Worth a read for those of us in the reality based world... ..... I guess agreeing with the above make me a China "hater"...
Not that by itself -- but the unending stream of hate and smear tactics does.
In any case, I hope that bullshit helped you feel better about your bullshit.
Yeah, quoting a bunch of academics is always a risky proposition. /s
You might want to peek into the dark side and actually read the entire PDF, but you're afraid of what you might find, just like Waveparticle is unable to deny Xinjiang Region human rights violations.
LOL!
Information is your Lord Valdemort, and you're scared to death that it will turn you inside out.
I don't deny there may be human rights violations according to the mighty US standard. But genocide? Definitely not!
UN defines genocide more broadly than murdering an ethnic population, and the US follows the UN standard.
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
Killing members of the group;
Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Elements of the crime
The Genocide Convention establishes in Article I that the crime of genocide may take place in the context of an armed conflict, international or non-international, but also in the context of a peaceful situation. The latter is less common but still possible. The same article establishes the obligation of the contracting parties to prevent and to punish the crime of genocide.
The popular understanding of what constitutes genocide tends to be broader than the content of the norm under international law. Article II of the Genocide Convention contains a narrow definition of the crime of genocide, which includes two main elements:
A mental element: the "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such"; and
A physical element, which includes the following five acts, enumerated exhaustively:
Killing members of the group
Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group
The intent is the most difficult element to determine. To constitute genocide, there must be a proven intent on the part of perpetrators to physically destroy a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. Cultural destruction does not suffice, nor does an intention to simply disperse a group. It is this special intent, or dolus specialis, that makes the crime of genocide so unique. In addition, case law has associated intent with the existence of a State or organizational plan or policy, even if the definition of genocide in international law does not include that element.
Importantly, the victims of genocide are deliberately targeted - not randomly – because of their real or perceived membership of one of the four groups protected under the Convention (which excludes political groups, for example). This means that the target of destruction must be the group, as such, and not its members as individuals. Genocide can also be committed against only a part of the group, as long as that part is identifiable (including within a geographically limited area) and “substantial.”
You lose this argument.
Which definition is violated?
At least 2, 3, and 4, according to reliable information, that I have previously posted, and you have previously denied.
4 is not. 4 said measure to PREVENT births within the group. But Uyghurs population actually grows faster than Hans in Xinjiang.
Birthrates in Xinjiang fell by almost half in the two years after the Chinese government implemented policies to reduce the number of babies born to Uyghur and other Muslim minority families, new research has claimed.
The figures show unprecedented declines which were more extreme than any global region at any time in the 71 years of UN fertility data collection, including during genocides in Rwanda and Cambodia, according to the authors of the report by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (Aspi).
The data adds to mounting evidence of coercive fertility policies in Xinjiang, including first-person accounts of forced sterilisation or birth control, and leaked policing data on the internment of women for violating family planning regulations.
They are among Chinese government policies believed to be designed to forcibly assimilate the Uyghur and other Muslim populations. In April, Human Rights Watch determined the Chinese government was committing crimes against humanity but said the extent of coercive birth control and sexual violence, while alarming, needed more investigation.
The authors of the report, Nathan Ruser and James Leibold, said they compiled it using publicly available Chinese government statistics to create datasets of county-level birthrates from 2011 to 2019, and comparing counties with higher proportions of Uyghur and other Muslim minorities.
China census: migration drives Han population growth in Xinjiang
The region’s Uygur community grew 16 per cent in the decade to 2020 compared with 25 per cent for HanRegional government says data prompted it to revise down Uygur population figures
Your statement is a lie.
Han are increasing their population from immigration into the region, not from births, and then there are also "forced" marriages of Uyghur women to Han;
BEIJING—China’s campaign of repression against Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in Xinjiang is brutal even by the standards of the worst authoritarian regimes. Since at least 2017, Beijing’s policies have included the mass internment of an estimated 1 million members of ethnic minorities, widespread surveillance, alleged forced labor, alleged forced abortions and sterilizations, the destruction of prayer sites and ethnic neighborhoods, and the desecration of burial sites. In January before leaving office, then-U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo labeled China’s treatment of the Uyghurs a genocide. China says its campaign is a legitimate push against terrorism and separatism, after sporadic bouts of violence rocked the region in recent decades.
ABOUT THE PHOTOS: Due to COVID-19 travel restrictions, photographer Roxi Pop directed remote photo sessions via WhatsApp, guiding the women’s family members—often their children—to take portraits of the women inside their homes around the world. Many didn’t want to reveal their exact locations or their children’s names.
Women have found themselves the targets of some of Beijing’s cruelest tactics. Last year, researcher Adrian Zenz found the region poured $37 million into programs—featuring forced sterilizations and IUD implantations—meant to slash birth rates, which dropped 24 percent in 2019 in Xinjiang compared with 4.2 percent nationwide.
But women have also been the fiercest fighters for Uyghur freedom and self-empowerment. More and more Uyghur and Kazakh women who managed to escape China have come out in the past year and spoken about their experiences, despite threats from Chinese state security against them and their families back in Xinjiang. In 2019, a Uyghur woman, Asiye Abdulahed, leaked the first trove of secret files that documented the camps’ existence—a move that unleashed a flood of threats against her and her family.
But besides sharing publicly harrowing accounts, Xinjiang women have used their professions—whether journalism, law, literature, or art—to create momentum for their resistance. “I think, indeed, Uyghur women are the most vulnerable in this genocide,” said Rayhan Asat, a Washington-based Uyghur lawyer who is campaigning for the release of her brother, Ekpar Asat, from detainment in Xinjiang. “Their bodily autonomy has been violated through sexual, medical means and forced labor.”
The PRC's denials are only increasing the world's resistance to China.
Worth a read for those of us in the reality based world... ..... I guess agreeing with the above make me a China "hater"...
Not that by itself -- but the unending stream of hate and smear tactics does.
In any case, I hope that bullshit helped you feel better about your bullshit.
Yeah, quoting a bunch of academics is always a risky proposition. /s
You might want to peek into the dark side and actually read the entire PDF, but you're afraid of what you might find, just like Waveparticle is unable to deny Xinjiang Region human rights violations.
LOL!
Information is your Lord Valdemort, and you're scared to death that it will turn you inside out.
I don't deny there may be human rights violations according to the mighty US standard. But genocide? Definitely not!
UN defines genocide more broadly than murdering an ethnic population, and the US follows the UN standard.
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
Killing members of the group;
Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Elements of the crime
The Genocide Convention establishes in Article I that the crime of genocide may take place in the context of an armed conflict, international or non-international, but also in the context of a peaceful situation. The latter is less common but still possible. The same article establishes the obligation of the contracting parties to prevent and to punish the crime of genocide.
The popular understanding of what constitutes genocide tends to be broader than the content of the norm under international law. Article II of the Genocide Convention contains a narrow definition of the crime of genocide, which includes two main elements:
A mental element: the "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such"; and
A physical element, which includes the following five acts, enumerated exhaustively:
Killing members of the group
Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group
The intent is the most difficult element to determine. To constitute genocide, there must be a proven intent on the part of perpetrators to physically destroy a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. Cultural destruction does not suffice, nor does an intention to simply disperse a group. It is this special intent, or dolus specialis, that makes the crime of genocide so unique. In addition, case law has associated intent with the existence of a State or organizational plan or policy, even if the definition of genocide in international law does not include that element.
Importantly, the victims of genocide are deliberately targeted - not randomly – because of their real or perceived membership of one of the four groups protected under the Convention (which excludes political groups, for example). This means that the target of destruction must be the group, as such, and not its members as individuals. Genocide can also be committed against only a part of the group, as long as that part is identifiable (including within a geographically limited area) and “substantial.”
You lose this argument.
Which definition is violated?
At least 2, 3, and 4, according to reliable information, that I have previously posted, and you have previously denied.
4 is not. 4 said measure to PREVENT births within the group. But Uyghurs population actually grows faster than Hans in Xinjiang.
Birthrates in Xinjiang fell by almost half in the two years after the Chinese government implemented policies to reduce the number of babies born to Uyghur and other Muslim minority families, new research has claimed.
The figures show unprecedented declines which were more extreme than any global region at any time in the 71 years of UN fertility data collection, including during genocides in Rwanda and Cambodia, according to the authors of the report by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (Aspi).
The data adds to mounting evidence of coercive fertility policies in Xinjiang, including first-person accounts of forced sterilisation or birth control, and leaked policing data on the internment of women for violating family planning regulations.
They are among Chinese government policies believed to be designed to forcibly assimilate the Uyghur and other Muslim populations. In April, Human Rights Watch determined the Chinese government was committing crimes against humanity but said the extent of coercive birth control and sexual violence, while alarming, needed more investigation.
The authors of the report, Nathan Ruser and James Leibold, said they compiled it using publicly available Chinese government statistics to create datasets of county-level birthrates from 2011 to 2019, and comparing counties with higher proportions of Uyghur and other Muslim minorities.
China census: migration drives Han population growth in Xinjiang
The region’s Uygur community grew 16 per cent in the decade to 2020 compared with 25 per cent for HanRegional government says data prompted it to revise down Uygur population figures
Your statement is a lie.
Han are increasing their population from immigration into the region, not from births, and then there are also "forced" marriages of Uyghur women to Han;
BEIJING—China’s campaign of repression against Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in Xinjiang is brutal even by the standards of the worst authoritarian regimes. Since at least 2017, Beijing’s policies have included the mass internment of an estimated 1 million members of ethnic minorities, widespread surveillance, alleged forced labor, alleged forced abortions and sterilizations, the destruction of prayer sites and ethnic neighborhoods, and the desecration of burial sites. In January before leaving office, then-U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo labeled China’s treatment of the Uyghurs a genocide. China says its campaign is a legitimate push against terrorism and separatism, after sporadic bouts of violence rocked the region in recent decades.
ABOUT THE PHOTOS: Due to COVID-19 travel restrictions, photographer Roxi Pop directed remote photo sessions via WhatsApp, guiding the women’s family members—often their children—to take portraits of the women inside their homes around the world. Many didn’t want to reveal their exact locations or their children’s names.
Women have found themselves the targets of some of Beijing’s cruelest tactics. Last year, researcher Adrian Zenz found the region poured $37 million into programs—featuring forced sterilizations and IUD implantations—meant to slash birth rates, which dropped 24 percent in 2019 in Xinjiang compared with 4.2 percent nationwide.
But women have also been the fiercest fighters for Uyghur freedom and self-empowerment. More and more Uyghur and Kazakh women who managed to escape China have come out in the past year and spoken about their experiences, despite threats from Chinese state security against them and their families back in Xinjiang. In 2019, a Uyghur woman, Asiye Abdulahed, leaked the first trove of secret files that documented the camps’ existence—a move that unleashed a flood of threats against her and her family.
But besides sharing publicly harrowing accounts, Xinjiang women have used their professions—whether journalism, law, literature, or art—to create momentum for their resistance. “I think, indeed, Uyghur women are the most vulnerable in this genocide,” said Rayhan Asat, a Washington-based Uyghur lawyer who is campaigning for the release of her brother, Ekpar Asat, from detainment in Xinjiang. “Their bodily autonomy has been violated through sexual, medical means and forced labor.”
The PRC's denials are only increasing the world's resistance to China.
You have a very serious reading comprehension problem. The Guardian article quoted a report from Australia. When I looked, the report gave no numbers just description words. The descriptive words are vague. I am pretty certain this report use exaggeration and the liar is the author.
Worth a read for those of us in the reality based world... ..... I guess agreeing with the above make me a China "hater"...
Not that by itself -- but the unending stream of hate and smear tactics does.
In any case, I hope that bullshit helped you feel better about your bullshit.
Yeah, quoting a bunch of academics is always a risky proposition. /s
You might want to peek into the dark side and actually read the entire PDF, but you're afraid of what you might find, just like Waveparticle is unable to deny Xinjiang Region human rights violations.
LOL!
Information is your Lord Valdemort, and you're scared to death that it will turn you inside out.
I don't deny there may be human rights violations according to the mighty US standard. But genocide? Definitely not!
UN defines genocide more broadly than murdering an ethnic population, and the US follows the UN standard.
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
Killing members of the group;
Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Elements of the crime
The Genocide Convention establishes in Article I that the crime of genocide may take place in the context of an armed conflict, international or non-international, but also in the context of a peaceful situation. The latter is less common but still possible. The same article establishes the obligation of the contracting parties to prevent and to punish the crime of genocide.
The popular understanding of what constitutes genocide tends to be broader than the content of the norm under international law. Article II of the Genocide Convention contains a narrow definition of the crime of genocide, which includes two main elements:
A mental element: the "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such"; and
A physical element, which includes the following five acts, enumerated exhaustively:
Killing members of the group
Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group
The intent is the most difficult element to determine. To constitute genocide, there must be a proven intent on the part of perpetrators to physically destroy a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. Cultural destruction does not suffice, nor does an intention to simply disperse a group. It is this special intent, or dolus specialis, that makes the crime of genocide so unique. In addition, case law has associated intent with the existence of a State or organizational plan or policy, even if the definition of genocide in international law does not include that element.
Importantly, the victims of genocide are deliberately targeted - not randomly – because of their real or perceived membership of one of the four groups protected under the Convention (which excludes political groups, for example). This means that the target of destruction must be the group, as such, and not its members as individuals. Genocide can also be committed against only a part of the group, as long as that part is identifiable (including within a geographically limited area) and “substantial.”
You lose this argument.
Which definition is violated?
At least 2, 3, and 4, according to reliable information, that I have previously posted, and you have previously denied.
4 is not. 4 said measure to PREVENT births within the group. But Uyghurs population actually grows faster than Hans in Xinjiang.
Birthrates in Xinjiang fell by almost half in the two years after the Chinese government implemented policies to reduce the number of babies born to Uyghur and other Muslim minority families, new research has claimed.
The figures show unprecedented declines which were more extreme than any global region at any time in the 71 years of UN fertility data collection, including during genocides in Rwanda and Cambodia, according to the authors of the report by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (Aspi).
The data adds to mounting evidence of coercive fertility policies in Xinjiang, including first-person accounts of forced sterilisation or birth control, and leaked policing data on the internment of women for violating family planning regulations.
They are among Chinese government policies believed to be designed to forcibly assimilate the Uyghur and other Muslim populations. In April, Human Rights Watch determined the Chinese government was committing crimes against humanity but said the extent of coercive birth control and sexual violence, while alarming, needed more investigation.
The authors of the report, Nathan Ruser and James Leibold, said they compiled it using publicly available Chinese government statistics to create datasets of county-level birthrates from 2011 to 2019, and comparing counties with higher proportions of Uyghur and other Muslim minorities.
China census: migration drives Han population growth in Xinjiang
The region’s Uygur community grew 16 per cent in the decade to 2020 compared with 25 per cent for HanRegional government says data prompted it to revise down Uygur population figures
Your statement is a lie.
Han are increasing their population from immigration into the region, not from births, and then there are also "forced" marriages of Uyghur women to Han;
BEIJING—China’s campaign of repression against Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in Xinjiang is brutal even by the standards of the worst authoritarian regimes. Since at least 2017, Beijing’s policies have included the mass internment of an estimated 1 million members of ethnic minorities, widespread surveillance, alleged forced labor, alleged forced abortions and sterilizations, the destruction of prayer sites and ethnic neighborhoods, and the desecration of burial sites. In January before leaving office, then-U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo labeled China’s treatment of the Uyghurs a genocide. China says its campaign is a legitimate push against terrorism and separatism, after sporadic bouts of violence rocked the region in recent decades.
ABOUT THE PHOTOS: Due to COVID-19 travel restrictions, photographer Roxi Pop directed remote photo sessions via WhatsApp, guiding the women’s family members—often their children—to take portraits of the women inside their homes around the world. Many didn’t want to reveal their exact locations or their children’s names.
Women have found themselves the targets of some of Beijing’s cruelest tactics. Last year, researcher Adrian Zenz found the region poured $37 million into programs—featuring forced sterilizations and IUD implantations—meant to slash birth rates, which dropped 24 percent in 2019 in Xinjiang compared with 4.2 percent nationwide.
But women have also been the fiercest fighters for Uyghur freedom and self-empowerment. More and more Uyghur and Kazakh women who managed to escape China have come out in the past year and spoken about their experiences, despite threats from Chinese state security against them and their families back in Xinjiang. In 2019, a Uyghur woman, Asiye Abdulahed, leaked the first trove of secret files that documented the camps’ existence—a move that unleashed a flood of threats against her and her family.
