C5The extraterritorial sanctions did not 'kill' Huawei. Far from it. ForThey have done untold damage to US semiconductor interests.
At most they threw a spanner into the works of Huawei's 5G and Kirin roadmap in the i8 short term.
So short that Huawei has already gone on record to say they will be back in smartphone business next year and I'd wager without US technology in its processor supply chain.
They have also confirmed new silicon for this year but no one knows what it will be. Possibly 5G related.
Whatever advances Chinese companies make are sure to find their way to purchasers in Russia.
Huawei has veered full force into the automotive market with latest rumours pointing to a multi billion dollar investment from a major German car company for it to use Huawei's self driving technology.
Restricting Android use would simply put even more wind under the wings of HarmonyOS.
U.S. Semiconductor interests are not "damaged" by the sanctions of Huawei, nor have they done "untold damage" to U.S. Semiconductor Interests. You are free to link to show how that is true or not.
As for the link to VW considering Huawei self driving, the article was pretty vague about that actually happening, but sure, maybe VW does want to do that. Still, there are already better self driving systems available that VW could license, and given the fact that Tesla's FSD is decidedly L2 capable, there isn't much needed to surpass Tesla.
HiSilicon has no leading edge fab access, and the article that you linked to acknowledged that fact. You need to do better if you are going to convince anyone of a Huawei phone comeback with HiSilicon.
Also, HarmonyOS 2.0 is still primarily AndroidOS, but sure, maybe that will change in HarmonyOS 3.0.
I do hope that China does attempt to ship technology to Russia, so that the West can take even more stringent action to reduce or prevent that transfer.
That's billions of dollars annually just from Huawei. Would you really like to see all of Russia moving purchases into China?
What would that do to US interests?
The US is limping along with some revenues from Huawei through licencing. Once Huawei has re-jigged it's supply chain, it will simply erradicate those US companies from the chain and send those billions into the pockets of US competitors.
Those references to HiSilicon are not mine. They came directly from Huawei.
What action could the West take against China transferring its own technology to Russia for strategic and financial gain?
Thanks for posting a link from 18 months ago.
China has almost no production of computing devices, SOC's, CPU's, and GPU's at 10 nm, and none under that, so no, China isn't going to be able to provide those devices to Russia.
More to the point, I'm guessing that the EU is also going to tighten its policies on Semiconductor sales to Russia.
12,18,24... It doesn't matter how many months. The damage is done.
How long do you think it takes to build out US technology from a design?
How long do you think it takes to re-jig a supply chain?
You claimed there was no damage. Associations directly representing US semi conductor interests (and thousands of companies, disagree with you).
10nm? What are you talking about? Over 90% of chip production is at 14nm or higher. China is very much in the game and ramping capacity just like everyone else.
Ah! And the EU set out its technology independence roadmap before the Huawei issue. Yes, to cut back it's reliance on the US.
Can you see a pattern emerging here?
And by the way, Huawei has already locked down contracts with EU companies to offset some lost supplies from the US.
Funny, but you seem to be reiterating a fact that everyone in the industry is stating; that there needs to be more resilience in the industry by building fabs in strategic locations to prevent supply chain disasters. Of course China wants to make more devices at lager nodes, but those aren't the preferred devices for leading edge phones, missiles, and aircraft, hence why the U.S. lured TSMC to Arizona to build a 5nm fab, to assure the U.S. Military that they would have a supply just in case China invades Taiwan in the future.
Sorry but missiles and aircraft aren't using the latest nodes for mission critical equipment. They use mature nodes and mature SoCs with mature software support
Not even self driving cars truly need the latest process nodes.
Tell me what advantages a 5nm process would bring to a single use missile.
As I said, over 90% of chip manufacturing is on mature nodes and for very good reason.
I'm sure that Xiaomi would be thrilled to compete with a 4nm Qualcomm against a 14nm, or even 10nm, SOC in a Huawei smartphone, but for missiles, it actually pays to have faster, smaller, lighter, and more powerful SOC;s. That's a smarter missile, and an advantage.
But hey, I'm fine with the PLA having a disadvantage in air to air and anti-ship missiles when it comes to a confrontation over Taiwan.
Smaller process node has no impact on how 'smart' the SoC is and size and weight are irrevelant on a 700 kilo missile with a very low unit count in terms of manufacturing.
Would you want to bet on that in the Taiwan Strait?
Of course!
Depending on who you ask, some of the most advanced missiles are Russian or Chinese anyway.
Size and power consumption matter on small energy constrained devices. They are irrevelant in things like missiles and cars.
Cutting edge nodes are irrevelant for almost ALL uses in fact. Why spend so much more when 28nm can do the job perfectly?
Uhm, no, for the most part, though Russia and China like to show off their latest wares. The U.S. is more tight lipped about its capabilities.
There is truth that China has an advantage in IRBM's, but that will rapidly change as the U.S. and Russia dissolved the treaty that restricted those for them. China is unhappy about the turnabout. China also has some long range air to air missiles, which would threaten in theater air refueling, so the U.S. Navy would be more inclined to standoff a bit.
There is also a truth that China and Russia have been putting in major efforts in hypersonic weapons, but that isn't news. The U.S. is portrayed in the popular press as being "behind" in hypersonic weapons, but I don't expect there is much truth to that once you look at production of such.
Still, the U.S. leads in the quality and quantify of Stealth aircraft, and stealth anti-ship missiles, and those will be what decides the outcome of any invasion of Taiwan. Our partners in the Indo-Pacific are also buying F-35's, Typhoon's, Rafale's, and K-21's, and the B-21 Stealth Bomber is already in production, with the initial test aircraft expected to make flights this year;
But Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall on Dec. 9 suggested the Air Force may continue to play its cards on the Raider close to the vest, even into 2022. “You’re not going to get to see much of it,” Kendall said during an online Defense One panel. “We don’t want to give our enemies a head start on any of this. We’re going to acknowledge that we’re doing this, let the public be aware, let the Congress be aware of it. But we’re not going to say a lot more about what we’re doing in the public.”
The huge advantage for the U.S. and it allies worldwide, is that they are already quite aware of China's militarization, and now, are aware of Russia's ambitions, which likely won't end well, whatever the outcome in Ukraine.
The U.S. and its allies are the acknowledged leaders in aircraft and aircraft engines, and it's quite a massive advantage. It's also true that Australia has about the same GDP as Russia, and they will be allowing B-21's to fly out of bases near Darwin. At the same time, the Austraiian Government is working to reverse the lease of port facilities in Darwin to the Chinese, for obvious concerns of National Security.
What strikes me odd, is that you are so Pro China, that you barely acknowledge that Spain is a member of NATO, and the EU, and in theory, shares values that are closer to the U.S. than to Russia and China. Yet here you are as ever, pushing China's Huawei as if your life depended on it; it doesn't by the way.
None of that had anything to do with process nodes and I am not pro China. I'm not a China hater either.
Cool, then you probably aren't all that worried about the West restricting semiconductor technology.
That is a stupid policy. Where is Apple forty years ago? There is no Macintosh.
Mortorola 68000 rocessor made in U.S, as was the fab equipment.
Is ir really a "stupid policy" to prevent known adversaries from misusing Western technology for weapons?
No.
There was no such stupid policy forty years ago. Not even four years ago.
Maybe if China wasn't militarizing at the rate it is, the West wouldn't need the restrictions. In a way, Putin screwed it up for Xi Jinping; now everyone in the West will have wised up.
Nonsense! China is the largest nation in the world. If the US needs such strong military, China needs even more.
No, unlike the U.S. trying to police the world and, increasingly trying to impose its form of government on the world, China's military is designed as a regional force not global. They make that clear when they say that they will never again let a foreign power dominate them.
You are incorrect about China being only a regional power, and it is easy to see that with just a bit of research.
You may be speaking of their economic reach. I was speaking of the their military which has, so far, stayed regional.
Nope, I'm speaking of their global military buildup, which hasn't "stayed regional" by any stretch.
C5The extraterritorial sanctions did not 'kill' Huawei. Far from it. ForThey have done untold damage to US semiconductor interests.
At most they threw a spanner into the works of Huawei's 5G and Kirin roadmap in the i8 short term.
So short that Huawei has already gone on record to say they will be back in smartphone business next year and I'd wager without US technology in its processor supply chain.
They have also confirmed new silicon for this year but no one knows what it will be. Possibly 5G related.
Whatever advances Chinese companies make are sure to find their way to purchasers in Russia.
Huawei has veered full force into the automotive market with latest rumours pointing to a multi billion dollar investment from a major German car company for it to use Huawei's self driving technology.
Restricting Android use would simply put even more wind under the wings of HarmonyOS.
U.S. Semiconductor interests are not "damaged" by the sanctions of Huawei, nor have they done "untold damage" to U.S. Semiconductor Interests. You are free to link to show how that is true or not.
As for the link to VW considering Huawei self driving, the article was pretty vague about that actually happening, but sure, maybe VW does want to do that. Still, there are already better self driving systems available that VW could license, and given the fact that Tesla's FSD is decidedly L2 capable, there isn't much needed to surpass Tesla.
HiSilicon has no leading edge fab access, and the article that you linked to acknowledged that fact. You need to do better if you are going to convince anyone of a Huawei phone comeback with HiSilicon.
Also, HarmonyOS 2.0 is still primarily AndroidOS, but sure, maybe that will change in HarmonyOS 3.0.
I do hope that China does attempt to ship technology to Russia, so that the West can take even more stringent action to reduce or prevent that transfer.
That's billions of dollars annually just from Huawei. Would you really like to see all of Russia moving purchases into China?
What would that do to US interests?
The US is limping along with some revenues from Huawei through licencing. Once Huawei has re-jigged it's supply chain, it will simply erradicate those US companies from the chain and send those billions into the pockets of US competitors.
Those references to HiSilicon are not mine. They came directly from Huawei.
What action could the West take against China transferring its own technology to Russia for strategic and financial gain?
Thanks for posting a link from 18 months ago.
China has almost no production of computing devices, SOC's, CPU's, and GPU's at 10 nm, and none under that, so no, China isn't going to be able to provide those devices to Russia.
More to the point, I'm guessing that the EU is also going to tighten its policies on Semiconductor sales to Russia.
12,18,24... It doesn't matter how many months. The damage is done.
How long do you think it takes to build out US technology from a design?
How long do you think it takes to re-jig a supply chain?
You claimed there was no damage. Associations directly representing US semi conductor interests (and thousands of companies, disagree with you).
10nm? What are you talking about? Over 90% of chip production is at 14nm or higher. China is very much in the game and ramping capacity just like everyone else.
Ah! And the EU set out its technology independence roadmap before the Huawei issue. Yes, to cut back it's reliance on the US.
Can you see a pattern emerging here?
And by the way, Huawei has already locked down contracts with EU companies to offset some lost supplies from the US.
Funny, but you seem to be reiterating a fact that everyone in the industry is stating; that there needs to be more resilience in the industry by building fabs in strategic locations to prevent supply chain disasters. Of course China wants to make more devices at lager nodes, but those aren't the preferred devices for leading edge phones, missiles, and aircraft, hence why the U.S. lured TSMC to Arizona to build a 5nm fab, to assure the U.S. Military that they would have a supply just in case China invades Taiwan in the future.
Sorry but missiles and aircraft aren't using the latest nodes for mission critical equipment. They use mature nodes and mature SoCs with mature software support
Not even self driving cars truly need the latest process nodes.
Tell me what advantages a 5nm process would bring to a single use missile.
As I said, over 90% of chip manufacturing is on mature nodes and for very good reason.
I'm sure that Xiaomi would be thrilled to compete with a 4nm Qualcomm against a 14nm, or even 10nm, SOC in a Huawei smartphone, but for missiles, it actually pays to have faster, smaller, lighter, and more powerful SOC;s. That's a smarter missile, and an advantage.
But hey, I'm fine with the PLA having a disadvantage in air to air and anti-ship missiles when it comes to a confrontation over Taiwan.
Smaller process node has no impact on how 'smart' the SoC is and size and weight are irrevelant on a 700 kilo missile with a very low unit count in terms of manufacturing.
Would you want to bet on that in the Taiwan Strait?
Of course!
Depending on who you ask, some of the most advanced missiles are Russian or Chinese anyway.
Size and power consumption matter on small energy constrained devices. They are irrevelant in things like missiles and cars.
Cutting edge nodes are irrevelant for almost ALL uses in fact. Why spend so much more when 28nm can do the job perfectly?
Uhm, no, for the most part, though Russia and China like to show off their latest wares. The U.S. is more tight lipped about its capabilities.
There is truth that China has an advantage in IRBM's, but that will rapidly change as the U.S. and Russia dissolved the treaty that restricted those for them. China is unhappy about the turnabout. China also has some long range air to air missiles, which would threaten in theater air refueling, so the U.S. Navy would be more inclined to standoff a bit.
There is also a truth that China and Russia have been putting in major efforts in hypersonic weapons, but that isn't news. The U.S. is portrayed in the popular press as being "behind" in hypersonic weapons, but I don't expect there is much truth to that once you look at production of such.
Still, the U.S. leads in the quality and quantify of Stealth aircraft, and stealth anti-ship missiles, and those will be what decides the outcome of any invasion of Taiwan. Our partners in the Indo-Pacific are also buying F-35's, Typhoon's, Rafale's, and K-21's, and the B-21 Stealth Bomber is already in production, with the initial test aircraft expected to make flights this year;
But Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall on Dec. 9 suggested the Air Force may continue to play its cards on the Raider close to the vest, even into 2022. “You’re not going to get to see much of it,” Kendall said during an online Defense One panel. “We don’t want to give our enemies a head start on any of this. We’re going to acknowledge that we’re doing this, let the public be aware, let the Congress be aware of it. But we’re not going to say a lot more about what we’re doing in the public.”
The huge advantage for the U.S. and it allies worldwide, is that they are already quite aware of China's militarization, and now, are aware of Russia's ambitions, which likely won't end well, whatever the outcome in Ukraine.
The U.S. and its allies are the acknowledged leaders in aircraft and aircraft engines, and it's quite a massive advantage. It's also true that Australia has about the same GDP as Russia, and they will be allowing B-21's to fly out of bases near Darwin. At the same time, the Austraiian Government is working to reverse the lease of port facilities in Darwin to the Chinese, for obvious concerns of National Security.
What strikes me odd, is that you are so Pro China, that you barely acknowledge that Spain is a member of NATO, and the EU, and in theory, shares values that are closer to the U.S. than to Russia and China. Yet here you are as ever, pushing China's Huawei as if your life depended on it; it doesn't by the way.
None of that had anything to do with process nodes and I am not pro China. I'm not a China hater either.
Cool, then you probably aren't all that worried about the West restricting semiconductor technology.
The 'West' isn't restricting anything. The US isn't the West.
The reality is that the US has shot itself in the head with its I'll conceived and clumsy efforts which have only served to 'buy time'. Time which is growing shorter by the day because China has accelerated its plans across the board.
As of last night, the U.S. is certainly the leader of the West, and China is trying to figure out how to walk the tightrope between support of Russian and not worsening the situation with the U.S. and the West.
China may have accelerated its plans across the board, but I'm guessing that the West has as well. China is no friend to the West.
This paper argues that it is high time for the European Union to adopt a proactive policy of managing the risks of sensitive technology transfer to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). On the basis of a common under- standing of the challenges of transferring dual-use technology, economi- cally, politically and security-wise, the European Union can optimise ben- efits from opportunities available in the promising and technologically rapidly advancing Chinese market.
China’s rise as a high-tech military power is central to US security con- cerns, while a European debate on the implications of a rising China be- yond the economic sphere is conspicuous by its absence. Concerns about Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) have prevailed in debates on high tech- nology transfers to the PRC, with less attention being paid to the ‘dual use’ nature of many of these technologies that can be utilised in both ci- vilian and military applications. Unlike the United States, the European Union has no overview on the amount and generation of sensitive tech- nology exported to the PRC. European policy on dual-use technologies is fragmentary at best, while conflicting export regimes and shrinking investments in research and education throughout the European Union are putting the EU’s technological lead at risk. This pressure further in- creases the need to find outside revenues to fund innovation and the next generation of technology – which could come from the expanding Chi- nese market. Given the central role of dual-use technologies in today’s information-based warfare, the EU’s traditionally high level of technology exports to China has become a sensitive topic across the Atlantic in recent years, as was highlighted by the clash over the potential lifting of the EU arms embargo in 2004/2005. In sum, dual-use technology transfers touch on aspects of competitiveness and innovative capacity, market access and security concerns.
A proactive policy needs to be based on a common understanding of Chi- na’s potential as a military superpower and of its likely impact on the European Union, the EU’s policies and its relationship with the United States. A proactive policy needs to merge security, economic and compe- tition aspects in order to sustain and extend the EU’s global influence. This influence, especially in the context of the currently intensifying arms race in space, can only be materialised by a political vision, in-depth knowledge of the other parties and a sound base of innovative technol- ogy within the European Union. In a post-Cold War world, countries like China represent the greatest opportunities and risks at the same time. The United States has responded to this ambivalent situation by trying out a system of balancing opportunities against risks in its ‘Validated End User’ regulation, first introduced in June 2007. The EU needs to follow with a proactive policy of ‘managing risks’ that helps encourage China to become a ‘responsible stakeholder’ while enabling European countries to continuously benefit from China’s development and at the same time remain vigilant regarding the security-related consequences of China’s economic ascent.
You have your China bias blinding you. The EU has very little to defend in the Indo-Pacific, but the U.S. and its Allies have a great deal to defend, including maintaining free and open navigation for the rest of the world.
Funny thing, I'm betting that the EU gets religion very quickly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Are you serious?
One person's opinion from 2009 is all you could dig up?
And on top of that, her essay described exactly what I said. Including the US strong arm tactics:
"The debate about lifting the EU’s arms embargo on China in 2005 dem-
onstrated the different perceptions of China’s rise within the EU and
across the Atlantic. It triggered off acrimonious arguments between EU
Member States and the United States. Shortly after the invasion of Iraq,
the transatlantic rift had not been healed, there was a high level of distrust
and the dispute turned exceedingly bitter. Finally, following US pressure
on European business, the embargo was maintained"
And once again, if it weren't for the US strong-arming Holland, ASML would already have sold around five lithography machines to China. The CEO of ASML is actively making his voice heard on the subject.
The Dutch stance could change at any moment by the way.
The Dutch stance isn't going to change. They have plenty of sales to the West.
You still are unable to show me any evidence that China is even close to 7nm fabs, yet you keep stating that "they have a plan".
You also won't acknowledge that the U.S. and it's allies in the Indo-Pacific consider China's militarization a threat, and FFS, you won't even acknowledge that Russia is destabilizing the EU, as we speak.
I happen to think the Dutch stance will change. ASML is pushing from its side too.
Enough sales? Surely they would want more sales if they could and China is where it's at and there is nothing at an EU level to limit that (in spite of your claims).
ASML has put back release of its next generation machines by three years and China is trying to produce homegrown alternatives.
I wouldn't rule that out at all and they are researching non-silicon chips.
China and evidence of 7nm nodes? Why do you want evidence?
Isn't Geely already planning volume production of its 7nm SoC for the automotive market? Hasn't SMIC already taped out its 8nm production and prepared for volume fabrication later this year?
All I've said is that China has accelerated its plans, which they have.
I don't have to 'acknowledge' the obvious about who is seen as a threat and militarisation of this or that. I try to steer clear of those geo politics wherever possible.
Well if SMIC has taped out 8mm production, then obviously, they don't need ASML, do they, and yeah, I'm aware of tapeouts at 7nm, but that is a long way from actual production capacity.
