CurtisHight
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Tim Cook's Japan tour continues at Sony iPhone camera facility
blastdoor said:freeassociate2 said:blastdoor said:Nice to highlight the non-Chinese parts of the supply chain. Japan is a particularly appealing partner — democratic, highly advanced, benevolent, dependable.
2. Everything is relative. Compared to almost every other country in Asia, my description is on the money.
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Intel's Thunderbolt 5 has twice the speed of Thunderbolt 4
dewme said:These advances always result in moving the bottleneck from one part of the system to a different part of the system. It’s all good, except for the part of the system that always seems to suffer: my wallet.
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Phil Schiller puts App Store users before developers & profits
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New Sonnet PCIe card brings two speedy NVMe SSD slots to Mac Pro
I have been wondering if a capability like unto this, native support for NVMe storage, was being designed into the upcoming Apple silicon Mac Pros. With the announcement of SanDisk Professional’s Pro-Blade system, I have wondered about a more physically robust implementation, the confluence of NVMe and CFexpress. -
Apple looks to move away from China for its new products, says Kuo
waveparticle said:tmay said:waveparticle said:StrangeDays said:waveparticle said:JWSC said:Assuming this is true, the recent Shanghai lockdowns have provided Apple with a politically acceptable excuse (from a CCP perspective) for Apple to move a large percentage of its supply chain outside China. Apple can point to 'supply chain instability' as a business reason, rather than the more concerning aspect of being reliant on business entities within a totalitarian regime that thinks little of human rights. Apple doesn't want to talk about that with China for fear that it would put them in bad standing with CCP officials. But the supply chain excuse can be viewed as non-political.
Perhaps the West is tiring of China's influence operations, which are an obvious softening up of the West prior to conflict over Taiwan. Good to hear that awareness of China's influence operations is becoming widespread.
How's that looking from your end?The U.S. has desired for China to rise out of its struggle between old and new, rise up victorious over the sufferings of the past and recognize and protect the human rights of its people, and respect the human rights of its neighbors. Until that uprising is complete, military men will do their job and imagine potential outcomes and seek to prevent those disfavorable to their society:In The Hunt for Red October, following the entourage from the Dallas boarding the Red October, we learn that Captain Ramius speaks some English and analyst Jack Ryan speaks a little Russian. They’ve been studying each other. “Rommel, you magnificent bastard, I read your book” exclaims George C. Scott in Patton (51:48–51:54). He too had been studying his adversary. So too, a century ago:———48. Raymond A. Esthus, Theodore Roosevelt and Japan (Seattle, 1966), 37. In 1906 Roosevelt asked the General Board of the U.S. Navy, chaired by Admiral George Dewey, to draw up war plans in case Japan attacked American possessions. The immediate cause of the request was a “war scare” drummed up by the press of both countries over mistreatment of Japanese immigrants in San Francisco after the earthquake of 1906. A plan known as War Plan Orange was the result. Plan Orange was perfected as the U.S. grand strategy in the Pacific between 1906 and 1914. It was upgraded over subsequent decades and was, in essence, the strategy used to defeat Japan, 1941– 1945. Edward S. Miller, War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897– 1945 (Annapolis, 1991).Edward S. Miller, “Japan’s Other Victory: Overseas Financing of the Russo-Japanese War”, The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective: World War Zero, John W. Steinberg, Bruce W. Menning, David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, David Wolff, and Shinji Yokote, eds. (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 478–479. The three bold words mark the new page.—Initially underestimating the force and determination with which the navy argued its position, Yamagata continued deliberations with navy officials for over a month. His efforts to construct a single Imperial Defense Plan, however, failed. In the end, Yamagata acquiesced to the navy’s demands for an autonomous defense plan and endorsed a policy compromise whereby both military services were allowed to formulate their own plans based on separate hypothetical enemies. As a result, the army selected Russia as Japan’s most likely future enemy and argued that the army must expand by six divisions to meet any potential war with Russia. The navy on the other hand, chose the largest non-allied naval power, the United States, as its hypothetical enemy and claimed that Japan must therefore put to sea a navy whose warships displaced a total 500,000 tons. Navy officials suggested that this required doubling the navy’s size as it stood in 1906.J. Charles Schencking, “Interservice Rivalry and Politics in Post-War Japan”, The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective: World War Zero, John W. Steinberg, Bruce W. Menning, David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, David Wolff, and Shinji Yokote, eds. (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 571.