And turn a blind eye to the atrocities in Palestine. Hypocrisy at its finest.
BeIt's not about justice or attrocities (as if the US, who has sponsored, done, and still sponsors and does all kinds of attrocities, even downrigh i8t invations and occupations) cared.
It's about the trade war.
Simply put, DJI does too well, and can get even bigger in the future. They'd rather have an American company get that market...
That is pretty much it.
The US has gone on record numerous times (sometimes unwittingly) as fearing being displaced by China as it sees it as a threat to US technological hegemony and influence.
That China is making huge technological strides and is likely to become a technological powerhouse is a widely accepted scenario.
However, the 'threat' isn't only Chinese. The EU also has a stated goal of becoming technologically independent (or in other words, not reliant on US influence, control, and restrictions).
As with China, those plans were in place long before Trump became president.
All Trump has achieved is to push governments to accelerate those independence plans, worsening the situation for US companies.
The US is now seen as unreliable and, logically, companies around the world (and governments) resent being 'told' what to do via executive orders issued under the guise of 'national security' simply because their companies (or their products) use a percentage of US technology.
These actions are mainly 'protectionist' in intent but are only serving to harm US technology interests in the long term.
Perhaps it is China's intellectual property theft that is the basis of its military expansionism that is the issue, and why the West is less willing to cede technological leadership to China. Perhaps it is China's "Wolf Warrior Diplomacy". There are numerous reasons that China is now seen as a threat.
You and you ilk believe that China has peaceful intentions; I do not. There is quite a bit of evidence to the effect that China's militarization is a threat to the West, and the current Rules of Order established at the end of WWII. These rules, for the most part, are the reason that the Global Economy works as well as it does.
Heck, even the EU's position on China is changing to recognize the threat that China poses, and at the same time, is more friendly to Taiwan.
However, the change in public opinion toward China is filtering through to Europe's leadership. Fallon believes that in countries which have historically been in favor of economic partnerships with China like France and Hungary -- which both have elections soon -- political opposition will be able to leverage public hostility.
The danger isn't that there won't be a coherent China strategy, but that a plan gets watered down so much it isn't worth the paper it's written on.
In the case of the Global Gateway, that could be private sector companies not keen to fund huge infrastructure projects that don't make money. On security, it might be that countries in southern Europe enjoy Chinese money and don't geographically see it as a threat. ***that sounds like your country of Spain...
For now, China hawks are happy that Brussels is attempting to stop trampling over its lofty ambitions of promoting democracy, human rights, and free trade, blinded by the Chinese yuan signs in their eyes.
What remains to be seen is whether the EU's own red tape and processes suffocate that ambition, and if once the pandemic begins to recede, Europe returns to its former bad habit of turning a blind eye, even when doing so hurts its own long-term interests.
The tide is turning against China's expansionism, and it isn't soon enough.
What did any of that have to do with what I said?
I'm talking about official statements, not opinion pieces.
William Barr said the US had to do something to stop Huawei and it's dominance in 5G for fear of "surrendering supremecy" to China.
He noted that 5G would form the backbone of countless new technologies and China was already making great strides in developing them.
As the US has nothing of its own to counter that situation, he even suggested the US should consider taking a controlling stake in Ericcson. Another wacky statement seeing as studies suggest that, even under 'sanctions', Huawei in 2021 had business in 5G that is equivalent to that of Ericcson and Nokia combined. Not to mention that the US has continually criticised alleged subsidies to Huawei from government. Huawei itself debunked those claims and it hasn't been brought up since.
The US has also used the terms destroy, kill and choke to refer to its stance on Huawei.
And if you bother to pay attention, even the latest, ehem, 'in depth' investigation on Huawei by Bloomberg, manages to spend much of the latter part of the article blowing holes in its own claims!
There's a lot of clutching at straws going on and desperate moves, but the CEO of ASML made things clear. The US approach will fail.
I have stated many times, that telecom is critical infrastructure, a National Security issue, and had been a concern of the U.S since the Obama Administration. That Huawei is notably working directly with the PRC to provide surveillance of minorities was found much later.
Evidently, people don't believe Huawei nor the PRC, and have made demands on their governments to mitigate that my restricting or outright banning Huawei infrastructure. Now that Merkel is out, I expect Germany to be much tougher on China as well.
As for ASML, the U.S. continues to deny a license to sell leading edge devices to China;
I’ve written several Seeking Alpha articles about China’s equipment industry which, after a decade of attempts, have less than a 5% share of the overall equipment market, according to The Information Network's report entitled "Global Semiconductor Equipment: Markets, Market Share, Market Forecasts." So this means that Taiwan will need to buy equipment from Japan, equipment from Mainland China, or build their own. But recall that in mid-2019, Japan embargoed semiconductor materials to Taiwan, particularly e-beam photoresist. I discussed this in a July 15, 2019 Seeking Alpha article entitled “Sorry, But Japan's Material Embargo Won't Help Micron Technology.”
The overreach of the sanctions by the U.S. government, started by President Trump, have been expanded under President Biden. But like it or not, the U.S. spends a lot of money protecting countries like Korea and Japan. Currently, there are approximately 55,000 U.S. troops in Japan and 26,500 U.S. troops in South Korea.