What I still can't believe, after all of your time here, is that you don't have a bias for China; you barely even consider EU investments in silicon as important, which is something even I am solidly behind.
Given the war in Ukraine, and China's "modest" support of Russia's invasion, and the EU's concerns about human rights violations, I don't expect that the West is going to reduce restrictions on dual use technology to either county for the foreseeable future.
Geely suggested production for this year and this month confirmed it for Q3. I believe Baidu also has the second generation of their chip ready for proctuction later this year.
C5The extraterritorial sanctions did not 'kill' Huawei. Far from it. ForThey have done untold damage to US semiconductor interests.
At most they threw a spanner into the works of Huawei's 5G and Kirin roadmap in the i8 short term.
So short that Huawei has already gone on record to say they will be back in smartphone business next year and I'd wager without US technology in its processor supply chain.
They have also confirmed new silicon for this year but no one knows what it will be. Possibly 5G related.
Whatever advances Chinese companies make are sure to find their way to purchasers in Russia.
Huawei has veered full force into the automotive market with latest rumours pointing to a multi billion dollar investment from a major German car company for it to use Huawei's self driving technology.
Restricting Android use would simply put even more wind under the wings of HarmonyOS.
U.S. Semiconductor interests are not "damaged" by the sanctions of Huawei, nor have they done "untold damage" to U.S. Semiconductor Interests. You are free to link to show how that is true or not.
As for the link to VW considering Huawei self driving, the article was pretty vague about that actually happening, but sure, maybe VW does want to do that. Still, there are already better self driving systems available that VW could license, and given the fact that Tesla's FSD is decidedly L2 capable, there isn't much needed to surpass Tesla.
HiSilicon has no leading edge fab access, and the article that you linked to acknowledged that fact. You need to do better if you are going to convince anyone of a Huawei phone comeback with HiSilicon.
Also, HarmonyOS 2.0 is still primarily AndroidOS, but sure, maybe that will change in HarmonyOS 3.0.
I do hope that China does attempt to ship technology to Russia, so that the West can take even more stringent action to reduce or prevent that transfer.
That's billions of dollars annually just from Huawei. Would you really like to see all of Russia moving purchases into China?
What would that do to US interests?
The US is limping along with some revenues from Huawei through licencing. Once Huawei has re-jigged it's supply chain, it will simply erradicate those US companies from the chain and send those billions into the pockets of US competitors.
Those references to HiSilicon are not mine. They came directly from Huawei.
What action could the West take against China transferring its own technology to Russia for strategic and financial gain?
Thanks for posting a link from 18 months ago.
China has almost no production of computing devices, SOC's, CPU's, and GPU's at 10 nm, and none under that, so no, China isn't going to be able to provide those devices to Russia.
More to the point, I'm guessing that the EU is also going to tighten its policies on Semiconductor sales to Russia.
12,18,24... It doesn't matter how many months. The damage is done.
How long do you think it takes to build out US technology from a design?
How long do you think it takes to re-jig a supply chain?
You claimed there was no damage. Associations directly representing US semi conductor interests (and thousands of companies, disagree with you).
10nm? What are you talking about? Over 90% of chip production is at 14nm or higher. China is very much in the game and ramping capacity just like everyone else.
Ah! And the EU set out its technology independence roadmap before the Huawei issue. Yes, to cut back it's reliance on the US.
Can you see a pattern emerging here?
And by the way, Huawei has already locked down contracts with EU companies to offset some lost supplies from the US.
Funny, but you seem to be reiterating a fact that everyone in the industry is stating; that there needs to be more resilience in the industry by building fabs in strategic locations to prevent supply chain disasters. Of course China wants to make more devices at lager nodes, but those aren't the preferred devices for leading edge phones, missiles, and aircraft, hence why the U.S. lured TSMC to Arizona to build a 5nm fab, to assure the U.S. Military that they would have a supply just in case China invades Taiwan in the future.
Sorry but missiles and aircraft aren't using the latest nodes for mission critical equipment. They use mature nodes and mature SoCs with mature software support
Not even self driving cars truly need the latest process nodes.
Tell me what advantages a 5nm process would bring to a single use missile.
As I said, over 90% of chip manufacturing is on mature nodes and for very good reason.
I'm sure that Xiaomi would be thrilled to compete with a 4nm Qualcomm against a 14nm, or even 10nm, SOC in a Huawei smartphone, but for missiles, it actually pays to have faster, smaller, lighter, and more powerful SOC;s. That's a smarter missile, and an advantage.
But hey, I'm fine with the PLA having a disadvantage in air to air and anti-ship missiles when it comes to a confrontation over Taiwan.
Smaller process node has no impact on how 'smart' the SoC is and size and weight are irrevelant on a 700 kilo missile with a very low unit count in terms of manufacturing.
Would you want to bet on that in the Taiwan Strait?
Of course!
Depending on who you ask, some of the most advanced missiles are Russian or Chinese anyway.
Size and power consumption matter on small energy constrained devices. They are irrevelant in things like missiles and cars.
Cutting edge nodes are irrevelant for almost ALL uses in fact. Why spend so much more when 28nm can do the job perfectly?
Uhm, no, for the most part, though Russia and China like to show off their latest wares. The U.S. is more tight lipped about its capabilities.
There is truth that China has an advantage in IRBM's, but that will rapidly change as the U.S. and Russia dissolved the treaty that restricted those for them. China is unhappy about the turnabout. China also has some long range air to air missiles, which would threaten in theater air refueling, so the U.S. Navy would be more inclined to standoff a bit.
There is also a truth that China and Russia have been putting in major efforts in hypersonic weapons, but that isn't news. The U.S. is portrayed in the popular press as being "behind" in hypersonic weapons, but I don't expect there is much truth to that once you look at production of such.
Still, the U.S. leads in the quality and quantify of Stealth aircraft, and stealth anti-ship missiles, and those will be what decides the outcome of any invasion of Taiwan. Our partners in the Indo-Pacific are also buying F-35's, Typhoon's, Rafale's, and K-21's, and the B-21 Stealth Bomber is already in production, with the initial test aircraft expected to make flights this year;
But Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall on Dec. 9 suggested the Air Force may continue to play its cards on the Raider close to the vest, even into 2022. “You’re not going to get to see much of it,” Kendall said during an online Defense One panel. “We don’t want to give our enemies a head start on any of this. We’re going to acknowledge that we’re doing this, let the public be aware, let the Congress be aware of it. But we’re not going to say a lot more about what we’re doing in the public.”
The huge advantage for the U.S. and it allies worldwide, is that they are already quite aware of China's militarization, and now, are aware of Russia's ambitions, which likely won't end well, whatever the outcome in Ukraine.
The U.S. and its allies are the acknowledged leaders in aircraft and aircraft engines, and it's quite a massive advantage. It's also true that Australia has about the same GDP as Russia, and they will be allowing B-21's to fly out of bases near Darwin. At the same time, the Austraiian Government is working to reverse the lease of port facilities in Darwin to the Chinese, for obvious concerns of National Security.
What strikes me odd, is that you are so Pro China, that you barely acknowledge that Spain is a member of NATO, and the EU, and in theory, shares values that are closer to the U.S. than to Russia and China. Yet here you are as ever, pushing China's Huawei as if your life depended on it; it doesn't by the way.
None of that had anything to do with process nodes and I am not pro China. I'm not a China hater either.
Cool, then you probably aren't all that worried about the West restricting semiconductor technology.
The 'West' isn't restricting anything. The US isn't the West.
The reality is that the US has shot itself in the head with its I'll conceived and clumsy efforts which have only served to 'buy time'. Time which is growing shorter by the day because China has accelerated its plans across the board.
As of last night, the U.S. is certainly the leader of the West, and China is trying to figure out how to walk the tightrope between support of Russian and not worsening the situation with the U.S. and the West.
China may have accelerated its plans across the board, but I'm guessing that the West has as well. China is no friend to the West.
This paper argues that it is high time for the European Union to adopt a proactive policy of managing the risks of sensitive technology transfer to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). On the basis of a common under- standing of the challenges of transferring dual-use technology, economi- cally, politically and security-wise, the European Union can optimise ben- efits from opportunities available in the promising and technologically rapidly advancing Chinese market.
China’s rise as a high-tech military power is central to US security con- cerns, while a European debate on the implications of a rising China be- yond the economic sphere is conspicuous by its absence. Concerns about Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) have prevailed in debates on high tech- nology transfers to the PRC, with less attention being paid to the ‘dual use’ nature of many of these technologies that can be utilised in both ci- vilian and military applications. Unlike the United States, the European Union has no overview on the amount and generation of sensitive tech- nology exported to the PRC. European policy on dual-use technologies is fragmentary at best, while conflicting export regimes and shrinking investments in research and education throughout the European Union are putting the EU’s technological lead at risk. This pressure further in- creases the need to find outside revenues to fund innovation and the next generation of technology – which could come from the expanding Chi- nese market. Given the central role of dual-use technologies in today’s information-based warfare, the EU’s traditionally high level of technology exports to China has become a sensitive topic across the Atlantic in recent years, as was highlighted by the clash over the potential lifting of the EU arms embargo in 2004/2005. In sum, dual-use technology transfers touch on aspects of competitiveness and innovative capacity, market access and security concerns.
A proactive policy needs to be based on a common understanding of Chi- na’s potential as a military superpower and of its likely impact on the European Union, the EU’s policies and its relationship with the United States. A proactive policy needs to merge security, economic and compe- tition aspects in order to sustain and extend the EU’s global influence. This influence, especially in the context of the currently intensifying arms race in space, can only be materialised by a political vision, in-depth knowledge of the other parties and a sound base of innovative technol- ogy within the European Union. In a post-Cold War world, countries like China represent the greatest opportunities and risks at the same time. The United States has responded to this ambivalent situation by trying out a system of balancing opportunities against risks in its ‘Validated End User’ regulation, first introduced in June 2007. The EU needs to follow with a proactive policy of ‘managing risks’ that helps encourage China to become a ‘responsible stakeholder’ while enabling European countries to continuously benefit from China’s development and at the same time remain vigilant regarding the security-related consequences of China’s economic ascent.
You have your China bias blinding you. The EU has very little to defend in the Indo-Pacific, but the U.S. and its Allies have a great deal to defend, including maintaining free and open navigation for the rest of the world.
Funny thing, I'm betting that the EU gets religion very quickly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Are you serious?
One person's opinion from 2009 is all you could dig up?
And on top of that, her essay described exactly what I said. Including the US strong arm tactics:
"The debate about lifting the EU’s arms embargo on China in 2005 dem-
onstrated the different perceptions of China’s rise within the EU and
across the Atlantic. It triggered off acrimonious arguments between EU
Member States and the United States. Shortly after the invasion of Iraq,
the transatlantic rift had not been healed, there was a high level of distrust
and the dispute turned exceedingly bitter. Finally, following US pressure
on European business, the embargo was maintained"
And once again, if it weren't for the US strong-arming Holland, ASML would already have sold around five lithography machines to China. The CEO of ASML is actively making his voice heard on the subject.
The Dutch stance could change at any moment by the way.
The Dutch stance isn't going to change. They have plenty of sales to the West.
You still are unable to show me any evidence that China is even close to 7nm fabs, yet you keep stating that "they have a plan".
You also won't acknowledge that the U.S. and it's allies in the Indo-Pacific consider China's militarization a threat, and FFS, you won't even acknowledge that Russia is destabilizing the EU, as we speak.
I happen to think the Dutch stance will change. ASML is pushing from its side too.
Enough sales? Surely they would want more sales if they could and China is where it's at and there is nothing at an EU level to limit that (in spite of your claims).
ASML has put back release of its next generation machines by three years and China is trying to produce homegrown alternatives.
I wouldn't rule that out at all and they are researching non-silicon chips.
China and evidence of 7nm nodes? Why do you want evidence?
Isn't Geely already planning volume production of its 7nm SoC for the automotive market? Hasn't SMIC already taped out its 8nm production and prepared for volume fabrication later this year?
All I've said is that China has accelerated its plans, which they have.
I don't have to 'acknowledge' the obvious about who is seen as a threat and militarisation of this or that. I try to steer clear of those geo politics wherever possible.
Well if SMIC has taped out 8mm production, then obviously, they don't need ASML, do they, and yeah, I'm aware of tapeouts at 7nm, but that is a long way from actual production capacity.
What I still can't believe, after all of your time here, is that you don't have a bias for China; you barely even consider EU investments in silicon as important, which is something even I am solidly behind.
Given the war in Ukraine, and China's "modest" support of Russia's invasion, and the EU's concerns about human rights violations, I don't expect that the West is going to reduce restrictions on dual use technology to either county for the foreseeable future.
Geely suggested production for this year and this month confirmed it for Q3. I believe Baidu also has the second generation of their chip ready for proctuction later this year.
C5The extraterritorial sanctions did not 'kill' Huawei. Far from it. ForThey have done untold damage to US semiconductor interests.
At most they threw a spanner into the works of Huawei's 5G and Kirin roadmap in the i8 short term.
So short that Huawei has already gone on record to say they will be back in smartphone business next year and I'd wager without US technology in its processor supply chain.
They have also confirmed new silicon for this year but no one knows what it will be. Possibly 5G related.
Whatever advances Chinese companies make are sure to find their way to purchasers in Russia.
Huawei has veered full force into the automotive market with latest rumours pointing to a multi billion dollar investment from a major German car company for it to use Huawei's self driving technology.
Restricting Android use would simply put even more wind under the wings of HarmonyOS.
U.S. Semiconductor interests are not "damaged" by the sanctions of Huawei, nor have they done "untold damage" to U.S. Semiconductor Interests. You are free to link to show how that is true or not.
As for the link to VW considering Huawei self driving, the article was pretty vague about that actually happening, but sure, maybe VW does want to do that. Still, there are already better self driving systems available that VW could license, and given the fact that Tesla's FSD is decidedly L2 capable, there isn't much needed to surpass Tesla.
HiSilicon has no leading edge fab access, and the article that you linked to acknowledged that fact. You need to do better if you are going to convince anyone of a Huawei phone comeback with HiSilicon.
Also, HarmonyOS 2.0 is still primarily AndroidOS, but sure, maybe that will change in HarmonyOS 3.0.
I do hope that China does attempt to ship technology to Russia, so that the West can take even more stringent action to reduce or prevent that transfer.
That's billions of dollars annually just from Huawei. Would you really like to see all of Russia moving purchases into China?
What would that do to US interests?
The US is limping along with some revenues from Huawei through licencing. Once Huawei has re-jigged it's supply chain, it will simply erradicate those US companies from the chain and send those billions into the pockets of US competitors.
Those references to HiSilicon are not mine. They came directly from Huawei.
What action could the West take against China transferring its own technology to Russia for strategic and financial gain?
Thanks for posting a link from 18 months ago.
China has almost no production of computing devices, SOC's, CPU's, and GPU's at 10 nm, and none under that, so no, China isn't going to be able to provide those devices to Russia.
More to the point, I'm guessing that the EU is also going to tighten its policies on Semiconductor sales to Russia.
12,18,24... It doesn't matter how many months. The damage is done.
How long do you think it takes to build out US technology from a design?
How long do you think it takes to re-jig a supply chain?
You claimed there was no damage. Associations directly representing US semi conductor interests (and thousands of companies, disagree with you).
10nm? What are you talking about? Over 90% of chip production is at 14nm or higher. China is very much in the game and ramping capacity just like everyone else.
Ah! And the EU set out its technology independence roadmap before the Huawei issue. Yes, to cut back it's reliance on the US.
Can you see a pattern emerging here?
And by the way, Huawei has already locked down contracts with EU companies to offset some lost supplies from the US.
Funny, but you seem to be reiterating a fact that everyone in the industry is stating; that there needs to be more resilience in the industry by building fabs in strategic locations to prevent supply chain disasters. Of course China wants to make more devices at lager nodes, but those aren't the preferred devices for leading edge phones, missiles, and aircraft, hence why the U.S. lured TSMC to Arizona to build a 5nm fab, to assure the U.S. Military that they would have a supply just in case China invades Taiwan in the future.
Sorry but missiles and aircraft aren't using the latest nodes for mission critical equipment. They use mature nodes and mature SoCs with mature software support
Not even self driving cars truly need the latest process nodes.
Tell me what advantages a 5nm process would bring to a single use missile.
As I said, over 90% of chip manufacturing is on mature nodes and for very good reason.
I'm sure that Xiaomi would be thrilled to compete with a 4nm Qualcomm against a 14nm, or even 10nm, SOC in a Huawei smartphone, but for missiles, it actually pays to have faster, smaller, lighter, and more powerful SOC;s. That's a smarter missile, and an advantage.
But hey, I'm fine with the PLA having a disadvantage in air to air and anti-ship missiles when it comes to a confrontation over Taiwan.
Smaller process node has no impact on how 'smart' the SoC is and size and weight are irrevelant on a 700 kilo missile with a very low unit count in terms of manufacturing.
Would you want to bet on that in the Taiwan Strait?
Of course!
Depending on who you ask, some of the most advanced missiles are Russian or Chinese anyway.
Size and power consumption matter on small energy constrained devices. They are irrevelant in things like missiles and cars.
Cutting edge nodes are irrevelant for almost ALL uses in fact. Why spend so much more when 28nm can do the job perfectly?
Uhm, no, for the most part, though Russia and China like to show off their latest wares. The U.S. is more tight lipped about its capabilities.
There is truth that China has an advantage in IRBM's, but that will rapidly change as the U.S. and Russia dissolved the treaty that restricted those for them. China is unhappy about the turnabout. China also has some long range air to air missiles, which would threaten in theater air refueling, so the U.S. Navy would be more inclined to standoff a bit.
There is also a truth that China and Russia have been putting in major efforts in hypersonic weapons, but that isn't news. The U.S. is portrayed in the popular press as being "behind" in hypersonic weapons, but I don't expect there is much truth to that once you look at production of such.
Still, the U.S. leads in the quality and quantify of Stealth aircraft, and stealth anti-ship missiles, and those will be what decides the outcome of any invasion of Taiwan. Our partners in the Indo-Pacific are also buying F-35's, Typhoon's, Rafale's, and K-21's, and the B-21 Stealth Bomber is already in production, with the initial test aircraft expected to make flights this year;
But Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall on Dec. 9 suggested the Air Force may continue to play its cards on the Raider close to the vest, even into 2022. “You’re not going to get to see much of it,” Kendall said during an online Defense One panel. “We don’t want to give our enemies a head start on any of this. We’re going to acknowledge that we’re doing this, let the public be aware, let the Congress be aware of it. But we’re not going to say a lot more about what we’re doing in the public.”
The huge advantage for the U.S. and it allies worldwide, is that they are already quite aware of China's militarization, and now, are aware of Russia's ambitions, which likely won't end well, whatever the outcome in Ukraine.
The U.S. and its allies are the acknowledged leaders in aircraft and aircraft engines, and it's quite a massive advantage. It's also true that Australia has about the same GDP as Russia, and they will be allowing B-21's to fly out of bases near Darwin. At the same time, the Austraiian Government is working to reverse the lease of port facilities in Darwin to the Chinese, for obvious concerns of National Security.
What strikes me odd, is that you are so Pro China, that you barely acknowledge that Spain is a member of NATO, and the EU, and in theory, shares values that are closer to the U.S. than to Russia and China. Yet here you are as ever, pushing China's Huawei as if your life depended on it; it doesn't by the way.
None of that had anything to do with process nodes and I am not pro China. I'm not a China hater either.
Cool, then you probably aren't all that worried about the West restricting semiconductor technology.
The 'West' isn't restricting anything. The US isn't the West.
The reality is that the US has shot itself in the head with its I'll conceived and clumsy efforts which have only served to 'buy time'. Time which is growing shorter by the day because China has accelerated its plans across the board.
