conspiracy before September 11 came to pass. The bad news for Bush (and the rest of us) is that some of the people most responsible for killing the computer system are now running the INS---put there by none other than George W. Bush. And since September 11, these officials have been operating below the media radar to make sure that a broken immigration-security system stays broken.
Why would members of the Bush administration want to do such a thing, given the president's firm commitment to fight terrorism? Because of the president's other firm commitment to courting Hispanic voters. Key Bush officials know that an effective system of tracking immigrants is the last thing Hispanic and other immigration lobbyists want to see. Indeed, a fundamental tension operates within the Bush administration itself, and the GOP generally, between national-security conservatives, who want a strong INS capable of keeping terrorists out, and libertarian conservatives, who want a weak INS incapable of stopping the free flow of labor. It's no exaggeration to say that the future security of the country may depend upon which side wins. ...
Very interesting confluence of politics, lobbying, privacy, and motives fighting against security needs.
[ 06-06-2002: Message edited by: THT ]</p>
<strong>
"Probable cause" is entirely dependent on whether it could be proven that Moussaoui was funded by al Queda and or went through the al Queda terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan. If the French intel said so, I can't see how that wouldn't be probable cause.</strong><hr></blockquote>
Where are you getting this? I don?t know what was in that Frech intelligence report. I?m just going by Rowley?s description of it in her memo to Mueller. I didn?t see her mention anything about Moussaoui recieving al Queda funding. I?m not saying it?s not in that report. There?s just a lot of information to track down and I can?t find this. It just seems to me that Rowley would mention it since it would have strengthened her argument regarding the debate over probable cause.
Also, as you said, it boils down to whether it could be proven that Moussaoui was funded by al Queda... Did the French intel report do that?
I'm leaning toward the opinion that there should be a lower standard than "probable cause" in cases like this anyway. Moussaoui wasn't an American citizen or a resident alien.
Where are you getting this? I don?t know what was in that Frech intelligence report. I?m just going by Rowley?s description of it in her memo to Mueller. I didn?t see her mention anything about Moussaoui recieving al Queda funding. I?m not saying it?s not in that report. There?s just a lot of information to track down and I can?t find this. It just seems to me that Rowley would mention it since it would have strengthened her argument regarding the debate over probable cause.</strong>
We, the public at large, don't know what's in the French intel report on Moussaoui. And it's highly likely that Rowley and anyone will not talk about what's in the report since it's classified. I do believe the French report says that Moussaoui went to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and had specific details of which fundamentilist Islamic organizations he had connections with. The money part is also my guess becuase paying for flight training in cash (though I may have this confused with someone else) is rather odd.
<strong>Also, as you said, it boils down to whether it could be proven that Moussaoui was funded by al Queda... Did the French intel report do that?</strong>
I'm not sure this would be the case (even though I said it), legally proven that is. Probable cause is a probability. It seems Turley wants 90% probability while Rowley thinks 51% is good enough for probable cause. The USA was supposed be in heightened alert from terrorist attacks at the time from "militant Islamic terrorists". Under this sort of atmosphere, Moussaoui seems to fit the "probable cause" condition pretty well, but apparently all the lines of communication weren't connected at the time.
What I meant by "proven" is what the French intel actually said. Did it really say that Moussaoui had connections to al Queda? If it did, then yes again, I think it's pretty open and shut.
<strong>I'm leaning toward the opinion that there should be a lower standard than "probable cause" in cases like this anyway. Moussaoui wasn't an American citizen or a resident alien.</strong>
I'm not there yet. I don't see it as that hard for the FBI and CIA to have done a better job of tracing someone's history.
[ 06-06-2002: Message edited by: THT ]</p>
It's the Law, Stupid! An excellent 6/8 National Journal column by <a href="http://nationaljournal.com/taylor.htm"; target="_blank">Stuart Taylor</a> fleshes out the argument that while the FBI may have been incompetent, it really was hamstrung by a) the stringent requirements for obtaining a search warrant under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and b) excessive fear of racial profiling, embedded in law and in the culture. .. Taylor points out that it's a lot easier to change the law and our thinking about profiling than it is to suddenly make the FBI and CIA bureaucracies vastly more efficient. ... P.S.: Taylor thinks Coleen Rowley was wrong -- the FBI hadn't met the standard of "probable cause" under the law. That's because the standard was way too high. As Taylor notes:
"Evidence of terrorist intent alone is not enough; "membership" in some particular international terrorist "group" must be shown."