But besides sharing publicly harrowing accounts, Xinjiang women have used their professions—whether journalism, law, literature, or art—to create momentum for their resistance. “I think, indeed, Uyghur women are the most vulnerable in this genocide,” said Rayhan Asat, a Washington-based Uyghur lawyer who is campaigning for the release of her brother, Ekpar Asat, from detainment in Xinjiang. “Their bodily autonomy has been violated through sexual, medical means and forced labor.”
The PRC's denials are only increasing the world's resistance to China.
You have a very serious reading comprehension problem. The Guardian article quoted a report from Australia. When I looked, the report gave no numbers just description words. The descriptive words are vague. I am pretty certain this report use exaggeration and the liar is the author.
You clown. The report has a ton of statistics, copious footnotes and references, and the main datasets come from the Chinese government.
Worth a read for those of us in the reality based world... ..... I guess agreeing with the above make me a China "hater"...
Not that by itself -- but the unending stream of hate and smear tactics does.
In any case, I hope that bullshit helped you feel better about your bullshit.
Yeah, quoting a bunch of academics is always a risky proposition. /s
You might want to peek into the dark side and actually read the entire PDF, but you're afraid of what you might find, just like Waveparticle is unable to deny Xinjiang Region human rights violations.
LOL!
Information is your Lord Valdemort, and you're scared to death that it will turn you inside out.
I don't deny there may be human rights violations according to the mighty US standard. But genocide? Definitely not!
UN defines genocide more broadly than murdering an ethnic population, and the US follows the UN standard.
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
Killing members of the group;
Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Elements of the crime
The Genocide Convention establishes in Article I that the crime of genocide may take place in the context of an armed conflict, international or non-international, but also in the context of a peaceful situation. The latter is less common but still possible. The same article establishes the obligation of the contracting parties to prevent and to punish the crime of genocide.
The popular understanding of what constitutes genocide tends to be broader than the content of the norm under international law. Article II of the Genocide Convention contains a narrow definition of the crime of genocide, which includes two main elements:
A mental element: the "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such"; and
A physical element, which includes the following five acts, enumerated exhaustively:
Killing members of the group
Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group
The intent is the most difficult element to determine. To constitute genocide, there must be a proven intent on the part of perpetrators to physically destroy a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. Cultural destruction does not suffice, nor does an intention to simply disperse a group. It is this special intent, or dolus specialis, that makes the crime of genocide so unique. In addition, case law has associated intent with the existence of a State or organizational plan or policy, even if the definition of genocide in international law does not include that element.
Importantly, the victims of genocide are deliberately targeted - not randomly – because of their real or perceived membership of one of the four groups protected under the Convention (which excludes political groups, for example). This means that the target of destruction must be the group, as such, and not its members as individuals. Genocide can also be committed against only a part of the group, as long as that part is identifiable (including within a geographically limited area) and “substantial.”
You lose this argument.
Which definition is violated?
At least 2, 3, and 4, according to reliable information, that I have previously posted, and you have previously denied.
4 is not. 4 said measure to PREVENT births within the group. But Uyghurs population actually grows faster than Hans in Xinjiang.
Birthrates in Xinjiang fell by almost half in the two years after the Chinese government implemented policies to reduce the number of babies born to Uyghur and other Muslim minority families, new research has claimed.
The figures show unprecedented declines which were more extreme than any global region at any time in the 71 years of UN fertility data collection, including during genocides in Rwanda and Cambodia, according to the authors of the report by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (Aspi).
The data adds to mounting evidence of coercive fertility policies in Xinjiang, including first-person accounts of forced sterilisation or birth control, and leaked policing data on the internment of women for violating family planning regulations.
They are among Chinese government policies believed to be designed to forcibly assimilate the Uyghur and other Muslim populations. In April, Human Rights Watch determined the Chinese government was committing crimes against humanity but said the extent of coercive birth control and sexual violence, while alarming, needed more investigation.
The authors of the report, Nathan Ruser and James Leibold, said they compiled it using publicly available Chinese government statistics to create datasets of county-level birthrates from 2011 to 2019, and comparing counties with higher proportions of Uyghur and other Muslim minorities.
China census: migration drives Han population growth in Xinjiang
The region’s Uygur community grew 16 per cent in the decade to 2020 compared with 25 per cent for HanRegional government says data prompted it to revise down Uygur population figures
Your statement is a lie.
Han are increasing their population from immigration into the region, not from births, and then there are also "forced" marriages of Uyghur women to Han;
BEIJING—China’s campaign of repression against Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in Xinjiang is brutal even by the standards of the worst authoritarian regimes. Since at least 2017, Beijing’s policies have included the mass internment of an estimated 1 million members of ethnic minorities, widespread surveillance, alleged forced labor, alleged forced abortions and sterilizations, the destruction of prayer sites and ethnic neighborhoods, and the desecration of burial sites. In January before leaving office, then-U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo labeled China’s treatment of the Uyghurs a genocide. China says its campaign is a legitimate push against terrorism and separatism, after sporadic bouts of violence rocked the region in recent decades.
ABOUT THE PHOTOS: Due to COVID-19 travel restrictions, photographer Roxi Pop directed remote photo sessions via WhatsApp, guiding the women’s family members—often their children—to take portraits of the women inside their homes around the world. Many didn’t want to reveal their exact locations or their children’s names.
Women have found themselves the targets of some of Beijing’s cruelest tactics. Last year, researcher Adrian Zenz found the region poured $37 million into programs—featuring forced sterilizations and IUD implantations—meant to slash birth rates, which dropped 24 percent in 2019 in Xinjiang compared with 4.2 percent nationwide.
But women have also been the fiercest fighters for Uyghur freedom and self-empowerment. More and more Uyghur and Kazakh women who managed to escape China have come out in the past year and spoken about their experiences, despite threats from Chinese state security against them and their families back in Xinjiang. In 2019, a Uyghur woman, Asiye Abdulahed, leaked the first trove of secret files that documented the camps’ existence—a move that unleashed a flood of threats against her and her family.
But besides sharing publicly harrowing accounts, Xinjiang women have used their professions—whether journalism, law, literature, or art—to create momentum for their resistance. “I think, indeed, Uyghur women are the most vulnerable in this genocide,” said Rayhan Asat, a Washington-based Uyghur lawyer who is campaigning for the release of her brother, Ekpar Asat, from detainment in Xinjiang. “Their bodily autonomy has been violated through sexual, medical means and forced labor.”
The PRC's denials are only increasing the world's resistance to China.
You have a very serious reading comprehension problem. The Guardian article quoted a report from Australia. When I looked, the report gave no numbers just description words. The descriptive words are vague. I am pretty certain this report use exaggeration and the liar is the author.
You clown. The report has a ton of statistics, copious footnotes and references, and the main datasets come from the Chinese government.
If you're going to make stuff up, don't make it up about things that are so easily disproved.
Mark Twain has said “There are three kinds of lies: Lies, Damned Lies, and Statistics” . Do you understand what he means?
This report quoted statistics published by CCP. What are the statistics? They are changes in birth rate. To deduce that there is genocide is a lie. I will give you a hint. China has a one child policy for the last twenty years until recently. But this policy applies only to Hans. If you can find the lie in the report from this clue, I will give you a A grade.
Worth a read for those of us in the reality based world... ..... I guess agreeing with the above make me a China "hater"...
Not that by itself -- but the unending stream of hate and smear tactics does.
In any case, I hope that bullshit helped you feel better about your bullshit.
Yeah, quoting a bunch of academics is always a risky proposition. /s
You might want to peek into the dark side and actually read the entire PDF, but you're afraid of what you might find, just like Waveparticle is unable to deny Xinjiang Region human rights violations.
LOL!
Information is your Lord Valdemort, and you're scared to death that it will turn you inside out.
I don't deny there may be human rights violations according to the mighty US standard. But genocide? Definitely not!
UN defines genocide more broadly than murdering an ethnic population, and the US follows the UN standard.
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
Killing members of the group;
Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Elements of the crime
The Genocide Convention establishes in Article I that the crime of genocide may take place in the context of an armed conflict, international or non-international, but also in the context of a peaceful situation. The latter is less common but still possible. The same article establishes the obligation of the contracting parties to prevent and to punish the crime of genocide.
The popular understanding of what constitutes genocide tends to be broader than the content of the norm under international law. Article II of the Genocide Convention contains a narrow definition of the crime of genocide, which includes two main elements:
A mental element: the "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such"; and
A physical element, which includes the following five acts, enumerated exhaustively:
Killing members of the group
Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group
The intent is the most difficult element to determine. To constitute genocide, there must be a proven intent on the part of perpetrators to physically destroy a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. Cultural destruction does not suffice, nor does an intention to simply disperse a group. It is this special intent, or dolus specialis, that makes the crime of genocide so unique. In addition, case law has associated intent with the existence of a State or organizational plan or policy, even if the definition of genocide in international law does not include that element.
Importantly, the victims of genocide are deliberately targeted - not randomly – because of their real or perceived membership of one of the four groups protected under the Convention (which excludes political groups, for example). This means that the target of destruction must be the group, as such, and not its members as individuals. Genocide can also be committed against only a part of the group, as long as that part is identifiable (including within a geographically limited area) and “substantial.”
You lose this argument.
Which definition is violated?
At least 2, 3, and 4, according to reliable information, that I have previously posted, and you have previously denied.
4 is not. 4 said measure to PREVENT births within the group. But Uyghurs population actually grows faster than Hans in Xinjiang.
Birthrates in Xinjiang fell by almost half in the two years after the Chinese government implemented policies to reduce the number of babies born to Uyghur and other Muslim minority families, new research has claimed.
The figures show unprecedented declines which were more extreme than any global region at any time in the 71 years of UN fertility data collection, including during genocides in Rwanda and Cambodia, according to the authors of the report by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (Aspi).
The data adds to mounting evidence of coercive fertility policies in Xinjiang, including first-person accounts of forced sterilisation or birth control, and leaked policing data on the internment of women for violating family planning regulations.
They are among Chinese government policies believed to be designed to forcibly assimilate the Uyghur and other Muslim populations. In April, Human Rights Watch determined the Chinese government was committing crimes against humanity but said the extent of coercive birth control and sexual violence, while alarming, needed more investigation.
The authors of the report, Nathan Ruser and James Leibold, said they compiled it using publicly available Chinese government statistics to create datasets of county-level birthrates from 2011 to 2019, and comparing counties with higher proportions of Uyghur and other Muslim minorities.
China census: migration drives Han population growth in Xinjiang
The region’s Uygur community grew 16 per cent in the decade to 2020 compared with 25 per cent for HanRegional government says data prompted it to revise down Uygur population figures
Your statement is a lie.
Han are increasing their population from immigration into the region, not from births, and then there are also "forced" marriages of Uyghur women to Han;
BEIJING—China’s campaign of repression against Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in Xinjiang is brutal even by the standards of the worst authoritarian regimes. Since at least 2017, Beijing’s policies have included the mass internment of an estimated 1 million members of ethnic minorities, widespread surveillance, alleged forced labor, alleged forced abortions and sterilizations, the destruction of prayer sites and ethnic neighborhoods, and the desecration of burial sites. In January before leaving office, then-U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo labeled China’s treatment of the Uyghurs a genocide. China says its campaign is a legitimate push against terrorism and separatism, after sporadic bouts of violence rocked the region in recent decades.
ABOUT THE PHOTOS: Due to COVID-19 travel restrictions, photographer Roxi Pop directed remote photo sessions via WhatsApp, guiding the women’s family members—often their children—to take portraits of the women inside their homes around the world. Many didn’t want to reveal their exact locations or their children’s names.
Women have found themselves the targets of some of Beijing’s cruelest tactics. Last year, researcher Adrian Zenz found the region poured $37 million into programs—featuring forced sterilizations and IUD implantations—meant to slash birth rates, which dropped 24 percent in 2019 in Xinjiang compared with 4.2 percent nationwide.
But women have also been the fiercest fighters for Uyghur freedom and self-empowerment. More and more Uyghur and Kazakh women who managed to escape China have come out in the past year and spoken about their experiences, despite threats from Chinese state security against them and their families back in Xinjiang. In 2019, a Uyghur woman, Asiye Abdulahed, leaked the first trove of secret files that documented the camps’ existence—a move that unleashed a flood of threats against her and her family.
But besides sharing publicly harrowing accounts, Xinjiang women have used their professions—whether journalism, law, literature, or art—to create momentum for their resistance. “I think, indeed, Uyghur women are the most vulnerable in this genocide,” said Rayhan Asat, a Washington-based Uyghur lawyer who is campaigning for the release of her brother, Ekpar Asat, from detainment in Xinjiang. “Their bodily autonomy has been violated through sexual, medical means and forced labor.”
The PRC's denials are only increasing the world's resistance to China.
You have a very serious reading comprehension problem. The Guardian article quoted a report from Australia. When I looked, the report gave no numbers just description words. The descriptive words are vague. I am pretty certain this report use exaggeration and the liar is the author.
You clown. The report has a ton of statistics, copious footnotes and references, and the main datasets come from the Chinese government.
If you're going to make stuff up, don't make it up about things that are so easily disproved.
Mark Twain has said “There are three kinds of lies: Lies, Damned Lies, and Statistics” . Do you understand what he means?
This report quoted statistics published by CCP. What are the statistics? They are changes in birth rate. To deduce that there is genocide is a lie. I will give you a hint. China has a one child policy for the last twenty years until recently. But this policy applies only to Hans. If you can find the lie in the report from this clue, I will give you a A grade.
Not my job, I didn't reference the report, and I don't care about your gradings, or your facile Mark Twain quotes.
Are you going to apologise for saying tmay had a reading comprehension problem when in fact it was you who clearly hadn't read the report properly?
Worth a read for those of us in the reality based world... ..... I guess agreeing with the above make me a China "hater"...
Not that by itself -- but the unending stream of hate and smear tactics does.
In any case, I hope that bullshit helped you feel better about your bullshit.
Yeah, quoting a bunch of academics is always a risky proposition. /s
You might want to peek into the dark side and actually read the entire PDF, but you're afraid of what you might find, just like Waveparticle is unable to deny Xinjiang Region human rights violations.
LOL!
Information is your Lord Valdemort, and you're scared to death that it will turn you inside out.
I don't deny there may be human rights violations according to the mighty US standard. But genocide? Definitely not!
UN defines genocide more broadly than murdering an ethnic population, and the US follows the UN standard.
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
Killing members of the group;
Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Elements of the crime
The Genocide Convention establishes in Article I that the crime of genocide may take place in the context of an armed conflict, international or non-international, but also in the context of a peaceful situation. The latter is less common but still possible. The same article establishes the obligation of the contracting parties to prevent and to punish the crime of genocide.
The popular understanding of what constitutes genocide tends to be broader than the content of the norm under international law. Article II of the Genocide Convention contains a narrow definition of the crime of genocide, which includes two main elements:
A mental element: the "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such"; and
A physical element, which includes the following five acts, enumerated exhaustively:
Killing members of the group
Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group
The intent is the most difficult element to determine. To constitute genocide, there must be a proven intent on the part of perpetrators to physically destroy a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. Cultural destruction does not suffice, nor does an intention to simply disperse a group. It is this special intent, or dolus specialis, that makes the crime of genocide so unique. In addition, case law has associated intent with the existence of a State or organizational plan or policy, even if the definition of genocide in international law does not include that element.
Importantly, the victims of genocide are deliberately targeted - not randomly – because of their real or perceived membership of one of the four groups protected under the Convention (which excludes political groups, for example). This means that the target of destruction must be the group, as such, and not its members as individuals. Genocide can also be committed against only a part of the group, as long as that part is identifiable (including within a geographically limited area) and “substantial.”
You lose this argument.
Which definition is violated?
At least 2, 3, and 4, according to reliable information, that I have previously posted, and you have previously denied.
4 is not. 4 said measure to PREVENT births within the group. But Uyghurs population actually grows faster than Hans in Xinjiang.
Birthrates in Xinjiang fell by almost half in the two years after the Chinese government implemented policies to reduce the number of babies born to Uyghur and other Muslim minority families, new research has claimed.
The figures show unprecedented declines which were more extreme than any global region at any time in the 71 years of UN fertility data collection, including during genocides in Rwanda and Cambodia, according to the authors of the report by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (Aspi).
The data adds to mounting evidence of coercive fertility policies in Xinjiang, including first-person accounts of forced sterilisation or birth control, and leaked policing data on the internment of women for violating family planning regulations.
They are among Chinese government policies believed to be designed to forcibly assimilate the Uyghur and other Muslim populations. In April, Human Rights Watch determined the Chinese government was committing crimes against humanity but said the extent of coercive birth control and sexual violence, while alarming, needed more investigation.
The authors of the report, Nathan Ruser and James Leibold, said they compiled it using publicly available Chinese government statistics to create datasets of county-level birthrates from 2011 to 2019, and comparing counties with higher proportions of Uyghur and other Muslim minorities.