In 2019, the U.S. and South Korea negotiated an agreement calling for South Korea to contribute approximately $893 million. Japan’s current support amounts to approximately $1.7 billion. By comparison, the Department of Defense currently estimates the total cost of maintaining the U.S. presence in South Korea and Japan at $4.5 billion and $5.7 billion, respectively.
And if sanctions and blacklists function as another strategy in protecting foreign countries, so be it. As China continues to advance militarily and technologically, these sanctions will only be broader based. This will only put sales of DUV lithography systems further in jeopardy and negatively impact ASML.
Erm, I can only imagine that you are being wilfully obtuse.
Yes. Huawei works directly with the Chinese government. It is an infrastructure supplier!
Huawei works directly with all its customers. Does that surprise you?
'The US is protecting so and so'. You mean like it protected Afghanistan and Iraq?
Nope! The US has strategic interests. That's it. When those strategic interests change, so so does the 'protection' mantra.
Let me say it straight. ASML is a business that wants to sell equipment to China. It is not happy that an external sovereign state is meddling in its ability to trade and it's CEO has spoken out on the subject many times.
He knows that this external limitation will lead to China creating homegrown competitors to his business interests.
You stepped around the facts with yet more opinion pieces and simply roll on with your anti China rhetoric.
The US doesn't want DJI to prosper, just like it didn't want Huawei to prosper.
Going about it the way they have, will not change anything. On the contrary, it will speed up the demise of US technological interests.
His line of thoughts are based on the right wing anti-China ideology. Their premise is China is US adversary. US doing similar things it is ok because it is us. China doing similar thins is not ok because China is an adversary thus a threat. Trump administration used four years to portray China as an adversary. US-China relation is in a downward trend because of this premise. Biden is unwilling or unable to change this sentiment. His hands are tied by this premise. Worse of all, China under Xi has decided to respond directly toward the attacks originated by this premise.
You are correct about his right wing/Trumpian approach: Anybody who stands in the way of their agenda is considered a "bad guy" to be destroyed by whatever means necessary and available.
As George Bush famously (or infamously?) said: "You're either for me Or you're agin' me".
There is no nuance or shades of grey in that world. Pure black & white, good vs bad.
Just dropping in for a moment on this interesting thread. I will point out here that you have been quite vigorously labeling anyone who offers any sort of criticism of the PRC as "China Haters," and using that label to dismiss any and all criticisms of Chinese policies or actions.
I will also point out that on this thread and elsewhere on this site, you have been offering fairly vigorous criticisms of the United States, which, thus far, you are still completely free to do here in the United States. Some of your criticisms of the US are even valid. Here in this country, it is possible to criticize the US government without being an "America Hater," but rather as someone who loves the country and wants it to live up to its ideals. Indeed, self-improvement is very hard to achieve if one claims to be perfect and above criticism. So these observations can be offered in this country to only with impunity, but as an act of patriotism.
Finally, I will note that in your vigorous dismissal of all those you label in black & white as "China Haters," you appear to be joining in a chorus of agreement with another person who posts here, seemingly writing from the perspective of the PRC itself. That person has written rather nonchalantly that China surveils all of its people 'for security,' not just minorities, and has written elsewhere on this site that the role of government includes 'dealing with' people who dissent and do not conform.
I would encourage you to reflect on these things. It would seem, were you instead to be an inhabitant of the PRC and writing similarly vigorous criticisms of that government from within, according to your online friend here, that you would be under surveillance 'for security,' and that it would be appropriate for your vigorous criticisms and dissent to lead to a point where you would be 'dealt with' by your government.
Recognizing these contrasts and being concerned about them does not make you, me or anyone else a "China Hater." China has an incredibly long history, a fascinating culture and literally billions of wonderful, beautiful people. Criticizing certain aspects of its governance is not hating China at all.
Wrong! Your logic is wrong. China hater refers to non-Chinese. Chinese that bash China is not called China hater. Thus your logic that George is not called America hater is wrong. You think he is an American. On the other, you hate me because in your heart you don't consider I am a American citizen.
I'm not wrong. George has indicated in the past that he is an American. I suppose he could be lying, but I'll take him for his word on that. You could be an American citizen, but the context of things that you've written here suggests otherwise. I could be wrong about that, and you are free to indicate that you are, you aren't or not to say at all. Either way, I don't hate you. Why would I hate you? There's no need for that. Disagreement neither requires nor indicates hate. Should I assume because you have offered criticisms of the US that you hate the United States? I didn't assume that, but you're free to make it clear that you do or you don't hate the US, or to say nothing at all about that.
The point is, George's comment about some other people seeing things in only black and white was ironic, given that he himself has been very busy labeling people in broad strokes with black and white accusations. None of that is necessary. If we want fewer wars and less fighting (and I certainly do), it would help to avoid such rhetoric. The world, figuratively speaking, is not black and white. It's not even shades of gray. It's the full spectrum of colors, all in light to dark. Rhetoric labeling people in all-or-nothing terms serves no useful purpose other than dehumanizing others in preparation of doing unspeakable things to them. I'm not interested in doing any of that. I may not agree with you, but I don't hate you. In fact, I hope you, your family and friends, wherever you are, have a beautiful day today, and that you can forget about all this other stuff and just be with the people you care about for a while.