So if it's just one guy who wants to blow up the Superbowl, we leave him alone! ... The problem is less dumb bureaucrats than dumb law...
Taylor points out that it's a lot easier to change the law and our thinking about profiling than it is to suddenly make the FBI and CIA bureaucracies vastly more efficient. ...</strong>
It is easier yes, but doing the hard thing - ie, reforming the 3 letter gov't agencies - benifits us all moreso, while changing the law has the potential to do just as much harm as good. We should do the hard thing because its the right thing to do.
As for profiling, I have no idea what it means, and I would contend that people don't have the same idea of what it is either.
<strong>Taylor thinks Coleen Rowley was wrong -- the FBI hadn't met the standard of "probable cause" under the law. That's because the standard was way too high. As Taylor notes:
"Evidence of terrorist intent alone is not enough; "membership" in some particular international terrorist "group" must be shown."</strong>
This is all assuming that there isn't more information than is publicly known in the French intel. I would presume going through al Queda training camps means membership. If not, then it's a tougher decision.
Also the "membership" qualification isn't the standard, it's:
Section.1801
(a) ''Foreign power'' means -
4. a group engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor;
(b) ''Agent of a foreign power'' means -
(1) any person other than a United States person, who -
(A) acts in the United States as an officer or employee of a foreign power, or as a member of a foreign power as defined in subsection (a)(4) of this section;
(B) acts for or on behalf of a foreign power which engages in clandestine intelligence activities in the United States contrary to the interests of the United States, when the circumstances of such person's presence in the United States indicate that such person may engage in such activities in the United States, or when such person knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of such activities or knowingly conspires with any person to engage in such activities; or ...
The difference between membership and "acting for or on behalf of," I'm not entirely sure, but a person "acting for or on behalf" seems a much looser statement than "membership".
<strong>So if it's just one guy who wants to blow up the Superbowl, we leave him alone! ... The problem is less dumb bureaucrats than dumb law...</strong>
A lone person wanting to commit a terrorist act will be very hard to stop.
[ 06-10-2002: Message edited by: THT ]</p>
Oh, I thought I might mention that the point here that Applenut and SpacemanSpiff are missing is that I listened to this stuff 30 years ago when it was new. I've since moved on to other things. Not that I don't go back for nostaligia. But, if I'm reading this correctly I'm glad we have something in common besides owning a Mac.
May 31, 2002
<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/31/opinion/31KRIS.html"; target="_blank">Liberal Reality Check</a>
By NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF
[quote]As we gather around F.B.I. headquarters sharpening our machetes and watching the buzzards circle overhead, let's be frank: There's a whiff of hypocrisy in the air.
One reason aggressive agents were restrained as they tried to go after Zacarias Moussaoui is that liberals like myself - and the news media caldron in which I toil and trouble - have regularly excoriated law enforcement authorities for taking shortcuts and engaging in racial profiling. As long as we're pointing fingers, we should peer into the mirror.
The timidity of bureau headquarters is indefensible. But it reflected not just myopic careerism but also an environment (that we who care about civil liberties helped create) in which officials were afraid of being assailed as insensitive storm troopers.
So it's time for civil libertarians to examine themselves with the same rigor with which we are prone to examine others. The bottom line is that Mr. Moussaoui was thrown in jail - thank God - not because there was evidence he had committed a crime but because he was a young Arab man who behaved suspiciously and fit our stereotypes about terrorists. One of the most widespread canards since 9/11 is that he wanted to learn to fly a 747 but not how to take off or land. That is completely false; on the contrary, repeated F.B.I. statements show that he specifically asked for instruction on taking off and landing.
Mr. Moussaoui aroused suspicion for much milder behavior: he paid $8,000 in cash for the flight lessons; he expressed "unusual interest" in the notion that a plane's doors could not be opened during flight; he was a wretched pilot and yet wanted to learn how to fly a jumbo jet...<hr></blockquote>