China census: migration drives Han population growth in Xinjiang
The region’s Uygur community grew 16 per cent in the decade to 2020 compared with 25 per cent for HanRegional government says data prompted it to revise down Uygur population figures
Your statement is a lie.
Han are increasing their population from immigration into the region, not from births, and then there are also "forced" marriages of Uyghur women to Han;
BEIJING—China’s campaign of repression against Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in Xinjiang is brutal even by the standards of the worst authoritarian regimes. Since at least 2017, Beijing’s policies have included the mass internment of an estimated 1 million members of ethnic minorities, widespread surveillance, alleged forced labor, alleged forced abortions and sterilizations, the destruction of prayer sites and ethnic neighborhoods, and the desecration of burial sites. In January before leaving office, then-U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo labeled China’s treatment of the Uyghurs a genocide. China says its campaign is a legitimate push against terrorism and separatism, after sporadic bouts of violence rocked the region in recent decades.
ABOUT THE PHOTOS: Due to COVID-19 travel restrictions, photographer Roxi Pop directed remote photo sessions via WhatsApp, guiding the women’s family members—often their children—to take portraits of the women inside their homes around the world. Many didn’t want to reveal their exact locations or their children’s names.
Women have found themselves the targets of some of Beijing’s cruelest tactics. Last year, researcher Adrian Zenz found the region poured $37 million into programs—featuring forced sterilizations and IUD implantations—meant to slash birth rates, which dropped 24 percent in 2019 in Xinjiang compared with 4.2 percent nationwide.
But women have also been the fiercest fighters for Uyghur freedom and self-empowerment. More and more Uyghur and Kazakh women who managed to escape China have come out in the past year and spoken about their experiences, despite threats from Chinese state security against them and their families back in Xinjiang. In 2019, a Uyghur woman, Asiye Abdulahed, leaked the first trove of secret files that documented the camps’ existence—a move that unleashed a flood of threats against her and her family.
But besides sharing publicly harrowing accounts, Xinjiang women have used their professions—whether journalism, law, literature, or art—to create momentum for their resistance. “I think, indeed, Uyghur women are the most vulnerable in this genocide,” said Rayhan Asat, a Washington-based Uyghur lawyer who is campaigning for the release of her brother, Ekpar Asat, from detainment in Xinjiang. “Their bodily autonomy has been violated through sexual, medical means and forced labor.”
The PRC's denials are only increasing the world's resistance to China.
You have a very serious reading comprehension problem. The Guardian article quoted a report from Australia. When I looked, the report gave no numbers just description words. The descriptive words are vague. I am pretty certain this report use exaggeration and the liar is the author.
You clown. The report has a ton of statistics, copious footnotes and references, and the main datasets come from the Chinese government.
If you're going to make stuff up, don't make it up about things that are so easily disproved.
Mark Twain has said “There are three kinds of lies: Lies, Damned Lies, and Statistics” . Do you understand what he means?
This report quoted statistics published by CCP. What are the statistics? They are changes in birth rate. To deduce that there is genocide is a lie. I will give you a hint. China has a one child policy for the last twenty years until recently. But this policy applies only to Hans. If you can find the lie in the report from this clue, I will give you a A grade.
Not my job, I didn't reference the report, and I don't care about your gradings, or your facile Mark Twain quotes.
Are you going to apologise for saying tmay had a reading comprehension problem when in fact it was you who clearly hadn't read the report properly?
No, I said " I am pretty certain this report use exaggeration and the liar is the author. " I am correct.
Worth a read for those of us in the reality based world... ..... I guess agreeing with the above make me a China "hater"...
Not that by itself -- but the unending stream of hate and smear tactics does.
In any case, I hope that bullshit helped you feel better about your bullshit.
Yeah, quoting a bunch of academics is always a risky proposition. /s
You might want to peek into the dark side and actually read the entire PDF, but you're afraid of what you might find, just like Waveparticle is unable to deny Xinjiang Region human rights violations.
LOL!
Information is your Lord Valdemort, and you're scared to death that it will turn you inside out.
I don't deny there may be human rights violations according to the mighty US standard. But genocide? Definitely not!
UN defines genocide more broadly than murdering an ethnic population, and the US follows the UN standard.
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
Killing members of the group;
Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Elements of the crime
The Genocide Convention establishes in Article I that the crime of genocide may take place in the context of an armed conflict, international or non-international, but also in the context of a peaceful situation. The latter is less common but still possible. The same article establishes the obligation of the contracting parties to prevent and to punish the crime of genocide.
The popular understanding of what constitutes genocide tends to be broader than the content of the norm under international law. Article II of the Genocide Convention contains a narrow definition of the crime of genocide, which includes two main elements:
A mental element: the "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such"; and
A physical element, which includes the following five acts, enumerated exhaustively:
Killing members of the group
Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group
The intent is the most difficult element to determine. To constitute genocide, there must be a proven intent on the part of perpetrators to physically destroy a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. Cultural destruction does not suffice, nor does an intention to simply disperse a group. It is this special intent, or dolus specialis, that makes the crime of genocide so unique. In addition, case law has associated intent with the existence of a State or organizational plan or policy, even if the definition of genocide in international law does not include that element.
Importantly, the victims of genocide are deliberately targeted - not randomly – because of their real or perceived membership of one of the four groups protected under the Convention (which excludes political groups, for example). This means that the target of destruction must be the group, as such, and not its members as individuals. Genocide can also be committed against only a part of the group, as long as that part is identifiable (including within a geographically limited area) and “substantial.”
You lose this argument.
Which definition is violated?
At least 2, 3, and 4, according to reliable information, that I have previously posted, and you have previously denied.
4 is not. 4 said measure to PREVENT births within the group. But Uyghurs population actually grows faster than Hans in Xinjiang.
Birthrates in Xinjiang fell by almost half in the two years after the Chinese government implemented policies to reduce the number of babies born to Uyghur and other Muslim minority families, new research has claimed.
The figures show unprecedented declines which were more extreme than any global region at any time in the 71 years of UN fertility data collection, including during genocides in Rwanda and Cambodia, according to the authors of the report by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (Aspi).
The data adds to mounting evidence of coercive fertility policies in Xinjiang, including first-person accounts of forced sterilisation or birth control, and leaked policing data on the internment of women for violating family planning regulations.
They are among Chinese government policies believed to be designed to forcibly assimilate the Uyghur and other Muslim populations. In April, Human Rights Watch determined the Chinese government was committing crimes against humanity but said the extent of coercive birth control and sexual violence, while alarming, needed more investigation.
The authors of the report, Nathan Ruser and James Leibold, said they compiled it using publicly available Chinese government statistics to create datasets of county-level birthrates from 2011 to 2019, and comparing counties with higher proportions of Uyghur and other Muslim minorities.
China census: migration drives Han population growth in Xinjiang
The region’s Uygur community grew 16 per cent in the decade to 2020 compared with 25 per cent for HanRegional government says data prompted it to revise down Uygur population figures
Your statement is a lie.
Han are increasing their population from immigration into the region, not from births, and then there are also "forced" marriages of Uyghur women to Han;
BEIJING—China’s campaign of repression against Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in Xinjiang is brutal even by the standards of the worst authoritarian regimes. Since at least 2017, Beijing’s policies have included the mass internment of an estimated 1 million members of ethnic minorities, widespread surveillance, alleged forced labor, alleged forced abortions and sterilizations, the destruction of prayer sites and ethnic neighborhoods, and the desecration of burial sites. In January before leaving office, then-U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo labeled China’s treatment of the Uyghurs a genocide. China says its campaign is a legitimate push against terrorism and separatism, after sporadic bouts of violence rocked the region in recent decades.
ABOUT THE PHOTOS: Due to COVID-19 travel restrictions, photographer Roxi Pop directed remote photo sessions via WhatsApp, guiding the women’s family members—often their children—to take portraits of the women inside their homes around the world. Many didn’t want to reveal their exact locations or their children’s names.
Women have found themselves the targets of some of Beijing’s cruelest tactics. Last year, researcher Adrian Zenz found the region poured $37 million into programs—featuring forced sterilizations and IUD implantations—meant to slash birth rates, which dropped 24 percent in 2019 in Xinjiang compared with 4.2 percent nationwide.
But women have also been the fiercest fighters for Uyghur freedom and self-empowerment. More and more Uyghur and Kazakh women who managed to escape China have come out in the past year and spoken about their experiences, despite threats from Chinese state security against them and their families back in Xinjiang. In 2019, a Uyghur woman, Asiye Abdulahed, leaked the first trove of secret files that documented the camps’ existence—a move that unleashed a flood of threats against her and her family.
But besides sharing publicly harrowing accounts, Xinjiang women have used their professions—whether journalism, law, literature, or art—to create momentum for their resistance. “I think, indeed, Uyghur women are the most vulnerable in this genocide,” said Rayhan Asat, a Washington-based Uyghur lawyer who is campaigning for the release of her brother, Ekpar Asat, from detainment in Xinjiang. “Their bodily autonomy has been violated through sexual, medical means and forced labor.”
The PRC's denials are only increasing the world's resistance to China.
You have a very serious reading comprehension problem. The Guardian article quoted a report from Australia. When I looked, the report gave no numbers just description words. The descriptive words are vague. I am pretty certain this report use exaggeration and the liar is the author.
You clown. The report has a ton of statistics, copious footnotes and references, and the main datasets come from the Chinese government.
If you're going to make stuff up, don't make it up about things that are so easily disproved.
Mark Twain has said “There are three kinds of lies: Lies, Damned Lies, and Statistics” . Do you understand what he means?
This report quoted statistics published by CCP. What are the statistics? They are changes in birth rate. To deduce that there is genocide is a lie. I will give you a hint. China has a one child policy for the last twenty years until recently. But this policy applies only to Hans. If you can find the lie in the report from this clue, I will give you a A grade.
Not my job, I didn't reference the report, and I don't care about your gradings, or your facile Mark Twain quotes.
Are you going to apologise for saying tmay had a reading comprehension problem when in fact it was you who clearly hadn't read the report properly?
No, I said " I am pretty certain this report use exaggeration and the liar is the author. " I am correct.
Nice attempt to misrepresent what you said just half a page up. Unfortunately for you I can read the whole thing. You said "the report gave no numbers just description words", which is utter bullshit. You hadn't read it, you just skimmed the key findings page and assumed it was the whole thing.
You are a very bad liar, but you are definitely a liar.
Worth a read for those of us in the reality based world... ..... I guess agreeing with the above make me a China "hater"...
Not that by itself -- but the unending stream of hate and smear tactics does.
In any case, I hope that bullshit helped you feel better about your bullshit.
Yeah, quoting a bunch of academics is always a risky proposition. /s
You might want to peek into the dark side and actually read the entire PDF, but you're afraid of what you might find, just like Waveparticle is unable to deny Xinjiang Region human rights violations.
LOL!
Information is your Lord Valdemort, and you're scared to death that it will turn you inside out.
I don't deny there may be human rights violations according to the mighty US standard. But genocide? Definitely not!
UN defines genocide more broadly than murdering an ethnic population, and the US follows the UN standard.
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
Killing members of the group;
Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Elements of the crime
The Genocide Convention establishes in Article I that the crime of genocide may take place in the context of an armed conflict, international or non-international, but also in the context of a peaceful situation. The latter is less common but still possible. The same article establishes the obligation of the contracting parties to prevent and to punish the crime of genocide.
The popular understanding of what constitutes genocide tends to be broader than the content of the norm under international law. Article II of the Genocide Convention contains a narrow definition of the crime of genocide, which includes two main elements:
A mental element: the "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such"; and
A physical element, which includes the following five acts, enumerated exhaustively:
Killing members of the group
Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group
The intent is the most difficult element to determine. To constitute genocide, there must be a proven intent on the part of perpetrators to physically destroy a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. Cultural destruction does not suffice, nor does an intention to simply disperse a group. It is this special intent, or dolus specialis, that makes the crime of genocide so unique. In addition, case law has associated intent with the existence of a State or organizational plan or policy, even if the definition of genocide in international law does not include that element.
Importantly, the victims of genocide are deliberately targeted - not randomly – because of their real or perceived membership of one of the four groups protected under the Convention (which excludes political groups, for example). This means that the target of destruction must be the group, as such, and not its members as individuals. Genocide can also be committed against only a part of the group, as long as that part is identifiable (including within a geographically limited area) and “substantial.”
You lose this argument.
Which definition is violated?
At least 2, 3, and 4, according to reliable information, that I have previously posted, and you have previously denied.
4 is not. 4 said measure to PREVENT births within the group. But Uyghurs population actually grows faster than Hans in Xinjiang.
Birthrates in Xinjiang fell by almost half in the two years after the Chinese government implemented policies to reduce the number of babies born to Uyghur and other Muslim minority families, new research has claimed.
The figures show unprecedented declines which were more extreme than any global region at any time in the 71 years of UN fertility data collection, including during genocides in Rwanda and Cambodia, according to the authors of the report by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (Aspi).
The data adds to mounting evidence of coercive fertility policies in Xinjiang, including first-person accounts of forced sterilisation or birth control, and leaked policing data on the internment of women for violating family planning regulations.
They are among Chinese government policies believed to be designed to forcibly assimilate the Uyghur and other Muslim populations. In April, Human Rights Watch determined the Chinese government was committing crimes against humanity but said the extent of coercive birth control and sexual violence, while alarming, needed more investigation.
The authors of the report, Nathan Ruser and James Leibold, said they compiled it using publicly available Chinese government statistics to create datasets of county-level birthrates from 2011 to 2019, and comparing counties with higher proportions of Uyghur and other Muslim minorities.
China census: migration drives Han population growth in Xinjiang
The region’s Uygur community grew 16 per cent in the decade to 2020 compared with 25 per cent for HanRegional government says data prompted it to revise down Uygur population figures
Your statement is a lie.
Han are increasing their population from immigration into the region, not from births, and then there are also "forced" marriages of Uyghur women to Han;
BEIJING—China’s campaign of repression against Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in Xinjiang is brutal even by the standards of the worst authoritarian regimes. Since at least 2017, Beijing’s policies have included the mass internment of an estimated 1 million members of ethnic minorities, widespread surveillance, alleged forced labor, alleged forced abortions and sterilizations, the destruction of prayer sites and ethnic neighborhoods, and the desecration of burial sites. In January before leaving office, then-U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo labeled China’s treatment of the Uyghurs a genocide. China says its campaign is a legitimate push against terrorism and separatism, after sporadic bouts of violence rocked the region in recent decades.
ABOUT THE PHOTOS: Due to COVID-19 travel restrictions, photographer Roxi Pop directed remote photo sessions via WhatsApp, guiding the women’s family members—often their children—to take portraits of the women inside their homes around the world. Many didn’t want to reveal their exact locations or their children’s names.
Women have found themselves the targets of some of Beijing’s cruelest tactics. Last year, researcher Adrian Zenz found the region poured $37 million into programs—featuring forced sterilizations and IUD implantations—meant to slash birth rates, which dropped 24 percent in 2019 in Xinjiang compared with 4.2 percent nationwide.
But women have also been the fiercest fighters for Uyghur freedom and self-empowerment. More and more Uyghur and Kazakh women who managed to escape China have come out in the past year and spoken about their experiences, despite threats from Chinese state security against them and their families back in Xinjiang. In 2019, a Uyghur woman, Asiye Abdulahed, leaked the first trove of secret files that documented the camps’ existence—a move that unleashed a flood of threats against her and her family.
But besides sharing publicly harrowing accounts, Xinjiang women have used their professions—whether journalism, law, literature, or art—to create momentum for their resistance. “I think, indeed, Uyghur women are the most vulnerable in this genocide,” said Rayhan Asat, a Washington-based Uyghur lawyer who is campaigning for the release of her brother, Ekpar Asat, from detainment in Xinjiang. “Their bodily autonomy has been violated through sexual, medical means and forced labor.”
The PRC's denials are only increasing the world's resistance to China.
You have a very serious reading comprehension problem. The Guardian article quoted a report from Australia. When I looked, the report gave no numbers just description words. The descriptive words are vague. I am pretty certain this report use exaggeration and the liar is the author.
You clown. The report has a ton of statistics, copious footnotes and references, and the main datasets come from the Chinese government.
If you're going to make stuff up, don't make it up about things that are so easily disproved.
Mark Twain has said “There are three kinds of lies: Lies, Damned Lies, and Statistics” . Do you understand what he means?
This report quoted statistics published by CCP. What are the statistics? They are changes in birth rate. To deduce that there is genocide is a lie. I will give you a hint. China has a one child policy for the last twenty years until recently. But this policy applies only to Hans. If you can find the lie in the report from this clue, I will give you a A grade.