You are wrong because you think he can be called America hater. I have explained it to you in simple words. You failed to understand it.
Your anther failed logic is saying I cannot defend China. This can be valid only if China is American adversary. This is true in the minds of China haters. But it is never officially declared. Thus I think I can say whatever I know is fact about China against China haters evil intention.
I understood it. I don't agree with your defining of the use of terminology.
I never said anything about whether or not you can "defend China," so my logic about that cannot have failed. Because I never said any such thing, there is no logic to have failed. You can say whatever you want about China. Your continued use of language like "China haters" and "evil intention" is exactly the rhetoric I referred to above that is only useful in dehumanizing others so you can fight with them. I hope that's not what you mean to do. There's no need for any of that.
You are assuming that "china hater" and "evil intention" are not accurate portrayals.
Trump started this whole thing doing what Trump does best: Spreading hate, fear and suspicion through smear campaigns filled with half truths (or in some cases no truth at all). And, once he started it, others have picked up that ball and ran with it.
Aside from the fact that it has us heading into another cold war that we can't afford and are unlikely to win, I object to it partly because it weakens America's moral fiber while distracting us from doing the things we need to do: Like becoming more competitive in the Global Market place.
I knew what the comments would look like before the thread even opened. One side changes, provides new voices, new information, and occasionally some thoughtful commentary, while the other side stays exactly the same, the same two people, just repeating the same denials, distortions, distractions and insults.
I knew what the comments would look like before the thread even opened. One side changes, provides new voices, new information, and occasionally some thoughtful commentary, while the other side stays exactly the same, the same two people, just repeating the same denials, distortions, distractions and insults.
Merry Christmas Everyone!
China Haters don't change -- they simply change smear tactics as needed to support their hate.
In 2018, a famous Hong Kong singer, Jacky Cheung, had a concert tour in
China. Chinese police managed to captured few dozen of fugitives after
the show with facial recognition and AI. And China has population of
1.3B people.
This one also appeared somewhere else here before as well, though the previous one seems to have been deleted before being repeated here. Edit: Found it. Posted earlier in this thread by "Viclauyyc."
The flexibility and resilience of America and its advanced-economy allies represent the polar opposite of China’s state-directed planning and implementation model. Their openness to people, ideas, and capital flows makes them creative dynamos, as well as fuels world-class research universities and yields demographic dividends by attracting talented and motivated people from all over the world. These qualities underpin their long-term comprehensive national power and the bloc’s global competitiveness. It also makes their responses to an assault formidable and favors their odds the longer a major cold or hot war continues. But free-wheeling systems also complicate near-term proactive preparation to head off conflicts.
Fortunately, Beijing’s belligerent behavior has helped solidify multiple allied diplomatic and military initiatives that, while presently insufficient to defend the rules-based order, nonetheless constitute a solid foundation on which to build. Diplomatic proofs of concept such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”),81 security alignments such as AUKUS, and hard security actions such as the Pacific Deterrence Initiative82 are now falling into place. The stage is set for follow-up measures to comprehensively “peak” the non-authoritarian world’s protective actions to hold the line in the Indo-Pacific.83
Throughout this decade of danger, American policymakers must understand that under Xi’s strongman rule, personal political survival will dictate PRC behavior. For Washington and its allies, the struggle centers on preserving and expanding the type of human well-being yielded by a system oriented toward freedom and rules-based governance that emphasizes reason and fair process over coercion and force. Conversely, Xi (like fellow authoritarian leaders such as Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un) uses a totally different operating system: rule for life, non-transparency, a ruthless “ends-justify-any- means” mindset, and policies that ultimately tend to be one-way, high-leverage bets on continued successful (and lightly opposed) revisionist actions abroad and near- absolute control domestically.
...
Gauntlet over Gizmos: Protecting Taiwan from Peak PRC Pressure through Early 2030s
The flexibility and resilience of America and its advanced-economy allies represent the polar opposite of China’s state-directed planning and implementation model. Their openness to people, ideas, and capital flows makes them creative dynamos, as well as fuels world-class research universities and yields demographic dividends by attracting talented and motivated people from all over the world. These qualities underpin their long-term comprehensive national power and the bloc’s global competitiveness. It also makes their responses to an assault formidable and favors their odds the longer a major cold or hot war continues. But free-wheeling systems also complicate near-term proactive preparation to head off conflicts.