As of last night, the U.S. is certainly the leader of the West, and China is trying to figure out how to walk the tightrope between support of Russian and not worsening the situation with the U.S. and the West.
China may have accelerated its plans across the board, but I'm guessing that the West has as well. China is no friend to the West.
This paper argues that it is high time for the European Union to adopt a proactive policy of managing the risks of sensitive technology transfer to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). On the basis of a common under- standing of the challenges of transferring dual-use technology, economi- cally, politically and security-wise, the European Union can optimise ben- efits from opportunities available in the promising and technologically rapidly advancing Chinese market.
China’s rise as a high-tech military power is central to US security con- cerns, while a European debate on the implications of a rising China be- yond the economic sphere is conspicuous by its absence. Concerns about Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) have prevailed in debates on high tech- nology transfers to the PRC, with less attention being paid to the ‘dual use’ nature of many of these technologies that can be utilised in both ci- vilian and military applications. Unlike the United States, the European Union has no overview on the amount and generation of sensitive tech- nology exported to the PRC. European policy on dual-use technologies is fragmentary at best, while conflicting export regimes and shrinking investments in research and education throughout the European Union are putting the EU’s technological lead at risk. This pressure further in- creases the need to find outside revenues to fund innovation and the next generation of technology – which could come from the expanding Chi- nese market. Given the central role of dual-use technologies in today’s information-based warfare, the EU’s traditionally high level of technology exports to China has become a sensitive topic across the Atlantic in recent years, as was highlighted by the clash over the potential lifting of the EU arms embargo in 2004/2005. In sum, dual-use technology transfers touch on aspects of competitiveness and innovative capacity, market access and security concerns.
A proactive policy needs to be based on a common understanding of Chi- na’s potential as a military superpower and of its likely impact on the European Union, the EU’s policies and its relationship with the United States. A proactive policy needs to merge security, economic and compe- tition aspects in order to sustain and extend the EU’s global influence. This influence, especially in the context of the currently intensifying arms race in space, can only be materialised by a political vision, in-depth knowledge of the other parties and a sound base of innovative technol- ogy within the European Union. In a post-Cold War world, countries like China represent the greatest opportunities and risks at the same time. The United States has responded to this ambivalent situation by trying out a system of balancing opportunities against risks in its ‘Validated End User’ regulation, first introduced in June 2007. The EU needs to follow with a proactive policy of ‘managing risks’ that helps encourage China to become a ‘responsible stakeholder’ while enabling European countries to continuously benefit from China’s development and at the same time remain vigilant regarding the security-related consequences of China’s economic ascent.
You have your China bias blinding you. The EU has very little to defend in the Indo-Pacific, but the U.S. and its Allies have a great deal to defend, including maintaining free and open navigation for the rest of the world.
Funny thing, I'm betting that the EU gets religion very quickly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Are you serious?
One person's opinion from 2009 is all you could dig up?
And on top of that, her essay described exactly what I said. Including the US strong arm tactics:
"The debate about lifting the EU’s arms embargo on China in 2005 dem-
onstrated the different perceptions of China’s rise within the EU and
across the Atlantic. It triggered off acrimonious arguments between EU
Member States and the United States. Shortly after the invasion of Iraq,
the transatlantic rift had not been healed, there was a high level of distrust
and the dispute turned exceedingly bitter. Finally, following US pressure
on European business, the embargo was maintained"
And once again, if it weren't for the US strong-arming Holland, ASML would already have sold around five lithography machines to China. The CEO of ASML is actively making his voice heard on the subject.
The Dutch stance could change at any moment by the way.
The Dutch stance isn't going to change. They have plenty of sales to the West.
You still are unable to show me any evidence that China is even close to 7nm fabs, yet you keep stating that "they have a plan".
You also won't acknowledge that the U.S. and it's allies in the Indo-Pacific consider China's militarization a threat, and FFS, you won't even acknowledge that Russia is destabilizing the EU, as we speak.
I happen to think the Dutch stance will change. ASML is pushing from its side too.
Enough sales? Surely they would want more sales if they could and China is where it's at and there is nothing at an EU level to limit that (in spite of your claims).
ASML has put back release of its next generation machines by three years and China is trying to produce homegrown alternatives.
I wouldn't rule that out at all and they are researching non-silicon chips.
China and evidence of 7nm nodes? Why do you want evidence?
Isn't Geely already planning volume production of its 7nm SoC for the automotive market? Hasn't SMIC already taped out its 8nm production and prepared for volume fabrication later this year?
All I've said is that China has accelerated its plans, which they have.
I don't have to 'acknowledge' the obvious about who is seen as a threat and militarisation of this or that. I try to steer clear of those geo politics wherever possible.
Well if SMIC has taped out 8mm production, then obviously, they don't need ASML, do they, and yeah, I'm aware of tapeouts at 7nm, but that is a long way from actual production capacity.
What I still can't believe, after all of your time here, is that you don't have a bias for China; you barely even consider EU investments in silicon as important, which is something even I am solidly behind.
Given the war in Ukraine, and China's "modest" support of Russia's invasion, and the EU's concerns about human rights violations, I don't expect that the West is going to reduce restrictions on dual use technology to either county for the foreseeable future.
Geely suggested production for this year and this month confirmed it for Q3. I believe Baidu also has the second generation of their chip ready for proctuction later this year.
Great, then they don't need ASML, do they?
I am not privy to that information but why not?
It's like saying they don't need TSMC.
Having options is always good.
All I know is that China, as the world's largest purchaser of chips, is definitely working to gain production independence and the US will lose a huge amount of revenue and have Chinese competition on the world stage (but we all knew that from the get go - US action is all about protectionism and not national security).
Sh!t just got real. Putin apologists: you owe the world an apology.
They owe more than an apology, they owe penance...
I have to admit I underestimated Putin. Not because I thought he was a good guy but because I fell into the same mental trap Obama seems to have fallen into. Which is to assume a higher level of rationality among my fellow humans than actually exists. Putin exploited weaknesses in the US and our allies that I hadn’t appreciated were there, at least not to the extent that they are there. This created, at least in his mind, an opening. Up until this point he has played a weak hand very well.
But now comes the real test. If this invasion wakes enough people up, it could turn out to be the worst mistake Putin has ever made. It could also make the world better appreciate the threat posed by China. Ten years ago I had a much more optimistic view of China than I do now. Now I see a new Cold War.
That view is what creates war. A losing war. It is based on two misconceptions:
1) That we're the good guys and they're the bad guys. Once you go there, you can justify anything.
2) That we are all powerful and our opponents weak. That's a recipe for disaster.
It's best to stick to reality where both are true and neither is true.
It's that realization and understanding of reality that kept us from mutual annihilation throughout the cold war.
We are the good guys, and Putin is the bad guy. That's easy to figure out.
But of course, you and Donald are on the same page, right?
Given a choice between false equivalence and binary thinking, I’ll go with binary thinking.
But the truth is that most things in life are a matter of degree, and the degree really matters. The US is not all good, Putin is not all bad. But the US is far better.
When you make the infeasible perfect the enemy of the feasible good the worst will win. In Europe today, Putin is the worst.
Putin threatened use of Nuclear weapons if NATO, or any other party, intervenes on the side of Ukraine. That's a binary choice.
In the end, Ukraine and Russia are both fucked, just on a different timeframe.
Russian forces are attempting to take Chernobyl, and may have already damaged a containment building. Fuckers.
Agreed, Putin is forcing binary choices, and the choice has to be the end of Putin.
I saw that about Chernobyl. I have to admit I'm confused -- why the heck would they want Chernobyl?
It was us who forced Putin into those choices: He was clear: commit to keeping NATO out of Ukraine -- or else. We chose the "or else" part.
As for Chernobyl, the "free Ukraine" crowd needs something to rally around. Chernobyl is kind of a silly one, but its all the have -- so far. That will change.
Seriously George, this invasion has nothing to do with NATO, since Ukraine could have never joined as long as it had territory that is in dispute, which it has had since the invasion of Crimea in 2014. It has nothing to do with offensive missiles in bordering NATO countries, since those aren't under the prevue of NATO.
Why you won't acknowledge the Putin is wiling to destroy a nascent democracy, fighting like hell to stay that way, is beyond comprehension.
Oh wait! Putin wants it destroyed precisely because the Ukrainians voted to oust Putin's puppet, in a landslide election, and Putin wants to reinstall the puppet by decapitating Ukraine current government. The fact that U.S. Intelligence, and solid journalism was able to uncover Russia's false flag operations that were in place in an attempt to blame Ukraine for starting the war is undeniable.
Fuck, even Russian citizens are being arrested, and risking arrests for protesting the invasion, because they know that they will be the one's who will pay for this, in lives and their economy.
Again, I don't see any difference between you and Trumpers, though ultimately, even the GOP will come around to supporting Ukraine, likely when it is too late to save Ukraines democracy.
C5The extraterritorial sanctions did not 'kill' Huawei. Far from it. ForThey have done untold damage to US semiconductor interests.
At most they threw a spanner into the works of Huawei's 5G and Kirin roadmap in the i8 short term.
So short that Huawei has already gone on record to say they will be back in smartphone business next year and I'd wager without US technology in its processor supply chain.
They have also confirmed new silicon for this year but no one knows what it will be. Possibly 5G related.
Whatever advances Chinese companies make are sure to find their way to purchasers in Russia.
Huawei has veered full force into the automotive market with latest rumours pointing to a multi billion dollar investment from a major German car company for it to use Huawei's self driving technology.
Restricting Android use would simply put even more wind under the wings of HarmonyOS.
U.S. Semiconductor interests are not "damaged" by the sanctions of Huawei, nor have they done "untold damage" to U.S. Semiconductor Interests. You are free to link to show how that is true or not.
As for the link to VW considering Huawei self driving, the article was pretty vague about that actually happening, but sure, maybe VW does want to do that. Still, there are already better self driving systems available that VW could license, and given the fact that Tesla's FSD is decidedly L2 capable, there isn't much needed to surpass Tesla.
HiSilicon has no leading edge fab access, and the article that you linked to acknowledged that fact. You need to do better if you are going to convince anyone of a Huawei phone comeback with HiSilicon.
Also, HarmonyOS 2.0 is still primarily AndroidOS, but sure, maybe that will change in HarmonyOS 3.0.
I do hope that China does attempt to ship technology to Russia, so that the West can take even more stringent action to reduce or prevent that transfer.
That's billions of dollars annually just from Huawei. Would you really like to see all of Russia moving purchases into China?
What would that do to US interests?
The US is limping along with some revenues from Huawei through licencing. Once Huawei has re-jigged it's supply chain, it will simply erradicate those US companies from the chain and send those billions into the pockets of US competitors.
Those references to HiSilicon are not mine. They came directly from Huawei.
What action could the West take against China transferring its own technology to Russia for strategic and financial gain?
Thanks for posting a link from 18 months ago.
China has almost no production of computing devices, SOC's, CPU's, and GPU's at 10 nm, and none under that, so no, China isn't going to be able to provide those devices to Russia.
More to the point, I'm guessing that the EU is also going to tighten its policies on Semiconductor sales to Russia.
12,18,24... It doesn't matter how many months. The damage is done.
How long do you think it takes to build out US technology from a design?
How long do you think it takes to re-jig a supply chain?
You claimed there was no damage. Associations directly representing US semi conductor interests (and thousands of companies, disagree with you).
10nm? What are you talking about? Over 90% of chip production is at 14nm or higher. China is very much in the game and ramping capacity just like everyone else.
Ah! And the EU set out its technology independence roadmap before the Huawei issue. Yes, to cut back it's reliance on the US.
Can you see a pattern emerging here?
And by the way, Huawei has already locked down contracts with EU companies to offset some lost supplies from the US.
Funny, but you seem to be reiterating a fact that everyone in the industry is stating; that there needs to be more resilience in the industry by building fabs in strategic locations to prevent supply chain disasters. Of course China wants to make more devices at lager nodes, but those aren't the preferred devices for leading edge phones, missiles, and aircraft, hence why the U.S. lured TSMC to Arizona to build a 5nm fab, to assure the U.S. Military that they would have a supply just in case China invades Taiwan in the future.
Sorry but missiles and aircraft aren't using the latest nodes for mission critical equipment. They use mature nodes and mature SoCs with mature software support
Not even self driving cars truly need the latest process nodes.
Tell me what advantages a 5nm process would bring to a single use missile.
As I said, over 90% of chip manufacturing is on mature nodes and for very good reason.
I'm sure that Xiaomi would be thrilled to compete with a 4nm Qualcomm against a 14nm, or even 10nm, SOC in a Huawei smartphone, but for missiles, it actually pays to have faster, smaller, lighter, and more powerful SOC;s. That's a smarter missile, and an advantage.
But hey, I'm fine with the PLA having a disadvantage in air to air and anti-ship missiles when it comes to a confrontation over Taiwan.
Smaller process node has no impact on how 'smart' the SoC is and size and weight are irrevelant on a 700 kilo missile with a very low unit count in terms of manufacturing.
Would you want to bet on that in the Taiwan Strait?
Of course!
Depending on who you ask, some of the most advanced missiles are Russian or Chinese anyway.
Size and power consumption matter on small energy constrained devices. They are irrevelant in things like missiles and cars.
Cutting edge nodes are irrevelant for almost ALL uses in fact. Why spend so much more when 28nm can do the job perfectly?
Uhm, no, for the most part, though Russia and China like to show off their latest wares. The U.S. is more tight lipped about its capabilities.
There is truth that China has an advantage in IRBM's, but that will rapidly change as the U.S. and Russia dissolved the treaty that restricted those for them. China is unhappy about the turnabout. China also has some long range air to air missiles, which would threaten in theater air refueling, so the U.S. Navy would be more inclined to standoff a bit.
There is also a truth that China and Russia have been putting in major efforts in hypersonic weapons, but that isn't news. The U.S. is portrayed in the popular press as being "behind" in hypersonic weapons, but I don't expect there is much truth to that once you look at production of such.
Still, the U.S. leads in the quality and quantify of Stealth aircraft, and stealth anti-ship missiles, and those will be what decides the outcome of any invasion of Taiwan. Our partners in the Indo-Pacific are also buying F-35's, Typhoon's, Rafale's, and K-21's, and the B-21 Stealth Bomber is already in production, with the initial test aircraft expected to make flights this year;
But Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall on Dec. 9 suggested the Air Force may continue to play its cards on the Raider close to the vest, even into 2022. “You’re not going to get to see much of it,” Kendall said during an online Defense One panel. “We don’t want to give our enemies a head start on any of this. We’re going to acknowledge that we’re doing this, let the public be aware, let the Congress be aware of it. But we’re not going to say a lot more about what we’re doing in the public.”
The huge advantage for the U.S. and it allies worldwide, is that they are already quite aware of China's militarization, and now, are aware of Russia's ambitions, which likely won't end well, whatever the outcome in Ukraine.
The U.S. and its allies are the acknowledged leaders in aircraft and aircraft engines, and it's quite a massive advantage. It's also true that Australia has about the same GDP as Russia, and they will be allowing B-21's to fly out of bases near Darwin. At the same time, the Austraiian Government is working to reverse the lease of port facilities in Darwin to the Chinese, for obvious concerns of National Security.
What strikes me odd, is that you are so Pro China, that you barely acknowledge that Spain is a member of NATO, and the EU, and in theory, shares values that are closer to the U.S. than to Russia and China. Yet here you are as ever, pushing China's Huawei as if your life depended on it; it doesn't by the way.
None of that had anything to do with process nodes and I am not pro China. I'm not a China hater either.
Cool, then you probably aren't all that worried about the West restricting semiconductor technology.
That is a stupid policy. Where is Apple forty years ago? There is no Macintosh.
Mortorola 68000 rocessor made in U.S, as was the fab equipment.
Is ir really a "stupid policy" to prevent known adversaries from misusing Western technology for weapons?
No.
There was no such stupid policy forty years ago. Not even four years ago.
Maybe if China wasn't militarizing at the rate it is, the West wouldn't need the restrictions. In a way, Putin screwed it up for Xi Jinping; now everyone in the West will have wised up.
Nonsense! China is the largest nation in the world. If the US needs such strong military, China needs even more.
No, unlike the U.S. trying to police the world and, increasingly trying to impose its form of government on the world, China's military is designed as a regional force not global. They make that clear when they say that they will never again let a foreign power dominate them.
You are incorrect about China being only a regional power, and it is easy to see that with just a bit of research.
You may be speaking of their economic reach. I was speaking of the their military which has, so far, stayed regional.
Nope, I'm speaking of their global military buildup, which hasn't "stayed regional" by any stretch.
Global? In Europe? In North America? In South America? In Africa? You are stretching to a distant future that may never happen. Because the world itself is changing rapidly.
C5The extraterritorial sanctions did not 'kill' Huawei. Far from it. ForThey have done untold damage to US semiconductor interests.
At most they threw a spanner into the works of Huawei's 5G and Kirin roadmap in the i8 short term.
So short that Huawei has already gone on record to say they will be back in smartphone business next year and I'd wager without US technology in its processor supply chain.
They have also confirmed new silicon for this year but no one knows what it will be. Possibly 5G related.
Whatever advances Chinese companies make are sure to find their way to purchasers in Russia.
Huawei has veered full force into the automotive market with latest rumours pointing to a multi billion dollar investment from a major German car company for it to use Huawei's self driving technology.
Restricting Android use would simply put even more wind under the wings of HarmonyOS.
U.S. Semiconductor interests are not "damaged" by the sanctions of Huawei, nor have they done "untold damage" to U.S. Semiconductor Interests. You are free to link to show how that is true or not.
As for the link to VW considering Huawei self driving, the article was pretty vague about that actually happening, but sure, maybe VW does want to do that. Still, there are already better self driving systems available that VW could license, and given the fact that Tesla's FSD is decidedly L2 capable, there isn't much needed to surpass Tesla.
HiSilicon has no leading edge fab access, and the article that you linked to acknowledged that fact. You need to do better if you are going to convince anyone of a Huawei phone comeback with HiSilicon.
Also, HarmonyOS 2.0 is still primarily AndroidOS, but sure, maybe that will change in HarmonyOS 3.0.
I do hope that China does attempt to ship technology to Russia, so that the West can take even more stringent action to reduce or prevent that transfer.
That's billions of dollars annually just from Huawei. Would you really like to see all of Russia moving purchases into China?
What would that do to US interests?
The US is limping along with some revenues from Huawei through licencing. Once Huawei has re-jigged it's supply chain, it will simply erradicate those US companies from the chain and send those billions into the pockets of US competitors.
Those references to HiSilicon are not mine. They came directly from Huawei.
What action could the West take against China transferring its own technology to Russia for strategic and financial gain?
Thanks for posting a link from 18 months ago.
China has almost no production of computing devices, SOC's, CPU's, and GPU's at 10 nm, and none under that, so no, China isn't going to be able to provide those devices to Russia.
More to the point, I'm guessing that the EU is also going to tighten its policies on Semiconductor sales to Russia.
12,18,24... It doesn't matter how many months. The damage is done.
How long do you think it takes to build out US technology from a design?
How long do you think it takes to re-jig a supply chain?
You claimed there was no damage. Associations directly representing US semi conductor interests (and thousands of companies, disagree with you).
10nm? What are you talking about? Over 90% of chip production is at 14nm or higher. China is very much in the game and ramping capacity just like everyone else.
Ah! And the EU set out its technology independence roadmap before the Huawei issue. Yes, to cut back it's reliance on the US.
Can you see a pattern emerging here?
And by the way, Huawei has already locked down contracts with EU companies to offset some lost supplies from the US.