Not my job, I didn't reference the report, and I don't care about your gradings, or your facile Mark Twain quotes.
Are you going to apologise for saying tmay had a reading comprehension problem when in fact it was you who clearly hadn't read the report properly?
No, I said " I am pretty certain this report use exaggeration and the liar is the author. " I am correct.
The flexibility and resilience of America and its advanced-economy allies represent the polar opposite of China’s state-directed planning and implementation model. Their openness to people, ideas, and capital flows makes them creative dynamos, as well as fuels world-class research universities and yields demographic dividends by attracting talented and motivated people from all over the world. These qualities underpin their long-term comprehensive national power and the bloc’s global competitiveness. It also makes their responses to an assault formidable and favors their odds the longer a major cold or hot war continues. But free-wheeling systems also complicate near-term proactive preparation to head off conflicts.
Fortunately, Beijing’s belligerent behavior has helped solidify multiple allied diplomatic and military initiatives that, while presently insufficient to defend the rules-based order, nonetheless constitute a solid foundation on which to build. Diplomatic proofs of concept such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”),81 security alignments such as AUKUS, and hard security actions such as the Pacific Deterrence Initiative82 are now falling into place. The stage is set for follow-up measures to comprehensively “peak” the non-authoritarian world’s protective actions to hold the line in the Indo-Pacific.83
Throughout this decade of danger, American policymakers must understand that under Xi’s strongman rule, personal political survival will dictate PRC behavior. For Washington and its allies, the struggle centers on preserving and expanding the type of human well-being yielded by a system oriented toward freedom and rules-based governance that emphasizes reason and fair process over coercion and force. Conversely, Xi (like fellow authoritarian leaders such as Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un) uses a totally different operating system: rule for life, non-transparency, a ruthless “ends-justify-any- means” mindset, and policies that ultimately tend to be one-way, high-leverage bets on continued successful (and lightly opposed) revisionist actions abroad and near- absolute control domestically.
...
Gauntlet over Gizmos: Protecting Taiwan from Peak PRC Pressure through Early 2030s
The flexibility and resilience of America and its advanced-economy allies represent the polar opposite of China’s state-directed planning and implementation model. Their openness to people, ideas, and capital flows makes them creative dynamos, as well as fuels world-class research universities and yields demographic dividends by attracting talented and motivated people from all over the world. These qualities underpin their long-term comprehensive national power and the bloc’s global competitiveness. It also makes their responses to an assault formidable and favors their odds the longer a major cold or hot war continues. But free-wheeling systems also complicate near-term proactive preparation to head off conflicts.
Fortunately, Beijing’s belligerent behavior has helped solidify multiple allied diplomatic and military initiatives that, while presently insufficient to defend the rules-based order, nonetheless constitute a solid foundation on which to build. Diplomatic proofs of concept such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”),81 security alignments such as AUKUS, and hard security actions such as the Pacific Deterrence Initiative82 are now falling into place. The stage is set for follow-up measures to comprehensively “peak” the non-authoritarian world’s protective actions to hold the line in the Indo-Pacific.83
Throughout this decade of danger, American policymakers must understand that under Xi’s strongman rule, personal political survival will dictate PRC behavior. For Washington and its allies, the struggle centers on preserving and expanding the type of human well-being yielded by a system oriented toward freedom and rules-based governance that emphasizes reason and fair process over coercion and force. Conversely, Xi (like fellow authoritarian leaders such as Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un) uses a totally different operating system: rule for life, non-transparency, a ruthless “ends-justify-any- means” mindset, and policies that ultimately tend to be one-way, high-leverage bets on continued successful (and lightly opposed) revisionist actions abroad and near- absolute control domestically.
Xi’s personalist leadership and nearly comprehensive suppression of dissenting voices in the Party’s senior ranks simultaneously raises the chances of making policy mistakes while reducing the flexibility to deal with them early. In such an embrittled system, the proverbial “leverage” that would have left Xi with outsized returns on a successful bet instead amplifies the downside, all for which he personally and exclusively signed. The “best-case” scenario entails continued stagnation and rot within the Party along the lines of what Minxin Pei has articulated.84 The “intermediate case” is an accelerated version of that, with Xi suffering a loss of status and authority on the heels of a policy disaster, internal challengers rising within the PRC, and internecine strife leading to accelerated weakening of the Party. The “bad case” scenario—which, in practice, would likely be interrelated with the intermediate one—is that Xi would double down on a mistaken course of action to prioritize political self-preservation. If such mistakes led to—or were made in the course of—a kinetic conflict, personal survival measures could rapidly transmute into regional or even global (i.e., nuclear, space, cyber) threats.
If Xi triggered a “margin call” on his personal political account through a failed high-stakes gamble, it would likely be paid in blood. Washington must thus prepare the American electorate and its institutional and physical infrastructure, as well as that of allies and partners abroad, for the likelihood that tensions will periodically ratchet up to uncomfortable levels—and that, despite the promise of determined deterrence, actual conflict cannot be ruled out. Si vis pacem, para bellum (“If you want peace, prepare for war”) must unfortunately serve as a central organizing principle for a range of U.S. and allied decisions during the next decade with respect to China under Xi.85
Given these unforgiving dynamics, the implications for U.S. leaders and planners are stark:
Do whatever remains possible to reach “peak” preparedness for deterrent competition against China by the mid-to-late 2020s and accept the tradeoffs.86
Nothing the U.S and its allies might theoretically achieve after 2035 is worth pursuing at the expense of capabilities that might be “better” than those in service now, but that could not be realistically fielded at scale until five years or more from now.
Much will be decided by the end of this decade. If America falters at this critical time—whether through creeping corrosion of the rules-based order at Beijing’s hands or the shocking impact of failing to defend Taiwan against military attack— many aspects of the world and future will be determined at the expense of U.S. interests and values.
The decade of danger is upon us. With existential stakes for American interests and values looming, there is no time left to waste. Washington and its allies must push to maximize their competitive edge as rapidly as possible to avoid an outcome they cannot afford—“losing the 2020s.” At what point the PRC reaches its peak may ultimately defy precise prediction, but the strong possibility of it occurring over the next few years should front-load America’s bottom-line planning and preparations, given the potential for irreversible linchpin effects. Near-term preparation to run this decade’s unforgiving gauntlet justifies any corresponding long-term tradeoffs and risks: “losing the 2020s” would also mean losing the 2030s and beyond. Ultimately, the best achievements in coming decades will matter little if we lose Taiwan on our watch. More broadly, allowing PRC revisionism to run as rampant in the 2020s as it did in the 2010s would risk negatively reshaping the world order for decades to come and could actually set the stage for even worse conflicts by destabilizing the planet’s most populous region. Alternatively, proactive deterrence actions now can sow the seeds for a more peaceful and prosperous future that would benefit all Indo-Pacific countries, China included. The mission is vital, the stakes are high, and the clock is ticking.
I guess agreeing with the above make me a China "hater"...
I wouldn’t take anything from the Baker Institute at face value. Over the years they’ve proven themselves to be heavily involved in the creation of far-right propaganda. Not saying the above is wrong, just that you should probably look to an ideologically diverse source for validation. YMMV.
The flexibility and resilience of America and its advanced-economy allies represent the polar opposite of China’s state-directed planning and implementation model. Their openness to people, ideas, and capital flows makes them creative dynamos, as well as fuels world-class research universities and yields demographic dividends by attracting talented and motivated people from all over the world. These qualities underpin their long-term comprehensive national power and the bloc’s global competitiveness. It also makes their responses to an assault formidable and favors their odds the longer a major cold or hot war continues. But free-wheeling systems also complicate near-term proactive preparation to head off conflicts.
Fortunately, Beijing’s belligerent behavior has helped solidify multiple allied diplomatic and military initiatives that, while presently insufficient to defend the rules-based order, nonetheless constitute a solid foundation on which to build. Diplomatic proofs of concept such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”),81 security alignments such as AUKUS, and hard security actions such as the Pacific Deterrence Initiative82 are now falling into place. The stage is set for follow-up measures to comprehensively “peak” the non-authoritarian world’s protective actions to hold the line in the Indo-Pacific.83
Throughout this decade of danger, American policymakers must understand that under Xi’s strongman rule, personal political survival will dictate PRC behavior. For Washington and its allies, the struggle centers on preserving and expanding the type of human well-being yielded by a system oriented toward freedom and rules-based governance that emphasizes reason and fair process over coercion and force. Conversely, Xi (like fellow authoritarian leaders such as Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un) uses a totally different operating system: rule for life, non-transparency, a ruthless “ends-justify-any- means” mindset, and policies that ultimately tend to be one-way, high-leverage bets on continued successful (and lightly opposed) revisionist actions abroad and near- absolute control domestically.
...
Gauntlet over Gizmos: Protecting Taiwan from Peak PRC Pressure through Early 2030s
The flexibility and resilience of America and its advanced-economy allies represent the polar opposite of China’s state-directed planning and implementation model. Their openness to people, ideas, and capital flows makes them creative dynamos, as well as fuels world-class research universities and yields demographic dividends by attracting talented and motivated people from all over the world. These qualities underpin their long-term comprehensive national power and the bloc’s global competitiveness. It also makes their responses to an assault formidable and favors their odds the longer a major cold or hot war continues. But free-wheeling systems also complicate near-term proactive preparation to head off conflicts.
Fortunately, Beijing’s belligerent behavior has helped solidify multiple allied diplomatic and military initiatives that, while presently insufficient to defend the rules-based order, nonetheless constitute a solid foundation on which to build. Diplomatic proofs of concept such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”),81 security alignments such as AUKUS, and hard security actions such as the Pacific Deterrence Initiative82 are now falling into place. The stage is set for follow-up measures to comprehensively “peak” the non-authoritarian world’s protective actions to hold the line in the Indo-Pacific.83
Throughout this decade of danger, American policymakers must understand that under Xi’s strongman rule, personal political survival will dictate PRC behavior. For Washington and its allies, the struggle centers on preserving and expanding the type of human well-being yielded by a system oriented toward freedom and rules-based governance that emphasizes reason and fair process over coercion and force. Conversely, Xi (like fellow authoritarian leaders such as Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un) uses a totally different operating system: rule for life, non-transparency, a ruthless “ends-justify-any- means” mindset, and policies that ultimately tend to be one-way, high-leverage bets on continued successful (and lightly opposed) revisionist actions abroad and near- absolute control domestically.
Xi’s personalist leadership and nearly comprehensive suppression of dissenting voices in the Party’s senior ranks simultaneously raises the chances of making policy mistakes while reducing the flexibility to deal with them early. In such an embrittled system, the proverbial “leverage” that would have left Xi with outsized returns on a successful bet instead amplifies the downside, all for which he personally and exclusively signed. The “best-case” scenario entails continued stagnation and rot within the Party along the lines of what Minxin Pei has articulated.84 The “intermediate case” is an accelerated version of that, with Xi suffering a loss of status and authority on the heels of a policy disaster, internal challengers rising within the PRC, and internecine strife leading to accelerated weakening of the Party. The “bad case” scenario—which, in practice, would likely be interrelated with the intermediate one—is that Xi would double down on a mistaken course of action to prioritize political self-preservation. If such mistakes led to—or were made in the course of—a kinetic conflict, personal survival measures could rapidly transmute into regional or even global (i.e., nuclear, space, cyber) threats.
If Xi triggered a “margin call” on his personal political account through a failed high-stakes gamble, it would likely be paid in blood. Washington must thus prepare the American electorate and its institutional and physical infrastructure, as well as that of allies and partners abroad, for the likelihood that tensions will periodically ratchet up to uncomfortable levels—and that, despite the promise of determined deterrence, actual conflict cannot be ruled out. Si vis pacem, para bellum (“If you want peace, prepare for war”) must unfortunately serve as a central organizing principle for a range of U.S. and allied decisions during the next decade with respect to China under Xi.85
Given these unforgiving dynamics, the implications for U.S. leaders and planners are stark:
Do whatever remains possible to reach “peak” preparedness for deterrent competition against China by the mid-to-late 2020s and accept the tradeoffs.86
Nothing the U.S and its allies might theoretically achieve after 2035 is worth pursuing at the expense of capabilities that might be “better” than those in service now, but that could not be realistically fielded at scale until five years or more from now.
Much will be decided by the end of this decade. If America falters at this critical time—whether through creeping corrosion of the rules-based order at Beijing’s hands or the shocking impact of failing to defend Taiwan against military attack— many aspects of the world and future will be determined at the expense of U.S. interests and values.
The decade of danger is upon us. With existential stakes for American interests and values looming, there is no time left to waste. Washington and its allies must push to maximize their competitive edge as rapidly as possible to avoid an outcome they cannot afford—“losing the 2020s.” At what point the PRC reaches its peak may ultimately defy precise prediction, but the strong possibility of it occurring over the next few years should front-load America’s bottom-line planning and preparations, given the potential for irreversible linchpin effects. Near-term preparation to run this decade’s unforgiving gauntlet justifies any corresponding long-term tradeoffs and risks: “losing the 2020s” would also mean losing the 2030s and beyond. Ultimately, the best achievements in coming decades will matter little if we lose Taiwan on our watch. More broadly, allowing PRC revisionism to run as rampant in the 2020s as it did in the 2010s would risk negatively reshaping the world order for decades to come and could actually set the stage for even worse conflicts by destabilizing the planet’s most populous region. Alternatively, proactive deterrence actions now can sow the seeds for a more peaceful and prosperous future that would benefit all Indo-Pacific countries, China included. The mission is vital, the stakes are high, and the clock is ticking.
I guess agreeing with the above make me a China "hater"...
I wouldn’t take anything from the Baker Institute at face value. Over the years they’ve proven themselves to be heavily involved in the creation of far-right propaganda. Not saying the above is wrong, just that you should probably look to an ideologically diverse source for validation. YMMV.
Uhm, considering that many sources worldwide are making more or less tha same arguments, your concerns of "right wing propaganda" fall flat.
It's definitely a wavky move and doesn't make a lot of sense. But then again, there is little sense on the entity list.
US drones have been used in sovereign states for what basically amounts to summary executions.
Drones that were designed to kill. Other drones are designed for reconnaissance.
DJI also makes drones. Even if it wanted to, I doubt they could stop them from being used for certain purposes.
But these look like mere allegations. Not even hard evidence.
US government is drawing China as a target and keeps throwing darts at it. It hopes it can hit the red eye with one target.
Yes, the U.S. " is drawing China as a target and keeps throwing darts at it" -- but not in hopes that one will stick. They adopted the FauxNews/Right Wing media method of repeating an allegation over and over then getting others to repeat it. Then, once their target audience starts assuming the lie is true they start building their house of cards of multiple lies on top of the original lie (which is usually some form of "This is the bad guy"). It's the new, modern method of brain washing the masses.
But its also important to realize that every one of the lies has some tiny grain of truth in it so they can claim its "factual". It's still a lie. But they use that tiny grain of truth because they're too smart to get caught speaking a complete falsehood containing not even a grain of truth -- because they would then have no means to fall back on their standard outrage when accused of lying.
It's a very effective weapon in their propaganda wars that the world has not yet developed an effective counter strategy against and instead typically falls back on arguing against the false claims -- which only gives them more media coverage -- at which point the lies become stronger and their target more confused.
China has started pushing back against it -- calling bull to the bull. That pisses off the liars to no end. But shining the light of truth is the only real defense against lies, slanders and defamations.
You make me laugh.
The entire Western World is getting tired of China's attempt to change the rules of order to allow the PRC's brand of "authoritarianism".
The flexibility and resilience of America and its advanced-economy allies represent the polar opposite of China’s state-directed planning and implementation model. Their openness to people, ideas, and capital flows makes them creative dynamos, as well as fuels world-class research universities and yields demographic dividends by attracting talented and motivated people from all over the world. These qualities underpin their long-term comprehensive national power and the bloc’s global competitiveness. It also makes their responses to an assault formidable and favors their odds the longer a major cold or hot war continues. But free-wheeling systems also complicate near-term proactive preparation to head off conflicts.
Fortunately, Beijing’s belligerent behavior has helped solidify multiple allied diplomatic and military initiatives that, while presently insufficient to defend the rules-based order, nonetheless constitute a solid foundation on which to build. Diplomatic proofs of concept such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”),81 security alignments such as AUKUS, and hard security actions such as the Pacific Deterrence Initiative82 are now falling into place. The stage is set for follow-up measures to comprehensively “peak” the non-authoritarian world’s protective actions to hold the line in the Indo-Pacific.83
Throughout this decade of danger, American policymakers must understand that under Xi’s strongman rule, personal political survival will dictate PRC behavior. For Washington and its allies, the struggle centers on preserving and expanding the type of human well-being yielded by a system oriented toward freedom and rules-based governance that emphasizes reason and fair process over coercion and force. Conversely, Xi (like fellow authoritarian leaders such as Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un) uses a totally different operating system: rule for life, non-transparency, a ruthless “ends-justify-any- means” mindset, and policies that ultimately tend to be one-way, high-leverage bets on continued successful (and lightly opposed) revisionist actions abroad and near- absolute control domestically.