Fortunately, Beijing’s belligerent behavior has helped solidify multiple allied diplomatic and military initiatives that, while presently insufficient to defend the rules-based order, nonetheless constitute a solid foundation on which to build. Diplomatic proofs of concept such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”),81 security alignments such as AUKUS, and hard security actions such as the Pacific Deterrence Initiative82 are now falling into place. The stage is set for follow-up measures to comprehensively “peak” the non-authoritarian world’s protective actions to hold the line in the Indo-Pacific.83
Throughout this decade of danger, American policymakers must understand that under Xi’s strongman rule, personal political survival will dictate PRC behavior. For Washington and its allies, the struggle centers on preserving and expanding the type of human well-being yielded by a system oriented toward freedom and rules-based governance that emphasizes reason and fair process over coercion and force. Conversely, Xi (like fellow authoritarian leaders such as Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un) uses a totally different operating system: rule for life, non-transparency, a ruthless “ends-justify-any- means” mindset, and policies that ultimately tend to be one-way, high-leverage bets on continued successful (and lightly opposed) revisionist actions abroad and near- absolute control domestically.
Xi’s personalist leadership and nearly comprehensive suppression of dissenting voices in the Party’s senior ranks simultaneously raises the chances of making policy mistakes while reducing the flexibility to deal with them early. In such an embrittled system, the proverbial “leverage” that would have left Xi with outsized returns on a successful bet instead amplifies the downside, all for which he personally and exclusively signed. The “best-case” scenario entails continued stagnation and rot within the Party along the lines of what Minxin Pei has articulated.84 The “intermediate case” is an accelerated version of that, with Xi suffering a loss of status and authority on the heels of a policy disaster, internal challengers rising within the PRC, and internecine strife leading to accelerated weakening of the Party. The “bad case” scenario—which, in practice, would likely be interrelated with the intermediate one—is that Xi would double down on a mistaken course of action to prioritize political self-preservation. If such mistakes led to—or were made in the course of—a kinetic conflict, personal survival measures could rapidly transmute into regional or even global (i.e., nuclear, space, cyber) threats.
If Xi triggered a “margin call” on his personal political account through a failed high-stakes gamble, it would likely be paid in blood. Washington must thus prepare the American electorate and its institutional and physical infrastructure, as well as that of allies and partners abroad, for the likelihood that tensions will periodically ratchet up to uncomfortable levels—and that, despite the promise of determined deterrence, actual conflict cannot be ruled out. Si vis pacem, para bellum (“If you want peace, prepare for war”) must unfortunately serve as a central organizing principle for a range of U.S. and allied decisions during the next decade with respect to China under Xi.85
Given these unforgiving dynamics, the implications for U.S. leaders and planners are stark:
Do whatever remains possible to reach “peak” preparedness for deterrent competition against China by the mid-to-late 2020s and accept the tradeoffs.86
Nothing the U.S and its allies might theoretically achieve after 2035 is worth pursuing at the expense of capabilities that might be “better” than those in service now, but that could not be realistically fielded at scale until five years or more from now.
Much will be decided by the end of this decade. If America falters at this critical time—whether through creeping corrosion of the rules-based order at Beijing’s hands or the shocking impact of failing to defend Taiwan against military attack— many aspects of the world and future will be determined at the expense of U.S. interests and values.
The decade of danger is upon us. With existential stakes for American interests and values looming, there is no time left to waste. Washington and its allies must push to maximize their competitive edge as rapidly as possible to avoid an outcome they cannot afford—“losing the 2020s.” At what point the PRC reaches its peak may ultimately defy precise prediction, but the strong possibility of it occurring over the next few years should front-load America’s bottom-line planning and preparations, given the potential for irreversible linchpin effects. Near-term preparation to run this decade’s unforgiving gauntlet justifies any corresponding long-term tradeoffs and risks: “losing the 2020s” would also mean losing the 2030s and beyond. Ultimately, the best achievements in coming decades will matter little if we lose Taiwan on our watch. More broadly, allowing PRC revisionism to run as rampant in the 2020s as it did in the 2010s would risk negatively reshaping the world order for decades to come and could actually set the stage for even worse conflicts by destabilizing the planet’s most populous region. Alternatively, proactive deterrence actions now can sow the seeds for a more peaceful and prosperous future that would benefit all Indo-Pacific countries, China included. The mission is vital, the stakes are high, and the clock is ticking.
I guess agreeing with the above make me a China "hater"...
The flexibility and resilience of America and its advanced-economy allies represent the polar opposite of China’s state-directed planning and implementation model. Their openness to people, ideas, and capital flows makes them creative dynamos, as well as fuels world-class research universities and yields demographic dividends by attracting talented and motivated people from all over the world. These qualities underpin their long-term comprehensive national power and the bloc’s global competitiveness. It also makes their responses to an assault formidable and favors their odds the longer a major cold or hot war continues. But free-wheeling systems also complicate near-term proactive preparation to head off conflicts.
Fortunately, Beijing’s belligerent behavior has helped solidify multiple allied diplomatic and military initiatives that, while presently insufficient to defend the rules-based order, nonetheless constitute a solid foundation on which to build. Diplomatic proofs of concept such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”),81 security alignments such as AUKUS, and hard security actions such as the Pacific Deterrence Initiative82 are now falling into place. The stage is set for follow-up measures to comprehensively “peak” the non-authoritarian world’s protective actions to hold the line in the Indo-Pacific.83
Throughout this decade of danger, American policymakers must understand that under Xi’s strongman rule, personal political survival will dictate PRC behavior. For Washington and its allies, the struggle centers on preserving and expanding the type of human well-being yielded by a system oriented toward freedom and rules-based governance that emphasizes reason and fair process over coercion and force. Conversely, Xi (like fellow authoritarian leaders such as Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un) uses a totally different operating system: rule for life, non-transparency, a ruthless “ends-justify-any- means” mindset, and policies that ultimately tend to be one-way, high-leverage bets on continued successful (and lightly opposed) revisionist actions abroad and near- absolute control domestically.