Funny, but you seem to be reiterating a fact that everyone in the industry is stating; that there needs to be more resilience in the industry by building fabs in strategic locations to prevent supply chain disasters. Of course China wants to make more devices at lager nodes, but those aren't the preferred devices for leading edge phones, missiles, and aircraft, hence why the U.S. lured TSMC to Arizona to build a 5nm fab, to assure the U.S. Military that they would have a supply just in case China invades Taiwan in the future.
Sorry but missiles and aircraft aren't using the latest nodes for mission critical equipment. They use mature nodes and mature SoCs with mature software support
Not even self driving cars truly need the latest process nodes.
Tell me what advantages a 5nm process would bring to a single use missile.
As I said, over 90% of chip manufacturing is on mature nodes and for very good reason.
I'm sure that Xiaomi would be thrilled to compete with a 4nm Qualcomm against a 14nm, or even 10nm, SOC in a Huawei smartphone, but for missiles, it actually pays to have faster, smaller, lighter, and more powerful SOC;s. That's a smarter missile, and an advantage.
But hey, I'm fine with the PLA having a disadvantage in air to air and anti-ship missiles when it comes to a confrontation over Taiwan.
Smaller process node has no impact on how 'smart' the SoC is and size and weight are irrevelant on a 700 kilo missile with a very low unit count in terms of manufacturing.
Would you want to bet on that in the Taiwan Strait?
Of course!
Depending on who you ask, some of the most advanced missiles are Russian or Chinese anyway.
Size and power consumption matter on small energy constrained devices. They are irrevelant in things like missiles and cars.
Cutting edge nodes are irrevelant for almost ALL uses in fact. Why spend so much more when 28nm can do the job perfectly?
Uhm, no, for the most part, though Russia and China like to show off their latest wares. The U.S. is more tight lipped about its capabilities.
There is truth that China has an advantage in IRBM's, but that will rapidly change as the U.S. and Russia dissolved the treaty that restricted those for them. China is unhappy about the turnabout. China also has some long range air to air missiles, which would threaten in theater air refueling, so the U.S. Navy would be more inclined to standoff a bit.
There is also a truth that China and Russia have been putting in major efforts in hypersonic weapons, but that isn't news. The U.S. is portrayed in the popular press as being "behind" in hypersonic weapons, but I don't expect there is much truth to that once you look at production of such.
Still, the U.S. leads in the quality and quantify of Stealth aircraft, and stealth anti-ship missiles, and those will be what decides the outcome of any invasion of Taiwan. Our partners in the Indo-Pacific are also buying F-35's, Typhoon's, Rafale's, and K-21's, and the B-21 Stealth Bomber is already in production, with the initial test aircraft expected to make flights this year;
But Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall on Dec. 9 suggested the Air Force may continue to play its cards on the Raider close to the vest, even into 2022. “You’re not going to get to see much of it,” Kendall said during an online Defense One panel. “We don’t want to give our enemies a head start on any of this. We’re going to acknowledge that we’re doing this, let the public be aware, let the Congress be aware of it. But we’re not going to say a lot more about what we’re doing in the public.”
The huge advantage for the U.S. and it allies worldwide, is that they are already quite aware of China's militarization, and now, are aware of Russia's ambitions, which likely won't end well, whatever the outcome in Ukraine.
The U.S. and its allies are the acknowledged leaders in aircraft and aircraft engines, and it's quite a massive advantage. It's also true that Australia has about the same GDP as Russia, and they will be allowing B-21's to fly out of bases near Darwin. At the same time, the Austraiian Government is working to reverse the lease of port facilities in Darwin to the Chinese, for obvious concerns of National Security.
What strikes me odd, is that you are so Pro China, that you barely acknowledge that Spain is a member of NATO, and the EU, and in theory, shares values that are closer to the U.S. than to Russia and China. Yet here you are as ever, pushing China's Huawei as if your life depended on it; it doesn't by the way.
None of that had anything to do with process nodes and I am not pro China. I'm not a China hater either.
Cool, then you probably aren't all that worried about the West restricting semiconductor technology.
The 'West' isn't restricting anything. The US isn't the West.
The reality is that the US has shot itself in the head with its I'll conceived and clumsy efforts which have only served to 'buy time'. Time which is growing shorter by the day because China has accelerated its plans across the board.
As of last night, the U.S. is certainly the leader of the West, and China is trying to figure out how to walk the tightrope between support of Russian and not worsening the situation with the U.S. and the West.
China may have accelerated its plans across the board, but I'm guessing that the West has as well. China is no friend to the West.
This paper argues that it is high time for the European Union to adopt a proactive policy of managing the risks of sensitive technology transfer to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). On the basis of a common under- standing of the challenges of transferring dual-use technology, economi- cally, politically and security-wise, the European Union can optimise ben- efits from opportunities available in the promising and technologically rapidly advancing Chinese market.
China’s rise as a high-tech military power is central to US security con- cerns, while a European debate on the implications of a rising China be- yond the economic sphere is conspicuous by its absence. Concerns about Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) have prevailed in debates on high tech- nology transfers to the PRC, with less attention being paid to the ‘dual use’ nature of many of these technologies that can be utilised in both ci- vilian and military applications. Unlike the United States, the European Union has no overview on the amount and generation of sensitive tech- nology exported to the PRC. European policy on dual-use technologies is fragmentary at best, while conflicting export regimes and shrinking investments in research and education throughout the European Union are putting the EU’s technological lead at risk. This pressure further in- creases the need to find outside revenues to fund innovation and the next generation of technology – which could come from the expanding Chi- nese market. Given the central role of dual-use technologies in today’s information-based warfare, the EU’s traditionally high level of technology exports to China has become a sensitive topic across the Atlantic in recent years, as was highlighted by the clash over the potential lifting of the EU arms embargo in 2004/2005. In sum, dual-use technology transfers touch on aspects of competitiveness and innovative capacity, market access and security concerns.
A proactive policy needs to be based on a common understanding of Chi- na’s potential as a military superpower and of its likely impact on the European Union, the EU’s policies and its relationship with the United States. A proactive policy needs to merge security, economic and compe- tition aspects in order to sustain and extend the EU’s global influence. This influence, especially in the context of the currently intensifying arms race in space, can only be materialised by a political vision, in-depth knowledge of the other parties and a sound base of innovative technol- ogy within the European Union. In a post-Cold War world, countries like China represent the greatest opportunities and risks at the same time. The United States has responded to this ambivalent situation by trying out a system of balancing opportunities against risks in its ‘Validated End User’ regulation, first introduced in June 2007. The EU needs to follow with a proactive policy of ‘managing risks’ that helps encourage China to become a ‘responsible stakeholder’ while enabling European countries to continuously benefit from China’s development and at the same time remain vigilant regarding the security-related consequences of China’s economic ascent.
You have your China bias blinding you. The EU has very little to defend in the Indo-Pacific, but the U.S. and its Allies have a great deal to defend, including maintaining free and open navigation for the rest of the world.
Funny thing, I'm betting that the EU gets religion very quickly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Are you serious?
One person's opinion from 2009 is all you could dig up?
And on top of that, her essay described exactly what I said. Including the US strong arm tactics:
"The debate about lifting the EU’s arms embargo on China in 2005 dem-
onstrated the different perceptions of China’s rise within the EU and
across the Atlantic. It triggered off acrimonious arguments between EU
Member States and the United States. Shortly after the invasion of Iraq,
the transatlantic rift had not been healed, there was a high level of distrust
and the dispute turned exceedingly bitter. Finally, following US pressure
on European business, the embargo was maintained"
And once again, if it weren't for the US strong-arming Holland, ASML would already have sold around five lithography machines to China. The CEO of ASML is actively making his voice heard on the subject.
The Dutch stance could change at any moment by the way.
The Dutch stance isn't going to change. They have plenty of sales to the West.
You still are unable to show me any evidence that China is even close to 7nm fabs, yet you keep stating that "they have a plan".
You also won't acknowledge that the U.S. and it's allies in the Indo-Pacific consider China's militarization a threat, and FFS, you won't even acknowledge that Russia is destabilizing the EU, as we speak.
I happen to think the Dutch stance will change. ASML is pushing from its side too.
Enough sales? Surely they would want more sales if they could and China is where it's at and there is nothing at an EU level to limit that (in spite of your claims).
ASML has put back release of its next generation machines by three years and China is trying to produce homegrown alternatives.
I wouldn't rule that out at all and they are researching non-silicon chips.
China and evidence of 7nm nodes? Why do you want evidence?
Isn't Geely already planning volume production of its 7nm SoC for the automotive market? Hasn't SMIC already taped out its 8nm production and prepared for volume fabrication later this year?
All I've said is that China has accelerated its plans, which they have.
I don't have to 'acknowledge' the obvious about who is seen as a threat and militarisation of this or that. I try to steer clear of those geo politics wherever possible.
Well if SMIC has taped out 8mm production, then obviously, they don't need ASML, do they, and yeah, I'm aware of tapeouts at 7nm, but that is a long way from actual production capacity.
What I still can't believe, after all of your time here, is that you don't have a bias for China; you barely even consider EU investments in silicon as important, which is something even I am solidly behind.
Given the war in Ukraine, and China's "modest" support of Russia's invasion, and the EU's concerns about human rights violations, I don't expect that the West is going to reduce restrictions on dual use technology to either county for the foreseeable future.
Geely suggested production for this year and this month confirmed it for Q3. I believe Baidu also has the second generation of their chip ready for proctuction later this year.
Great, then they don't need ASML, do they?
I am not privy to that information but why not?
It's like saying they don't need TSMC.
Having options is always good.
All I know is that China, as the world's largest purchaser of chips, is definitely working to gain production independence and the US will lose a huge amount of revenue and have Chinese competition on the world stage (but we all knew that from the get go - US action is all about protectionism and not national security).
The U.S. isn't going to lose a "hell of a lot of revenue" if the U.S. is building more leading edge fabs, and if the U.S. is also favoring friendly countries as partners.
For fuck's sake, Look at what is happening in Ukraine today, and tell me that leading edge semiconductor technology doesn't have usefulness in weapons, and therefor, isn't a National Security concern. Russia is killing a lot of civilians with dumb bombs and rockets, because they don't have the wealth, or desire to build, large quantities of precision weapons that the West routinely has available. Those weapons require a lot of technology, and why the fuck should we let authoritarians powers have that technology if we know that they will eventually use it against the U.S. or our partners.
But oh yeah, authoritarians will be forced to use dumb bombs that are known for collateral damages, and civilian deaths, because of EUV restrictions.
You are aware the the leader in semiconductors is Taiwan which is everyday, under threat from the PLA. Why should the West make it easy for China.
C5The extraterritorial sanctions did not 'kill' Huawei. Far from it. ForThey have done untold damage to US semiconductor interests.
At most they threw a spanner into the works of Huawei's 5G and Kirin roadmap in the i8 short term.
So short that Huawei has already gone on record to say they will be back in smartphone business next year and I'd wager without US technology in its processor supply chain.
They have also confirmed new silicon for this year but no one knows what it will be. Possibly 5G related.
Whatever advances Chinese companies make are sure to find their way to purchasers in Russia.
Huawei has veered full force into the automotive market with latest rumours pointing to a multi billion dollar investment from a major German car company for it to use Huawei's self driving technology.
Restricting Android use would simply put even more wind under the wings of HarmonyOS.
U.S. Semiconductor interests are not "damaged" by the sanctions of Huawei, nor have they done "untold damage" to U.S. Semiconductor Interests. You are free to link to show how that is true or not.
As for the link to VW considering Huawei self driving, the article was pretty vague about that actually happening, but sure, maybe VW does want to do that. Still, there are already better self driving systems available that VW could license, and given the fact that Tesla's FSD is decidedly L2 capable, there isn't much needed to surpass Tesla.
HiSilicon has no leading edge fab access, and the article that you linked to acknowledged that fact. You need to do better if you are going to convince anyone of a Huawei phone comeback with HiSilicon.
Also, HarmonyOS 2.0 is still primarily AndroidOS, but sure, maybe that will change in HarmonyOS 3.0.
I do hope that China does attempt to ship technology to Russia, so that the West can take even more stringent action to reduce or prevent that transfer.
That's billions of dollars annually just from Huawei. Would you really like to see all of Russia moving purchases into China?
What would that do to US interests?
The US is limping along with some revenues from Huawei through licencing. Once Huawei has re-jigged it's supply chain, it will simply erradicate those US companies from the chain and send those billions into the pockets of US competitors.
Those references to HiSilicon are not mine. They came directly from Huawei.
What action could the West take against China transferring its own technology to Russia for strategic and financial gain?
Thanks for posting a link from 18 months ago.
China has almost no production of computing devices, SOC's, CPU's, and GPU's at 10 nm, and none under that, so no, China isn't going to be able to provide those devices to Russia.
More to the point, I'm guessing that the EU is also going to tighten its policies on Semiconductor sales to Russia.
12,18,24... It doesn't matter how many months. The damage is done.
How long do you think it takes to build out US technology from a design?
How long do you think it takes to re-jig a supply chain?
You claimed there was no damage. Associations directly representing US semi conductor interests (and thousands of companies, disagree with you).
10nm? What are you talking about? Over 90% of chip production is at 14nm or higher. China is very much in the game and ramping capacity just like everyone else.
Ah! And the EU set out its technology independence roadmap before the Huawei issue. Yes, to cut back it's reliance on the US.
Can you see a pattern emerging here?
And by the way, Huawei has already locked down contracts with EU companies to offset some lost supplies from the US.
Funny, but you seem to be reiterating a fact that everyone in the industry is stating; that there needs to be more resilience in the industry by building fabs in strategic locations to prevent supply chain disasters. Of course China wants to make more devices at lager nodes, but those aren't the preferred devices for leading edge phones, missiles, and aircraft, hence why the U.S. lured TSMC to Arizona to build a 5nm fab, to assure the U.S. Military that they would have a supply just in case China invades Taiwan in the future.
Sorry but missiles and aircraft aren't using the latest nodes for mission critical equipment. They use mature nodes and mature SoCs with mature software support
Not even self driving cars truly need the latest process nodes.
Tell me what advantages a 5nm process would bring to a single use missile.
As I said, over 90% of chip manufacturing is on mature nodes and for very good reason.
I'm sure that Xiaomi would be thrilled to compete with a 4nm Qualcomm against a 14nm, or even 10nm, SOC in a Huawei smartphone, but for missiles, it actually pays to have faster, smaller, lighter, and more powerful SOC;s. That's a smarter missile, and an advantage.
But hey, I'm fine with the PLA having a disadvantage in air to air and anti-ship missiles when it comes to a confrontation over Taiwan.
Smaller process node has no impact on how 'smart' the SoC is and size and weight are irrevelant on a 700 kilo missile with a very low unit count in terms of manufacturing.
Would you want to bet on that in the Taiwan Strait?
Of course!
Depending on who you ask, some of the most advanced missiles are Russian or Chinese anyway.
Size and power consumption matter on small energy constrained devices. They are irrevelant in things like missiles and cars.
Cutting edge nodes are irrevelant for almost ALL uses in fact. Why spend so much more when 28nm can do the job perfectly?
Uhm, no, for the most part, though Russia and China like to show off their latest wares. The U.S. is more tight lipped about its capabilities.
There is truth that China has an advantage in IRBM's, but that will rapidly change as the U.S. and Russia dissolved the treaty that restricted those for them. China is unhappy about the turnabout. China also has some long range air to air missiles, which would threaten in theater air refueling, so the U.S. Navy would be more inclined to standoff a bit.
There is also a truth that China and Russia have been putting in major efforts in hypersonic weapons, but that isn't news. The U.S. is portrayed in the popular press as being "behind" in hypersonic weapons, but I don't expect there is much truth to that once you look at production of such.
Still, the U.S. leads in the quality and quantify of Stealth aircraft, and stealth anti-ship missiles, and those will be what decides the outcome of any invasion of Taiwan. Our partners in the Indo-Pacific are also buying F-35's, Typhoon's, Rafale's, and K-21's, and the B-21 Stealth Bomber is already in production, with the initial test aircraft expected to make flights this year;
But Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall on Dec. 9 suggested the Air Force may continue to play its cards on the Raider close to the vest, even into 2022. “You’re not going to get to see much of it,” Kendall said during an online Defense One panel. “We don’t want to give our enemies a head start on any of this. We’re going to acknowledge that we’re doing this, let the public be aware, let the Congress be aware of it. But we’re not going to say a lot more about what we’re doing in the public.”
The huge advantage for the U.S. and it allies worldwide, is that they are already quite aware of China's militarization, and now, are aware of Russia's ambitions, which likely won't end well, whatever the outcome in Ukraine.
The U.S. and its allies are the acknowledged leaders in aircraft and aircraft engines, and it's quite a massive advantage. It's also true that Australia has about the same GDP as Russia, and they will be allowing B-21's to fly out of bases near Darwin. At the same time, the Austraiian Government is working to reverse the lease of port facilities in Darwin to the Chinese, for obvious concerns of National Security.
What strikes me odd, is that you are so Pro China, that you barely acknowledge that Spain is a member of NATO, and the EU, and in theory, shares values that are closer to the U.S. than to Russia and China. Yet here you are as ever, pushing China's Huawei as if your life depended on it; it doesn't by the way.
None of that had anything to do with process nodes and I am not pro China. I'm not a China hater either.
Cool, then you probably aren't all that worried about the West restricting semiconductor technology.
The 'West' isn't restricting anything. The US isn't the West.
The reality is that the US has shot itself in the head with its I'll conceived and clumsy efforts which have only served to 'buy time'. Time which is growing shorter by the day because China has accelerated its plans across the board.
As of last night, the U.S. is certainly the leader of the West, and China is trying to figure out how to walk the tightrope between support of Russian and not worsening the situation with the U.S. and the West.
China may have accelerated its plans across the board, but I'm guessing that the West has as well. China is no friend to the West.
This paper argues that it is high time for the European Union to adopt a proactive policy of managing the risks of sensitive technology transfer to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). On the basis of a common under- standing of the challenges of transferring dual-use technology, economi- cally, politically and security-wise, the European Union can optimise ben- efits from opportunities available in the promising and technologically rapidly advancing Chinese market.
China’s rise as a high-tech military power is central to US security con- cerns, while a European debate on the implications of a rising China be- yond the economic sphere is conspicuous by its absence. Concerns about Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) have prevailed in debates on high tech- nology transfers to the PRC, with less attention being paid to the ‘dual use’ nature of many of these technologies that can be utilised in both ci- vilian and military applications. Unlike the United States, the European Union has no overview on the amount and generation of sensitive tech- nology exported to the PRC. European policy on dual-use technologies is fragmentary at best, while conflicting export regimes and shrinking investments in research and education throughout the European Union are putting the EU’s technological lead at risk. This pressure further in- creases the need to find outside revenues to fund innovation and the next generation of technology – which could come from the expanding Chi- nese market. Given the central role of dual-use technologies in today’s information-based warfare, the EU’s traditionally high level of technology exports to China has become a sensitive topic across the Atlantic in recent years, as was highlighted by the clash over the potential lifting of the EU arms embargo in 2004/2005. In sum, dual-use technology transfers touch on aspects of competitiveness and innovative capacity, market access and security concerns.
A proactive policy needs to be based on a common understanding of Chi- na’s potential as a military superpower and of its likely impact on the European Union, the EU’s policies and its relationship with the United States. A proactive policy needs to merge security, economic and compe- tition aspects in order to sustain and extend the EU’s global influence. This influence, especially in the context of the currently intensifying arms race in space, can only be materialised by a political vision, in-depth knowledge of the other parties and a sound base of innovative technol- ogy within the European Union. In a post-Cold War world, countries like China represent the greatest opportunities and risks at the same time. The United States has responded to this ambivalent situation by trying out a system of balancing opportunities against risks in its ‘Validated End User’ regulation, first introduced in June 2007. The EU needs to follow with a proactive policy of ‘managing risks’ that helps encourage China to become a ‘responsible stakeholder’ while enabling European countries to continuously benefit from China’s development and at the same time remain vigilant regarding the security-related consequences of China’s economic ascent.