...
Gauntlet over Gizmos: Protecting Taiwan from Peak PRC Pressure through Early 2030s
The flexibility and resilience of America and its advanced-economy allies represent the polar opposite of China’s state-directed planning and implementation model. Their openness to people, ideas, and capital flows makes them creative dynamos, as well as fuels world-class research universities and yields demographic dividends by attracting talented and motivated people from all over the world. These qualities underpin their long-term comprehensive national power and the bloc’s global competitiveness. It also makes their responses to an assault formidable and favors their odds the longer a major cold or hot war continues. But free-wheeling systems also complicate near-term proactive preparation to head off conflicts.
Fortunately, Beijing’s belligerent behavior has helped solidify multiple allied diplomatic and military initiatives that, while presently insufficient to defend the rules-based order, nonetheless constitute a solid foundation on which to build. Diplomatic proofs of concept such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”),81 security alignments such as AUKUS, and hard security actions such as the Pacific Deterrence Initiative82 are now falling into place. The stage is set for follow-up measures to comprehensively “peak” the non-authoritarian world’s protective actions to hold the line in the Indo-Pacific.83
Throughout this decade of danger, American policymakers must understand that under Xi’s strongman rule, personal political survival will dictate PRC behavior. For Washington and its allies, the struggle centers on preserving and expanding the type of human well-being yielded by a system oriented toward freedom and rules-based governance that emphasizes reason and fair process over coercion and force. Conversely, Xi (like fellow authoritarian leaders such as Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un) uses a totally different operating system: rule for life, non-transparency, a ruthless “ends-justify-any- means” mindset, and policies that ultimately tend to be one-way, high-leverage bets on continued successful (and lightly opposed) revisionist actions abroad and near- absolute control domestically.
Xi’s personalist leadership and nearly comprehensive suppression of dissenting voices in the Party’s senior ranks simultaneously raises the chances of making policy mistakes while reducing the flexibility to deal with them early. In such an embrittled system, the proverbial “leverage” that would have left Xi with outsized returns on a successful bet instead amplifies the downside, all for which he personally and exclusively signed. The “best-case” scenario entails continued stagnation and rot within the Party along the lines of what Minxin Pei has articulated.84 The “intermediate case” is an accelerated version of that, with Xi suffering a loss of status and authority on the heels of a policy disaster, internal challengers rising within the PRC, and internecine strife leading to accelerated weakening of the Party. The “bad case” scenario—which, in practice, would likely be interrelated with the intermediate one—is that Xi would double down on a mistaken course of action to prioritize political self-preservation. If such mistakes led to—or were made in the course of—a kinetic conflict, personal survival measures could rapidly transmute into regional or even global (i.e., nuclear, space, cyber) threats.
If Xi triggered a “margin call” on his personal political account through a failed high-stakes gamble, it would likely be paid in blood. Washington must thus prepare the American electorate and its institutional and physical infrastructure, as well as that of allies and partners abroad, for the likelihood that tensions will periodically ratchet up to uncomfortable levels—and that, despite the promise of determined deterrence, actual conflict cannot be ruled out. Si vis pacem, para bellum (“If you want peace, prepare for war”) must unfortunately serve as a central organizing principle for a range of U.S. and allied decisions during the next decade with respect to China under Xi.85
Given these unforgiving dynamics, the implications for U.S. leaders and planners are stark:
Do whatever remains possible to reach “peak” preparedness for deterrent competition against China by the mid-to-late 2020s and accept the tradeoffs.86
Nothing the U.S and its allies might theoretically achieve after 2035 is worth pursuing at the expense of capabilities that might be “better” than those in service now, but that could not be realistically fielded at scale until five years or more from now.
Much will be decided by the end of this decade. If America falters at this critical time—whether through creeping corrosion of the rules-based order at Beijing’s hands or the shocking impact of failing to defend Taiwan against military attack— many aspects of the world and future will be determined at the expense of U.S. interests and values.
The decade of danger is upon us. With existential stakes for American interests and values looming, there is no time left to waste. Washington and its allies must push to maximize their competitive edge as rapidly as possible to avoid an outcome they cannot afford—“losing the 2020s.” At what point the PRC reaches its peak may ultimately defy precise prediction, but the strong possibility of it occurring over the next few years should front-load America’s bottom-line planning and preparations, given the potential for irreversible linchpin effects. Near-term preparation to run this decade’s unforgiving gauntlet justifies any corresponding long-term tradeoffs and risks: “losing the 2020s” would also mean losing the 2030s and beyond. Ultimately, the best achievements in coming decades will matter little if we lose Taiwan on our watch. More broadly, allowing PRC revisionism to run as rampant in the 2020s as it did in the 2010s would risk negatively reshaping the world order for decades to come and could actually set the stage for even worse conflicts by destabilizing the planet’s most populous region. Alternatively, proactive deterrence actions now can sow the seeds for a more peaceful and prosperous future that would benefit all Indo-Pacific countries, China included. The mission is vital, the stakes are high, and the clock is ticking.
I guess agreeing with the above make me a China "hater"...
I wouldn’t take anything from the Baker Institute at face value. Over the years they’ve proven themselves to be heavily involved in the creation of far-right propaganda. Not saying the above is wrong, just that you should probably look to an ideologically diverse source for validation. YMMV.
Uhm, considering that many sources worldwide are making more or less tha same arguments, your concerns of "right wing propaganda" fall flat.
Looks like you didn’t take the Baker Institutes words at face value—well done. Their role in creating propaganda though is well established.
The flexibility and resilience of America and its advanced-economy allies represent the polar opposite of China’s state-directed planning and implementation model. Their openness to people, ideas, and capital flows makes them creative dynamos, as well as fuels world-class research universities and yields demographic dividends by attracting talented and motivated people from all over the world. These qualities underpin their long-term comprehensive national power and the bloc’s global competitiveness. It also makes their responses to an assault formidable and favors their odds the longer a major cold or hot war continues. But free-wheeling systems also complicate near-term proactive preparation to head off conflicts.
Fortunately, Beijing’s belligerent behavior has helped solidify multiple allied diplomatic and military initiatives that, while presently insufficient to defend the rules-based order, nonetheless constitute a solid foundation on which to build. Diplomatic proofs of concept such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”),81 security alignments such as AUKUS, and hard security actions such as the Pacific Deterrence Initiative82 are now falling into place. The stage is set for follow-up measures to comprehensively “peak” the non-authoritarian world’s protective actions to hold the line in the Indo-Pacific.83
Throughout this decade of danger, American policymakers must understand that under Xi’s strongman rule, personal political survival will dictate PRC behavior. For Washington and its allies, the struggle centers on preserving and expanding the type of human well-being yielded by a system oriented toward freedom and rules-based governance that emphasizes reason and fair process over coercion and force. Conversely, Xi (like fellow authoritarian leaders such as Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un) uses a totally different operating system: rule for life, non-transparency, a ruthless “ends-justify-any- means” mindset, and policies that ultimately tend to be one-way, high-leverage bets on continued successful (and lightly opposed) revisionist actions abroad and near- absolute control domestically.
...
Gauntlet over Gizmos: Protecting Taiwan from Peak PRC Pressure through Early 2030s
The flexibility and resilience of America and its advanced-economy allies represent the polar opposite of China’s state-directed planning and implementation model. Their openness to people, ideas, and capital flows makes them creative dynamos, as well as fuels world-class research universities and yields demographic dividends by attracting talented and motivated people from all over the world. These qualities underpin their long-term comprehensive national power and the bloc’s global competitiveness. It also makes their responses to an assault formidable and favors their odds the longer a major cold or hot war continues. But free-wheeling systems also complicate near-term proactive preparation to head off conflicts.
Fortunately, Beijing’s belligerent behavior has helped solidify multiple allied diplomatic and military initiatives that, while presently insufficient to defend the rules-based order, nonetheless constitute a solid foundation on which to build. Diplomatic proofs of concept such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”),81 security alignments such as AUKUS, and hard security actions such as the Pacific Deterrence Initiative82 are now falling into place. The stage is set for follow-up measures to comprehensively “peak” the non-authoritarian world’s protective actions to hold the line in the Indo-Pacific.83
Throughout this decade of danger, American policymakers must understand that under Xi’s strongman rule, personal political survival will dictate PRC behavior. For Washington and its allies, the struggle centers on preserving and expanding the type of human well-being yielded by a system oriented toward freedom and rules-based governance that emphasizes reason and fair process over coercion and force. Conversely, Xi (like fellow authoritarian leaders such as Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un) uses a totally different operating system: rule for life, non-transparency, a ruthless “ends-justify-any- means” mindset, and policies that ultimately tend to be one-way, high-leverage bets on continued successful (and lightly opposed) revisionist actions abroad and near- absolute control domestically.
Xi’s personalist leadership and nearly comprehensive suppression of dissenting voices in the Party’s senior ranks simultaneously raises the chances of making policy mistakes while reducing the flexibility to deal with them early. In such an embrittled system, the proverbial “leverage” that would have left Xi with outsized returns on a successful bet instead amplifies the downside, all for which he personally and exclusively signed. The “best-case” scenario entails continued stagnation and rot within the Party along the lines of what Minxin Pei has articulated.84 The “intermediate case” is an accelerated version of that, with Xi suffering a loss of status and authority on the heels of a policy disaster, internal challengers rising within the PRC, and internecine strife leading to accelerated weakening of the Party. The “bad case” scenario—which, in practice, would likely be interrelated with the intermediate one—is that Xi would double down on a mistaken course of action to prioritize political self-preservation. If such mistakes led to—or were made in the course of—a kinetic conflict, personal survival measures could rapidly transmute into regional or even global (i.e., nuclear, space, cyber) threats.
If Xi triggered a “margin call” on his personal political account through a failed high-stakes gamble, it would likely be paid in blood. Washington must thus prepare the American electorate and its institutional and physical infrastructure, as well as that of allies and partners abroad, for the likelihood that tensions will periodically ratchet up to uncomfortable levels—and that, despite the promise of determined deterrence, actual conflict cannot be ruled out. Si vis pacem, para bellum (“If you want peace, prepare for war”) must unfortunately serve as a central organizing principle for a range of U.S. and allied decisions during the next decade with respect to China under Xi.85
Given these unforgiving dynamics, the implications for U.S. leaders and planners are stark:
Do whatever remains possible to reach “peak” preparedness for deterrent competition against China by the mid-to-late 2020s and accept the tradeoffs.86
Nothing the U.S and its allies might theoretically achieve after 2035 is worth pursuing at the expense of capabilities that might be “better” than those in service now, but that could not be realistically fielded at scale until five years or more from now.
Much will be decided by the end of this decade. If America falters at this critical time—whether through creeping corrosion of the rules-based order at Beijing’s hands or the shocking impact of failing to defend Taiwan against military attack— many aspects of the world and future will be determined at the expense of U.S. interests and values.
The decade of danger is upon us. With existential stakes for American interests and values looming, there is no time left to waste. Washington and its allies must push to maximize their competitive edge as rapidly as possible to avoid an outcome they cannot afford—“losing the 2020s.” At what point the PRC reaches its peak may ultimately defy precise prediction, but the strong possibility of it occurring over the next few years should front-load America’s bottom-line planning and preparations, given the potential for irreversible linchpin effects. Near-term preparation to run this decade’s unforgiving gauntlet justifies any corresponding long-term tradeoffs and risks: “losing the 2020s” would also mean losing the 2030s and beyond. Ultimately, the best achievements in coming decades will matter little if we lose Taiwan on our watch. More broadly, allowing PRC revisionism to run as rampant in the 2020s as it did in the 2010s would risk negatively reshaping the world order for decades to come and could actually set the stage for even worse conflicts by destabilizing the planet’s most populous region. Alternatively, proactive deterrence actions now can sow the seeds for a more peaceful and prosperous future that would benefit all Indo-Pacific countries, China included. The mission is vital, the stakes are high, and the clock is ticking.
I guess agreeing with the above make me a China "hater"...
I wouldn’t take anything from the Baker Institute at face value. Over the years they’ve proven themselves to be heavily involved in the creation of far-right propaganda. Not saying the above is wrong, just that you should probably look to an ideologically diverse source for validation. YMMV.
Uhm, considering that many sources worldwide are making more or less tha same arguments, your concerns of "right wing propaganda" fall flat.
Looks like you didn’t take the Baker Institutes words at face value—well done. Their role in creating propaganda though is well established.
Some people around here seem to think that linking "hawkish" information is "right wing", "Trumpist", or "hateful"; it isn't. China is a human rights violator, a bully to its neighbors, and a threat to world peace. As a Liberal, and having a fair knowledge of history, especially in the WWII Pacific campaigns, I'm only too aware of how little time the West has to counter China, and how little time China has to attempt to remain a world power.
There are plenty of other sources worldwide that mirror the Baker Institutes warning, albeit most are less "hawkish", but there is a consensus that China is a threat to the West, and the existing Rules of Order, and that the U.S. and our allies would be better off constraining China's impulse to invade Taiwan, than allowing China's militarism to go unchecked.
In the meantime, China's demographics will likely create a slowing economy and a halving of its population by 2060.
You don't seem to have too much comment on the obvious pro China propaganda going on here, all of it from a small number of the usual posters.
The flexibility and resilience of America and its advanced-economy allies represent the polar opposite of China’s state-directed planning and implementation model. Their openness to people, ideas, and capital flows makes them creative dynamos, as well as fuels world-class research universities and yields demographic dividends by attracting talented and motivated people from all over the world. These qualities underpin their long-term comprehensive national power and the bloc’s global competitiveness. It also makes their responses to an assault formidable and favors their odds the longer a major cold or hot war continues. But free-wheeling systems also complicate near-term proactive preparation to head off conflicts.
Fortunately, Beijing’s belligerent behavior has helped solidify multiple allied diplomatic and military initiatives that, while presently insufficient to defend the rules-based order, nonetheless constitute a solid foundation on which to build. Diplomatic proofs of concept such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”),81 security alignments such as AUKUS, and hard security actions such as the Pacific Deterrence Initiative82 are now falling into place. The stage is set for follow-up measures to comprehensively “peak” the non-authoritarian world’s protective actions to hold the line in the Indo-Pacific.83
Throughout this decade of danger, American policymakers must understand that under Xi’s strongman rule, personal political survival will dictate PRC behavior. For Washington and its allies, the struggle centers on preserving and expanding the type of human well-being yielded by a system oriented toward freedom and rules-based governance that emphasizes reason and fair process over coercion and force. Conversely, Xi (like fellow authoritarian leaders such as Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un) uses a totally different operating system: rule for life, non-transparency, a ruthless “ends-justify-any- means” mindset, and policies that ultimately tend to be one-way, high-leverage bets on continued successful (and lightly opposed) revisionist actions abroad and near- absolute control domestically.
...
Gauntlet over Gizmos: Protecting Taiwan from Peak PRC Pressure through Early 2030s
The flexibility and resilience of America and its advanced-economy allies represent the polar opposite of China’s state-directed planning and implementation model. Their openness to people, ideas, and capital flows makes them creative dynamos, as well as fuels world-class research universities and yields demographic dividends by attracting talented and motivated people from all over the world. These qualities underpin their long-term comprehensive national power and the bloc’s global competitiveness. It also makes their responses to an assault formidable and favors their odds the longer a major cold or hot war continues. But free-wheeling systems also complicate near-term proactive preparation to head off conflicts.
Fortunately, Beijing’s belligerent behavior has helped solidify multiple allied diplomatic and military initiatives that, while presently insufficient to defend the rules-based order, nonetheless constitute a solid foundation on which to build. Diplomatic proofs of concept such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”),81 security alignments such as AUKUS, and hard security actions such as the Pacific Deterrence Initiative82 are now falling into place. The stage is set for follow-up measures to comprehensively “peak” the non-authoritarian world’s protective actions to hold the line in the Indo-Pacific.83
Throughout this decade of danger, American policymakers must understand that under Xi’s strongman rule, personal political survival will dictate PRC behavior. For Washington and its allies, the struggle centers on preserving and expanding the type of human well-being yielded by a system oriented toward freedom and rules-based governance that emphasizes reason and fair process over coercion and force. Conversely, Xi (like fellow authoritarian leaders such as Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un) uses a totally different operating system: rule for life, non-transparency, a ruthless “ends-justify-any- means” mindset, and policies that ultimately tend to be one-way, high-leverage bets on continued successful (and lightly opposed) revisionist actions abroad and near- absolute control domestically.