...
Gauntlet over Gizmos: Protecting Taiwan from Peak PRC Pressure through Early 2030s
The flexibility and resilience of America and its advanced-economy allies represent the polar opposite of China’s state-directed planning and implementation model. Their openness to people, ideas, and capital flows makes them creative dynamos, as well as fuels world-class research universities and yields demographic dividends by attracting talented and motivated people from all over the world. These qualities underpin their long-term comprehensive national power and the bloc’s global competitiveness. It also makes their responses to an assault formidable and favors their odds the longer a major cold or hot war continues. But free-wheeling systems also complicate near-term proactive preparation to head off conflicts.
Fortunately, Beijing’s belligerent behavior has helped solidify multiple allied diplomatic and military initiatives that, while presently insufficient to defend the rules-based order, nonetheless constitute a solid foundation on which to build. Diplomatic proofs of concept such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”),81 security alignments such as AUKUS, and hard security actions such as the Pacific Deterrence Initiative82 are now falling into place. The stage is set for follow-up measures to comprehensively “peak” the non-authoritarian world’s protective actions to hold the line in the Indo-Pacific.83
Throughout this decade of danger, American policymakers must understand that under Xi’s strongman rule, personal political survival will dictate PRC behavior. For Washington and its allies, the struggle centers on preserving and expanding the type of human well-being yielded by a system oriented toward freedom and rules-based governance that emphasizes reason and fair process over coercion and force. Conversely, Xi (like fellow authoritarian leaders such as Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un) uses a totally different operating system: rule for life, non-transparency, a ruthless “ends-justify-any- means” mindset, and policies that ultimately tend to be one-way, high-leverage bets on continued successful (and lightly opposed) revisionist actions abroad and near- absolute control domestically.
Xi’s personalist leadership and nearly comprehensive suppression of dissenting voices in the Party’s senior ranks simultaneously raises the chances of making policy mistakes while reducing the flexibility to deal with them early. In such an embrittled system, the proverbial “leverage” that would have left Xi with outsized returns on a successful bet instead amplifies the downside, all for which he personally and exclusively signed. The “best-case” scenario entails continued stagnation and rot within the Party along the lines of what Minxin Pei has articulated.84 The “intermediate case” is an accelerated version of that, with Xi suffering a loss of status and authority on the heels of a policy disaster, internal challengers rising within the PRC, and internecine strife leading to accelerated weakening of the Party. The “bad case” scenario—which, in practice, would likely be interrelated with the intermediate one—is that Xi would double down on a mistaken course of action to prioritize political self-preservation. If such mistakes led to—or were made in the course of—a kinetic conflict, personal survival measures could rapidly transmute into regional or even global (i.e., nuclear, space, cyber) threats.
If Xi triggered a “margin call” on his personal political account through a failed high-stakes gamble, it would likely be paid in blood. Washington must thus prepare the American electorate and its institutional and physical infrastructure, as well as that of allies and partners abroad, for the likelihood that tensions will periodically ratchet up to uncomfortable levels—and that, despite the promise of determined deterrence, actual conflict cannot be ruled out. Si vis pacem, para bellum (“If you want peace, prepare for war”) must unfortunately serve as a central organizing principle for a range of U.S. and allied decisions during the next decade with respect to China under Xi.85
Given these unforgiving dynamics, the implications for U.S. leaders and planners are stark:
Do whatever remains possible to reach “peak” preparedness for deterrent competition against China by the mid-to-late 2020s and accept the tradeoffs.86
Nothing the U.S and its allies might theoretically achieve after 2035 is worth pursuing at the expense of capabilities that might be “better” than those in service now, but that could not be realistically fielded at scale until five years or more from now.
Much will be decided by the end of this decade. If America falters at this critical time—whether through creeping corrosion of the rules-based order at Beijing’s hands or the shocking impact of failing to defend Taiwan against military attack— many aspects of the world and future will be determined at the expense of U.S. interests and values.
The decade of danger is upon us. With existential stakes for American interests and values looming, there is no time left to waste. Washington and its allies must push to maximize their competitive edge as rapidly as possible to avoid an outcome they cannot afford—“losing the 2020s.” At what point the PRC reaches its peak may ultimately defy precise prediction, but the strong possibility of it occurring over the next few years should front-load America’s bottom-line planning and preparations, given the potential for irreversible linchpin effects. Near-term preparation to run this decade’s unforgiving gauntlet justifies any corresponding long-term tradeoffs and risks: “losing the 2020s” would also mean losing the 2030s and beyond. Ultimately, the best achievements in coming decades will matter little if we lose Taiwan on our watch. More broadly, allowing PRC revisionism to run as rampant in the 2020s as it did in the 2010s would risk negatively reshaping the world order for decades to come and could actually set the stage for even worse conflicts by destabilizing the planet’s most populous region. Alternatively, proactive deterrence actions now can sow the seeds for a more peaceful and prosperous future that would benefit all Indo-Pacific countries, China included. The mission is vital, the stakes are high, and the clock is ticking.
