damonf

Xed said:

So this guy had ADP enabled but probably also used a PIN instead of a complex passcode for his device?

Personally, I waited a long time before enabling ADP because of the very clear warnings Apple gives before enabling it.

AppleInsider said:

While under ADP the Recovery Key is needed, the suit insists that Apple is still capable of doing something about the situation. Mathews' lawyer K. Jon Breyer says it is "indefensible" for Apple to hold onto the data "they don't own."

We'd hate to do that so we'll go ahead and delete that encrypted file off our servers by deleting your iCloud account. Happy?

Whereas I disagree with the suit that Apple can do anything after the fact for this user, it is rather dumb that ADP exists to protect iCloud data tied to an Apple Account (formerly Apple ID), yet in the enabling/disabling process for ADP there is never a prompt from the Settings app to enter one's Apple Account password to proceed.  All it takes is snatching someone's unlocked iPhone out of their hands and running off and quickly enabling ADP.  The ability to enable it without so much as having to enter one's Apple Account password despite the fact that it can lock one out of iCloud data is preposterous.  It is too easy to enable and needs some additional safeguards to prevent abuse.

How about a U.S. law:

Any U.S. based company instructed by any foreign country to decrypt data of Americans or required to disable decryption of American citizens’ devices (such as computers, phones, or tablets) must immediately cease all operations - including but not limited to sales, support, and services - in said country until such order is rescinded by said country.

The intent not being to hurt the company being asked (Apple, in this case), but to preempt such attempts with a harsh, effective punishment to the offending country. 

Apple could give users the ability to filter messages by keywords they provide in order to offload matching texts into a “Filtered” or “Suspicious” folder. Would be nice to do the same in the Mail app, for items that get through the mail provider’s mail filters. 

AppleInsider said:

Back in April, Emergency SOS also saved a snowboarder in Switzerland. On a solo trip at about 10,000 feet altitude, Tim Blakey fell into a hidden crevasse in the snow.

Despite an iPhone battery life of 3%, he could use Emergency SOS to contact emergency services. Rescuers found him and took him to the hospital for an injured ankle.

I presume "April" is supposed to be some other month, given the satellite version of Emergency SOS didn't gen enabled until November.  The service was not available in April 2022.

This is somewhat old news, especially looking at the single-core comparisons.  Geekbench shows a single-core score of 1756 for the 2022 Mac Studio with the M1 Max (10 core: 8 high-performance, 2 high-efficiency), but 1900 for the 13-inch 2022 MacBook Pro with the M2 (8 core: 4 high-performance, 4 high-efficiency).  Because the M1 Max has double the number of performance cores compared to the base M2, it outperforms the M2 on multicore (Mac Studio M1 Max: 12336, MBP M2: 8735), which should be expected. So with the M2 Pro having the potential for the same count of high-performance cores (8) as the M1 Max, it should come as no surprise that the M2 Pro can exceed the M1 Max on a strictly CPU benchmark test.

The main benefits of the "Max" series are in GPU performance, memory bandwidth (double the Pro series of same generation), and the additional ProRes encoder/decoder.  If you look within the same generation (i.e. M1 Pro vs M1 Max), the CPU performance gains on the Max vs the Pro of the same core count are very subtle: 

- MBP 16" 2021, M1 Pro (10 core): 1742 single core test, 12141 multi-core test
- MBP 16" 2021, M1 Max (10 core): 1745 single core test, 12191 multi-core test

Source: Mac Benchmarks - Geekbench Browser