Xi’s personalist leadership and nearly comprehensive suppression of dissenting voices in the Party’s senior ranks simultaneously raises the chances of making policy mistakes while reducing the flexibility to deal with them early. In such an embrittled system, the proverbial “leverage” that would have left Xi with outsized returns on a successful bet instead amplifies the downside, all for which he personally and exclusively signed. The “best-case” scenario entails continued stagnation and rot within the Party along the lines of what Minxin Pei has articulated.84 The “intermediate case” is an accelerated version of that, with Xi suffering a loss of status and authority on the heels of a policy disaster, internal challengers rising within the PRC, and internecine strife leading to accelerated weakening of the Party. The “bad case” scenario—which, in practice, would likely be interrelated with the intermediate one—is that Xi would double down on a mistaken course of action to prioritize political self-preservation. If such mistakes led to—or were made in the course of—a kinetic conflict, personal survival measures could rapidly transmute into regional or even global (i.e., nuclear, space, cyber) threats.
If Xi triggered a “margin call” on his personal political account through a failed high-stakes gamble, it would likely be paid in blood. Washington must thus prepare the American electorate and its institutional and physical infrastructure, as well as that of allies and partners abroad, for the likelihood that tensions will periodically ratchet up to uncomfortable levels—and that, despite the promise of determined deterrence, actual conflict cannot be ruled out. Si vis pacem, para bellum (“If you want peace, prepare for war”) must unfortunately serve as a central organizing principle for a range of U.S. and allied decisions during the next decade with respect to China under Xi.85
Given these unforgiving dynamics, the implications for U.S. leaders and planners are stark:
Do whatever remains possible to reach “peak” preparedness for deterrent competition against China by the mid-to-late 2020s and accept the tradeoffs.86
Nothing the U.S and its allies might theoretically achieve after 2035 is worth pursuing at the expense of capabilities that might be “better” than those in service now, but that could not be realistically fielded at scale until five years or more from now.
Much will be decided by the end of this decade. If America falters at this critical time—whether through creeping corrosion of the rules-based order at Beijing’s hands or the shocking impact of failing to defend Taiwan against military attack— many aspects of the world and future will be determined at the expense of U.S. interests and values.
The decade of danger is upon us. With existential stakes for American interests and values looming, there is no time left to waste. Washington and its allies must push to maximize their competitive edge as rapidly as possible to avoid an outcome they cannot afford—“losing the 2020s.” At what point the PRC reaches its peak may ultimately defy precise prediction, but the strong possibility of it occurring over the next few years should front-load America’s bottom-line planning and preparations, given the potential for irreversible linchpin effects. Near-term preparation to run this decade’s unforgiving gauntlet justifies any corresponding long-term tradeoffs and risks: “losing the 2020s” would also mean losing the 2030s and beyond. Ultimately, the best achievements in coming decades will matter little if we lose Taiwan on our watch. More broadly, allowing PRC revisionism to run as rampant in the 2020s as it did in the 2010s would risk negatively reshaping the world order for decades to come and could actually set the stage for even worse conflicts by destabilizing the planet’s most populous region. Alternatively, proactive deterrence actions now can sow the seeds for a more peaceful and prosperous future that would benefit all Indo-Pacific countries, China included. The mission is vital, the stakes are high, and the clock is ticking.
I guess agreeing with the above make me a China "hater"...
I wouldn’t take anything from the Baker Institute at face value. Over the years they’ve proven themselves to be heavily involved in the creation of far-right propaganda. Not saying the above is wrong, just that you should probably look to an ideologically diverse source for validation. YMMV.
Uhm, considering that many sources worldwide are making more or less tha same arguments, your concerns of "right wing propaganda" fall flat.
Looks like you didn’t take the Baker Institutes words at face value—well done. Their role in creating propaganda though is well established.
Some people around here seem to think that linking "hawkish" information is "right wing", "Trumpist", or "hateful"; it isn't. China is a human rights violator, a bully to its neighbors, and a threat to world peace. As a Liberal, and having a fair knowledge of history, especially in the WWII Pacific campaigns, I'm only too aware of how little time the West has to counter China, and how little time China has to attempt to remain a world power.
There are plenty of other sources worldwide that mirror the Baker Institutes warning, albeit most are less "hawkish", but there is a consensus that China is a threat to the West, and the existing Rules of Order, and that the U.S. and our allies would be better off constraining China's impulse to invade Taiwan, than allowing China's militarism to go unchecked.
In the meantime, China's demographics will likely create a slowing economy and a halving of its population by 2060.
You don't seem to have too much comment on the obvious pro China propaganda going on here, all of it from a small number of the usual posters.
Please explain how do you implicates the WWII Pacific campaigns to China today? The western version of history always intrigues me such as the Opium War and Chinese Exclusion Act. Some westerners try to brainwash people thinking China is a threat to world peace. History shows for the last two hundred years all the major wars are launched by western nations. So the prediction is against history. This is a contradiction.
The flexibility and resilience of America and its advanced-economy allies represent the polar opposite of China’s state-directed planning and implementation model. Their openness to people, ideas, and capital flows makes them creative dynamos, as well as fuels world-class research universities and yields demographic dividends by attracting talented and motivated people from all over the world. These qualities underpin their long-term comprehensive national power and the bloc’s global competitiveness. It also makes their responses to an assault formidable and favors their odds the longer a major cold or hot war continues. But free-wheeling systems also complicate near-term proactive preparation to head off conflicts.
Fortunately, Beijing’s belligerent behavior has helped solidify multiple allied diplomatic and military initiatives that, while presently insufficient to defend the rules-based order, nonetheless constitute a solid foundation on which to build. Diplomatic proofs of concept such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”),81 security alignments such as AUKUS, and hard security actions such as the Pacific Deterrence Initiative82 are now falling into place. The stage is set for follow-up measures to comprehensively “peak” the non-authoritarian world’s protective actions to hold the line in the Indo-Pacific.83
Throughout this decade of danger, American policymakers must understand that under Xi’s strongman rule, personal political survival will dictate PRC behavior. For Washington and its allies, the struggle centers on preserving and expanding the type of human well-being yielded by a system oriented toward freedom and rules-based governance that emphasizes reason and fair process over coercion and force. Conversely, Xi (like fellow authoritarian leaders such as Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un) uses a totally different operating system: rule for life, non-transparency, a ruthless “ends-justify-any- means” mindset, and policies that ultimately tend to be one-way, high-leverage bets on continued successful (and lightly opposed) revisionist actions abroad and near- absolute control domestically.
...
Gauntlet over Gizmos: Protecting Taiwan from Peak PRC Pressure through Early 2030s
The flexibility and resilience of America and its advanced-economy allies represent the polar opposite of China’s state-directed planning and implementation model. Their openness to people, ideas, and capital flows makes them creative dynamos, as well as fuels world-class research universities and yields demographic dividends by attracting talented and motivated people from all over the world. These qualities underpin their long-term comprehensive national power and the bloc’s global competitiveness. It also makes their responses to an assault formidable and favors their odds the longer a major cold or hot war continues. But free-wheeling systems also complicate near-term proactive preparation to head off conflicts.
Fortunately, Beijing’s belligerent behavior has helped solidify multiple allied diplomatic and military initiatives that, while presently insufficient to defend the rules-based order, nonetheless constitute a solid foundation on which to build. Diplomatic proofs of concept such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”),81 security alignments such as AUKUS, and hard security actions such as the Pacific Deterrence Initiative82 are now falling into place. The stage is set for follow-up measures to comprehensively “peak” the non-authoritarian world’s protective actions to hold the line in the Indo-Pacific.83
Throughout this decade of danger, American policymakers must understand that under Xi’s strongman rule, personal political survival will dictate PRC behavior. For Washington and its allies, the struggle centers on preserving and expanding the type of human well-being yielded by a system oriented toward freedom and rules-based governance that emphasizes reason and fair process over coercion and force. Conversely, Xi (like fellow authoritarian leaders such as Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un) uses a totally different operating system: rule for life, non-transparency, a ruthless “ends-justify-any- means” mindset, and policies that ultimately tend to be one-way, high-leverage bets on continued successful (and lightly opposed) revisionist actions abroad and near- absolute control domestically.
Xi’s personalist leadership and nearly comprehensive suppression of dissenting voices in the Party’s senior ranks simultaneously raises the chances of making policy mistakes while reducing the flexibility to deal with them early. In such an embrittled system, the proverbial “leverage” that would have left Xi with outsized returns on a successful bet instead amplifies the downside, all for which he personally and exclusively signed. The “best-case” scenario entails continued stagnation and rot within the Party along the lines of what Minxin Pei has articulated.84 The “intermediate case” is an accelerated version of that, with Xi suffering a loss of status and authority on the heels of a policy disaster, internal challengers rising within the PRC, and internecine strife leading to accelerated weakening of the Party. The “bad case” scenario—which, in practice, would likely be interrelated with the intermediate one—is that Xi would double down on a mistaken course of action to prioritize political self-preservation. If such mistakes led to—or were made in the course of—a kinetic conflict, personal survival measures could rapidly transmute into regional or even global (i.e., nuclear, space, cyber) threats.
If Xi triggered a “margin call” on his personal political account through a failed high-stakes gamble, it would likely be paid in blood. Washington must thus prepare the American electorate and its institutional and physical infrastructure, as well as that of allies and partners abroad, for the likelihood that tensions will periodically ratchet up to uncomfortable levels—and that, despite the promise of determined deterrence, actual conflict cannot be ruled out. Si vis pacem, para bellum (“If you want peace, prepare for war”) must unfortunately serve as a central organizing principle for a range of U.S. and allied decisions during the next decade with respect to China under Xi.85
Given these unforgiving dynamics, the implications for U.S. leaders and planners are stark:
Do whatever remains possible to reach “peak” preparedness for deterrent competition against China by the mid-to-late 2020s and accept the tradeoffs.86
Nothing the U.S and its allies might theoretically achieve after 2035 is worth pursuing at the expense of capabilities that might be “better” than those in service now, but that could not be realistically fielded at scale until five years or more from now.
Much will be decided by the end of this decade. If America falters at this critical time—whether through creeping corrosion of the rules-based order at Beijing’s hands or the shocking impact of failing to defend Taiwan against military attack— many aspects of the world and future will be determined at the expense of U.S. interests and values.
The decade of danger is upon us. With existential stakes for American interests and values looming, there is no time left to waste. Washington and its allies must push to maximize their competitive edge as rapidly as possible to avoid an outcome they cannot afford—“losing the 2020s.” At what point the PRC reaches its peak may ultimately defy precise prediction, but the strong possibility of it occurring over the next few years should front-load America’s bottom-line planning and preparations, given the potential for irreversible linchpin effects. Near-term preparation to run this decade’s unforgiving gauntlet justifies any corresponding long-term tradeoffs and risks: “losing the 2020s” would also mean losing the 2030s and beyond. Ultimately, the best achievements in coming decades will matter little if we lose Taiwan on our watch. More broadly, allowing PRC revisionism to run as rampant in the 2020s as it did in the 2010s would risk negatively reshaping the world order for decades to come and could actually set the stage for even worse conflicts by destabilizing the planet’s most populous region. Alternatively, proactive deterrence actions now can sow the seeds for a more peaceful and prosperous future that would benefit all Indo-Pacific countries, China included. The mission is vital, the stakes are high, and the clock is ticking.
I guess agreeing with the above make me a China "hater"...
I wouldn’t take anything from the Baker Institute at face value. Over the years they’ve proven themselves to be heavily involved in the creation of far-right propaganda. Not saying the above is wrong, just that you should probably look to an ideologically diverse source for validation. YMMV.
Uhm, considering that many sources worldwide are making more or less tha same arguments, your concerns of "right wing propaganda" fall flat.
Looks like you didn’t take the Baker Institutes words at face value—well done. Their role in creating propaganda though is well established.
Some people around here seem to think that linking "hawkish" information is "right wing", "Trumpist", or "hateful"; it isn't. China is a human rights violator, a bully to its neighbors, and a threat to world peace. As a Liberal, and having a fair knowledge of history, especially in the WWII Pacific campaigns, I'm only too aware of how little time the West has to counter China, and how little time China has to attempt to remain a world power.
There are plenty of other sources worldwide that mirror the Baker Institutes warning, albeit most are less "hawkish", but there is a consensus that China is a threat to the West, and the existing Rules of Order, and that the U.S. and our allies would be better off constraining China's impulse to invade Taiwan, than allowing China's militarism to go unchecked.
In the meantime, China's demographics will likely create a slowing economy and a halving of its population by 2060.
You don't seem to have too much comment on the obvious pro China propaganda going on here, all of it from a small number of the usual posters.
Please explain how do you implicates the WWII Pacific campaigns to China today? The western version of history always intrigues me such as the Opium War and Chinese Exclusion Act. Some westerners try to brainwash people thinking China is a threat to world peace. History shows for the last two hundred years all the major wars are launched by western nations. So the prediction is against history. This is a contradiction.
LOL!
At some point, you are just talking to yourself. There is ample evidence that China is a threat to the West, and I've posted plenty of links on that.
Please also attempt to counter my claim about both China's overaged demographic, and there slowing growth. I'll wait.
The flexibility and resilience of America and its advanced-economy allies represent the polar opposite of China’s state-directed planning and implementation model. Their openness to people, ideas, and capital flows makes them creative dynamos, as well as fuels world-class research universities and yields demographic dividends by attracting talented and motivated people from all over the world. These qualities underpin their long-term comprehensive national power and the bloc’s global competitiveness. It also makes their responses to an assault formidable and favors their odds the longer a major cold or hot war continues. But free-wheeling systems also complicate near-term proactive preparation to head off conflicts.
Fortunately, Beijing’s belligerent behavior has helped solidify multiple allied diplomatic and military initiatives that, while presently insufficient to defend the rules-based order, nonetheless constitute a solid foundation on which to build. Diplomatic proofs of concept such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”),81 security alignments such as AUKUS, and hard security actions such as the Pacific Deterrence Initiative82 are now falling into place. The stage is set for follow-up measures to comprehensively “peak” the non-authoritarian world’s protective actions to hold the line in the Indo-Pacific.83
Throughout this decade of danger, American policymakers must understand that under Xi’s strongman rule, personal political survival will dictate PRC behavior. For Washington and its allies, the struggle centers on preserving and expanding the type of human well-being yielded by a system oriented toward freedom and rules-based governance that emphasizes reason and fair process over coercion and force. Conversely, Xi (like fellow authoritarian leaders such as Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un) uses a totally different operating system: rule for life, non-transparency, a ruthless “ends-justify-any- means” mindset, and policies that ultimately tend to be one-way, high-leverage bets on continued successful (and lightly opposed) revisionist actions abroad and near- absolute control domestically.
...
Gauntlet over Gizmos: Protecting Taiwan from Peak PRC Pressure through Early 2030s
The flexibility and resilience of America and its advanced-economy allies represent the polar opposite of China’s state-directed planning and implementation model. Their openness to people, ideas, and capital flows makes them creative dynamos, as well as fuels world-class research universities and yields demographic dividends by attracting talented and motivated people from all over the world. These qualities underpin their long-term comprehensive national power and the bloc’s global competitiveness. It also makes their responses to an assault formidable and favors their odds the longer a major cold or hot war continues. But free-wheeling systems also complicate near-term proactive preparation to head off conflicts.
Fortunately, Beijing’s belligerent behavior has helped solidify multiple allied diplomatic and military initiatives that, while presently insufficient to defend the rules-based order, nonetheless constitute a solid foundation on which to build. Diplomatic proofs of concept such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”),81 security alignments such as AUKUS, and hard security actions such as the Pacific Deterrence Initiative82 are now falling into place. The stage is set for follow-up measures to comprehensively “peak” the non-authoritarian world’s protective actions to hold the line in the Indo-Pacific.83
Throughout this decade of danger, American policymakers must understand that under Xi’s strongman rule, personal political survival will dictate PRC behavior. For Washington and its allies, the struggle centers on preserving and expanding the type of human well-being yielded by a system oriented toward freedom and rules-based governance that emphasizes reason and fair process over coercion and force. Conversely, Xi (like fellow authoritarian leaders such as Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un) uses a totally different operating system: rule for life, non-transparency, a ruthless “ends-justify-any- means” mindset, and policies that ultimately tend to be one-way, high-leverage bets on continued successful (and lightly opposed) revisionist actions abroad and near- absolute control domestically.
