Chen says: "I think BlackBerry, like any company, should have a basic civil responsibility. If the world is in danger, we should be able to help out."
How is Blackberry doing with:
Running their company on clean energy,
Labor,
Recycling,
Elimination of hazardous materials,
Mining conflict-free minerals.
If he truly thinks Apple isn't doing as well as Blackberry to improve their "basic civil responsibility" then perhaps a re-evaluation of his company is in order.
He is also playing the emotion card my stating flat out false implications. Apple did, as he states, "But if you have the data, you should give it to them" - Apple gave them everything the DID have, and then provided assistance for how the FBI may get what Apple didn't.
Which doesn't necessarily mean he's wrong, but that he has nothing to substantiate his claims with in regard to security on a viable mobile platform in 2016.
The blackberry CEO is indirectly saying he doesn't believe apple when they say they have no access. If you read between the lines. He's saying because of that the government will require mandatory backdoors. And he is trying to blame apples principals for this piece of legislation.
His belief that Apple was "refusing to unlock" says it all... hasn't it been shown clearly that Apple *can't* unlock certain devices? Refusal and inability are two different things.
...BlackBerry CEO John Chen slammed Apple chief Tim Cook in a Tuesday sppech [sic], sugesting [sic] that Cook was putting his company's reputation "above the greater good."
The shooter's iPhone 5c had been prevented from making further iCloud backups after discovery by the FBI, because of a password request made by the city of San Bernardino at the behest of law enforcement. Chen is taking issue with Cook's refusal to order Apple engineers to build and maintain a tool allowing the FBI access to the encrypted iPhone..
As a retired Test Engineer, Apple does have a way to access the data on iPhones to bypass the lock feature, they have their bed-of-nails test beds used to final test logic boards prior to assembly into a finished iPhone. These test fixtures and associated test software can be reprogrammed to download memory contents and associated secure enclave and provide that information to law enforcement for them to review and decrypt. This is possible because logic boards have test points used by test engineers to bypass normal inputs and outputs to speed testing of logic portions of the finished product.
The shooter's iPhone 5c had been prevented from making further iCloud backups after discovery by the FBI, because of a password request made by the city of San Bernardino at the behest of law enforcement. Chen is taking issue with Cook's refusal to order Apple engineers to build and maintain a tool allowing the FBI access to the encrypted iPhone..
As a retired Test Engineer, Apple does have a way to access the data on iPhones to bypass the lock feature, they have their bed-of-nails test beds used to final test logic boards prior to assembly into a finished iPhone. These test fixtures and associated test software can be reprogrammed to download memory contents and associated secure enclave and provide that information to law enforcement for them to review and decrypt. This is possible because logic boards have test points used by test engineers to bypass normal inputs and outputs to speed testing of logic portions of the finished product.
Retired Apple test engineer? If not, just because you worked for a company that already had backdoors included in their hardware doesn't mean all hardware can be broken the way you describe. If you did work for Apple, I'd begin looking for a hiding place because anything pertaining to Apple hardware is proprietary and you would have had to sign a legally binding non-disclosure agreement when leaving.
Prove your point with technical information, not just theory.
What worries me about Chen's statement is the fact that the Blackberry BES was the only (and might still be) mobile phone system approved for government classified discussions. This meant everything was encrypted, including all data on the BES servers. Blackberry never had need-to-know access to any of this data (and if someone gave them that access, they should have been arrested) so it sounds like Chen knows Blackberry had a back door to all their systems. This should come as bad news to all government installations using this system because if Blackberry can break in anyone can. Just because the government installations have a way to decrypt the data and conversations by government employees doesn't mean there's a back door, it simply means there's a front door or secondary access method to this system and data (IT people).
Mr. Chen would you then care to explain your company's stance on not providing a backdoor for certain countries or just stick quietly with your two-faced position? http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-10888954
The shooter's iPhone 5c had been prevented from making further iCloud backups after discovery by the FBI, because of a password request made by the city of San Bernardino at the behest of law enforcement. Chen is taking issue with Cook's refusal to order Apple engineers to build and maintain a tool allowing the FBI access to the encrypted iPhone..
As a retired Test Engineer, Apple does have a way to access the data on iPhones to bypass the lock feature, they have their bed-of-nails test beds used to final test logic boards prior to assembly into a finished iPhone. These test fixtures and associated test software can be reprogrammed to download memory contents and associated secure enclave and provide that information to law enforcement for them to review and decrypt. This is possible because logic boards have test points used by test engineers to bypass normal inputs and outputs to speed testing of logic portions of the finished product.
Quoting Apple's iOS security guide:
The device’s unique ID (UID) and a device group ID (GID) are AES 256-bit keys fused
(UID) or compiled (GID) into the application processor and Secure Enclave during
manufacturing. No software or firmware can read them directly; they can see only the
results of encryption or decryption operations performed by dedicated AES engines
implemented in silicon using the UID or GID as a key. Additionally, the Secure Enclave’s
UID and GID can only be used by the AES engine dedicated to the Secure Enclave. The
UIDs are unique to each device and are not recorded by Apple or any of its suppliers.
The GIDs are common to all processors in a class of devices (for example, all devices
using the Apple A8 processor), and are used for non security-critical tasks such as when
delivering system software during installation and restore. Integrating these keys into
the silicon helps prevent them from being tampered with or bypassed, or accessed
outside the AES engine. The UIDs and GIDs are also not available via JTAG or other
debugging interfaces.
As a retired Test Engineer, Apple does have a way to access the data on iPhones to bypass the lock feature, they have their bed-of-nails test beds used to final test logic boards prior to assembly into a finished iPhone. These test fixtures and associated test software can be reprogrammed to download memory contents and associated secure enclave and provide that information to law enforcement for them to review and decrypt. This is possible because logic boards have test points used by test engineers to bypass normal inputs and outputs to speed testing of logic portions of the finished product.
Retired Apple test engineer? If not, just because you worked for a company that already had backdoors included in their hardware doesn't mean all hardware can be broken the way you describe. If you did work for Apple, I'd begin looking for a hiding place because anything pertaining to Apple hardware is proprietary and you would have had to sign a legally binding non-disclosure agreement when leaving.
Prove your point with technical information, not just theory.
Comments
Tool.
BlackBerry CEO
Is completely irrelevant now.
Which doesn't necessarily mean he's wrong, but that he has nothing to substantiate his claims with in regard to security on a viable mobile platform in 2016.
His belief that Apple was "refusing to unlock" says it all... hasn't it been shown clearly that Apple *can't* unlock certain devices? Refusal and inability are two different things.
Prove your point with technical information, not just theory.
Dead Clade Walking
The device’s unique ID (UID) and a device group ID (GID) are AES 256-bit keys fused (UID) or compiled (GID) into the application processor and Secure Enclave during manufacturing. No software or firmware can read them directly; they can see only the results of encryption or decryption operations performed by dedicated AES engines implemented in silicon using the UID or GID as a key. Additionally, the Secure Enclave’s UID and GID can only be used by the AES engine dedicated to the Secure Enclave. The UIDs are unique to each device and are not recorded by Apple or any of its suppliers. The GIDs are common to all processors in a class of devices (for example, all devices using the Apple A8 processor), and are used for non security-critical tasks such as when delivering system software during installation and restore. Integrating these keys into the silicon helps prevent them from being tampered with or bypassed, or accessed outside the AES engine. The UIDs and GIDs are also not available via JTAG or other debugging interfaces.
If Apple could, doesn't mean they should.