You have your China bias blinding you. The EU has very little to defend in the Indo-Pacific, but the U.S. and its Allies have a great deal to defend, including maintaining free and open navigation for the rest of the world.
Funny thing, I'm betting that the EU gets religion very quickly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Are you serious?
One person's opinion from 2009 is all you could dig up?
And on top of that, her essay described exactly what I said. Including the US strong arm tactics:
"The debate about lifting the EU’s arms embargo on China in 2005 dem-
onstrated the different perceptions of China’s rise within the EU and
across the Atlantic. It triggered off acrimonious arguments between EU
Member States and the United States. Shortly after the invasion of Iraq,
the transatlantic rift had not been healed, there was a high level of distrust
and the dispute turned exceedingly bitter. Finally, following US pressure
on European business, the embargo was maintained"
And once again, if it weren't for the US strong-arming Holland, ASML would already have sold around five lithography machines to China. The CEO of ASML is actively making his voice heard on the subject.
The Dutch stance could change at any moment by the way.
The Dutch stance isn't going to change. They have plenty of sales to the West.
You still are unable to show me any evidence that China is even close to 7nm fabs, yet you keep stating that "they have a plan".
You also won't acknowledge that the U.S. and it's allies in the Indo-Pacific consider China's militarization a threat, and FFS, you won't even acknowledge that Russia is destabilizing the EU, as we speak.
I happen to think the Dutch stance will change. ASML is pushing from its side too.
Enough sales? Surely they would want more sales if they could and China is where it's at and there is nothing at an EU level to limit that (in spite of your claims).
ASML has put back release of its next generation machines by three years and China is trying to produce homegrown alternatives.
I wouldn't rule that out at all and they are researching non-silicon chips.
China and evidence of 7nm nodes? Why do you want evidence?
Isn't Geely already planning volume production of its 7nm SoC for the automotive market? Hasn't SMIC already taped out its 8nm production and prepared for volume fabrication later this year?
All I've said is that China has accelerated its plans, which they have.
I don't have to 'acknowledge' the obvious about who is seen as a threat and militarisation of this or that. I try to steer clear of those geo politics wherever possible.
Well if SMIC has taped out 8mm production, then obviously, they don't need ASML, do they, and yeah, I'm aware of tapeouts at 7nm, but that is a long way from actual production capacity.
What I still can't believe, after all of your time here, is that you don't have a bias for China; you barely even consider EU investments in silicon as important, which is something even I am solidly behind.
Given the war in Ukraine, and China's "modest" support of Russia's invasion, and the EU's concerns about human rights violations, I don't expect that the West is going to reduce restrictions on dual use technology to either county for the foreseeable future.
Geely suggested production for this year and this month confirmed it for Q3. I believe Baidu also has the second generation of their chip ready for proctuction later this year.
Great, then they don't need ASML, do they?
I am not privy to that information but why not?
It's like saying they don't need TSMC.
Having options is always good.
All I know is that China, as the world's largest purchaser of chips, is definitely working to gain production independence and the US will lose a huge amount of revenue and have Chinese competition on the world stage (but we all knew that from the get go - US action is all about protectionism and not national security).
The U.S. isn't going to lose a "hell of a lot of revenue" if the U.S. is building more leading edge fabs, and if the U.S. is also favoring friendly countries as partners.
For fuck's sake, Look at what is happening in Ukraine today, and tell me that leading edge semiconductor technology doesn't have usefulness in weapons, and therefor, isn't a National Security concern. Russia is killing a lot of civilians with dumb bombs and rockets, because they don't have the wealth, or desire to build, large quantities of precision weapons that the West routinely has available. Those weapons require a lot of technology, and why the fuck should we let authoritarians powers have that technology if we know that they will eventually use it against the U.S. or our partners.
But oh yeah, authoritarians will be forced to use dumb bombs that are known for collateral damages, and civilian deaths, because of EUV restrictions.
You are aware the the leader in semiconductors is Taiwan which is everyday, under threat from the PLA. Why should the West make it easy for China.
For fuck's sake, it looks like Ukraine will surrender quickly. We have to think what will it be one month after that. Stock markets have reversed its downward turning positive especially AAPLE. It looks like investors have realized all your fuss about Putin will be passing. LOL
C5The extraterritorial sanctions did not 'kill' Huawei. Far from it. ForThey have done untold damage to US semiconductor interests.
At most they threw a spanner into the works of Huawei's 5G and Kirin roadmap in the i8 short term.
So short that Huawei has already gone on record to say they will be back in smartphone business next year and I'd wager without US technology in its processor supply chain.
They have also confirmed new silicon for this year but no one knows what it will be. Possibly 5G related.
Whatever advances Chinese companies make are sure to find their way to purchasers in Russia.
Huawei has veered full force into the automotive market with latest rumours pointing to a multi billion dollar investment from a major German car company for it to use Huawei's self driving technology.
Restricting Android use would simply put even more wind under the wings of HarmonyOS.
U.S. Semiconductor interests are not "damaged" by the sanctions of Huawei, nor have they done "untold damage" to U.S. Semiconductor Interests. You are free to link to show how that is true or not.
As for the link to VW considering Huawei self driving, the article was pretty vague about that actually happening, but sure, maybe VW does want to do that. Still, there are already better self driving systems available that VW could license, and given the fact that Tesla's FSD is decidedly L2 capable, there isn't much needed to surpass Tesla.
HiSilicon has no leading edge fab access, and the article that you linked to acknowledged that fact. You need to do better if you are going to convince anyone of a Huawei phone comeback with HiSilicon.
Also, HarmonyOS 2.0 is still primarily AndroidOS, but sure, maybe that will change in HarmonyOS 3.0.
I do hope that China does attempt to ship technology to Russia, so that the West can take even more stringent action to reduce or prevent that transfer.
That's billions of dollars annually just from Huawei. Would you really like to see all of Russia moving purchases into China?
What would that do to US interests?
The US is limping along with some revenues from Huawei through licencing. Once Huawei has re-jigged it's supply chain, it will simply erradicate those US companies from the chain and send those billions into the pockets of US competitors.
Those references to HiSilicon are not mine. They came directly from Huawei.
What action could the West take against China transferring its own technology to Russia for strategic and financial gain?
Thanks for posting a link from 18 months ago.
China has almost no production of computing devices, SOC's, CPU's, and GPU's at 10 nm, and none under that, so no, China isn't going to be able to provide those devices to Russia.
More to the point, I'm guessing that the EU is also going to tighten its policies on Semiconductor sales to Russia.
12,18,24... It doesn't matter how many months. The damage is done.
How long do you think it takes to build out US technology from a design?
How long do you think it takes to re-jig a supply chain?
You claimed there was no damage. Associations directly representing US semi conductor interests (and thousands of companies, disagree with you).
10nm? What are you talking about? Over 90% of chip production is at 14nm or higher. China is very much in the game and ramping capacity just like everyone else.
Ah! And the EU set out its technology independence roadmap before the Huawei issue. Yes, to cut back it's reliance on the US.
Can you see a pattern emerging here?
And by the way, Huawei has already locked down contracts with EU companies to offset some lost supplies from the US.
Funny, but you seem to be reiterating a fact that everyone in the industry is stating; that there needs to be more resilience in the industry by building fabs in strategic locations to prevent supply chain disasters. Of course China wants to make more devices at lager nodes, but those aren't the preferred devices for leading edge phones, missiles, and aircraft, hence why the U.S. lured TSMC to Arizona to build a 5nm fab, to assure the U.S. Military that they would have a supply just in case China invades Taiwan in the future.
Sorry but missiles and aircraft aren't using the latest nodes for mission critical equipment. They use mature nodes and mature SoCs with mature software support
Not even self driving cars truly need the latest process nodes.
Tell me what advantages a 5nm process would bring to a single use missile.
As I said, over 90% of chip manufacturing is on mature nodes and for very good reason.
I'm sure that Xiaomi would be thrilled to compete with a 4nm Qualcomm against a 14nm, or even 10nm, SOC in a Huawei smartphone, but for missiles, it actually pays to have faster, smaller, lighter, and more powerful SOC;s. That's a smarter missile, and an advantage.
But hey, I'm fine with the PLA having a disadvantage in air to air and anti-ship missiles when it comes to a confrontation over Taiwan.
Smaller process node has no impact on how 'smart' the SoC is and size and weight are irrevelant on a 700 kilo missile with a very low unit count in terms of manufacturing.
Would you want to bet on that in the Taiwan Strait?
Of course!
Depending on who you ask, some of the most advanced missiles are Russian or Chinese anyway.
Size and power consumption matter on small energy constrained devices. They are irrevelant in things like missiles and cars.
Cutting edge nodes are irrevelant for almost ALL uses in fact. Why spend so much more when 28nm can do the job perfectly?
Uhm, no, for the most part, though Russia and China like to show off their latest wares. The U.S. is more tight lipped about its capabilities.
There is truth that China has an advantage in IRBM's, but that will rapidly change as the U.S. and Russia dissolved the treaty that restricted those for them. China is unhappy about the turnabout. China also has some long range air to air missiles, which would threaten in theater air refueling, so the U.S. Navy would be more inclined to standoff a bit.
There is also a truth that China and Russia have been putting in major efforts in hypersonic weapons, but that isn't news. The U.S. is portrayed in the popular press as being "behind" in hypersonic weapons, but I don't expect there is much truth to that once you look at production of such.
Still, the U.S. leads in the quality and quantify of Stealth aircraft, and stealth anti-ship missiles, and those will be what decides the outcome of any invasion of Taiwan. Our partners in the Indo-Pacific are also buying F-35's, Typhoon's, Rafale's, and K-21's, and the B-21 Stealth Bomber is already in production, with the initial test aircraft expected to make flights this year;
But Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall on Dec. 9 suggested the Air Force may continue to play its cards on the Raider close to the vest, even into 2022. “You’re not going to get to see much of it,” Kendall said during an online Defense One panel. “We don’t want to give our enemies a head start on any of this. We’re going to acknowledge that we’re doing this, let the public be aware, let the Congress be aware of it. But we’re not going to say a lot more about what we’re doing in the public.”
The huge advantage for the U.S. and it allies worldwide, is that they are already quite aware of China's militarization, and now, are aware of Russia's ambitions, which likely won't end well, whatever the outcome in Ukraine.
The U.S. and its allies are the acknowledged leaders in aircraft and aircraft engines, and it's quite a massive advantage. It's also true that Australia has about the same GDP as Russia, and they will be allowing B-21's to fly out of bases near Darwin. At the same time, the Austraiian Government is working to reverse the lease of port facilities in Darwin to the Chinese, for obvious concerns of National Security.
What strikes me odd, is that you are so Pro China, that you barely acknowledge that Spain is a member of NATO, and the EU, and in theory, shares values that are closer to the U.S. than to Russia and China. Yet here you are as ever, pushing China's Huawei as if your life depended on it; it doesn't by the way.
None of that had anything to do with process nodes and I am not pro China. I'm not a China hater either.
Cool, then you probably aren't all that worried about the West restricting semiconductor technology.
The 'West' isn't restricting anything. The US isn't the West.
The reality is that the US has shot itself in the head with its I'll conceived and clumsy efforts which have only served to 'buy time'. Time which is growing shorter by the day because China has accelerated its plans across the board.
As of last night, the U.S. is certainly the leader of the West, and China is trying to figure out how to walk the tightrope between support of Russian and not worsening the situation with the U.S. and the West.
China may have accelerated its plans across the board, but I'm guessing that the West has as well. China is no friend to the West.
This paper argues that it is high time for the European Union to adopt a proactive policy of managing the risks of sensitive technology transfer to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). On the basis of a common under- standing of the challenges of transferring dual-use technology, economi- cally, politically and security-wise, the European Union can optimise ben- efits from opportunities available in the promising and technologically rapidly advancing Chinese market.
China’s rise as a high-tech military power is central to US security con- cerns, while a European debate on the implications of a rising China be- yond the economic sphere is conspicuous by its absence. Concerns about Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) have prevailed in debates on high tech- nology transfers to the PRC, with less attention being paid to the ‘dual use’ nature of many of these technologies that can be utilised in both ci- vilian and military applications. Unlike the United States, the European Union has no overview on the amount and generation of sensitive tech- nology exported to the PRC. European policy on dual-use technologies is fragmentary at best, while conflicting export regimes and shrinking investments in research and education throughout the European Union are putting the EU’s technological lead at risk. This pressure further in- creases the need to find outside revenues to fund innovation and the next generation of technology – which could come from the expanding Chi- nese market. Given the central role of dual-use technologies in today’s information-based warfare, the EU’s traditionally high level of technology exports to China has become a sensitive topic across the Atlantic in recent years, as was highlighted by the clash over the potential lifting of the EU arms embargo in 2004/2005. In sum, dual-use technology transfers touch on aspects of competitiveness and innovative capacity, market access and security concerns.
A proactive policy needs to be based on a common understanding of Chi- na’s potential as a military superpower and of its likely impact on the European Union, the EU’s policies and its relationship with the United States. A proactive policy needs to merge security, economic and compe- tition aspects in order to sustain and extend the EU’s global influence. This influence, especially in the context of the currently intensifying arms race in space, can only be materialised by a political vision, in-depth knowledge of the other parties and a sound base of innovative technol- ogy within the European Union. In a post-Cold War world, countries like China represent the greatest opportunities and risks at the same time. The United States has responded to this ambivalent situation by trying out a system of balancing opportunities against risks in its ‘Validated End User’ regulation, first introduced in June 2007. The EU needs to follow with a proactive policy of ‘managing risks’ that helps encourage China to become a ‘responsible stakeholder’ while enabling European countries to continuously benefit from China’s development and at the same time remain vigilant regarding the security-related consequences of China’s economic ascent.
You have your China bias blinding you. The EU has very little to defend in the Indo-Pacific, but the U.S. and its Allies have a great deal to defend, including maintaining free and open navigation for the rest of the world.
Funny thing, I'm betting that the EU gets religion very quickly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Are you serious?
One person's opinion from 2009 is all you could dig up?
And on top of that, her essay described exactly what I said. Including the US strong arm tactics:
"The debate about lifting the EU’s arms embargo on China in 2005 dem-
onstrated the different perceptions of China’s rise within the EU and
across the Atlantic. It triggered off acrimonious arguments between EU
Member States and the United States. Shortly after the invasion of Iraq,
the transatlantic rift had not been healed, there was a high level of distrust
and the dispute turned exceedingly bitter. Finally, following US pressure
on European business, the embargo was maintained"
And once again, if it weren't for the US strong-arming Holland, ASML would already have sold around five lithography machines to China. The CEO of ASML is actively making his voice heard on the subject.
The Dutch stance could change at any moment by the way.
The Dutch stance isn't going to change. They have plenty of sales to the West.
You still are unable to show me any evidence that China is even close to 7nm fabs, yet you keep stating that "they have a plan".
You also won't acknowledge that the U.S. and it's allies in the Indo-Pacific consider China's militarization a threat, and FFS, you won't even acknowledge that Russia is destabilizing the EU, as we speak.
I happen to think the Dutch stance will change. ASML is pushing from its side too.
Enough sales? Surely they would want more sales if they could and China is where it's at and there is nothing at an EU level to limit that (in spite of your claims).
ASML has put back release of its next generation machines by three years and China is trying to produce homegrown alternatives.
I wouldn't rule that out at all and they are researching non-silicon chips.
China and evidence of 7nm nodes? Why do you want evidence?
Isn't Geely already planning volume production of its 7nm SoC for the automotive market? Hasn't SMIC already taped out its 8nm production and prepared for volume fabrication later this year?
All I've said is that China has accelerated its plans, which they have.
I don't have to 'acknowledge' the obvious about who is seen as a threat and militarisation of this or that. I try to steer clear of those geo politics wherever possible.
Well if SMIC has taped out 8mm production, then obviously, they don't need ASML, do they, and yeah, I'm aware of tapeouts at 7nm, but that is a long way from actual production capacity.
What I still can't believe, after all of your time here, is that you don't have a bias for China; you barely even consider EU investments in silicon as important, which is something even I am solidly behind.
Given the war in Ukraine, and China's "modest" support of Russia's invasion, and the EU's concerns about human rights violations, I don't expect that the West is going to reduce restrictions on dual use technology to either county for the foreseeable future.
Geely suggested production for this year and this month confirmed it for Q3. I believe Baidu also has the second generation of their chip ready for proctuction later this year.
Great, then they don't need ASML, do they?
I am not privy to that information but why not?
It's like saying they don't need TSMC.
Having options is always good.
All I know is that China, as the world's largest purchaser of chips, is definitely working to gain production independence and the US will lose a huge amount of revenue and have Chinese competition on the world stage (but we all knew that from the get go - US action is all about protectionism and not national security).
The U.S. isn't going to lose a "hell of a lot of revenue" if the U.S. is building more leading edge fabs, and if the U.S. is also favoring friendly countries as partners.
For fuck's sake, Look at what is happening in Ukraine today, and tell me that leading edge semiconductor technology doesn't have usefulness in weapons, and therefor, isn't a National Security concern. Russia is killing a lot of civilians with dumb bombs and rockets, because they don't have the wealth, or desire to build, large quantities of precision weapons that the West routinely has available. Those weapons require a lot of technology, and why the fuck should we let authoritarians powers have that technology if we know that they will eventually use it against the U.S. or our partners.
But oh yeah, authoritarians will be forced to use dumb bombs that are known for collateral damages, and civilian deaths, because of EUV restrictions.
You are aware the the leader in semiconductors is Taiwan which is everyday, under threat from the PLA. Why should the West make it easy for China.
For fuck's sake, it looks like Ukraine will surrender quickly. We have to think what will it be one month after that. Stock markets have reversed its downward turning positive especially AAPLE. It looks like investors have realized all your fuss about Putin will be passing. LOL
Yeah, what will come after that. Massive sanctions against Russia, and China buying Russian oil. China is not a friend to Ukraine, whom they buy agricultural products from, nor to the West.
C5The extraterritorial sanctions did not 'kill' Huawei. Far from it. ForThey have done untold damage to US semiconductor interests.
At most they threw a spanner into the works of Huawei's 5G and Kirin roadmap in the i8 short term.
So short that Huawei has already gone on record to say they will be back in smartphone business next year and I'd wager without US technology in its processor supply chain.
They have also confirmed new silicon for this year but no one knows what it will be. Possibly 5G related.
Whatever advances Chinese companies make are sure to find their way to purchasers in Russia.
Huawei has veered full force into the automotive market with latest rumours pointing to a multi billion dollar investment from a major German car company for it to use Huawei's self driving technology.
Restricting Android use would simply put even more wind under the wings of HarmonyOS.
U.S. Semiconductor interests are not "damaged" by the sanctions of Huawei, nor have they done "untold damage" to U.S. Semiconductor Interests. You are free to link to show how that is true or not.
As for the link to VW considering Huawei self driving, the article was pretty vague about that actually happening, but sure, maybe VW does want to do that. Still, there are already better self driving systems available that VW could license, and given the fact that Tesla's FSD is decidedly L2 capable, there isn't much needed to surpass Tesla.
HiSilicon has no leading edge fab access, and the article that you linked to acknowledged that fact. You need to do better if you are going to convince anyone of a Huawei phone comeback with HiSilicon.