I guess agreeing with the above make me a China "hater"...
The best description of this article is innuendo. Can you show me which is fact?
"Other common names among lawmaker portfolios are Coca-Cola and Apple, which have been previously linked to forced labor in Xinjiang." "Newsweek review of financial filings in Congress has found that lawmakers who are driving legislation to protect Uyghurs in China are also invested—either directly in the form of stocks, or indirectly via mutual funds—in major companies tied to the oppression in Xinjiang."
"Other common names among lawmaker portfolios are Coca-Cola and Apple, which have been previously linked to forced labor in Xinjiang." "Newsweek review of financial filings in Congress has found that lawmakers who are driving legislation to protect Uyghurs in China are also invested—either directly in the form of stocks, or indirectly via mutual funds—in major companies tied to the oppression in Xinjiang."
Almost certainly, Apple is in the portfolios of just about any savvy investor, but thanks for noting the connection to Xinjiang region human rights violations. I guess you are more interested in whataboutism than defending the PRC? Tough fail, on your part. You chose poorly.
"Other common names among lawmaker portfolios are Coca-Cola and Apple, which have been previously linked to forced labor in Xinjiang." "Newsweek review of financial filings in Congress has found that lawmakers who are driving legislation to protect Uyghurs in China are also invested—either directly in the form of stocks, or indirectly via mutual funds—in major companies tied to the oppression in Xinjiang."
Almost certainly, Apple is in the portfolios of just about any savvy investor, but thanks for noting the connection to Xinjiang region human rights violations. I guess you are more interested in whataboutism than defending the PRC? Tough fail, on your part. You chose poorly.
Well, we will wait to see how Apple respond to this blackmailing.
Worth a read for those of us in the reality based world... ..... I guess agreeing with the above make me a China "hater"...
Not that by itself -- but the unending stream of hate and smear tactics does.
In any case, I hope that bullshit helped you feel better about your bullshit.
Yeah, quoting a bunch of academics is always a risky proposition. /s
You might want to peek into the dark side and actually read the entire PDF, but you're afraid of what you might find, just like Waveparticle is unable to deny Xinjiang Region human rights violations.
LOL!
Information is your Lord Valdemort, and you're scared to death that it will turn you inside out.
Worth a read for those of us in the reality based world... ..... I guess agreeing with the above make me a China "hater"...
Not that by itself -- but the unending stream of hate and smear tactics does.
In any case, I hope that bullshit helped you feel better about your bullshit.
Yeah, quoting a bunch of academics is always a risky proposition. /s
You might want to peek into the dark side and actually read the entire PDF, but you're afraid of what you might find, just like Waveparticle is unable to deny Xinjiang Region human rights violations.
LOL!
Information is your Lord Valdemort, and you're scared to death that it will turn you inside out.
I don't deny there may be human rights violations according to the mighty US standard. But genocide? Definitely not!
Worth a read for those of us in the reality based world... ..... I guess agreeing with the above make me a China "hater"...
Not that by itself -- but the unending stream of hate and smear tactics does.
In any case, I hope that bullshit helped you feel better about your bullshit.
Yeah, quoting a bunch of academics is always a risky proposition. /s
You might want to peek into the dark side and actually read the entire PDF, but you're afraid of what you might find, just like Waveparticle is unable to deny Xinjiang Region human rights violations.
LOL!
Information is your Lord Valdemort, and you're scared to death that it will turn you inside out.
I don't deny there may be human rights violations according to the mighty US standard. But genocide? Definitely not!
UN defines genocide more broadly than murdering an ethnic population, and the US follows the UN standard.
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
Killing members of the group;
Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Elements of the crime
The Genocide Convention establishes in Article I that the crime of genocide may take place in the context of an armed conflict, international or non-international, but also in the context of a peaceful situation. The latter is less common but still possible. The same article establishes the obligation of the contracting parties to prevent and to punish the crime of genocide.
The popular understanding of what constitutes genocide tends to be broader than the content of the norm under international law. Article II of the Genocide Convention contains a narrow definition of the crime of genocide, which includes two main elements:
A mental element: the "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such"; and
A physical element, which includes the following five acts, enumerated exhaustively:
Killing members of the group
Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group
The intent is the most difficult element to determine. To constitute genocide, there must be a proven intent on the part of perpetrators to physically destroy a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. Cultural destruction does not suffice, nor does an intention to simply disperse a group. It is this special intent, or dolus specialis, that makes the crime of genocide so unique. In addition, case law has associated intent with the existence of a State or organizational plan or policy, even if the definition of genocide in international law does not include that element.
Importantly, the victims of genocide are deliberately targeted - not randomly – because of their real or perceived membership of one of the four groups protected under the Convention (which excludes political groups, for example). This means that the target of destruction must be the group, as such, and not its members as individuals. Genocide can also be committed against only a part of the group, as long as that part is identifiable (including within a geographically limited area) and “substantial.”