Xi’s personalist leadership and nearly comprehensive suppression of dissenting voices in the Party’s senior ranks simultaneously raises the chances of making policy mistakes while reducing the flexibility to deal with them early. In such an embrittled system, the proverbial “leverage” that would have left Xi with outsized returns on a successful bet instead amplifies the downside, all for which he personally and exclusively signed. The “best-case” scenario entails continued stagnation and rot within the Party along the lines of what Minxin Pei has articulated.84 The “intermediate case” is an accelerated version of that, with Xi suffering a loss of status and authority on the heels of a policy disaster, internal challengers rising within the PRC, and internecine strife leading to accelerated weakening of the Party. The “bad case” scenario—which, in practice, would likely be interrelated with the intermediate one—is that Xi would double down on a mistaken course of action to prioritize political self-preservation. If such mistakes led to—or were made in the course of—a kinetic conflict, personal survival measures could rapidly transmute into regional or even global (i.e., nuclear, space, cyber) threats.
If Xi triggered a “margin call” on his personal political account through a failed high-stakes gamble, it would likely be paid in blood. Washington must thus prepare the American electorate and its institutional and physical infrastructure, as well as that of allies and partners abroad, for the likelihood that tensions will periodically ratchet up to uncomfortable levels—and that, despite the promise of determined deterrence, actual conflict cannot be ruled out. Si vis pacem, para bellum (“If you want peace, prepare for war”) must unfortunately serve as a central organizing principle for a range of U.S. and allied decisions during the next decade with respect to China under Xi.85
Given these unforgiving dynamics, the implications for U.S. leaders and planners are stark:
Do whatever remains possible to reach “peak” preparedness for deterrent competition against China by the mid-to-late 2020s and accept the tradeoffs.86
Nothing the U.S and its allies might theoretically achieve after 2035 is worth pursuing at the expense of capabilities that might be “better” than those in service now, but that could not be realistically fielded at scale until five years or more from now.
Much will be decided by the end of this decade. If America falters at this critical time—whether through creeping corrosion of the rules-based order at Beijing’s hands or the shocking impact of failing to defend Taiwan against military attack— many aspects of the world and future will be determined at the expense of U.S. interests and values.
The decade of danger is upon us. With existential stakes for American interests and values looming, there is no time left to waste. Washington and its allies must push to maximize their competitive edge as rapidly as possible to avoid an outcome they cannot afford—“losing the 2020s.” At what point the PRC reaches its peak may ultimately defy precise prediction, but the strong possibility of it occurring over the next few years should front-load America’s bottom-line planning and preparations, given the potential for irreversible linchpin effects. Near-term preparation to run this decade’s unforgiving gauntlet justifies any corresponding long-term tradeoffs and risks: “losing the 2020s” would also mean losing the 2030s and beyond. Ultimately, the best achievements in coming decades will matter little if we lose Taiwan on our watch. More broadly, allowing PRC revisionism to run as rampant in the 2020s as it did in the 2010s would risk negatively reshaping the world order for decades to come and could actually set the stage for even worse conflicts by destabilizing the planet’s most populous region. Alternatively, proactive deterrence actions now can sow the seeds for a more peaceful and prosperous future that would benefit all Indo-Pacific countries, China included. The mission is vital, the stakes are high, and the clock is ticking.
I guess agreeing with the above make me a China "hater"...
I wouldn’t take anything from the Baker Institute at face value. Over the years they’ve proven themselves to be heavily involved in the creation of far-right propaganda. Not saying the above is wrong, just that you should probably look to an ideologically diverse source for validation. YMMV.
Uhm, considering that many sources worldwide are making more or less tha same arguments, your concerns of "right wing propaganda" fall flat.
Looks like you didn’t take the Baker Institutes words at face value—well done. Their role in creating propaganda though is well established.
Some people around here seem to think that linking "hawkish" information is "right wing", "Trumpist", or "hateful"; it isn't. China is a human rights violator, a bully to its neighbors, and a threat to world peace. As a Liberal, and having a fair knowledge of history, especially in the WWII Pacific campaigns, I'm only too aware of how little time the West has to counter China, and how little time China has to attempt to remain a world power.
There are plenty of other sources worldwide that mirror the Baker Institutes warning, albeit most are less "hawkish", but there is a consensus that China is a threat to the West, and the existing Rules of Order, and that the U.S. and our allies would be better off constraining China's impulse to invade Taiwan, than allowing China's militarism to go unchecked.
In the meantime, China's demographics will likely create a slowing economy and a halving of its population by 2060.
You don't seem to have too much comment on the obvious pro China propaganda going on here, all of it from a small number of the usual posters.
Please explain how do you implicates the WWII Pacific campaigns to China today? The western version of history always intrigues me such as the Opium War and Chinese Exclusion Act. Some westerners try to brainwash people thinking China is a threat to world peace. History shows for the last two hundred years all the major wars are launched by western nations. So the prediction is against history. This is a contradiction.
LOL!
At some point, you are just talking to yourself. There is ample evidence that China is a threat to the West, and I've posted plenty of links on that.
Please also attempt to counter my claim about both China's overaged demographic, and there slowing growth. I'll wait.
You can only laugh at your own words? Why can't you answer your own words I bold-faced?
The flexibility and resilience of America and its advanced-economy allies represent the polar opposite of China’s state-directed planning and implementation model. Their openness to people, ideas, and capital flows makes them creative dynamos, as well as fuels world-class research universities and yields demographic dividends by attracting talented and motivated people from all over the world. These qualities underpin their long-term comprehensive national power and the bloc’s global competitiveness. It also makes their responses to an assault formidable and favors their odds the longer a major cold or hot war continues. But free-wheeling systems also complicate near-term proactive preparation to head off conflicts.
Fortunately, Beijing’s belligerent behavior has helped solidify multiple allied diplomatic and military initiatives that, while presently insufficient to defend the rules-based order, nonetheless constitute a solid foundation on which to build. Diplomatic proofs of concept such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”),81 security alignments such as AUKUS, and hard security actions such as the Pacific Deterrence Initiative82 are now falling into place. The stage is set for follow-up measures to comprehensively “peak” the non-authoritarian world’s protective actions to hold the line in the Indo-Pacific.83
Throughout this decade of danger, American policymakers must understand that under Xi’s strongman rule, personal political survival will dictate PRC behavior. For Washington and its allies, the struggle centers on preserving and expanding the type of human well-being yielded by a system oriented toward freedom and rules-based governance that emphasizes reason and fair process over coercion and force. Conversely, Xi (like fellow authoritarian leaders such as Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un) uses a totally different operating system: rule for life, non-transparency, a ruthless “ends-justify-any- means” mindset, and policies that ultimately tend to be one-way, high-leverage bets on continued successful (and lightly opposed) revisionist actions abroad and near- absolute control domestically.
...
Gauntlet over Gizmos: Protecting Taiwan from Peak PRC Pressure through Early 2030s
The flexibility and resilience of America and its advanced-economy allies represent the polar opposite of China’s state-directed planning and implementation model. Their openness to people, ideas, and capital flows makes them creative dynamos, as well as fuels world-class research universities and yields demographic dividends by attracting talented and motivated people from all over the world. These qualities underpin their long-term comprehensive national power and the bloc’s global competitiveness. It also makes their responses to an assault formidable and favors their odds the longer a major cold or hot war continues. But free-wheeling systems also complicate near-term proactive preparation to head off conflicts.
Fortunately, Beijing’s belligerent behavior has helped solidify multiple allied diplomatic and military initiatives that, while presently insufficient to defend the rules-based order, nonetheless constitute a solid foundation on which to build. Diplomatic proofs of concept such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”),81 security alignments such as AUKUS, and hard security actions such as the Pacific Deterrence Initiative82 are now falling into place. The stage is set for follow-up measures to comprehensively “peak” the non-authoritarian world’s protective actions to hold the line in the Indo-Pacific.83
Throughout this decade of danger, American policymakers must understand that under Xi’s strongman rule, personal political survival will dictate PRC behavior. For Washington and its allies, the struggle centers on preserving and expanding the type of human well-being yielded by a system oriented toward freedom and rules-based governance that emphasizes reason and fair process over coercion and force. Conversely, Xi (like fellow authoritarian leaders such as Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un) uses a totally different operating system: rule for life, non-transparency, a ruthless “ends-justify-any- means” mindset, and policies that ultimately tend to be one-way, high-leverage bets on continued successful (and lightly opposed) revisionist actions abroad and near- absolute control domestically.
Xi’s personalist leadership and nearly comprehensive suppression of dissenting voices in the Party’s senior ranks simultaneously raises the chances of making policy mistakes while reducing the flexibility to deal with them early. In such an embrittled system, the proverbial “leverage” that would have left Xi with outsized returns on a successful bet instead amplifies the downside, all for which he personally and exclusively signed. The “best-case” scenario entails continued stagnation and rot within the Party along the lines of what Minxin Pei has articulated.84 The “intermediate case” is an accelerated version of that, with Xi suffering a loss of status and authority on the heels of a policy disaster, internal challengers rising within the PRC, and internecine strife leading to accelerated weakening of the Party. The “bad case” scenario—which, in practice, would likely be interrelated with the intermediate one—is that Xi would double down on a mistaken course of action to prioritize political self-preservation. If such mistakes led to—or were made in the course of—a kinetic conflict, personal survival measures could rapidly transmute into regional or even global (i.e., nuclear, space, cyber) threats.
If Xi triggered a “margin call” on his personal political account through a failed high-stakes gamble, it would likely be paid in blood. Washington must thus prepare the American electorate and its institutional and physical infrastructure, as well as that of allies and partners abroad, for the likelihood that tensions will periodically ratchet up to uncomfortable levels—and that, despite the promise of determined deterrence, actual conflict cannot be ruled out. Si vis pacem, para bellum (“If you want peace, prepare for war”) must unfortunately serve as a central organizing principle for a range of U.S. and allied decisions during the next decade with respect to China under Xi.85
Given these unforgiving dynamics, the implications for U.S. leaders and planners are stark:
Do whatever remains possible to reach “peak” preparedness for deterrent competition against China by the mid-to-late 2020s and accept the tradeoffs.86
Nothing the U.S and its allies might theoretically achieve after 2035 is worth pursuing at the expense of capabilities that might be “better” than those in service now, but that could not be realistically fielded at scale until five years or more from now.
Much will be decided by the end of this decade. If America falters at this critical time—whether through creeping corrosion of the rules-based order at Beijing’s hands or the shocking impact of failing to defend Taiwan against military attack— many aspects of the world and future will be determined at the expense of U.S. interests and values.
The decade of danger is upon us. With existential stakes for American interests and values looming, there is no time left to waste. Washington and its allies must push to maximize their competitive edge as rapidly as possible to avoid an outcome they cannot afford—“losing the 2020s.” At what point the PRC reaches its peak may ultimately defy precise prediction, but the strong possibility of it occurring over the next few years should front-load America’s bottom-line planning and preparations, given the potential for irreversible linchpin effects. Near-term preparation to run this decade’s unforgiving gauntlet justifies any corresponding long-term tradeoffs and risks: “losing the 2020s” would also mean losing the 2030s and beyond. Ultimately, the best achievements in coming decades will matter little if we lose Taiwan on our watch. More broadly, allowing PRC revisionism to run as rampant in the 2020s as it did in the 2010s would risk negatively reshaping the world order for decades to come and could actually set the stage for even worse conflicts by destabilizing the planet’s most populous region. Alternatively, proactive deterrence actions now can sow the seeds for a more peaceful and prosperous future that would benefit all Indo-Pacific countries, China included. The mission is vital, the stakes are high, and the clock is ticking.
I guess agreeing with the above make me a China "hater"...
I wouldn’t take anything from the Baker Institute at face value. Over the years they’ve proven themselves to be heavily involved in the creation of far-right propaganda. Not saying the above is wrong, just that you should probably look to an ideologically diverse source for validation. YMMV.
Uhm, considering that many sources worldwide are making more or less tha same arguments, your concerns of "right wing propaganda" fall flat.
Looks like you didn’t take the Baker Institutes words at face value—well done. Their role in creating propaganda though is well established.
Some people around here seem to think that linking "hawkish" information is "right wing", "Trumpist", or "hateful"; it isn't. China is a human rights violator, a bully to its neighbors, and a threat to world peace. As a Liberal, and having a fair knowledge of history, especially in the WWII Pacific campaigns, I'm only too aware of how little time the West has to counter China, and how little time China has to attempt to remain a world power.
There are plenty of other sources worldwide that mirror the Baker Institutes warning, albeit most are less "hawkish", but there is a consensus that China is a threat to the West, and the existing Rules of Order, and that the U.S. and our allies would be better off constraining China's impulse to invade Taiwan, than allowing China's militarism to go unchecked.
In the meantime, China's demographics will likely create a slowing economy and a halving of its population by 2060.
You don't seem to have too much comment on the obvious pro China propaganda going on here, all of it from a small number of the usual posters.
Please explain how do you implicates the WWII Pacific campaigns to China today? The western version of history always intrigues me such as the Opium War and Chinese Exclusion Act. Some westerners try to brainwash people thinking China is a threat to world peace. History shows for the last two hundred years all the major wars are launched by western nations. So the prediction is against history. This is a contradiction.
LOL!
At some point, you are just talking to yourself. There is ample evidence that China is a threat to the West, and I've posted plenty of links on that.
Please also attempt to counter my claim about both China's overaged demographic, and there slowing growth. I'll wait.
You can only laugh at your own words? Why can't you answer your own words I bold-faced?
How about reading a history book on the War in the Pacific; then get back to me.
The flexibility and resilience of America and its advanced-economy allies represent the polar opposite of China’s state-directed planning and implementation model. Their openness to people, ideas, and capital flows makes them creative dynamos, as well as fuels world-class research universities and yields demographic dividends by attracting talented and motivated people from all over the world. These qualities underpin their long-term comprehensive national power and the bloc’s global competitiveness. It also makes their responses to an assault formidable and favors their odds the longer a major cold or hot war continues. But free-wheeling systems also complicate near-term proactive preparation to head off conflicts.
Fortunately, Beijing’s belligerent behavior has helped solidify multiple allied diplomatic and military initiatives that, while presently insufficient to defend the rules-based order, nonetheless constitute a solid foundation on which to build. Diplomatic proofs of concept such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”),81 security alignments such as AUKUS, and hard security actions such as the Pacific Deterrence Initiative82 are now falling into place. The stage is set for follow-up measures to comprehensively “peak” the non-authoritarian world’s protective actions to hold the line in the Indo-Pacific.83
Throughout this decade of danger, American policymakers must understand that under Xi’s strongman rule, personal political survival will dictate PRC behavior. For Washington and its allies, the struggle centers on preserving and expanding the type of human well-being yielded by a system oriented toward freedom and rules-based governance that emphasizes reason and fair process over coercion and force. Conversely, Xi (like fellow authoritarian leaders such as Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un) uses a totally different operating system: rule for life, non-transparency, a ruthless “ends-justify-any- means” mindset, and policies that ultimately tend to be one-way, high-leverage bets on continued successful (and lightly opposed) revisionist actions abroad and near- absolute control domestically.
...
Gauntlet over Gizmos: Protecting Taiwan from Peak PRC Pressure through Early 2030s
The flexibility and resilience of America and its advanced-economy allies represent the polar opposite of China’s state-directed planning and implementation model. Their openness to people, ideas, and capital flows makes them creative dynamos, as well as fuels world-class research universities and yields demographic dividends by attracting talented and motivated people from all over the world. These qualities underpin their long-term comprehensive national power and the bloc’s global competitiveness. It also makes their responses to an assault formidable and favors their odds the longer a major cold or hot war continues. But free-wheeling systems also complicate near-term proactive preparation to head off conflicts.
Fortunately, Beijing’s belligerent behavior has helped solidify multiple allied diplomatic and military initiatives that, while presently insufficient to defend the rules-based order, nonetheless constitute a solid foundation on which to build. Diplomatic proofs of concept such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”),81 security alignments such as AUKUS, and hard security actions such as the Pacific Deterrence Initiative82 are now falling into place. The stage is set for follow-up measures to comprehensively “peak” the non-authoritarian world’s protective actions to hold the line in the Indo-Pacific.83
Throughout this decade of danger, American policymakers must understand that under Xi’s strongman rule, personal political survival will dictate PRC behavior. For Washington and its allies, the struggle centers on preserving and expanding the type of human well-being yielded by a system oriented toward freedom and rules-based governance that emphasizes reason and fair process over coercion and force. Conversely, Xi (like fellow authoritarian leaders such as Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un) uses a totally different operating system: rule for life, non-transparency, a ruthless “ends-justify-any- means” mindset, and policies that ultimately tend to be one-way, high-leverage bets on continued successful (and lightly opposed) revisionist actions abroad and near- absolute control domestically.