Also, HarmonyOS 2.0 is still primarily AndroidOS, but sure, maybe that will change in HarmonyOS 3.0.
I do hope that China does attempt to ship technology to Russia, so that the West can take even more stringent action to reduce or prevent that transfer.
That's billions of dollars annually just from Huawei. Would you really like to see all of Russia moving purchases into China?
What would that do to US interests?
The US is limping along with some revenues from Huawei through licencing. Once Huawei has re-jigged it's supply chain, it will simply erradicate those US companies from the chain and send those billions into the pockets of US competitors.
Those references to HiSilicon are not mine. They came directly from Huawei.
What action could the West take against China transferring its own technology to Russia for strategic and financial gain?
Thanks for posting a link from 18 months ago.
China has almost no production of computing devices, SOC's, CPU's, and GPU's at 10 nm, and none under that, so no, China isn't going to be able to provide those devices to Russia.
More to the point, I'm guessing that the EU is also going to tighten its policies on Semiconductor sales to Russia.
12,18,24... It doesn't matter how many months. The damage is done.
How long do you think it takes to build out US technology from a design?
How long do you think it takes to re-jig a supply chain?
You claimed there was no damage. Associations directly representing US semi conductor interests (and thousands of companies, disagree with you).
10nm? What are you talking about? Over 90% of chip production is at 14nm or higher. China is very much in the game and ramping capacity just like everyone else.
Ah! And the EU set out its technology independence roadmap before the Huawei issue. Yes, to cut back it's reliance on the US.
Can you see a pattern emerging here?
And by the way, Huawei has already locked down contracts with EU companies to offset some lost supplies from the US.
Funny, but you seem to be reiterating a fact that everyone in the industry is stating; that there needs to be more resilience in the industry by building fabs in strategic locations to prevent supply chain disasters. Of course China wants to make more devices at lager nodes, but those aren't the preferred devices for leading edge phones, missiles, and aircraft, hence why the U.S. lured TSMC to Arizona to build a 5nm fab, to assure the U.S. Military that they would have a supply just in case China invades Taiwan in the future.
Sorry but missiles and aircraft aren't using the latest nodes for mission critical equipment. They use mature nodes and mature SoCs with mature software support
Not even self driving cars truly need the latest process nodes.
Tell me what advantages a 5nm process would bring to a single use missile.
As I said, over 90% of chip manufacturing is on mature nodes and for very good reason.
I'm sure that Xiaomi would be thrilled to compete with a 4nm Qualcomm against a 14nm, or even 10nm, SOC in a Huawei smartphone, but for missiles, it actually pays to have faster, smaller, lighter, and more powerful SOC;s. That's a smarter missile, and an advantage.
But hey, I'm fine with the PLA having a disadvantage in air to air and anti-ship missiles when it comes to a confrontation over Taiwan.
Smaller process node has no impact on how 'smart' the SoC is and size and weight are irrevelant on a 700 kilo missile with a very low unit count in terms of manufacturing.
Would you want to bet on that in the Taiwan Strait?
Of course!
Depending on who you ask, some of the most advanced missiles are Russian or Chinese anyway.
Size and power consumption matter on small energy constrained devices. They are irrevelant in things like missiles and cars.
Cutting edge nodes are irrevelant for almost ALL uses in fact. Why spend so much more when 28nm can do the job perfectly?
Uhm, no, for the most part, though Russia and China like to show off their latest wares. The U.S. is more tight lipped about its capabilities.
There is truth that China has an advantage in IRBM's, but that will rapidly change as the U.S. and Russia dissolved the treaty that restricted those for them. China is unhappy about the turnabout. China also has some long range air to air missiles, which would threaten in theater air refueling, so the U.S. Navy would be more inclined to standoff a bit.
There is also a truth that China and Russia have been putting in major efforts in hypersonic weapons, but that isn't news. The U.S. is portrayed in the popular press as being "behind" in hypersonic weapons, but I don't expect there is much truth to that once you look at production of such.
Still, the U.S. leads in the quality and quantify of Stealth aircraft, and stealth anti-ship missiles, and those will be what decides the outcome of any invasion of Taiwan. Our partners in the Indo-Pacific are also buying F-35's, Typhoon's, Rafale's, and K-21's, and the B-21 Stealth Bomber is already in production, with the initial test aircraft expected to make flights this year;
But Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall on Dec. 9 suggested the Air Force may continue to play its cards on the Raider close to the vest, even into 2022. “You’re not going to get to see much of it,” Kendall said during an online Defense One panel. “We don’t want to give our enemies a head start on any of this. We’re going to acknowledge that we’re doing this, let the public be aware, let the Congress be aware of it. But we’re not going to say a lot more about what we’re doing in the public.”
The huge advantage for the U.S. and it allies worldwide, is that they are already quite aware of China's militarization, and now, are aware of Russia's ambitions, which likely won't end well, whatever the outcome in Ukraine.
The U.S. and its allies are the acknowledged leaders in aircraft and aircraft engines, and it's quite a massive advantage. It's also true that Australia has about the same GDP as Russia, and they will be allowing B-21's to fly out of bases near Darwin. At the same time, the Austraiian Government is working to reverse the lease of port facilities in Darwin to the Chinese, for obvious concerns of National Security.
What strikes me odd, is that you are so Pro China, that you barely acknowledge that Spain is a member of NATO, and the EU, and in theory, shares values that are closer to the U.S. than to Russia and China. Yet here you are as ever, pushing China's Huawei as if your life depended on it; it doesn't by the way.
None of that had anything to do with process nodes and I am not pro China. I'm not a China hater either.
Cool, then you probably aren't all that worried about the West restricting semiconductor technology.
The 'West' isn't restricting anything. The US isn't the West.
The reality is that the US has shot itself in the head with its I'll conceived and clumsy efforts which have only served to 'buy time'. Time which is growing shorter by the day because China has accelerated its plans across the board.
As of last night, the U.S. is certainly the leader of the West, and China is trying to figure out how to walk the tightrope between support of Russian and not worsening the situation with the U.S. and the West.
China may have accelerated its plans across the board, but I'm guessing that the West has as well. China is no friend to the West.
This paper argues that it is high time for the European Union to adopt a proactive policy of managing the risks of sensitive technology transfer to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). On the basis of a common under- standing of the challenges of transferring dual-use technology, economi- cally, politically and security-wise, the European Union can optimise ben- efits from opportunities available in the promising and technologically rapidly advancing Chinese market.
China’s rise as a high-tech military power is central to US security con- cerns, while a European debate on the implications of a rising China be- yond the economic sphere is conspicuous by its absence. Concerns about Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) have prevailed in debates on high tech- nology transfers to the PRC, with less attention being paid to the ‘dual use’ nature of many of these technologies that can be utilised in both ci- vilian and military applications. Unlike the United States, the European Union has no overview on the amount and generation of sensitive tech- nology exported to the PRC. European policy on dual-use technologies is fragmentary at best, while conflicting export regimes and shrinking investments in research and education throughout the European Union are putting the EU’s technological lead at risk. This pressure further in- creases the need to find outside revenues to fund innovation and the next generation of technology – which could come from the expanding Chi- nese market. Given the central role of dual-use technologies in today’s information-based warfare, the EU’s traditionally high level of technology exports to China has become a sensitive topic across the Atlantic in recent years, as was highlighted by the clash over the potential lifting of the EU arms embargo in 2004/2005. In sum, dual-use technology transfers touch on aspects of competitiveness and innovative capacity, market access and security concerns.
A proactive policy needs to be based on a common understanding of Chi- na’s potential as a military superpower and of its likely impact on the European Union, the EU’s policies and its relationship with the United States. A proactive policy needs to merge security, economic and compe- tition aspects in order to sustain and extend the EU’s global influence. This influence, especially in the context of the currently intensifying arms race in space, can only be materialised by a political vision, in-depth knowledge of the other parties and a sound base of innovative technol- ogy within the European Union. In a post-Cold War world, countries like China represent the greatest opportunities and risks at the same time. The United States has responded to this ambivalent situation by trying out a system of balancing opportunities against risks in its ‘Validated End User’ regulation, first introduced in June 2007. The EU needs to follow with a proactive policy of ‘managing risks’ that helps encourage China to become a ‘responsible stakeholder’ while enabling European countries to continuously benefit from China’s development and at the same time remain vigilant regarding the security-related consequences of China’s economic ascent.
You have your China bias blinding you. The EU has very little to defend in the Indo-Pacific, but the U.S. and its Allies have a great deal to defend, including maintaining free and open navigation for the rest of the world.
Funny thing, I'm betting that the EU gets religion very quickly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Are you serious?
One person's opinion from 2009 is all you could dig up?
And on top of that, her essay described exactly what I said. Including the US strong arm tactics:
"The debate about lifting the EU’s arms embargo on China in 2005 dem-
onstrated the different perceptions of China’s rise within the EU and
across the Atlantic. It triggered off acrimonious arguments between EU
Member States and the United States. Shortly after the invasion of Iraq,
the transatlantic rift had not been healed, there was a high level of distrust
and the dispute turned exceedingly bitter. Finally, following US pressure
on European business, the embargo was maintained"
And once again, if it weren't for the US strong-arming Holland, ASML would already have sold around five lithography machines to China. The CEO of ASML is actively making his voice heard on the subject.
The Dutch stance could change at any moment by the way.
The Dutch stance isn't going to change. They have plenty of sales to the West.
You still are unable to show me any evidence that China is even close to 7nm fabs, yet you keep stating that "they have a plan".
You also won't acknowledge that the U.S. and it's allies in the Indo-Pacific consider China's militarization a threat, and FFS, you won't even acknowledge that Russia is destabilizing the EU, as we speak.
I happen to think the Dutch stance will change. ASML is pushing from its side too.
Enough sales? Surely they would want more sales if they could and China is where it's at and there is nothing at an EU level to limit that (in spite of your claims).
ASML has put back release of its next generation machines by three years and China is trying to produce homegrown alternatives.
I wouldn't rule that out at all and they are researching non-silicon chips.
China and evidence of 7nm nodes? Why do you want evidence?
Isn't Geely already planning volume production of its 7nm SoC for the automotive market? Hasn't SMIC already taped out its 8nm production and prepared for volume fabrication later this year?
All I've said is that China has accelerated its plans, which they have.
I don't have to 'acknowledge' the obvious about who is seen as a threat and militarisation of this or that. I try to steer clear of those geo politics wherever possible.
Well if SMIC has taped out 8mm production, then obviously, they don't need ASML, do they, and yeah, I'm aware of tapeouts at 7nm, but that is a long way from actual production capacity.
What I still can't believe, after all of your time here, is that you don't have a bias for China; you barely even consider EU investments in silicon as important, which is something even I am solidly behind.
Given the war in Ukraine, and China's "modest" support of Russia's invasion, and the EU's concerns about human rights violations, I don't expect that the West is going to reduce restrictions on dual use technology to either county for the foreseeable future.
Geely suggested production for this year and this month confirmed it for Q3. I believe Baidu also has the second generation of their chip ready for proctuction later this year.
Great, then they don't need ASML, do they?
I am not privy to that information but why not?
It's like saying they don't need TSMC.
Having options is always good.
All I know is that China, as the world's largest purchaser of chips, is definitely working to gain production independence and the US will lose a huge amount of revenue and have Chinese competition on the world stage (but we all knew that from the get go - US action is all about protectionism and not national security).
The U.S. isn't going to lose a "hell of a lot of revenue" if the U.S. is building more leading edge fabs, and if the U.S. is also favoring friendly countries as partners.
For fuck's sake, Look at what is happening in Ukraine today, and tell me that leading edge semiconductor technology doesn't have usefulness in weapons, and therefor, isn't a National Security concern. Russia is killing a lot of civilians with dumb bombs and rockets, because they don't have the wealth, or desire to build, large quantities of precision weapons that the West routinely has available. Those weapons require a lot of technology, and why the fuck should we let authoritarians powers have that technology if we know that they will eventually use it against the U.S. or our partners.
But oh yeah, authoritarians will be forced to use dumb bombs that are known for collateral damages, and civilian deaths, because of EUV restrictions.
You are aware the the leader in semiconductors is Taiwan which is everyday, under threat from the PLA. Why should the West make it easy for China.
For fuck's sake, it looks like Ukraine will surrender quickly. We have to think what will it be one month after that. Stock markets have reversed its downward turning positive especially AAPLE. It looks like investors have realized all your fuss about Putin will be passing. LOL
Yeah, what will come after that. Massive sanctions against Russia, and China buying Russian oil. China is not a friend to Ukraine, whom they buy agricultural products from, nor to the West.
C5The extraterritorial sanctions did not 'kill' Huawei. Far from it. ForThey have done untold damage to US semiconductor interests.
At most they threw a spanner into the works of Huawei's 5G and Kirin roadmap in the i8 short term.
So short that Huawei has already gone on record to say they will be back in smartphone business next year and I'd wager without US technology in its processor supply chain.
They have also confirmed new silicon for this year but no one knows what it will be. Possibly 5G related.
Whatever advances Chinese companies make are sure to find their way to purchasers in Russia.
Huawei has veered full force into the automotive market with latest rumours pointing to a multi billion dollar investment from a major German car company for it to use Huawei's self driving technology.
Restricting Android use would simply put even more wind under the wings of HarmonyOS.
U.S. Semiconductor interests are not "damaged" by the sanctions of Huawei, nor have they done "untold damage" to U.S. Semiconductor Interests. You are free to link to show how that is true or not.
As for the link to VW considering Huawei self driving, the article was pretty vague about that actually happening, but sure, maybe VW does want to do that. Still, there are already better self driving systems available that VW could license, and given the fact that Tesla's FSD is decidedly L2 capable, there isn't much needed to surpass Tesla.
HiSilicon has no leading edge fab access, and the article that you linked to acknowledged that fact. You need to do better if you are going to convince anyone of a Huawei phone comeback with HiSilicon.
Also, HarmonyOS 2.0 is still primarily AndroidOS, but sure, maybe that will change in HarmonyOS 3.0.
I do hope that China does attempt to ship technology to Russia, so that the West can take even more stringent action to reduce or prevent that transfer.
That's billions of dollars annually just from Huawei. Would you really like to see all of Russia moving purchases into China?
What would that do to US interests?
The US is limping along with some revenues from Huawei through licencing. Once Huawei has re-jigged it's supply chain, it will simply erradicate those US companies from the chain and send those billions into the pockets of US competitors.
Those references to HiSilicon are not mine. They came directly from Huawei.
What action could the West take against China transferring its own technology to Russia for strategic and financial gain?
Thanks for posting a link from 18 months ago.
China has almost no production of computing devices, SOC's, CPU's, and GPU's at 10 nm, and none under that, so no, China isn't going to be able to provide those devices to Russia.
More to the point, I'm guessing that the EU is also going to tighten its policies on Semiconductor sales to Russia.
12,18,24... It doesn't matter how many months. The damage is done.
How long do you think it takes to build out US technology from a design?
How long do you think it takes to re-jig a supply chain?
You claimed there was no damage. Associations directly representing US semi conductor interests (and thousands of companies, disagree with you).
10nm? What are you talking about? Over 90% of chip production is at 14nm or higher. China is very much in the game and ramping capacity just like everyone else.
Ah! And the EU set out its technology independence roadmap before the Huawei issue. Yes, to cut back it's reliance on the US.
Can you see a pattern emerging here?
And by the way, Huawei has already locked down contracts with EU companies to offset some lost supplies from the US.
Funny, but you seem to be reiterating a fact that everyone in the industry is stating; that there needs to be more resilience in the industry by building fabs in strategic locations to prevent supply chain disasters. Of course China wants to make more devices at lager nodes, but those aren't the preferred devices for leading edge phones, missiles, and aircraft, hence why the U.S. lured TSMC to Arizona to build a 5nm fab, to assure the U.S. Military that they would have a supply just in case China invades Taiwan in the future.
Sorry but missiles and aircraft aren't using the latest nodes for mission critical equipment. They use mature nodes and mature SoCs with mature software support
Not even self driving cars truly need the latest process nodes.
Tell me what advantages a 5nm process would bring to a single use missile.
As I said, over 90% of chip manufacturing is on mature nodes and for very good reason.
I'm sure that Xiaomi would be thrilled to compete with a 4nm Qualcomm against a 14nm, or even 10nm, SOC in a Huawei smartphone, but for missiles, it actually pays to have faster, smaller, lighter, and more powerful SOC;s. That's a smarter missile, and an advantage.
But hey, I'm fine with the PLA having a disadvantage in air to air and anti-ship missiles when it comes to a confrontation over Taiwan.
Smaller process node has no impact on how 'smart' the SoC is and size and weight are irrevelant on a 700 kilo missile with a very low unit count in terms of manufacturing.
Would you want to bet on that in the Taiwan Strait?
Of course!
Depending on who you ask, some of the most advanced missiles are Russian or Chinese anyway.
Size and power consumption matter on small energy constrained devices. They are irrevelant in things like missiles and cars.
Cutting edge nodes are irrevelant for almost ALL uses in fact. Why spend so much more when 28nm can do the job perfectly?
Uhm, no, for the most part, though Russia and China like to show off their latest wares. The U.S. is more tight lipped about its capabilities.
There is truth that China has an advantage in IRBM's, but that will rapidly change as the U.S. and Russia dissolved the treaty that restricted those for them. China is unhappy about the turnabout. China also has some long range air to air missiles, which would threaten in theater air refueling, so the U.S. Navy would be more inclined to standoff a bit.
There is also a truth that China and Russia have been putting in major efforts in hypersonic weapons, but that isn't news. The U.S. is portrayed in the popular press as being "behind" in hypersonic weapons, but I don't expect there is much truth to that once you look at production of such.
Still, the U.S. leads in the quality and quantify of Stealth aircraft, and stealth anti-ship missiles, and those will be what decides the outcome of any invasion of Taiwan. Our partners in the Indo-Pacific are also buying F-35's, Typhoon's, Rafale's, and K-21's, and the B-21 Stealth Bomber is already in production, with the initial test aircraft expected to make flights this year;
But Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall on Dec. 9 suggested the Air Force may continue to play its cards on the Raider close to the vest, even into 2022. “You’re not going to get to see much of it,” Kendall said during an online Defense One panel. “We don’t want to give our enemies a head start on any of this. We’re going to acknowledge that we’re doing this, let the public be aware, let the Congress be aware of it. But we’re not going to say a lot more about what we’re doing in the public.”
The huge advantage for the U.S. and it allies worldwide, is that they are already quite aware of China's militarization, and now, are aware of Russia's ambitions, which likely won't end well, whatever the outcome in Ukraine.
The U.S. and its allies are the acknowledged leaders in aircraft and aircraft engines, and it's quite a massive advantage. It's also true that Australia has about the same GDP as Russia, and they will be allowing B-21's to fly out of bases near Darwin. At the same time, the Austraiian Government is working to reverse the lease of port facilities in Darwin to the Chinese, for obvious concerns of National Security.
What strikes me odd, is that you are so Pro China, that you barely acknowledge that Spain is a member of NATO, and the EU, and in theory, shares values that are closer to the U.S. than to Russia and China. Yet here you are as ever, pushing China's Huawei as if your life depended on it; it doesn't by the way.
None of that had anything to do with process nodes and I am not pro China. I'm not a China hater either.
Cool, then you probably aren't all that worried about the West restricting semiconductor technology.
The 'West' isn't restricting anything. The US isn't the West.
The reality is that the US has shot itself in the head with its I'll conceived and clumsy efforts which have only served to 'buy time'. Time which is growing shorter by the day because China has accelerated its plans across the board.
As of last night, the U.S. is certainly the leader of the West, and China is trying to figure out how to walk the tightrope between support of Russian and not worsening the situation with the U.S. and the West.