Worth a read for those of us in the reality based world... ..... I guess agreeing with the above make me a China "hater"...
Not that by itself -- but the unending stream of hate and smear tactics does.
In any case, I hope that bullshit helped you feel better about your bullshit.
Yeah, quoting a bunch of academics is always a risky proposition. /s
You might want to peek into the dark side and actually read the entire PDF, but you're afraid of what you might find, just like Waveparticle is unable to deny Xinjiang Region human rights violations.
LOL!
Information is your Lord Valdemort, and you're scared to death that it will turn you inside out.
I don't deny there may be human rights violations according to the mighty US standard. But genocide? Definitely not!
UN defines genocide more broadly than murdering an ethnic population, and the US follows the UN standard.
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
Killing members of the group;
Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Elements of the crime
The Genocide Convention establishes in Article I that the crime of genocide may take place in the context of an armed conflict, international or non-international, but also in the context of a peaceful situation. The latter is less common but still possible. The same article establishes the obligation of the contracting parties to prevent and to punish the crime of genocide.
The popular understanding of what constitutes genocide tends to be broader than the content of the norm under international law. Article II of the Genocide Convention contains a narrow definition of the crime of genocide, which includes two main elements:
A mental element: the "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such"; and
A physical element, which includes the following five acts, enumerated exhaustively:
Killing members of the group
Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group
The intent is the most difficult element to determine. To constitute genocide, there must be a proven intent on the part of perpetrators to physically destroy a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. Cultural destruction does not suffice, nor does an intention to simply disperse a group. It is this special intent, or dolus specialis, that makes the crime of genocide so unique. In addition, case law has associated intent with the existence of a State or organizational plan or policy, even if the definition of genocide in international law does not include that element.
Importantly, the victims of genocide are deliberately targeted - not randomly – because of their real or perceived membership of one of the four groups protected under the Convention (which excludes political groups, for example). This means that the target of destruction must be the group, as such, and not its members as individuals. Genocide can also be committed against only a part of the group, as long as that part is identifiable (including within a geographically limited area) and “substantial.”
Worth a read for those of us in the reality based world... ..... I guess agreeing with the above make me a China "hater"...
Not that by itself -- but the unending stream of hate and smear tactics does.
In any case, I hope that bullshit helped you feel better about your bullshit.
Yeah, quoting a bunch of academics is always a risky proposition. /s
You might want to peek into the dark side and actually read the entire PDF, but you're afraid of what you might find, just like Waveparticle is unable to deny Xinjiang Region human rights violations.
LOL!
Information is your Lord Valdemort, and you're scared to death that it will turn you inside out.
I don't deny there may be human rights violations according to the mighty US standard. But genocide? Definitely not!
UN defines genocide more broadly than murdering an ethnic population, and the US follows the UN standard.
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
Killing members of the group;
Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Elements of the crime
The Genocide Convention establishes in Article I that the crime of genocide may take place in the context of an armed conflict, international or non-international, but also in the context of a peaceful situation. The latter is less common but still possible. The same article establishes the obligation of the contracting parties to prevent and to punish the crime of genocide.
The popular understanding of what constitutes genocide tends to be broader than the content of the norm under international law. Article II of the Genocide Convention contains a narrow definition of the crime of genocide, which includes two main elements:
A mental element: the "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such"; and
A physical element, which includes the following five acts, enumerated exhaustively:
Killing members of the group
Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group
The intent is the most difficult element to determine. To constitute genocide, there must be a proven intent on the part of perpetrators to physically destroy a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. Cultural destruction does not suffice, nor does an intention to simply disperse a group. It is this special intent, or dolus specialis, that makes the crime of genocide so unique. In addition, case law has associated intent with the existence of a State or organizational plan or policy, even if the definition of genocide in international law does not include that element.
Importantly, the victims of genocide are deliberately targeted - not randomly – because of their real or perceived membership of one of the four groups protected under the Convention (which excludes political groups, for example). This means that the target of destruction must be the group, as such, and not its members as individuals. Genocide can also be committed against only a part of the group, as long as that part is identifiable (including within a geographically limited area) and “substantial.”
You lose this argument.
Which definition is violated?
At least 2, 3, and 4, according to reliable information, that I have previously posted, and you have previously denied.
In 2018, a famous Hong Kong singer, Jacky Cheung, had a concert tour in China. Chinese police managed to captured few dozen of fugitives after the show with facial recognition and AI. And China has population of 1.3B people.
Are you saying that police should not be allowed to arrest fugitives because they attended a concert? Or is it just Chinese police?
Worth a read for those of us in the reality based world... ..... I guess agreeing with the above make me a China "hater"...
Not that by itself -- but the unending stream of hate and smear tactics does.
In any case, I hope that bullshit helped you feel better about your bullshit.
Yeah, quoting a bunch of academics is always a risky proposition. /s
You might want to peek into the dark side and actually read the entire PDF, but you're afraid of what you might find, just like Waveparticle is unable to deny Xinjiang Region human rights violations.
LOL!
Information is your Lord Valdemort, and you're scared to death that it will turn you inside out.