Xi’s personalist leadership and nearly comprehensive suppression of dissenting voices in the Party’s senior ranks simultaneously raises the chances of making policy mistakes while reducing the flexibility to deal with them early. In such an embrittled system, the proverbial “leverage” that would have left Xi with outsized returns on a successful bet instead amplifies the downside, all for which he personally and exclusively signed. The “best-case” scenario entails continued stagnation and rot within the Party along the lines of what Minxin Pei has articulated.84 The “intermediate case” is an accelerated version of that, with Xi suffering a loss of status and authority on the heels of a policy disaster, internal challengers rising within the PRC, and internecine strife leading to accelerated weakening of the Party. The “bad case” scenario—which, in practice, would likely be interrelated with the intermediate one—is that Xi would double down on a mistaken course of action to prioritize political self-preservation. If such mistakes led to—or were made in the course of—a kinetic conflict, personal survival measures could rapidly transmute into regional or even global (i.e., nuclear, space, cyber) threats.
If Xi triggered a “margin call” on his personal political account through a failed high-stakes gamble, it would likely be paid in blood. Washington must thus prepare the American electorate and its institutional and physical infrastructure, as well as that of allies and partners abroad, for the likelihood that tensions will periodically ratchet up to uncomfortable levels—and that, despite the promise of determined deterrence, actual conflict cannot be ruled out. Si vis pacem, para bellum (“If you want peace, prepare for war”) must unfortunately serve as a central organizing principle for a range of U.S. and allied decisions during the next decade with respect to China under Xi.85
Given these unforgiving dynamics, the implications for U.S. leaders and planners are stark:
Do whatever remains possible to reach “peak” preparedness for deterrent competition against China by the mid-to-late 2020s and accept the tradeoffs.86
Nothing the U.S and its allies might theoretically achieve after 2035 is worth pursuing at the expense of capabilities that might be “better” than those in service now, but that could not be realistically fielded at scale until five years or more from now.
Much will be decided by the end of this decade. If America falters at this critical time—whether through creeping corrosion of the rules-based order at Beijing’s hands or the shocking impact of failing to defend Taiwan against military attack— many aspects of the world and future will be determined at the expense of U.S. interests and values.
The decade of danger is upon us. With existential stakes for American interests and values looming, there is no time left to waste. Washington and its allies must push to maximize their competitive edge as rapidly as possible to avoid an outcome they cannot afford—“losing the 2020s.” At what point the PRC reaches its peak may ultimately defy precise prediction, but the strong possibility of it occurring over the next few years should front-load America’s bottom-line planning and preparations, given the potential for irreversible linchpin effects. Near-term preparation to run this decade’s unforgiving gauntlet justifies any corresponding long-term tradeoffs and risks: “losing the 2020s” would also mean losing the 2030s and beyond. Ultimately, the best achievements in coming decades will matter little if we lose Taiwan on our watch. More broadly, allowing PRC revisionism to run as rampant in the 2020s as it did in the 2010s would risk negatively reshaping the world order for decades to come and could actually set the stage for even worse conflicts by destabilizing the planet’s most populous region. Alternatively, proactive deterrence actions now can sow the seeds for a more peaceful and prosperous future that would benefit all Indo-Pacific countries, China included. The mission is vital, the stakes are high, and the clock is ticking.
I guess agreeing with the above make me a China "hater"...
I wouldn’t take anything from the Baker Institute at face value. Over the years they’ve proven themselves to be heavily involved in the creation of far-right propaganda. Not saying the above is wrong, just that you should probably look to an ideologically diverse source for validation. YMMV.
Uhm, considering that many sources worldwide are making more or less tha same arguments, your concerns of "right wing propaganda" fall flat.
Looks like you didn’t take the Baker Institutes words at face value—well done. Their role in creating propaganda though is well established.
Some people around here seem to think that linking "hawkish" information is "right wing", "Trumpist", or "hateful"; it isn't. China is a human rights violator, a bully to its neighbors, and a threat to world peace. As a Liberal, and having a fair knowledge of history, especially in the WWII Pacific campaigns, I'm only too aware of how little time the West has to counter China, and how little time China has to attempt to remain a world power.
There are plenty of other sources worldwide that mirror the Baker Institutes warning, albeit most are less "hawkish", but there is a consensus that China is a threat to the West, and the existing Rules of Order, and that the U.S. and our allies would be better off constraining China's impulse to invade Taiwan, than allowing China's militarism to go unchecked.
In the meantime, China's demographics will likely create a slowing economy and a halving of its population by 2060.
You don't seem to have too much comment on the obvious pro China propaganda going on here, all of it from a small number of the usual posters.
Please explain how do you implicates the WWII Pacific campaigns to China today? The western version of history always intrigues me such as the Opium War and Chinese Exclusion Act. Some westerners try to brainwash people thinking China is a threat to world peace. History shows for the last two hundred years all the major wars are launched by western nations. So the prediction is against history. This is a contradiction.
LOL!
At some point, you are just talking to yourself. There is ample evidence that China is a threat to the West, and I've posted plenty of links on that.
Please also attempt to counter my claim about both China's overaged demographic, and there slowing growth. I'll wait.
You can only laugh at your own words? Why can't you answer your own words I bold-faced?
How about reading a history book on the War in the Pacific; then get back to me.
Everybody knows WWII. I just want to know what you mean by WWII Pacific campaigns. And how you relate them to what China will be doing in the near future. You should be able to describe it in a few sentences. If you got it from the right wing propaganda, you can just copy it over here.
The flexibility and resilience of America and its advanced-economy allies represent the polar opposite of China’s state-directed planning and implementation model. Their openness to people, ideas, and capital flows makes them creative dynamos, as well as fuels world-class research universities and yields demographic dividends by attracting talented and motivated people from all over the world. These qualities underpin their long-term comprehensive national power and the bloc’s global competitiveness. It also makes their responses to an assault formidable and favors their odds the longer a major cold or hot war continues. But free-wheeling systems also complicate near-term proactive preparation to head off conflicts.
Fortunately, Beijing’s belligerent behavior has helped solidify multiple allied diplomatic and military initiatives that, while presently insufficient to defend the rules-based order, nonetheless constitute a solid foundation on which to build. Diplomatic proofs of concept such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”),81 security alignments such as AUKUS, and hard security actions such as the Pacific Deterrence Initiative82 are now falling into place. The stage is set for follow-up measures to comprehensively “peak” the non-authoritarian world’s protective actions to hold the line in the Indo-Pacific.83
Throughout this decade of danger, American policymakers must understand that under Xi’s strongman rule, personal political survival will dictate PRC behavior. For Washington and its allies, the struggle centers on preserving and expanding the type of human well-being yielded by a system oriented toward freedom and rules-based governance that emphasizes reason and fair process over coercion and force. Conversely, Xi (like fellow authoritarian leaders such as Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un) uses a totally different operating system: rule for life, non-transparency, a ruthless “ends-justify-any- means” mindset, and policies that ultimately tend to be one-way, high-leverage bets on continued successful (and lightly opposed) revisionist actions abroad and near- absolute control domestically.
...
Gauntlet over Gizmos: Protecting Taiwan from Peak PRC Pressure through Early 2030s
The flexibility and resilience of America and its advanced-economy allies represent the polar opposite of China’s state-directed planning and implementation model. Their openness to people, ideas, and capital flows makes them creative dynamos, as well as fuels world-class research universities and yields demographic dividends by attracting talented and motivated people from all over the world. These qualities underpin their long-term comprehensive national power and the bloc’s global competitiveness. It also makes their responses to an assault formidable and favors their odds the longer a major cold or hot war continues. But free-wheeling systems also complicate near-term proactive preparation to head off conflicts.
Fortunately, Beijing’s belligerent behavior has helped solidify multiple allied diplomatic and military initiatives that, while presently insufficient to defend the rules-based order, nonetheless constitute a solid foundation on which to build. Diplomatic proofs of concept such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”),81 security alignments such as AUKUS, and hard security actions such as the Pacific Deterrence Initiative82 are now falling into place. The stage is set for follow-up measures to comprehensively “peak” the non-authoritarian world’s protective actions to hold the line in the Indo-Pacific.83
Throughout this decade of danger, American policymakers must understand that under Xi’s strongman rule, personal political survival will dictate PRC behavior. For Washington and its allies, the struggle centers on preserving and expanding the type of human well-being yielded by a system oriented toward freedom and rules-based governance that emphasizes reason and fair process over coercion and force. Conversely, Xi (like fellow authoritarian leaders such as Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un) uses a totally different operating system: rule for life, non-transparency, a ruthless “ends-justify-any- means” mindset, and policies that ultimately tend to be one-way, high-leverage bets on continued successful (and lightly opposed) revisionist actions abroad and near- absolute control domestically.
Xi’s personalist leadership and nearly comprehensive suppression of dissenting voices in the Party’s senior ranks simultaneously raises the chances of making policy mistakes while reducing the flexibility to deal with them early. In such an embrittled system, the proverbial “leverage” that would have left Xi with outsized returns on a successful bet instead amplifies the downside, all for which he personally and exclusively signed. The “best-case” scenario entails continued stagnation and rot within the Party along the lines of what Minxin Pei has articulated.84 The “intermediate case” is an accelerated version of that, with Xi suffering a loss of status and authority on the heels of a policy disaster, internal challengers rising within the PRC, and internecine strife leading to accelerated weakening of the Party. The “bad case” scenario—which, in practice, would likely be interrelated with the intermediate one—is that Xi would double down on a mistaken course of action to prioritize political self-preservation. If such mistakes led to—or were made in the course of—a kinetic conflict, personal survival measures could rapidly transmute into regional or even global (i.e., nuclear, space, cyber) threats.
If Xi triggered a “margin call” on his personal political account through a failed high-stakes gamble, it would likely be paid in blood. Washington must thus prepare the American electorate and its institutional and physical infrastructure, as well as that of allies and partners abroad, for the likelihood that tensions will periodically ratchet up to uncomfortable levels—and that, despite the promise of determined deterrence, actual conflict cannot be ruled out. Si vis pacem, para bellum (“If you want peace, prepare for war”) must unfortunately serve as a central organizing principle for a range of U.S. and allied decisions during the next decade with respect to China under Xi.85
Given these unforgiving dynamics, the implications for U.S. leaders and planners are stark:
Do whatever remains possible to reach “peak” preparedness for deterrent competition against China by the mid-to-late 2020s and accept the tradeoffs.86
Nothing the U.S and its allies might theoretically achieve after 2035 is worth pursuing at the expense of capabilities that might be “better” than those in service now, but that could not be realistically fielded at scale until five years or more from now.
Much will be decided by the end of this decade. If America falters at this critical time—whether through creeping corrosion of the rules-based order at Beijing’s hands or the shocking impact of failing to defend Taiwan against military attack— many aspects of the world and future will be determined at the expense of U.S. interests and values.
The decade of danger is upon us. With existential stakes for American interests and values looming, there is no time left to waste. Washington and its allies must push to maximize their competitive edge as rapidly as possible to avoid an outcome they cannot afford—“losing the 2020s.” At what point the PRC reaches its peak may ultimately defy precise prediction, but the strong possibility of it occurring over the next few years should front-load America’s bottom-line planning and preparations, given the potential for irreversible linchpin effects. Near-term preparation to run this decade’s unforgiving gauntlet justifies any corresponding long-term tradeoffs and risks: “losing the 2020s” would also mean losing the 2030s and beyond. Ultimately, the best achievements in coming decades will matter little if we lose Taiwan on our watch. More broadly, allowing PRC revisionism to run as rampant in the 2020s as it did in the 2010s would risk negatively reshaping the world order for decades to come and could actually set the stage for even worse conflicts by destabilizing the planet’s most populous region. Alternatively, proactive deterrence actions now can sow the seeds for a more peaceful and prosperous future that would benefit all Indo-Pacific countries, China included. The mission is vital, the stakes are high, and the clock is ticking.
I guess agreeing with the above make me a China "hater"...
I wouldn’t take anything from the Baker Institute at face value. Over the years they’ve proven themselves to be heavily involved in the creation of far-right propaganda. Not saying the above is wrong, just that you should probably look to an ideologically diverse source for validation. YMMV.
Uhm, considering that many sources worldwide are making more or less tha same arguments, your concerns of "right wing propaganda" fall flat.
Looks like you didn’t take the Baker Institutes words at face value—well done. Their role in creating propaganda though is well established.
Some people around here seem to think that linking "hawkish" information is "right wing", "Trumpist", or "hateful"; it isn't. China is a human rights violator, a bully to its neighbors, and a threat to world peace. As a Liberal, and having a fair knowledge of history, especially in the WWII Pacific campaigns, I'm only too aware of how little time the West has to counter China, and how little time China has to attempt to remain a world power.
There are plenty of other sources worldwide that mirror the Baker Institutes warning, albeit most are less "hawkish", but there is a consensus that China is a threat to the West, and the existing Rules of Order, and that the U.S. and our allies would be better off constraining China's impulse to invade Taiwan, than allowing China's militarism to go unchecked.
In the meantime, China's demographics will likely create a slowing economy and a halving of its population by 2060.
You don't seem to have too much comment on the obvious pro China propaganda going on here, all of it from a small number of the usual posters.
Please explain how do you implicates the WWII Pacific campaigns to China today? The western version of history always intrigues me such as the Opium War and Chinese Exclusion Act. Some westerners try to brainwash people thinking China is a threat to world peace. History shows for the last two hundred years all the major wars are launched by western nations. So the prediction is against history. This is a contradiction.
LOL!
At some point, you are just talking to yourself. There is ample evidence that China is a threat to the West, and I've posted plenty of links on that.
Please also attempt to counter my claim about both China's overaged demographic, and there slowing growth. I'll wait.
You can only laugh at your own words? Why can't you answer your own words I bold-faced?
How about reading a history book on the War in the Pacific; then get back to me.
Everybody knows WWII. I just want to know what you mean by WWII Pacific campaigns. And how you relate them to what China will be doing in the near future. You should be able to describe it in a few sentences. If you got it from the right wing propaganda, you can just copy it over here.
It's about Geography, the first, and second, island chains, the Philippines, Indonesia, Cambodia, Singapore and Malaysia, and even the UAE.
Then, look at how China is attempting to expand its presence in the Central and South Pacific. and Indian Ocean. Hence why the U.S. and it Allies are pushing back against China's military expansionism.
Comments
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3137252/china-census-migration-drives-han-population-growth-xinjiang
Your statement is a lie.
Han are increasing their population from immigration into the region, not from births, and then there are also "forced" marriages of Uyghur women to Han;
https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/12/uyghur-women-are-chinas-victims-and-resistance/
The PRC's denials are only increasing the world's resistance to China.
I doubt you even glanced at the report given that your "research" rarely goes beyond Wikipedia, so here's a direct link: https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/ad-aspi/2021-05/Family%20deplanning%20v2.pdf?IO4rxtbW_Up5C6usSJ4EpMFHm6khL7uF
If you're going to make stuff up, don't make it up about things that are so easily disproved.
This report quoted statistics published by CCP. What are the statistics? They are changes in birth rate. To deduce that there is genocide is a lie. I will give you a hint. China has a one child policy for the last twenty years until recently. But this policy applies only to Hans. If you can find the lie in the report from this clue, I will give you a A grade.
Are you going to apologise for saying tmay had a reading comprehension problem when in fact it was you who clearly hadn't read the report properly?
You are a very bad liar, but you are definitely a liar.
Sounds like more overtime for you at the United Front Work Department tomorrow. Better rest up.
Some people around here seem to think that linking "hawkish" information is "right wing", "Trumpist", or "hateful"; it isn't. China is a human rights violator, a bully to its neighbors, and a threat to world peace. As a Liberal, and having a fair knowledge of history, especially in the WWII Pacific campaigns, I'm only too aware of how little time the West has to counter China, and how little time China has to attempt to remain a world power.
There are plenty of other sources worldwide that mirror the Baker Institutes warning, albeit most are less "hawkish", but there is a consensus that China is a threat to the West, and the existing Rules of Order, and that the U.S. and our allies would be better off constraining China's impulse to invade Taiwan, than allowing China's militarism to go unchecked.
In the meantime, China's demographics will likely create a slowing economy and a halving of its population by 2060.
You don't seem to have too much comment on the obvious pro China propaganda going on here, all of it from a small number of the usual posters.
At some point, you are just talking to yourself. There is ample evidence that China is a threat to the West, and I've posted plenty of links on that.
Please also attempt to counter my claim about both China's overaged demographic, and there slowing growth. I'll wait.
Then, look at how China is attempting to expand its presence in the Central and South Pacific. and Indian Ocean. Hence why the U.S. and it Allies are pushing back against China's military expansionism.