China may have accelerated its plans across the board, but I'm guessing that the West has as well. China is no friend to the West.
This paper argues that it is high time for the European Union to adopt a proactive policy of managing the risks of sensitive technology transfer to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). On the basis of a common under- standing of the challenges of transferring dual-use technology, economi- cally, politically and security-wise, the European Union can optimise ben- efits from opportunities available in the promising and technologically rapidly advancing Chinese market.
China’s rise as a high-tech military power is central to US security con- cerns, while a European debate on the implications of a rising China be- yond the economic sphere is conspicuous by its absence. Concerns about Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) have prevailed in debates on high tech- nology transfers to the PRC, with less attention being paid to the ‘dual use’ nature of many of these technologies that can be utilised in both ci- vilian and military applications. Unlike the United States, the European Union has no overview on the amount and generation of sensitive tech- nology exported to the PRC. European policy on dual-use technologies is fragmentary at best, while conflicting export regimes and shrinking investments in research and education throughout the European Union are putting the EU’s technological lead at risk. This pressure further in- creases the need to find outside revenues to fund innovation and the next generation of technology – which could come from the expanding Chi- nese market. Given the central role of dual-use technologies in today’s information-based warfare, the EU’s traditionally high level of technology exports to China has become a sensitive topic across the Atlantic in recent years, as was highlighted by the clash over the potential lifting of the EU arms embargo in 2004/2005. In sum, dual-use technology transfers touch on aspects of competitiveness and innovative capacity, market access and security concerns.
A proactive policy needs to be based on a common understanding of Chi- na’s potential as a military superpower and of its likely impact on the European Union, the EU’s policies and its relationship with the United States. A proactive policy needs to merge security, economic and compe- tition aspects in order to sustain and extend the EU’s global influence. This influence, especially in the context of the currently intensifying arms race in space, can only be materialised by a political vision, in-depth knowledge of the other parties and a sound base of innovative technol- ogy within the European Union. In a post-Cold War world, countries like China represent the greatest opportunities and risks at the same time. The United States has responded to this ambivalent situation by trying out a system of balancing opportunities against risks in its ‘Validated End User’ regulation, first introduced in June 2007. The EU needs to follow with a proactive policy of ‘managing risks’ that helps encourage China to become a ‘responsible stakeholder’ while enabling European countries to continuously benefit from China’s development and at the same time remain vigilant regarding the security-related consequences of China’s economic ascent.
You have your China bias blinding you. The EU has very little to defend in the Indo-Pacific, but the U.S. and its Allies have a great deal to defend, including maintaining free and open navigation for the rest of the world.
Funny thing, I'm betting that the EU gets religion very quickly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Are you serious?
One person's opinion from 2009 is all you could dig up?
And on top of that, her essay described exactly what I said. Including the US strong arm tactics:
"The debate about lifting the EU’s arms embargo on China in 2005 dem-
onstrated the different perceptions of China’s rise within the EU and
across the Atlantic. It triggered off acrimonious arguments between EU
Member States and the United States. Shortly after the invasion of Iraq,
the transatlantic rift had not been healed, there was a high level of distrust
and the dispute turned exceedingly bitter. Finally, following US pressure
on European business, the embargo was maintained"
And once again, if it weren't for the US strong-arming Holland, ASML would already have sold around five lithography machines to China. The CEO of ASML is actively making his voice heard on the subject.
The Dutch stance could change at any moment by the way.
The Dutch stance isn't going to change. They have plenty of sales to the West.
You still are unable to show me any evidence that China is even close to 7nm fabs, yet you keep stating that "they have a plan".
You also won't acknowledge that the U.S. and it's allies in the Indo-Pacific consider China's militarization a threat, and FFS, you won't even acknowledge that Russia is destabilizing the EU, as we speak.
I happen to think the Dutch stance will change. ASML is pushing from its side too.
Enough sales? Surely they would want more sales if they could and China is where it's at and there is nothing at an EU level to limit that (in spite of your claims).
ASML has put back release of its next generation machines by three years and China is trying to produce homegrown alternatives.
I wouldn't rule that out at all and they are researching non-silicon chips.
China and evidence of 7nm nodes? Why do you want evidence?
Isn't Geely already planning volume production of its 7nm SoC for the automotive market? Hasn't SMIC already taped out its 8nm production and prepared for volume fabrication later this year?
All I've said is that China has accelerated its plans, which they have.
I don't have to 'acknowledge' the obvious about who is seen as a threat and militarisation of this or that. I try to steer clear of those geo politics wherever possible.
Well if SMIC has taped out 8mm production, then obviously, they don't need ASML, do they, and yeah, I'm aware of tapeouts at 7nm, but that is a long way from actual production capacity.
What I still can't believe, after all of your time here, is that you don't have a bias for China; you barely even consider EU investments in silicon as important, which is something even I am solidly behind.
Given the war in Ukraine, and China's "modest" support of Russia's invasion, and the EU's concerns about human rights violations, I don't expect that the West is going to reduce restrictions on dual use technology to either county for the foreseeable future.
Geely suggested production for this year and this month confirmed it for Q3. I believe Baidu also has the second generation of their chip ready for proctuction later this year.
Great, then they don't need ASML, do they?
I am not privy to that information but why not?
It's like saying they don't need TSMC.
Having options is always good.
All I know is that China, as the world's largest purchaser of chips, is definitely working to gain production independence and the US will lose a huge amount of revenue and have Chinese competition on the world stage (but we all knew that from the get go - US action is all about protectionism and not national security).
The U.S. isn't going to lose a "hell of a lot of revenue" if the U.S. is building more leading edge fabs, and if the U.S. is also favoring friendly countries as partners.
For fuck's sake, Look at what is happening in Ukraine today, and tell me that leading edge semiconductor technology doesn't have usefulness in weapons, and therefor, isn't a National Security concern. Russia is killing a lot of civilians with dumb bombs and rockets, because they don't have the wealth, or desire to build, large quantities of precision weapons that the West routinely has available. Those weapons require a lot of technology, and why the fuck should we let authoritarians powers have that technology if we know that they will eventually use it against the U.S. or our partners.
But oh yeah, authoritarians will be forced to use dumb bombs that are known for collateral damages, and civilian deaths, because of EUV restrictions.
You are aware the the leader in semiconductors is Taiwan which is everyday, under threat from the PLA. Why should the West make it easy for China.
For fuck's sake, it looks like Ukraine will surrender quickly. We have to think what will it be one month after that. Stock markets have reversed its downward turning positive especially AAPLE. It looks like investors have realized all your fuss about Putin will be passing. LOL
Yeah, what will come after that. Massive sanctions against Russia, and China buying Russian oil. China is not a friend to Ukraine, whom they buy agricultural products from, nor to the West.
Keep pushing. lol
I will.
I hate authoritarians.
NATO members, not NATO, are sending Air Defense Systems, ammunition, and more weapons, so maybe Ukraine will bleed Russian's invasion forces and ruin Putin's invasion plans.
If there are increasing civilian casualties, which I expect, then maybe some NATO members, not NATO, will put in place no fly zones big enough to protect the civilian population.
C5The extraterritorial sanctions did not 'kill' Huawei. Far from it. ForThey have done untold damage to US semiconductor interests.
At most they threw a spanner into the works of Huawei's 5G and Kirin roadmap in the i8 short term.
So short that Huawei has already gone on record to say they will be back in smartphone business next year and I'd wager without US technology in its processor supply chain.
They have also confirmed new silicon for this year but no one knows what it will be. Possibly 5G related.
Whatever advances Chinese companies make are sure to find their way to purchasers in Russia.
Huawei has veered full force into the automotive market with latest rumours pointing to a multi billion dollar investment from a major German car company for it to use Huawei's self driving technology.
Restricting Android use would simply put even more wind under the wings of HarmonyOS.
U.S. Semiconductor interests are not "damaged" by the sanctions of Huawei, nor have they done "untold damage" to U.S. Semiconductor Interests. You are free to link to show how that is true or not.
As for the link to VW considering Huawei self driving, the article was pretty vague about that actually happening, but sure, maybe VW does want to do that. Still, there are already better self driving systems available that VW could license, and given the fact that Tesla's FSD is decidedly L2 capable, there isn't much needed to surpass Tesla.
HiSilicon has no leading edge fab access, and the article that you linked to acknowledged that fact. You need to do better if you are going to convince anyone of a Huawei phone comeback with HiSilicon.
Also, HarmonyOS 2.0 is still primarily AndroidOS, but sure, maybe that will change in HarmonyOS 3.0.
I do hope that China does attempt to ship technology to Russia, so that the West can take even more stringent action to reduce or prevent that transfer.
That's billions of dollars annually just from Huawei. Would you really like to see all of Russia moving purchases into China?
What would that do to US interests?
The US is limping along with some revenues from Huawei through licencing. Once Huawei has re-jigged it's supply chain, it will simply erradicate those US companies from the chain and send those billions into the pockets of US competitors.
Those references to HiSilicon are not mine. They came directly from Huawei.
What action could the West take against China transferring its own technology to Russia for strategic and financial gain?
Thanks for posting a link from 18 months ago.
China has almost no production of computing devices, SOC's, CPU's, and GPU's at 10 nm, and none under that, so no, China isn't going to be able to provide those devices to Russia.
More to the point, I'm guessing that the EU is also going to tighten its policies on Semiconductor sales to Russia.
12,18,24... It doesn't matter how many months. The damage is done.
How long do you think it takes to build out US technology from a design?
How long do you think it takes to re-jig a supply chain?
You claimed there was no damage. Associations directly representing US semi conductor interests (and thousands of companies, disagree with you).
10nm? What are you talking about? Over 90% of chip production is at 14nm or higher. China is very much in the game and ramping capacity just like everyone else.
Ah! And the EU set out its technology independence roadmap before the Huawei issue. Yes, to cut back it's reliance on the US.
Can you see a pattern emerging here?
And by the way, Huawei has already locked down contracts with EU companies to offset some lost supplies from the US.
Funny, but you seem to be reiterating a fact that everyone in the industry is stating; that there needs to be more resilience in the industry by building fabs in strategic locations to prevent supply chain disasters. Of course China wants to make more devices at lager nodes, but those aren't the preferred devices for leading edge phones, missiles, and aircraft, hence why the U.S. lured TSMC to Arizona to build a 5nm fab, to assure the U.S. Military that they would have a supply just in case China invades Taiwan in the future.
Sorry but missiles and aircraft aren't using the latest nodes for mission critical equipment. They use mature nodes and mature SoCs with mature software support
Not even self driving cars truly need the latest process nodes.
Tell me what advantages a 5nm process would bring to a single use missile.
As I said, over 90% of chip manufacturing is on mature nodes and for very good reason.
I'm sure that Xiaomi would be thrilled to compete with a 4nm Qualcomm against a 14nm, or even 10nm, SOC in a Huawei smartphone, but for missiles, it actually pays to have faster, smaller, lighter, and more powerful SOC;s. That's a smarter missile, and an advantage.
But hey, I'm fine with the PLA having a disadvantage in air to air and anti-ship missiles when it comes to a confrontation over Taiwan.
Smaller process node has no impact on how 'smart' the SoC is and size and weight are irrevelant on a 700 kilo missile with a very low unit count in terms of manufacturing.
Would you want to bet on that in the Taiwan Strait?
Of course!
Depending on who you ask, some of the most advanced missiles are Russian or Chinese anyway.
Size and power consumption matter on small energy constrained devices. They are irrevelant in things like missiles and cars.
Cutting edge nodes are irrevelant for almost ALL uses in fact. Why spend so much more when 28nm can do the job perfectly?
Uhm, no, for the most part, though Russia and China like to show off their latest wares. The U.S. is more tight lipped about its capabilities.
There is truth that China has an advantage in IRBM's, but that will rapidly change as the U.S. and Russia dissolved the treaty that restricted those for them. China is unhappy about the turnabout. China also has some long range air to air missiles, which would threaten in theater air refueling, so the U.S. Navy would be more inclined to standoff a bit.
There is also a truth that China and Russia have been putting in major efforts in hypersonic weapons, but that isn't news. The U.S. is portrayed in the popular press as being "behind" in hypersonic weapons, but I don't expect there is much truth to that once you look at production of such.
Still, the U.S. leads in the quality and quantify of Stealth aircraft, and stealth anti-ship missiles, and those will be what decides the outcome of any invasion of Taiwan. Our partners in the Indo-Pacific are also buying F-35's, Typhoon's, Rafale's, and K-21's, and the B-21 Stealth Bomber is already in production, with the initial test aircraft expected to make flights this year;
But Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall on Dec. 9 suggested the Air Force may continue to play its cards on the Raider close to the vest, even into 2022. “You’re not going to get to see much of it,” Kendall said during an online Defense One panel. “We don’t want to give our enemies a head start on any of this. We’re going to acknowledge that we’re doing this, let the public be aware, let the Congress be aware of it. But we’re not going to say a lot more about what we’re doing in the public.”
The huge advantage for the U.S. and it allies worldwide, is that they are already quite aware of China's militarization, and now, are aware of Russia's ambitions, which likely won't end well, whatever the outcome in Ukraine.
The U.S. and its allies are the acknowledged leaders in aircraft and aircraft engines, and it's quite a massive advantage. It's also true that Australia has about the same GDP as Russia, and they will be allowing B-21's to fly out of bases near Darwin. At the same time, the Austraiian Government is working to reverse the lease of port facilities in Darwin to the Chinese, for obvious concerns of National Security.
What strikes me odd, is that you are so Pro China, that you barely acknowledge that Spain is a member of NATO, and the EU, and in theory, shares values that are closer to the U.S. than to Russia and China. Yet here you are as ever, pushing China's Huawei as if your life depended on it; it doesn't by the way.
None of that had anything to do with process nodes and I am not pro China. I'm not a China hater either.
Cool, then you probably aren't all that worried about the West restricting semiconductor technology.
The 'West' isn't restricting anything. The US isn't the West.
The reality is that the US has shot itself in the head with its I'll conceived and clumsy efforts which have only served to 'buy time'. Time which is growing shorter by the day because China has accelerated its plans across the board.
As of last night, the U.S. is certainly the leader of the West, and China is trying to figure out how to walk the tightrope between support of Russian and not worsening the situation with the U.S. and the West.
China may have accelerated its plans across the board, but I'm guessing that the West has as well. China is no friend to the West.
This paper argues that it is high time for the European Union to adopt a proactive policy of managing the risks of sensitive technology transfer to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). On the basis of a common under- standing of the challenges of transferring dual-use technology, economi- cally, politically and security-wise, the European Union can optimise ben- efits from opportunities available in the promising and technologically rapidly advancing Chinese market.
China’s rise as a high-tech military power is central to US security con- cerns, while a European debate on the implications of a rising China be- yond the economic sphere is conspicuous by its absence. Concerns about Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) have prevailed in debates on high tech- nology transfers to the PRC, with less attention being paid to the ‘dual use’ nature of many of these technologies that can be utilised in both ci- vilian and military applications. Unlike the United States, the European Union has no overview on the amount and generation of sensitive tech- nology exported to the PRC. European policy on dual-use technologies is fragmentary at best, while conflicting export regimes and shrinking investments in research and education throughout the European Union are putting the EU’s technological lead at risk. This pressure further in- creases the need to find outside revenues to fund innovation and the next generation of technology – which could come from the expanding Chi- nese market. Given the central role of dual-use technologies in today’s information-based warfare, the EU’s traditionally high level of technology exports to China has become a sensitive topic across the Atlantic in recent years, as was highlighted by the clash over the potential lifting of the EU arms embargo in 2004/2005. In sum, dual-use technology transfers touch on aspects of competitiveness and innovative capacity, market access and security concerns.
A proactive policy needs to be based on a common understanding of Chi- na’s potential as a military superpower and of its likely impact on the European Union, the EU’s policies and its relationship with the United States. A proactive policy needs to merge security, economic and compe- tition aspects in order to sustain and extend the EU’s global influence. This influence, especially in the context of the currently intensifying arms race in space, can only be materialised by a political vision, in-depth knowledge of the other parties and a sound base of innovative technol- ogy within the European Union. In a post-Cold War world, countries like China represent the greatest opportunities and risks at the same time. The United States has responded to this ambivalent situation by trying out a system of balancing opportunities against risks in its ‘Validated End User’ regulation, first introduced in June 2007. The EU needs to follow with a proactive policy of ‘managing risks’ that helps encourage China to become a ‘responsible stakeholder’ while enabling European countries to continuously benefit from China’s development and at the same time remain vigilant regarding the security-related consequences of China’s economic ascent.
You have your China bias blinding you. The EU has very little to defend in the Indo-Pacific, but the U.S. and its Allies have a great deal to defend, including maintaining free and open navigation for the rest of the world.
Funny thing, I'm betting that the EU gets religion very quickly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Are you serious?
One person's opinion from 2009 is all you could dig up?
And on top of that, her essay described exactly what I said. Including the US strong arm tactics:
"The debate about lifting the EU’s arms embargo on China in 2005 dem-
onstrated the different perceptions of China’s rise within the EU and
across the Atlantic. It triggered off acrimonious arguments between EU
Member States and the United States. Shortly after the invasion of Iraq,
the transatlantic rift had not been healed, there was a high level of distrust
and the dispute turned exceedingly bitter. Finally, following US pressure
on European business, the embargo was maintained"
And once again, if it weren't for the US strong-arming Holland, ASML would already have sold around five lithography machines to China. The CEO of ASML is actively making his voice heard on the subject.
The Dutch stance could change at any moment by the way.
The Dutch stance isn't going to change. They have plenty of sales to the West.
You still are unable to show me any evidence that China is even close to 7nm fabs, yet you keep stating that "they have a plan".
You also won't acknowledge that the U.S. and it's allies in the Indo-Pacific consider China's militarization a threat, and FFS, you won't even acknowledge that Russia is destabilizing the EU, as we speak.
I happen to think the Dutch stance will change. ASML is pushing from its side too.
Enough sales? Surely they would want more sales if they could and China is where it's at and there is nothing at an EU level to limit that (in spite of your claims).
ASML has put back release of its next generation machines by three years and China is trying to produce homegrown alternatives.
I wouldn't rule that out at all and they are researching non-silicon chips.
China and evidence of 7nm nodes? Why do you want evidence?
Isn't Geely already planning volume production of its 7nm SoC for the automotive market? Hasn't SMIC already taped out its 8nm production and prepared for volume fabrication later this year?
All I've said is that China has accelerated its plans, which they have.
I don't have to 'acknowledge' the obvious about who is seen as a threat and militarisation of this or that. I try to steer clear of those geo politics wherever possible.
Well if SMIC has taped out 8mm production, then obviously, they don't need ASML, do they, and yeah, I'm aware of tapeouts at 7nm, but that is a long way from actual production capacity.
What I still can't believe, after all of your time here, is that you don't have a bias for China; you barely even consider EU investments in silicon as important, which is something even I am solidly behind.
Given the war in Ukraine, and China's "modest" support of Russia's invasion, and the EU's concerns about human rights violations, I don't expect that the West is going to reduce restrictions on dual use technology to either county for the foreseeable future.
Geely suggested production for this year and this month confirmed it for Q3. I believe Baidu also has the second generation of their chip ready for proctuction later this year.
Great, then they don't need ASML, do they?
I am not privy to that information but why not?
It's like saying they don't need TSMC.
Having options is always good.
All I know is that China, as the world's largest purchaser of chips, is definitely working to gain production independence and the US will lose a huge amount of revenue and have Chinese competition on the world stage (but we all knew that from the get go - US action is all about protectionism and not national security).
The U.S. isn't going to lose a "hell of a lot of revenue" if the U.S. is building more leading edge fabs, and if the U.S. is also favoring friendly countries as partners.