I don't deny there may be human rights violations according to the mighty US standard. But genocide? Definitely not!
UN defines genocide more broadly than murdering an ethnic population, and the US follows the UN standard.
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
Killing members of the group;
Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Elements of the crime
The Genocide Convention establishes in Article I that the crime of genocide may take place in the context of an armed conflict, international or non-international, but also in the context of a peaceful situation. The latter is less common but still possible. The same article establishes the obligation of the contracting parties to prevent and to punish the crime of genocide.
The popular understanding of what constitutes genocide tends to be broader than the content of the norm under international law. Article II of the Genocide Convention contains a narrow definition of the crime of genocide, which includes two main elements:
A mental element: the "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such"; and
A physical element, which includes the following five acts, enumerated exhaustively:
Killing members of the group
Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group
The intent is the most difficult element to determine. To constitute genocide, there must be a proven intent on the part of perpetrators to physically destroy a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. Cultural destruction does not suffice, nor does an intention to simply disperse a group. It is this special intent, or dolus specialis, that makes the crime of genocide so unique. In addition, case law has associated intent with the existence of a State or organizational plan or policy, even if the definition of genocide in international law does not include that element.
Importantly, the victims of genocide are deliberately targeted - not randomly – because of their real or perceived membership of one of the four groups protected under the Convention (which excludes political groups, for example). This means that the target of destruction must be the group, as such, and not its members as individuals. Genocide can also be committed against only a part of the group, as long as that part is identifiable (including within a geographically limited area) and “substantial.”
You lose this argument.
Which definition is violated?
At least 2, 3, and 4, according to reliable information, that I have previously posted, and you have previously denied.
4 is not. 4 said measure to PREVENT births within the group. But Uyghurs population actually grows faster than Hans in Xinjiang.
Worth a read for those of us in the reality based world... ..... I guess agreeing with the above make me a China "hater"...
Not that by itself -- but the unending stream of hate and smear tactics does.
In any case, I hope that bullshit helped you feel better about your bullshit.
Yeah, quoting a bunch of academics is always a risky proposition. /s
You might want to peek into the dark side and actually read the entire PDF, but you're afraid of what you might find, just like Waveparticle is unable to deny Xinjiang Region human rights violations.
LOL!
Information is your Lord Valdemort, and you're scared to death that it will turn you inside out.
I don't deny there may be human rights violations according to the mighty US standard. But genocide? Definitely not!
UN defines genocide more broadly than murdering an ethnic population, and the US follows the UN standard.
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
Killing members of the group;
Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Elements of the crime
The Genocide Convention establishes in Article I that the crime of genocide may take place in the context of an armed conflict, international or non-international, but also in the context of a peaceful situation. The latter is less common but still possible. The same article establishes the obligation of the contracting parties to prevent and to punish the crime of genocide.
The popular understanding of what constitutes genocide tends to be broader than the content of the norm under international law. Article II of the Genocide Convention contains a narrow definition of the crime of genocide, which includes two main elements:
A mental element: the "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such"; and
A physical element, which includes the following five acts, enumerated exhaustively:
Killing members of the group
Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group
The intent is the most difficult element to determine. To constitute genocide, there must be a proven intent on the part of perpetrators to physically destroy a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. Cultural destruction does not suffice, nor does an intention to simply disperse a group. It is this special intent, or dolus specialis, that makes the crime of genocide so unique. In addition, case law has associated intent with the existence of a State or organizational plan or policy, even if the definition of genocide in international law does not include that element.
Importantly, the victims of genocide are deliberately targeted - not randomly – because of their real or perceived membership of one of the four groups protected under the Convention (which excludes political groups, for example). This means that the target of destruction must be the group, as such, and not its members as individuals. Genocide can also be committed against only a part of the group, as long as that part is identifiable (including within a geographically limited area) and “substantial.”
You lose this argument.
Which definition is violated?
At least 2, 3, and 4, according to reliable information, that I have previously posted, and you have previously denied.
4 is not. 4 said measure to PREVENT births within the group. But Uyghurs population actually grows faster than Hans in Xinjiang.
Well that settles it. China's genocide is questionable because of a barely related statistic for one of the three counts, so case dismissed!
Comments
Merry Christmas Everyone!
China Haters don't change -- they simply change smear tactics as needed to support their hate.
https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/b63419af/ces-pub-china-competition-121321.pdf
I guess agreeing with the above make me a China "hater"...
https://www.newsweek.com/us-senators-xinjiang-law-investments-linked-china-uyghur-genocide-1661550
"Other common names among lawmaker portfolios are Coca-Cola and Apple, which have been previously linked to forced labor in Xinjiang."
"Newsweek review of financial filings in Congress has found that lawmakers who are driving legislation to protect Uyghurs in China are also invested—either directly in the form of stocks, or indirectly via mutual funds—in major companies tied to the oppression in Xinjiang."
You might want to peek into the dark side and actually read the entire PDF, but you're afraid of what you might find, just like Waveparticle is unable to deny Xinjiang Region human rights violations.
LOL!
Information is your Lord Valdemort, and you're scared to death that it will turn you inside out.
https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide.shtml
You lose this argument.