For fuck's sake, Look at what is happening in Ukraine today, and tell me that leading edge semiconductor technology doesn't have usefulness in weapons, and therefor, isn't a National Security concern. Russia is killing a lot of civilians with dumb bombs and rockets, because they don't have the wealth, or desire to build, large quantities of precision weapons that the West routinely has available. Those weapons require a lot of technology, and why the fuck should we let authoritarians powers have that technology if we know that they will eventually use it against the U.S. or our partners.
But oh yeah, authoritarians will be forced to use dumb bombs that are known for collateral damages, and civilian deaths, because of EUV restrictions.
You are aware the the leader in semiconductors is Taiwan which is everyday, under threat from the PLA. Why should the West make it easy for China.
None, and I'll repeat that, NONE of those weapons require leading edge process nodes.
Smart or dumb, it can all be achieved at much larger nodes.
For real national security reasons (quantum, AI etc) that ship has already sailed. Both Russia and China are well served. Especially China.
And yes, the US will lose a hell of a lot of revenue. Even with the sanctions against Huawei, it lost a lot.
That's why US semiconductor associations representing thousands of companies protested against those sanctions.
Once China has its domestic needs served it will be offering its technology to the rest of the world and offering competition.
C5The extraterritorial sanctions did not 'kill' Huawei. Far from it. ForThey have done untold damage to US semiconductor interests.
At most they threw a spanner into the works of Huawei's 5G and Kirin roadmap in the i8 short term.
So short that Huawei has already gone on record to say they will be back in smartphone business next year and I'd wager without US technology in its processor supply chain.
They have also confirmed new silicon for this year but no one knows what it will be. Possibly 5G related.
Whatever advances Chinese companies make are sure to find their way to purchasers in Russia.
Huawei has veered full force into the automotive market with latest rumours pointing to a multi billion dollar investment from a major German car company for it to use Huawei's self driving technology.
Restricting Android use would simply put even more wind under the wings of HarmonyOS.
U.S. Semiconductor interests are not "damaged" by the sanctions of Huawei, nor have they done "untold damage" to U.S. Semiconductor Interests. You are free to link to show how that is true or not.
As for the link to VW considering Huawei self driving, the article was pretty vague about that actually happening, but sure, maybe VW does want to do that. Still, there are already better self driving systems available that VW could license, and given the fact that Tesla's FSD is decidedly L2 capable, there isn't much needed to surpass Tesla.
HiSilicon has no leading edge fab access, and the article that you linked to acknowledged that fact. You need to do better if you are going to convince anyone of a Huawei phone comeback with HiSilicon.
Also, HarmonyOS 2.0 is still primarily AndroidOS, but sure, maybe that will change in HarmonyOS 3.0.
I do hope that China does attempt to ship technology to Russia, so that the West can take even more stringent action to reduce or prevent that transfer.
That's billions of dollars annually just from Huawei. Would you really like to see all of Russia moving purchases into China?
What would that do to US interests?
The US is limping along with some revenues from Huawei through licencing. Once Huawei has re-jigged it's supply chain, it will simply erradicate those US companies from the chain and send those billions into the pockets of US competitors.
Those references to HiSilicon are not mine. They came directly from Huawei.
What action could the West take against China transferring its own technology to Russia for strategic and financial gain?
Thanks for posting a link from 18 months ago.
China has almost no production of computing devices, SOC's, CPU's, and GPU's at 10 nm, and none under that, so no, China isn't going to be able to provide those devices to Russia.
More to the point, I'm guessing that the EU is also going to tighten its policies on Semiconductor sales to Russia.
12,18,24... It doesn't matter how many months. The damage is done.
How long do you think it takes to build out US technology from a design?
How long do you think it takes to re-jig a supply chain?
You claimed there was no damage. Associations directly representing US semi conductor interests (and thousands of companies, disagree with you).
10nm? What are you talking about? Over 90% of chip production is at 14nm or higher. China is very much in the game and ramping capacity just like everyone else.
Ah! And the EU set out its technology independence roadmap before the Huawei issue. Yes, to cut back it's reliance on the US.
Can you see a pattern emerging here?
And by the way, Huawei has already locked down contracts with EU companies to offset some lost supplies from the US.
Funny, but you seem to be reiterating a fact that everyone in the industry is stating; that there needs to be more resilience in the industry by building fabs in strategic locations to prevent supply chain disasters. Of course China wants to make more devices at lager nodes, but those aren't the preferred devices for leading edge phones, missiles, and aircraft, hence why the U.S. lured TSMC to Arizona to build a 5nm fab, to assure the U.S. Military that they would have a supply just in case China invades Taiwan in the future.
Sorry but missiles and aircraft aren't using the latest nodes for mission critical equipment. They use mature nodes and mature SoCs with mature software support
Not even self driving cars truly need the latest process nodes.
Tell me what advantages a 5nm process would bring to a single use missile.
As I said, over 90% of chip manufacturing is on mature nodes and for very good reason.
I'm sure that Xiaomi would be thrilled to compete with a 4nm Qualcomm against a 14nm, or even 10nm, SOC in a Huawei smartphone, but for missiles, it actually pays to have faster, smaller, lighter, and more powerful SOC;s. That's a smarter missile, and an advantage.
But hey, I'm fine with the PLA having a disadvantage in air to air and anti-ship missiles when it comes to a confrontation over Taiwan.
Smaller process node has no impact on how 'smart' the SoC is and size and weight are irrevelant on a 700 kilo missile with a very low unit count in terms of manufacturing.
Would you want to bet on that in the Taiwan Strait?
Of course!
Depending on who you ask, some of the most advanced missiles are Russian or Chinese anyway.
Size and power consumption matter on small energy constrained devices. They are irrevelant in things like missiles and cars.
Cutting edge nodes are irrevelant for almost ALL uses in fact. Why spend so much more when 28nm can do the job perfectly?
Uhm, no, for the most part, though Russia and China like to show off their latest wares. The U.S. is more tight lipped about its capabilities.
There is truth that China has an advantage in IRBM's, but that will rapidly change as the U.S. and Russia dissolved the treaty that restricted those for them. China is unhappy about the turnabout. China also has some long range air to air missiles, which would threaten in theater air refueling, so the U.S. Navy would be more inclined to standoff a bit.
There is also a truth that China and Russia have been putting in major efforts in hypersonic weapons, but that isn't news. The U.S. is portrayed in the popular press as being "behind" in hypersonic weapons, but I don't expect there is much truth to that once you look at production of such.
Still, the U.S. leads in the quality and quantify of Stealth aircraft, and stealth anti-ship missiles, and those will be what decides the outcome of any invasion of Taiwan. Our partners in the Indo-Pacific are also buying F-35's, Typhoon's, Rafale's, and K-21's, and the B-21 Stealth Bomber is already in production, with the initial test aircraft expected to make flights this year;
But Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall on Dec. 9 suggested the Air Force may continue to play its cards on the Raider close to the vest, even into 2022. “You’re not going to get to see much of it,” Kendall said during an online Defense One panel. “We don’t want to give our enemies a head start on any of this. We’re going to acknowledge that we’re doing this, let the public be aware, let the Congress be aware of it. But we’re not going to say a lot more about what we’re doing in the public.”
The huge advantage for the U.S. and it allies worldwide, is that they are already quite aware of China's militarization, and now, are aware of Russia's ambitions, which likely won't end well, whatever the outcome in Ukraine.
The U.S. and its allies are the acknowledged leaders in aircraft and aircraft engines, and it's quite a massive advantage. It's also true that Australia has about the same GDP as Russia, and they will be allowing B-21's to fly out of bases near Darwin. At the same time, the Austraiian Government is working to reverse the lease of port facilities in Darwin to the Chinese, for obvious concerns of National Security.
What strikes me odd, is that you are so Pro China, that you barely acknowledge that Spain is a member of NATO, and the EU, and in theory, shares values that are closer to the U.S. than to Russia and China. Yet here you are as ever, pushing China's Huawei as if your life depended on it; it doesn't by the way.
None of that had anything to do with process nodes and I am not pro China. I'm not a China hater either.
Cool, then you probably aren't all that worried about the West restricting semiconductor technology.
The 'West' isn't restricting anything. The US isn't the West.
The reality is that the US has shot itself in the head with its I'll conceived and clumsy efforts which have only served to 'buy time'. Time which is growing shorter by the day because China has accelerated its plans across the board.
As of last night, the U.S. is certainly the leader of the West, and China is trying to figure out how to walk the tightrope between support of Russian and not worsening the situation with the U.S. and the West.
China may have accelerated its plans across the board, but I'm guessing that the West has as well. China is no friend to the West.
This paper argues that it is high time for the European Union to adopt a proactive policy of managing the risks of sensitive technology transfer to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). On the basis of a common under- standing of the challenges of transferring dual-use technology, economi- cally, politically and security-wise, the European Union can optimise ben- efits from opportunities available in the promising and technologically rapidly advancing Chinese market.
China’s rise as a high-tech military power is central to US security con- cerns, while a European debate on the implications of a rising China be- yond the economic sphere is conspicuous by its absence. Concerns about Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) have prevailed in debates on high tech- nology transfers to the PRC, with less attention being paid to the ‘dual use’ nature of many of these technologies that can be utilised in both ci- vilian and military applications. Unlike the United States, the European Union has no overview on the amount and generation of sensitive tech- nology exported to the PRC. European policy on dual-use technologies is fragmentary at best, while conflicting export regimes and shrinking investments in research and education throughout the European Union are putting the EU’s technological lead at risk. This pressure further in- creases the need to find outside revenues to fund innovation and the next generation of technology – which could come from the expanding Chi- nese market. Given the central role of dual-use technologies in today’s information-based warfare, the EU’s traditionally high level of technology exports to China has become a sensitive topic across the Atlantic in recent years, as was highlighted by the clash over the potential lifting of the EU arms embargo in 2004/2005. In sum, dual-use technology transfers touch on aspects of competitiveness and innovative capacity, market access and security concerns.
A proactive policy needs to be based on a common understanding of Chi- na’s potential as a military superpower and of its likely impact on the European Union, the EU’s policies and its relationship with the United States. A proactive policy needs to merge security, economic and compe- tition aspects in order to sustain and extend the EU’s global influence. This influence, especially in the context of the currently intensifying arms race in space, can only be materialised by a political vision, in-depth knowledge of the other parties and a sound base of innovative technol- ogy within the European Union. In a post-Cold War world, countries like China represent the greatest opportunities and risks at the same time. The United States has responded to this ambivalent situation by trying out a system of balancing opportunities against risks in its ‘Validated End User’ regulation, first introduced in June 2007. The EU needs to follow with a proactive policy of ‘managing risks’ that helps encourage China to become a ‘responsible stakeholder’ while enabling European countries to continuously benefit from China’s development and at the same time remain vigilant regarding the security-related consequences of China’s economic ascent.
You have your China bias blinding you. The EU has very little to defend in the Indo-Pacific, but the U.S. and its Allies have a great deal to defend, including maintaining free and open navigation for the rest of the world.
Funny thing, I'm betting that the EU gets religion very quickly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Are you serious?
One person's opinion from 2009 is all you could dig up?
And on top of that, her essay described exactly what I said. Including the US strong arm tactics:
"The debate about lifting the EU’s arms embargo on China in 2005 dem-
onstrated the different perceptions of China’s rise within the EU and
across the Atlantic. It triggered off acrimonious arguments between EU
Member States and the United States. Shortly after the invasion of Iraq,
the transatlantic rift had not been healed, there was a high level of distrust
and the dispute turned exceedingly bitter. Finally, following US pressure
on European business, the embargo was maintained"
And once again, if it weren't for the US strong-arming Holland, ASML would already have sold around five lithography machines to China. The CEO of ASML is actively making his voice heard on the subject.
The Dutch stance could change at any moment by the way.
The Dutch stance isn't going to change. They have plenty of sales to the West.
You still are unable to show me any evidence that China is even close to 7nm fabs, yet you keep stating that "they have a plan".
You also won't acknowledge that the U.S. and it's allies in the Indo-Pacific consider China's militarization a threat, and FFS, you won't even acknowledge that Russia is destabilizing the EU, as we speak.
I happen to think the Dutch stance will change. ASML is pushing from its side too.
Enough sales? Surely they would want more sales if they could and China is where it's at and there is nothing at an EU level to limit that (in spite of your claims).
ASML has put back release of its next generation machines by three years and China is trying to produce homegrown alternatives.
I wouldn't rule that out at all and they are researching non-silicon chips.
China and evidence of 7nm nodes? Why do you want evidence?
Isn't Geely already planning volume production of its 7nm SoC for the automotive market? Hasn't SMIC already taped out its 8nm production and prepared for volume fabrication later this year?
All I've said is that China has accelerated its plans, which they have.
I don't have to 'acknowledge' the obvious about who is seen as a threat and militarisation of this or that. I try to steer clear of those geo politics wherever possible.
Well if SMIC has taped out 8mm production, then obviously, they don't need ASML, do they, and yeah, I'm aware of tapeouts at 7nm, but that is a long way from actual production capacity.
What I still can't believe, after all of your time here, is that you don't have a bias for China; you barely even consider EU investments in silicon as important, which is something even I am solidly behind.
Given the war in Ukraine, and China's "modest" support of Russia's invasion, and the EU's concerns about human rights violations, I don't expect that the West is going to reduce restrictions on dual use technology to either county for the foreseeable future.
Geely suggested production for this year and this month confirmed it for Q3. I believe Baidu also has the second generation of their chip ready for proctuction later this year.
Great, then they don't need ASML, do they?
I am not privy to that information but why not?
It's like saying they don't need TSMC.
Having options is always good.
All I know is that China, as the world's largest purchaser of chips, is definitely working to gain production independence and the US will lose a huge amount of revenue and have Chinese competition on the world stage (but we all knew that from the get go - US action is all about protectionism and not national security).
The U.S. isn't going to lose a "hell of a lot of revenue" if the U.S. is building more leading edge fabs, and if the U.S. is also favoring friendly countries as partners.
For fuck's sake, Look at what is happening in Ukraine today, and tell me that leading edge semiconductor technology doesn't have usefulness in weapons, and therefor, isn't a National Security concern. Russia is killing a lot of civilians with dumb bombs and rockets, because they don't have the wealth, or desire to build, large quantities of precision weapons that the West routinely has available. Those weapons require a lot of technology, and why the fuck should we let authoritarians powers have that technology if we know that they will eventually use it against the U.S. or our partners.
But oh yeah, authoritarians will be forced to use dumb bombs that are known for collateral damages, and civilian deaths, because of EUV restrictions.
You are aware the the leader in semiconductors is Taiwan which is everyday, under threat from the PLA. Why should the West make it easy for China.
None, and I'll repeat that, NONE of those weapons require leading edge process nodes.
Smart or dumb, it can all be achieved at much larger nodes.
For real national security reasons (quantum, AI etc) that ship has already sailed. Both Russia and China are well served. Especially China.
And yes, the US will lose a hell of a lot of revenue. Even with the sanctions against Huawei, it lost a lot.
That's why US semiconductor associations representing thousands of companies protested against those sanctions.
Once China has its domestic needs served it will be offering its technology to the rest of the world and offering competition.
Okay, then let China fucking do it themselves, so you and I don't need to have yet another conversation about National Security, because you don't want to believe that China is a threat to the existing rules of order;
As Russian missiles flew through the Ukrainian sky Thursday and world leaders decried an invasion spreading across the country, China refused to condemn Russia's move outright, while appearing to levy blame on the United States and its allies.
Beijing finds itself in a complex position as Russia's invasion of its neighbor intensifies, needing to balance a close strategic partnership with Moscow with its seemingly contradictory policy of supporting state sovereignty.
A Chinese government official Thursday sidestepped questions over whether it would condemn Russia's actions or consider it an "invasion."
Instead, China's Assistant Foreign Minister Hua Chunying -- who repeated staid lines about seeking peace through dialogue and said the situation was "not what we would hope to see" -- was quick to point the finger at the US, implying that Washington was a "culprit" for "fanning up flames," referring to US warnings in recent weeks of an imminent invasion.
"China has taken a responsible attitude and persuaded all parties not to escalate tensions or incite war...Those who follow the US' lead in fanning up flames and then shifting the blame onto others are truly irresponsible," she said.
Yeah, Fuck China if they can't even understand what an invasion looks like. I guess they are worried that they aren't going to be able to pull off a secret invasion of Taiwan, because the U.S. will be "fanning up flames" of an imminent invasion. Funny thing though, the U.S. was almost spot on in its intelligence leading up the to invasion.
Comments
https://carnewschina.com/2022/02/08/chinas-first-7nm-auto-chip-from-geely-to-be-mass-produced-in-q3/
It's like saying they don't need TSMC.
Having options is always good.
All I know is that China, as the world's largest purchaser of chips, is definitely working to gain production independence and the US will lose a huge amount of revenue and have Chinese competition on the world stage (but we all knew that from the get go - US action is all about protectionism and not national security).
Why you won't acknowledge the Putin is wiling to destroy a nascent democracy, fighting like hell to stay that way, is beyond comprehension.
Oh wait! Putin wants it destroyed precisely because the Ukrainians voted to oust Putin's puppet, in a landslide election, and Putin wants to reinstall the puppet by decapitating Ukraine current government. The fact that U.S. Intelligence, and solid journalism was able to uncover Russia's false flag operations that were in place in an attempt to blame Ukraine for starting the war is undeniable.
Fuck, even Russian citizens are being arrested, and risking arrests for protesting the invasion, because they know that they will be the one's who will pay for this, in lives and their economy.
Again, I don't see any difference between you and Trumpers, though ultimately, even the GOP will come around to supporting Ukraine, likely when it is too late to save Ukraines democracy.
I guess that you are the 15% still favorable to Russia...and you think that it is everyone but Putin's fault.
For fuck's sake, Look at what is happening in Ukraine today, and tell me that leading edge semiconductor technology doesn't have usefulness in weapons, and therefor, isn't a National Security concern. Russia is killing a lot of civilians with dumb bombs and rockets, because they don't have the wealth, or desire to build, large quantities of precision weapons that the West routinely has available. Those weapons require a lot of technology, and why the fuck should we let authoritarians powers have that technology if we know that they will eventually use it against the U.S. or our partners.
But oh yeah, authoritarians will be forced to use dumb bombs that are known for collateral damages, and civilian deaths, because of EUV restrictions.
You are aware the the leader in semiconductors is Taiwan which is everyday, under threat from the PLA. Why should the West make it easy for China.
I hate authoritarians.
NATO members, not NATO, are sending Air Defense Systems, ammunition, and more weapons, so maybe Ukraine will bleed Russian's invasion forces and ruin Putin's invasion plans.
If there are increasing civilian casualties, which I expect, then maybe some NATO members, not NATO, will put in place no fly zones big enough to protect the civilian population.
Smart or dumb, it can all be achieved at much larger nodes.
For real national security reasons (quantum, AI etc) that ship has already sailed. Both Russia and China are well served. Especially China.
And yes, the US will lose a hell of a lot of revenue. Even with the sanctions against Huawei, it lost a lot.
That's why US semiconductor associations representing thousands of companies protested against those sanctions.
Once China has its domestic needs served it will be offering its technology to the rest of the world and offering competition.
https://www.cnn.com/2022/02/25/china/china-reaction-ukraine-russia-intl-hnk-mic/index.html
Yeah, Fuck China if they can't even understand what an invasion looks like. I guess they are worried that they aren't going to be able to pull off a secret invasion of Taiwan, because the U.S. will be "fanning up flames" of an imminent invasion. Funny thing though, the U.S. was almost spot on in its intelligence leading up the to invasion.